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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
1.1 Preamble 
Spain’s emergence as an investment force to be reckoned with at the end of the 20th and 
beginning of the 21st centuries came as a surprise to many. The eye-catching 
investments of Spanish multinationals, particularly in Latin America and Great Britain, 
inevitably reminded both friends and foes of Spain’s imperial expansion some 500 years 
earlier. In the English-speaking world, the Spanish business manoeuvres triggered 
memories of the quest for world domination between Spain and England and, several 
centuries later, between Spain and the US. In the Spanish-speaking world, they 
inevitably brought back memories of colonial times. Centuries of imperialist and ethnic 
tensions between Spain and Latin American nations have indeed resulted in a complex 
relationship between the Mother Country and its Kids. Thanks to the cultural and linguistic 
proximity, Latin Americans generally have a favourable opinion about Spain, but the 
conquest and colonial era remain a blemish on their mutual relations. Spaniards, in 
contrast, generally feel proud of the prominent role their multinationals came to play on 
the global economic stage. 
 
This dissertation sets out to study how these tensions affected the discursive 
representation of Spanish Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in (written) media discourse. 
Four broad research topics were singled out for investigation: (i) the discursive 
representation of business manoeuvres performed by Spanish companies as 
confrontations between Spain and other nations/regions, (ii) the use of historical 
references to Spain’s colonial past in newspaper accounts of Spanish Foreign Direct 
Investment, (iii) the discursive strategizing deployed by prominent social actors to 
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(de)legitimate controversial decisions involving a Spanish company operating abroad 
(i.c. Repsol-YPF in Argentina), and (iv) the positioning of quality newspapers vis-à-vis 
corporate controversies (i.c. cross-border acquisition and (partial) renationalization) in 
the directly involved news environments (i.c. Argentina and Spain). 
 
The reported research is inevitably the result of a number of choices. At the 
beginning of the project, the decision was made to analyse media representations of 
both Spanish FDI in general and a specific case of Spanish FDI in Latin America. The 
acquisition of the Argentine oil company YPF by the Spanish oil company Repsol in 1999 
was chosen for a number of reasons. First, both Repsol and YPF were of great economic 
and strategic importance for their respective home countries. Second, Repsol’s $15 
billion all-cash offer to acquire YPF in April 1999 was the largest single investment made 
by a single Spanish company in the 20th century. Third, Repsol’s acquisition came after 
the Argentine government had decided to sell its remaining shares in the (already 
partially privatized) oil company YPF. The special role of a national government in a 
process of acquisition after privatization has not been fully explored in the literature on 
the discursive underpinnings of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Fourth, 
Argentina is often regarded as the paradigmatic case of anti-Spanish feelings in the 
context of the Spanish investments. A few years after the decision was made to focus on 
the Repsol-YPF case, the Spanish-Argentine company (and the tensions between Spain 
and Argentina) suddenly became the centre of a global media storm. In April 2012, the 
Argentine government announced that it would (partially) expropriate and 
renationalize YPF. It was decided to add the 2012 case to the study in the concluding 
Chapter 5 because the media representation of the (partial) expropriation and 
renationalization of YPF offers an excellent opportunity to both reflect and further 
build on the findings of the analysis presented in the preceding chapters. 
 
The media discourse on Spanish FDI in general and on the two Repsol-YPF cases will 
be approached from two different (though in many ways interlinked) discourse analytic 
perspectives: the first from the field of metaphor studies, the second from the field of 
organization studies. The choice of precisely these two perspectives is motivated by two 
general observations. The first is that the contemporary Spanish investments abroad 
are at times explicitly compared to Spain’s imperial expansion of the past. The second 
observation is that the Spanish investments were not always welcomed by the host 
countries because they entail a loss of control over local assets to foreign investors. These 
two observations form the basis for the analysis presented in this dissertation. The two 
discourse analytic perspectives that guide the analysis theoretically and conceptually 
draw on insights from two fields of investigation. The analysis of the historical 
references draws on recent contributions to metaphor theory that have paid particular 
attention to the socio-cultural situatedness of metaphors. The concepts discourse 
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metaphor and metaphor scenario proved to be particularly useful. The analysis of the 
different reactions to cross-border business manoeuvres draws on the discourse 
analytic framework developed by a number of (mainly) Finnish researchers to analyse 
the discursive underpinnings of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. The discourse 
analytic model that will be used in this dissertation draws in particular on their concept 
of discursive strategizing and on their identification of different discourses surrounding 
these business events. 
 
The following sections of this introductory chapter will provide more details about 
the two discourse analytic perspectives (section 1.2) and the different sets of data 
(section 1.3) that were used to gain insights into the ways in which different (written) 
media outlets discursively represented Spanish FDI. The introduction ends with an 
outline of the dissertation (section 1.4). 
1.2 Discourse analytic perspectives 
In this introductory chapter, the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings of the two 
discourse analytic perspectives that guide the analysis of the discursive representation 
of Spanish FDI in (written) media discourse are explained. The key notions that will be 
used throughout the dissertation are also introduced and briefly discussed. Section 1.2.1 
discusses the rationale for choosing concepts from recent contributions to metaphor 
theory to study the use of historical references to Spain’s colonial past in (written) 
media discourse about Spanish FDI. Section 1.2.2 discusses the discourse analytic 
framework that was modelled, developed and continuously refined by researchers of 
the so-called Finnish School. A more detailed discussion of these concepts and the ways 
in which they are operationalized for the analysis will be presented at the beginning of 
the two major empirical chapters (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4). 
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1.2.1 Historical references to Spain’s colonial past: Discourse metaphors 
and metaphor scenarios 
The starting point of Chapter 3 is the observation that Spain’s economic expansion was 
at times compared to Spain’s imperial expansion five hundred years earlier, with the 
terms reconquest and new conquistador as perhaps the two most salient examples. Spain’s 
past in the region was indeed frequently referred to in the context of the increasing 
Spanish corporate presence in Latin America, for instance, in a number of titles of both 
academic (Casas Gragea, 2001; de las Casas, 2005; Koch, 2002; Toral, 2001a)1 and socio-
critical publications (Cecchini & Zicolillo, 2002; Gavaldá, 2003; Greenpeace España, 
2009)2. These examples were written in Spanish or English and were published in Spain, 
Latin America or the United States. In his book The rise of Spanish multinationals, Spanish 
sociologist and political economist Guillén (2005) writes that 
[...] terms such as “Eldorado,” “colonization,” “invasion,” and, most famously, 
“new conquistadors” (or even “acquistadors”) were used to convey the perception 
of a primitive but determined, daring and audacious cadre of firms taking over a 
number of Latin American companies which nobody else wanted to buy (Guillén, 
2005, p. 177). 
Several studies have analysed the ways in which historical references can be used to 
make sense of the present and/or predict the outcome of current events. Some of these 
historical references can be seen as historical analogies because they explicitly bring the 
past back to the present by constructing an aspect of the past as being similar to an 
aspect of the present (Edy, 1999). Angstrom (2011), for instance, investigated both US 
political and academic discourse in the context of the Bush administration’s war on 
terrorism and found that it was often linked to (i) the Second World War; (ii) the 
Crusades; (iii) the Vietnam War; and (iv) the Cold War. Other studies have looked into 
the use of historical analogies in media discourse. Zelizer (2004) found that Time 
magazine described the Iraq War as Gulf War II. Edy and Daradanova’s (2006) analysis 
showed how journalists used the crash of the space shuttle Challenger in 1986 as a frame 
of reference to structure their stories about the crash of the Columbia in 2003. Houchin 
Winfield, Friedman and Trisnadi (2002) investigated the coverage of the 11 September 
terrorist attack in two British and two US newspapers. They found that the newspapers 
on either side of the Atlantic compared the attack to the previous World Trade Centre 
 
                                                     
1
 These four authors refer to la reconquista (the reconquest) of the continent in the title of their work. 
2
 Both Cecchini and Zicolillo (2002) and Greenpeace España (2009) use the term nuevos conquistadores (new 
conquistadors). Gavaldá (2003) writes about la recolonización (the recolonization). 
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bombing (1993) and the bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (1998). 
Moreover, the impact and scale were related to Pearl Harbour (1941) and the Oklahoma 
City bombing (1995) by all four newspapers. 
 
But can the historical references to Spain’s past in Latin America be seen as historical 
analogies? In the examples of the historical analogies above, there is a direct link 
between the current event and the past event. For instance, the Iraq War was linked to a 
previous armed conflict in the region between similar parties. The terrorist attack on 
the WTC Towers in New York was linked to previous terrorist attacks. The analogy is 
definitely made on the basis of a similarity between two events that dit not occur at the 
same time. However, the mapping occurs within one and the same conceptual domain 
(war, terrorist attack). The link between the Spanish conquistadors and the Spanish 
investors is more complex because it involves a mapping across conceptual domains 
(from BUSINESS – COLONIAL TIMES). Therefore, it is more suitable to draw on metaphor 
studies to unravel the similarity that is drawn upon to establish the link between the 
Spanish conquistadors and the Spanish investors. 
 
In the context of Spain’s economic internationalization, the conceptual mapping 
occurs across two different conceptual domains. The similarity between the conquistadors 
and the investors is obtained by mapping the source domain of the Spanish conquest of 
the Americas in the 16th century onto the target domain of the Spanish investments in 
Latin America at the end of the 20th century. This link can also be illustrated by Gibbs’ 
(1994) IS LIKE test: the Spanish investors of the present ARE LIKE the Spanish 
conquistadors of the past. 
 
The influential work of Lakoff and Johnson (1980) has proven to be useful for the 
analysis of established, conventional metaphors such as ANGER IS HEAT or LIGHT IS 
GOODNESS. Their classical framework has a strong experientialist basis because it posits 
that, universally, our way of understanding the world grows out of bodily experience. At 
a later stage, this focus was adapted to include not only individual body experience, but 
also collective socio-cultural experience (Johnson, 1992; Lakoff, 1987). Still, Zinken 
(2003) argued that this traditional framework generally neglected the socio-cultural 
situatedness of metaphors. Several studies have also paid greater attention to the 
connection between metaphor and culture (Deignan, 2003; Kövecses, 2005; Nerlich, 
Hamilton, & Rowe, 2002). This shift in focus resulted in the creation of two new concepts 
that are better suited for the present analysis: discourse metaphor (Nerlich, 2005; Zinken, 
Hellsten, & Nerlich, 2008) and metaphor scenario (Musolff, 2006). Both Musolff (2013) and 
Nerlich (2011) have touched upon the complementarity between the two concepts. The 
analysis in Chapter 3 aims to contribute to this field of study by further exploring the 
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usefulness of combining the two concepts for the analysis of metaphors in real-world 
discourse. 
 
Discourse metaphor is defined as “a relatively stable metaphorical projection that 
functions as a key framing device within a particular discourse over a certain period of 
time” (Zinken et al., 2008, p. 363). Discourse metaphors “highlight salient aspects of a 
socially, culturally, or politically relevant topic” and the “source concepts […] occupy an 
important place in cultural imagination” (Nerlich, 2005, p. 72). Zinken (2003) describes 
the cultural motivation of discourse metaphors as a kind of intertextuality because the 
link between source and target domain is based on discursive rather than conceptual 
mappings. These metaphors “seem to be discursively embedded in a relatively stable 
reservoir of cultural myths and social representations available in social memory – e.g. 
memories of past wars” (Zinken et al., 2008, p. 367). The study by Nerlich et al. (2002) on 
the socio-cultural conceptualizations of foot and mouth disease in the UK in 2001 
showed, for instance, that images of plague-filled medieval villages were used 
frequently by journalists of The Guardian Unlimited to construct their news stories on 
this topic. According to Zinken et al. (2008, p. 368), new topics and events are often 
discussed in terms of cultural and mythical commonplaces, with a source domain that is 
much older than the target domain, especially in times of social upheaval. 
 
The second concept that will be used to study the references to Spain’s colonial past 
in the context of its economic expansion is Musolff’s (2006) concept of metaphor 
scenario. A metaphor scenario is defined as 
[...] a set of assumptions made by competent members of a discourse community 
about ‘typical’ aspects of a source-situation, for example, its participants and their 
roles, the ‘dramatic’ storylines and outcomes, and conventional evaluations of 
whether they count as successful or unsuccessful, normal or abnormal, 
permissible or illegitimate, etc. (Musolff, 2006, p. 28) 
Moreover, these scenarios “enable the speakers to not only apply source to target 
concepts but to draw on them to build narrative frames for the conceptualization and 
assessment of socio-political issues” (Musolff, 2006, p. 36). Nerlich and Koteyko (2010, p. 
42) observed that “the source concepts used in discursive metaphorical framing can be 
organized into mini-narratives through metaphor scenarios”. Musolff (2013) also briefly 
mentioned the link between the two concepts. 
Discourse metaphors and the narrative-argumentative scenarios that they evoke 
play a particularly significant role in communication insofar as they suggest 
specific courses of action as “default” options/solutions and attach socio-ethical 
evaluations to them. (Musolff, 2013, p. 58) 
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In their study of the discourses around carbon offsetting during a period of increased 
media attention to climate change, Nerlich and Koteyko (2010) identified two related 
metaphor scenarios based on the widely shared socio-cultural conceptualizations of the 
Wild West: a gold rush scenario and a cowboy scenario. Their research indicated that 
journalists used these scenarios in two different ways. On the one hand, they were used 
to highlight the romantic aspects of the Wild West by activating assumptions about the 
rough and outdoor life, adventure or braveness. On the other hand, they were also 
found to be used to “caution against the ‘permissiveness’ that the Wild West can 
connote and the dangers posed by greed and exploitation” by activating assumptions 
about treachery, brutality and lawlessness (Nerlich & Koteyko, 2010, p. 49). The 
attractiveness of these scenarios for journalists lies in the fact that they activate 
narratively linked metaphor scenarios which “seem to provide a stock of metaphors, 
stories, and images that exhibit high conceptual entrenchment and international 
appeal, and which are very familiar and easy to understand” (Nerlich & Koteyko, 2010, 
p. 43). 
 
In the case of the historical references through which Spanish investors are 
compared to Spanish conquistadors, the metaphorical source-target projection fits the 
definition of a discourse metaphor perfectly. First, there can be no doubt about the 
lasting impact of the discursive legacies surrounding Spain’s imperial ambitions of the 
past3 (see also section 2.3). As such, the metaphorical projection can certainly be seen as 
a salient image with an important place in socio-cultural imagination. The historical 
references are also used to refer to a salient socio-cultural topic. Mergers and 
acquisitions are likely to have a major impact on various sectors of society, especially in 
cross-border M&As, where the acquiring company potentially faces a clash of both 
corporate and national cultures. These historical references can thus be used to refer to 
a time of social upheaval. Finally, the source concept of the Spanish conquistador is much 
older than the target concept of the Spanish investor. 
 
The new conquistadors discourse metaphor evokes a number of metaphor scenarios 
or socio-culturally grounded narratives with a rich conceptual structure that are, in this 
case, deeply embedded in the discursive tradition surrounding the original 
conquistadors who conquered the New World in the 16th century. Based on the premise 
that history repeats itself, one of the most basic narratives about the past (see Edy, 
 
                                                     
3
 Nerlich and Koteyko (2010, p. 40) also note that “gold rush imagery is rooted in the romanticized, 
mythological, or metaphorical rather than the real aspects of the gold rush, as popularized in legends, songs, and 
art work” (my emphasis). 
 8 
1999), metaphor scenarios carry with them “normative assumptions concerning the 
intentions, states of minds, and emotions of the scenario participants, and concerning 
the chances of success and social acceptability of the ‘scenes’ they are ‘enacting’” 
(Musolff, 2006, pp. 35-36). In the case of the colonial metaphor scenarios, the 
participants, the roles they are enacting, the dramatic storylines and outcomes are 
stored in the (collective) socio-cultural background knowledge about the discovery, 
conquest and colonization of America. The Spaniards are, again, cast in the role of 
actively discovering, invading and conquering the New World. The native Americans, 
when mentioned, are usually again cast in the role of victims. 
 
The analysis of the discourse metaphors and metaphor scenarios that were used in 
(written) media discourse on Spanish Foreign Direct Investment will be presented in 
Chapter 3. Section 3.2 will first discuss the foundations of these colonial metaphor 
scenarios. It will be argued that two elements are crucial for setting up these socio-
culturally grounded narratives: the (business) media’s tendency to emphasize conflict 
scenarios and to represent cross-border business actions at the level of the nation. 
Section 3.3 will then look into a selection of newspaper accounts of Spanish FDI in 
general. Section 3.4 will scrutinize a selection of texts on the topic of the privatization 
and acquisition of YPF. The data will be analysed in view of the following two broad 
research topics: 
RT1: The discursive representation of business manoeuvres performed by Spanish 
companies as confrontations between Spain and other nations/regions. 
 
RT2: The use of historical references to Spain’s colonial past in newspaper 
accounts of Spanish Foreign Direct Investment. 
At the start of each of the two empirical sections in Chapter 3, these broad research 
topics will be narrowed to more specific research questions that will guide the analysis 
of the different sets of newspaper accounts of Spanish FDI. In the concluding Chapter 5, 
the case of the 2012 (partial) expropriation and renationalization of YPF will be used to 
both reflect and further build on the analysis presented in Chapter 3. 
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1.2.2 Discursive perspectives on cross-border mergers and acquisitions: 
The Finnish School 
The starting point of Chapter 4 is the observation that at the end of the 20th century, 
nationalistic feelings came to the forefront in several Latin American countries as a 
result of the Spanish investors’ business strategies of taking over former state-owned 
companies. Often, cross-border mergers and acquisitions not only have a severe impact 
on the corporate level, but also on broader economic and societal levels (including, for 
instance, concerns about competition, employment and ownership structure in the 
target company’s (national) environment). This has resulted in a substantial body of 
research along various disciplinary lines, examining M&A-processes from strategic, 
human resource, cultural and discursive perspectives (see Angwin and Vaara (2005) and 
Cartwright and Schoenberg (2006) for comprehensive overviews). 
 
Strategically oriented studies have traditionally focused on the link between 
potential synergistic benefits and enhanced performance of merged companies. These 
studies have provided insights into mechanisms of value creation through mergers and 
acquisitions (Chatterjee, 1986; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Schweiger & Very, 2003). 
Other contributions have focused on specific strategies such as resource sharing 
(Capron & Pistre, 2002) and transfer of knowledge (Ahuja & Katila, 2001). A different line 
of research has taken a human resource perspective on mergers and acquisitions. This 
research focuses on the social consequences of M&As by looking into the reactions of 
employees (Gutknecht & Keys, 1993; Maguire & Phillips, 2008) and managers (Cartwright 
& Cooper, 1993; Fried, Tiegs, Naughton, & Ashforth, 1996). The insights gained from 
these studies have helped to better understand the causes and consequences of 
organizational resistance in these integration processes. A third field of enquiry focuses 
on the cultural dynamics of mergers and acquisitions. These studies part from the 
argument that cultural differences – which are often referred to, but mostly poorly 
defined – are major causes of problems in post-merger or post-acquisition integration 
processes. Studies have focused on cultural clashes (Buono & Bowditch, 2003) and the 
impact of cultural differences on shareholder value (Chatterjee, Lubatkin, Schweiger, & 
Weber, 1992). In relation to cross-border mergers and acquisitions, researchers have 
turned to national cultural differences (Gertsen, Søderberg, & Torp, 1998; Olie, 1994) and 
the dynamics of acculturation processes (Larsson & Lubatkin, 2001; Sarala, 2010). 
 
According to Vaara (2002), the M&A literature had been dominated by these 
managerialist perspectives until the discursive turn in organization studies at the 
beginning of the 21st century (Alvesson & Karreman, 2000; Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 
2004). Scholars working in this area signal the importance of discourse in constructing 
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the social world. Phillips et al. (2004, p. 640), for instance, describe the discursive realm 
as the “background against which current actions occur – enabling some actions and 
constraining others”. The discursive turn also led to an increasing interest in the 
discursive elements at work in mergers and acquisitions. A lot of the research within 
this discursive tradition has been carried out by Finnish researchers who mainly 
analysed cases in the Nordic countries (Ahonen, 2009; Ahonen, Tienari, & Vaara, 2011; 
Hellgren et al., 2002; Kuronen, Tienari, & Vaara, 2005; Risberg, Tienari, & Vaara, 2003; 
Tienari, Vaara, & Björkman, 2003; Vaara & Monin, 2010; Vaara & Tienari, 2002, 2008, 
2011; Vaara, Tienari, & Laurila, 2006). Following Zhu and McKenna (2012, p. 528), the 
descriptor “Finnish School” will be used to refer to their research collectively. In view of 
the analysis of the Repsol-YPF case in Chapter 4, this section will present an overview of 
the main contributions of these Nordic studies to our understanding of the discursive 
underpinnings of international mergers and acquisitions. In particular, this review will 
zoom in on their conceptualization of the discourses surrounding cross-border M&As. 
 
In an influential study of media texts on three domestic Finnish mergers, Vaara and 
Tienari (2002) identified four discourses: rationalistic, cultural, societal and individualistic 
discourses. They identified these discourses as “distinctive discursive frameworks 
within which the cases and the social actors were constructed and specific themes were 
brought up” (Vaara & Tienari, 2002, p. 284). Table 1 gives a comprehensive overview of 
the characteristics of these discourses, as identified and described by Vaara and Tienari 
(2002). 
Table 1 Characteristics of the four discourses (Vaara & Tienari, 2002) 
Rationalistic discourse Characteristic of this discourse are the company-level 
considerations focusing on the means to create economic 
value (including themes such as the unavoidability of the 
merger, the potential for growth and/or increased 
efficiency after the merger, etc.). 
Within this discourse, a further distinction was made 
between competitiveness and rationalization discourse: 
- Competitiveness-rationalistic discourse parallels the ideas 
of mainstream management rhetoric. 
- Rationalization-rationalistic discourse is characterized by 
a combination of the managers’ strategic arguments 
and an evaluation of the human consequences of the 
measures taken (viz. representing personnel 
reductions as an opportunity to increase efficiency). 
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Cultural discourse Characteristic of this discourse are the common 
conceptualizations of M&A-processes as a confrontation 
between cultures. 
Within this discourse, a further distinction was made 
between organizational and nationalistic discourse: 
- Organizational-cultural discourse draws on clashes 
between the two organizations in terms of 
organizational structures, practices and values. 
- Nationalistic-cultural discourse draws on perceived 
differences between national cultures and is often 
used to represent the deal as a confrontation between 
nations. It typically surfaces in the context of cross-
border mergers and acquisitions. 
Societal discourse Characteristic of this discourse are the more general 
societal reflections concerning the consequences of the 
deal. Within this discourse, a further distinction was made 
between employment, owernship and competition 
discourse: 
- Employment-societal discourse places the deal into a 
framework of labour concerns. 
- Ownership-societal discourse focuses on the question of 
changes in the ownership structure. 
- Competition-societal discourse draws on the (potential) 
reduction of competition in a particular sector after 
an M&A. 
Individualistic discourse Characteristic of this discourse is the close personal focus 
on the key decision makers in a given M&A-process. 
The study conducted by Vaara and Tienari (2002) was followed by a number of research 
papers that drew upon this categorization to study the discourses surrounding mergers 
and acquisitions (Hellgren et al., 2002; Kuronen et al., 2005; Risberg et al., 2003; Tienari 
et al., 2003). In these studies, the conceptualization of the dominant rationalistic 
discourse is stable. The conceptualization of the potential counter-discourses is, 
however, not as uniform. Individualistic discourse is hardly touched upon in these studies 
and cultural and societal discourse are often taken together as one, which is then labelled 
nationalistic discourse. Vaara and Tienari (2002) already seemed to be pointing towards 
the close relation between societal and cultural discourse, and hence the potential to see 
them as one discourse, when they wrote that societal discourse is typically employed for 
“critical evaluation of the concentration of ownership – or reflection of the loss of 
national/societal control of specific organizations and social functions” (Vaara & Tienari, 
2002, p. 292, my emphasis). The analysis in Chapter 4 will focus on the interplay between 
rationalistic and (societal-)nationalistic discourse. 
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In the following, I will review the studies that in my view have contributed the most 
to the study of the interplay between rationalistic and nationalistic discourse in media 
texts on cross-border mergers and acquisitions. What these studies have in common is 
that they examined (i) how different stakeholders mobilize rationalistic and/or 
(societal-) nationalistic discourse to legitimate or delegitimate the deal (termed 
discursive strategizing) and (ii) the ways in which the media draw on these discourses 
when they discursively (re)present and (re)construct international mergers and 
acquisitions (Hellgren et al., 2002; Kuronen et al., 2005; Risberg et al., 2003; Tienari et al., 
2003). These studies in the research tradition of the Finnish School have provided 
important insights into the discursive underpinnings of cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions and have added significantly to our understanding of the social meaning of 
these major international business events. 
 
In a study of media representations of a Swedish bank’s attempt to acquire a 
Norwegian bank, Tienari et al. (2003) focused on the difference between rationalistic 
and nationalistic discourse. They found that rationalistic discourse works through 
specific topics such as corporate growth, competitiveness and efficiency whereas 
nationalistic discourse is much more emotional, evolving around topics such as loss of 
ownership and national stereotypes. They also examined the strategies that different 
stakeholders of these companies used to either pursue (legitimate) or resist (delegitimate) 
the deal. In this respect, Tienari et al. (2003, p. 379) write about discursive strategizing 
which they define as the mobilization of specific discourses to pursue specific ends4. 
They found that the proponents of a deal mainly mobilized (legitimating) rationalistic 
discourse, whereas opponents of a deal were more likely to resort to (delegitimating) 
nationalistic discourse. 
 
Hellgren et al. (2002) identified and analysed the tension between rationalistic and 
nationalistic discourse in newspaper accounts of the cross-border merger between two 
pharmaceutical companies: Astra (Sweden) and Zeneca Group PLC (United Kingdom). 
From their study they concluded, on the one hand, that rationalistic discourse 
dominates public discussions of (cross-border) mergers and acquisitions and, on the 
other hand, that nationalistic discourse provides a powerful discursive framework to 
challenge the rationality of these high-profile business manoeuvres. Risberg et al. (2003) 
identified and analysed a similar tension in the context of the merger between 
 
                                                     
4
 They draw on Barry and Elmes’ (1997) idea that strategy is language constructed to persuade others toward 
certain understandings and actions and on the work of Hardy et al. (2000) which showed how actors can 
access and mobilize different discourses to generate new meanings that help – or hinder – the enactment of 
particular strategies. 
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Nordbanken (Sweden) and Merita Bank (Finland). Kuronen et al. (2005) focused on the 
role of the media in representing cross-border mergers and acquisitions by conducting a 
close reading of a single media text published by a Finnish business weekly on the topic 
of the merger between MeritaNordbanken (Finland-Sweden) and Unidanmark 
(Denmark). Interestingly, these three studies also described how the media on the 
winning side (the acquiring company’s news environment) tended to describe the M&A 
in neutral, rationalistic, matter-of-fact terms, whereas the losing side (the target 
company’s news environment) was more inclined to include nationalistic 
considerations as well. 
 
More recently, some of the insights gained from these mainly Nordic case studies 
have been applied to other geographical regions. In his study of two contested UK-
German business actions, Halsall (2008) further developed the polarity between the 
rationalistic discourse of global capitalism and the nationalistic discourse of local 
impact. He specifically looked into “how political discourse can successfully mediate 
between the instinctive ‘nationalist’ desire of the public to protect the company by 
means of state intervention, and the ‘rationalist’ dictates of neo-liberalism, according to 
which such state intervention is neither desirable nor possible” (Halsall, 2008, pp. 790-
791). Riad, Vaara, and Zhang (2012) looked into Chinese-American relations in the 
context of the takeover of an American company (IBM’s Personal Computer Division) by 
a Chinese company (Lenovo). Among other things, they showed how English-language 
media discussed the acquisition as a threat to US interests, while Chinese media 
represented the move as a peaceful rising (Riad et al., 2012, p. 142). Zhu and McKenna 
(2012) investigated the discursive elements surrounding the attempt of a Chinese 
company (Chinalco) to acquire an Australian mining company (Rio Tinto). In their case 
study, they also noted the strong presence of both rationalistic and nationalistic 
discourse. They also found that, again, the (societal) national interest figured prominently 
in nationalistic discourse. Just like Tienari et al. (2003), Zhu and McKenna (2012) 
stressed that both rationalistic and nationalistic discourse can be mobilized to either 
legitimate or delegitimate a particular M&A-deal. 
 
The discourse analytic model that will be used in Chapter 4 to analyse (written) 
media discourse on the Repsol-YPF case also draws on the binary opposition between 
rationalistic and (societal-)nationalistic discourse. These two discourses are closely linked 
to two of the most prominent, and contradictory, pressures multinational companies 
have to deal with, particularly when engaged in cross-border mergers and acquisitions: 
global-economic and local-societal interests (Naisbitt, 1994; Vaara & Tienari, 2011). The 
main characteristics of both rationalistic and (societal-)nationalistic discourse in the 
context of cross-border mergers and acquisitions are presented in Table 2. 
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Table 2 Main characteristics of rationalistic and nationalistic discourse, the two dominant 
discourses in cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
RATIONALISTIC DISCOURSE Characteristic of this discourse are the company-
level considerations focussing attention, mainly, on 
the means to create economic value. 
Typically, this discourse is mobilized by those in 
favour of the M&A. 
NATIONALISTIC DISCOURSE Characteristic of this discourse is the link to the 
national cultures of the implicated companies and 
the consequences of the deal for the wider social 
and economic (local/national) environment in which 
the M&A takes place. 
Typically, this discourse is mobilized by those 
against the M&A. 
The analysis of the interplay between rationalistic and nationalistic discourse in the 
(written) media discourse on the privatization and acquisition of YPF will be presented 
in Chapter 4. In section 4.2, the discourse analytic model will be outlined in detail. The 
model is largely based on the framework of the Finnish School, but an attempt was 
made to add some methodological refinement by drawing on insights from Appraisal 
Theory (Martin & White, 2005; Thomson, White, & Kitley, 2008), qualitative data analysis 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994) and journalistic stance (Vertommen, Vandendaele, & Van 
Praet, 2012; White, 2012). In section 4.3, the analysis will focus on the discursive struggle 
between various social actors over the legitimacy of the Repsol-YPF deal. Section 4.4 will 
present a comparative analysis of the Argentine and Spanish (written) media’s 
discursive (re)presentation and (re)construction of the Repsol-YPF case. As such, the 
media discourse on the Repsol-YPF case will be analysed in view of the following broad 
research topics. 
RT3: The discursive strategizing deployed by prominent social actors to 
(de)legitimate controversial decisions involving a Spanish company operating 
abroad (i.c. Repsol-YPF in Argentina). 
 
RT4: The positioning of quality newspapers vis-à-vis corporate controversies (i.c. 
cross-border acquisition and (partial) renationalization) in the directly involved 
news environments (i.c. Argentina and Spain). 
These broad research topics will be turned into more specific research questions at the 
start of each of the two empirical sections in Chapter 4. The media representation of the 
2012 (partial) expropriation and renationalization of YPF will be used in the concluding 
Chapter 5 to reflect and further build on the analysis of the discursive underpinnings of 
the Repsol-YPF case presented in Chapter 4. 
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1.3 Presentation of the corpora 
The analysis of media representations of Spanish Foreign Direct Investment will be 
performed on three different sets of publicly available data. The first data set contains a 
selection of 80 English-language newspaper articles5 published over a 20-year period 
(1990-2009). These texts, with a broad focus on Spanish FDI in general, will be used in 
Chapter 3 to study the English-language newspapers’ representation of Spain’s 
economic expansion at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century as a 
confrontation between nations/regions (section 3.3.4) and to study the use of Spain’s 
colonial past in this context by the English-language (written) media (section 3.3.5). The 
second data set contains a selection of 220 Argentine and 110 Spanish newspaper 
articles published on the topic of the privatization and subsequent acquisition of the 
Argentine oil company YPF in 1998 and 1999. These texts will also be used in Chapter 3 
to analyse whether the Spanish-language (written) media represented this specific 
cross-border business manoeuvre as a confrontation between Argentina and Spain 
(section 3.4.2) and if Spain’s colonial past was used in this context (section 3.4.3). In 
Chapter 4, the Spanish-language data set will also be used to analyse the way in which 
four prominent social actors in this process tried to either legitimate or delegitimate the 
decision to privatize/sell or acquire/buy the Argentine oil company (section 4.3) and to 
unveil the differences and similarities in the Argentine and Spanish media 
representation of the Repsol-YPF case (section 4.4). The third data set contains a 
selection of 36 newspaper articles published in April 2012 on the topic of the (partial) 
expropriation and renationalization of YPF. In the concluding Chapter 5, these articles 
(both English- and Spanish-language texts) will be used to both reflect and further build 
on the analysis presented in the empirical sections in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. 
  
 
                                                     
5
 The umbrella term newspaper article is used in this dissertation to refer to hard news reports, investigative 
news reports and editorials. The more specific terms will be used in the empirical sections of this dissertation 
whenever making a distinction is relevant for the analysis. 
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1.3.1 The 1990-2009 corpus: English-language newspaper accounts of 
Spanish Foreign Direct Investment 
The English-language corpus contains 80 newspaper articles with a broad focus on 
Spanish Foreign Direct Investment in the period between 1990 and 2009. The corpus 
contains a representative set of newspaper articles published by 14 different English-
language newspapers, from all over the world. The texts were selected by conducting a 
search for the English-language newspapers in the Lexis Nexis electronic database using 
the keywords Spanish companies and Latin America. Even though the financial crises that 
struck Latin America at the beginning of the 21st century significantly slowed down the 
first wave of Spanish investments, these keywords still proved to be relevant for the 
articles published after the turn of the century as well. Indeed, it was found that 
English-language journalists at times referred back to the first wave of Spanish FDI 
when they wrote about the second wave of Spanish FDI when Spanish companies 
ventured into other parts of the world (see also section 3.3.5). 
 
The Lexis Nexis search unit was set to include the whole article and the time period 
was set from 1 January 1990 to 31 December 2009 (20-year time span). The search tool 
automatically included the singular form Spanish company as well. The search produced 
665 items. The data selection was then further refined with a secondary manual search 
(Schafraad, Wester, & Scheepers, 2006). Articles were selected to be included in the 
corpus if the text gave an overview of Spanish Foreign Direct Investment in general. In 
order to decide this, headlines, keyword-concordances and sometimes the body of the 
article were closely read. An article was always selected if the keyword Spanish companies 
appeared more than once in the body of the article. 
 
Consider, by way of example, the Lexis Nexis result for one of the articles in the 1990-
2009 corpus. The concordance lines reveal that the keyword Latin America is used eight 
times in this 1992 Miami Herald article. The keyword Spanish companies is not found but 
Lexis Nexis selected this article because the singular form Spanish company is identified 
once in the text. 
Spain reaches out 
The Miami Herald, November 29, 1992 Sunday, BUSINESS; K; Pg. 1, 996 words, JANE 
BUSSEY Herald Business Writer 
...States and a gateway to Latin America and the Caribbean. There are no firm... 
...looking to extend operations to Latin America. But the peseta has been 
devalued... 
...least one major Spanish company, Corporación Mapfre, agrees. The... 
...insurance firms throughout Latin America, Mapfre has become the single... 
...insurance companies in Latin America. Its premiums from its Latin American... 
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...other companies, the entree to Latin America and the Caribbean is just as 
important. The... 
...economic growth in Latin America, after a decade of... 
...in the northernmost city of Latin America,” said Jose Marquina,... 
...deposit, which mostly come from Latin America,” said Joaquin Frances,... 
(bold in original Lexis Nexis keyword concordances) 
The headline and the concordance lines on the results page hint at a relevant article for 
this study, even though the keyword Spanish companies is not mentioned in this text. A 
closer reading of the body of the article revealed, however, that the journalist refers to 
the Spanish companies by using a variety of terms such as Spanish investors and Spanish 
firms. These nation metonymic compounds are also considered relevant for the study 
and the article was selected for the 1990-2009 corpus. 
WITH little fanfare, Spanish investors have quickly become big players in South 
Florida. [...] Spanish banks and other companies have poured more than $ 1 billion 
into South Florida. [...] Spanish firms say they have found Miami has better 
communications. [...] Spanish investors have snapped up hotels in the area [...] 
(Miami Herald, 1992, 29 November; my emphasis) 
Following this procedure, the initial selection was reduced to a total of 80 articles, 
published by 14 different English-language newspapers, from all over the world (Table 
3). More than half of the texts were published by the Financial Times (46). The New York 
Times comes in second place, but with considerably fewer articles (7). Seven 
newspapers are represented in this corpus with only one article on the topic of the 
Spanish Foreign Direct Investment (in general). 
Table 3 Newspapers in the English-language 1990-2009 corpus 
English-language newspapers 
The Financial Times (46) 
The New York Times (7) 
The International Herald Tribune (6) 
The Miami Herald (6) 
The Times (4) 
The Herald (Glasgow) (2) 
The Washington Post (2) 
The Guardian Unlimited (1) 
The New Straits Times (Malaysia) (1) 
The Calgary Herald (Alberta) (1) 
The Express (1) 
The New Zealand Herald (1) 
The Observer (1) 
The Sunday Telegraph (1) 
The timeline in Figure 1 spans the 20-year period and represents the number of selected 
articles published each year. Three peaks can be observed: 1998, the year in which a 
number of Spanish companies made eye-catching investments in Latin America, 2001-
2002, the peak of the financial crises in Latin America, with major implications for the 
Spanish companies, and 2005-2007, the period in which Spanish companies ventured 




Figure 1 Newspaper articles in the English-language 1990-2009 corpus, year by year 
A list of all the articles in the 1990-2009 corpus can be found in the Corpora section at the 
end of this dissertation. 
1.3.2 The 1998-1999 corpus: Argentine and Spanish newspaper accounts 
of the privatization and acquisition of YPF 
The Spanish-language 1998-1999 corpus contains 330 newspaper articles about a specific 
case of Spanish FDI in Latin America: Spanish Repsol’s acquisition (after privatization) of 
Argentine YPF in 1998-1999. The corpus contains a selection of newspaper articles 
published by four widely read and prestigious quality newspapers, two for each of the 
two news environments that are directly involved in this case: Argentina and Spain. The 
newspapers that were chosen are the two leading Argentine national dailies Clarín 
(centrist) and La Nación (conservative), the Spanish leading national newspaper El País 
(centre-left) and the Spanish leading financial newspaper Cinco Días (left-liberal)6. 
 
The search query used for all four newspapers was “Repsol” AND “YPF” and the time 
period was set from 1 January 1998 to 31 December 1999. The Spanish texts were found 
 
                                                     
6
 Cinco Días was chosen because the archive of Spain’s second newspaper El Mundo (centre-right) was not 
available for the years 1998-1999 at the time the corpus was compiled (September 2010). El Mundo was chosen 
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by conducting the search on the Lexis Nexis electronic database for the two Spanish 
newspapers El País and Cinco Días. Since there are no Argentine newspapers in the Lexis 
Nexis database, the Argentine texts were selected from the electronic databases of the 
two Argentine newspapers (http://buscar.lanacion.com.ar/ and 
http://buscador.clarin.com/). 
 
As for the English-language corpus, the data selection was also further refined with a 
secondary manual search (Schafraad et al., 2006). Articles were selected to be included 
in the 1998-1999 corpus if the privatization and/or acquisition of YPF were mentioned 
in the text and if the Spanish company Repsol was also mentioned. In order to decide 
this, headlines, keyword-concordances and sometimes the body of the article were 
closely read. The first article in the Spanish-language corpus was published on 19 
February 1998 by the Argentine newspaper Clarín. In the article, the journalist writes 
about the fact that the Menem government still needed to decide how it was going to 
sell its remaining YPF shares (20%), either on the international stock markets or in one 
package to another (probably foreign) oil company. The Spanish company Repsol is 
mentioned in a list of oil companies that, according to market rumours, had shown 
interest in buying the state’s shares in one package. 
[título] Limitarían la venta de las acciones del Estado en YPF 
[cuerpo] En el mercado mencionan en esa lista a la española Repsol, tal vez asociada 
con la Amoco de EE.UU., y a la estatal venezolana PDVSA […]. (Clarín, 19 February 
1998) 
[headline] Restrictions might be placed on the sale of the state’s YPF shares 
[body] According to market rumours, the list includes Spanish Repsol, perhaps in 
association with U.S. Amoco, and Venezuelan state company PDVSA […]. 
The articles that were selected give an insight into the different phases in the 
privatization and acquisition process: (i) Repsol showing interest in buying the state’s 
shares (August 1998), (ii) the discussion about the privatization method and the 
Argentine government’s decision to sell 14.9% of YPF in one package (October-
November 1998), (iii) Repsol’s purchase of the 14.9% package (January 1999), (iv) 
Repsol’s all-cash offer to acquire the whole company (April-May 1999), (v) the 
integration process (June-July 1999) and, finally, (vi) Repsol-YPF’s listing on the Buenos 
Aires Stock Exchange (November-December 1999). 
(i) 
[título] Los españoles, detrás de YPF. (Clarín, 1998, 28 July) 
 [headline] The Spaniards are after YPF 
(ii) 
[título] Sigue en carrera la venta en bloque de las acciones de YPF (La Nación, 28 
October) 
 [headline] The proposal to sell the YPF shares in one package is still on the table  
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[título] YPF mantiene la obligación de OPA para quien compre más del 14,9% 
(Cinco Días, 1998, 26 November) 
[headline] YPF maintains the obligation that whoever buys more than 14.9% must 
make a takeover bid 
(iii) 
[título] Repsol logró una pieza estratégica en la región (La Nación, 1999, 21 
January[b]) 
 [headline] Repsol acquired a strategic piece in the region 
[título] Repsol es la décima petrolera del mundo tras comprar YPF (El País, 1999, 
22 January) 
 [headline] Repsol is the tenth largest oil company in the world after buying YPF 
(iv) 
[título] Quieren comprar todo YPF por 13 439 millones de dólares (Clarín, 1999, 30 
April) 
 [headline] They want to buy all of YPF for 13.5 billion dollars 
[título] Repsol lanza una oferta de adquisición de 2,08 billones sobre la argentina 
YPF (El País, 1999, 30 April[b]) 
[headline] Repsol launches a takeover bid fo 2.08 trillion [pesetas] to acquire 
Argentine YPF 
[título] Repsol da el paso (Cinco Días, 1999, 3 May[a]) 
 [headline] Repsol makes the move 
[título] La española Repsol se juega a todo o nada (La Nación, 1999, 4 May[c]) 
 [headline] All or nothing for Spanish Repsol 
(v) 
[título] Estructura integrada y Monti en la dirección (Cinco Días, 1999, 8 July) 
 [headline] Integrated structure and Monti in the Board of Directors 
[título] Repsol apura la fusión con YPF (La Nación, 1999, 13 July) 
 [headline] Repsol is speeding up its merger with YPF 
(vi) 
[título] Repsol, en la Bolsa (Clarín, 1999, 1 December). 
 [headline] Repsol, on the Stock Exchange 
[título] La llegada de Repsol-YPF no pudo animar la Bolsa (La Nación, 1999, 1 
December) 
 [headline] The arrival of Repsol-YPF could not revive the Stock Exchange. 
At times, the Argentine newspapers also referred to Repsol’s acquisition of YPF in 
longer, more investigative newspaper articles in which the acquisition process was used 
to write about the broader picture of Spanish and other Foreign Direct Investment in 
Argentina as a result of the opening up of the Argentine economy under President 
Carlos Menem. 
[título] El 7% de la economía, en manos españolas (Clarín, 1999, 9 May[e]) 
 [headline] 7% of the economy, in Spanish hands 
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[título] La Argentina extranjera (La Nación, 1999, 9 May[b]) 
 [headline] Argentina, owned by foreigners 
 
[título] Cómo se despliega la reconquista española? (Clarín, 1999, 30 May[a]) 
 [headline] How does the Spanish reconquest unfold? 
The total number of articles in the Spanish-language 1998-1999 corpus is 330. The 
Argentine subcorpus contains 220 texts, the Spanish subcorpus 110. Some more detailed 
numbers are mentioned in Table 4. 
Table 4 Newspaper articles in the Spanish-language 1998-1999 corpus, year by year 
 1998 1999 Total 
Clarín (Ar) 27 89 116 
La Nación (Ar) 16 88 104 
Cinco Días (Sp) 7 70 77 
El País (Sp) 1 32 33 
The timeline in Figure 2 represents the number of selected articles published each 
month by the four Spanish-language newspapers. Figure 2 clearly shows a peak in the 3-
month period between May and July 1999, immediately after Repsol’s all-cash offer to 
purchase all YPF shares and take full control of the Argentine company at the end of 
April 1999. In fact, 52.5% (173/330) of the articles in the corpus were published during 
this 3-month span. 
 
 
Figure 2 Newspaper articles in the Spanish-language 1998-1999 corpus, month by month 
A list of all the articles in the 1998-1999 corpus can be found in the Corpora section at the 


















































































1.3.3 The 2012 corpus: English-language and Spanish-language 
newspaper accounts of the (partial) expropriation and 
renationalization of YPF 
The 2012 corpus contains a selection of newspaper articles that were published on the 
topic of the expropriation of YPF. The total number of texts is 36. The texts were 
selected and copied at the end of April 2012 from the websites of six different 
(influential) English-language (online) news sources, of the three most important 
Argentine dailies and of the two leading Spanish national newspapers. The exact 
number of articles per newspaper can be found in Table 5. 
Table 5 Newspaper articles in the 2012 corpus 
English-language newspapers Spanish-language newspapers 
English-language texts (6) Argentine texts (9) Spanish texts (21) 
The Financial Times (1) 
The Guardian (1) 
The Huffington Post (1) 
The New York Times (1) 
Time Magazine (1) 
The Wall Street Journal (1) 
Clarín (10) 
La Nación (6) 
Página 12 (5) 
El País (5) 
El Mundo (4) 
El País (centre-left) and El Mundo (centre-right) are the two leading national 
newspapers in Spain. Clarín (centrist) and La Nación (conservative) are the two leading 
national newspapers in Argentina. The two Argentine dailies are known to be generally 
critical of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and her government (Cuestas, Freille, & 
O'Gorman, 2009). In order to balance their critical perspective, it was decided to include 
a number of texts that were published by the Argentine quality newspaper Página 12 
(centre-left) which is known to be generally supportive of the Kirchner government 
(Dominguez, 2012, p. 80). 
 
The corpus contains 11 news reports that were published in the days immediately 
following the announcement (16, 17 and 18 April 2012) and 25 argumentative texts that 
were published between 13 and 21 April 2012. In the the news reports, the journalist 
authors report on Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s decision to expropriate Repsol’s YPF 
shares. All 6 English-language texts are news reports. There are also 5 Spanish-language 
news reports in the corpus, one for each of the five Spanish-language newspapers in the 
corpus. The headlines of these reports are rather factual. 
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[headline] Argentina to renationalize oil group YPF (Financial Times, 2012, 17 
April) 
[headline] Argentina to seize control of oil firm (Wall Street Journal, 2012, 17 
April) 
 
[título] Cristina expropió YPF: ya la manejan De Vido y Kicillof (Clarín, 2012, 17 
April[a]) 
 [headline] Cristina expropriated YPF: De Vido and Kicillof already run it 
[título] Cristina decidió la expropiación de YPF (La Nación, 2012, 16 April) 
 [headline] Cristina decided to expropriate YPF 
[título] Argentina expropia a Repsol su filial YPF (El País, 2012, 17 April[a]) 
 [headline] Argentina expropriates Repsol’s subsidiary YPF 
The 25 argumentative texts in the 2012 corpus can be subdivided into 21 editorials and 4 
columns written by guest writers. The 21 editorials were published by the two Spanish 
newspapers El País (4) and El Mundo (3) and the two Argentine newspapers Clarín (9) 
and La Nación (5). In these texts, the editorialists comment, first, on the possibility that 
the Argentine government would renationalize the Argentine oil company and, later, on 
the announcement that it would indeed go ahead with this plan. The headlines of the 
editorials already show that these texts are characterized by a more argumentative 
writing style. 
[título] Una expropicación que se complica (Clarín, 2012, 13 April) 
 [headline] An increasingly complicated expropriation 
[título] Kirchner se merece una respuesta contundente del Gobierno español (El 
Mundo, 2012, 13 April) 
 [headline] Kirchner deserves a strong response from the Spanish government 
[título] Populismo intimidatorio (El País, 2012, 18 April) 
 [headline] Intimidating populism 
[título] YPF: arbitrariedad y mala fe (La Nación, 2012, 18 April) 
 [headline] YPF: arbitrary action and bad faith 
[título] YPF: lo que el país necesita es una política eficiente (Clarín, 2012, 22 April) 
 [headline] YPF: what the country needs is an efficient policy 
Página 12 does not publish an editorial, but the day after the announcement (on 17 April 
2012), the newspaper did publish 4 columns in which four different guest writers give 
their view on the Argentine government’s decision to expropriate Repsol’s YPF shares. 
These four columnists are high-profile Argentines with an economic background. 
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Martín Granovsky, a radio and television journalist and a regular Página 12 
columnist (Página 12, 2012, 17 April[b]) 
Claudio Scaletta, a freelance journalist, regular Página 12 columnist and self-
declared ‘desarrollist’ economist7 (Página 12, 2012, 17 April[c]) 
Alfredo Zaiat, an economist, chief editor of the Página 12 Economics section and 
author of the book Economía a contramano: Cómo entender la economía política (2012) 
(Página 12, 17 April[d]) 
Mario Rapoport, a professor of Economic History and History of International 
Relations at the University of Buenos Aires (Página 12, 17 April[e]) 
A list of all the articles in the 2012 corpus can be found in the Corpora section at the end 
of this dissertation. 
  
 
                                                     
7
 On his twitter account, he places himself in the camp of president Fernández de Kirchner as his description 
reads: “heterodox, and therefore desarrollist, economist and journalist”. Desarrollist refers to a 
nationalist/developmentalist school of political economy (see, for instance, Grugel & Riggirozzi, 2007, p. 88). 
  25 
1.4 The dissertation in outline 
This dissertation presents a thorough discourse analysis of (written) media 
representations of Spanish Foreign Direct Investment. The structure of this dissertation 
is outlined as follows. 
 
In the first section 1.1 of this introductory Chapter 1, the central theme of the 
dissertation was introduced. Then, in section 1.2, the two discourse analytic 
perspectives that will guide the analysis were briefly reviewed. Next, section 1.3 
presented the three sets of data on which the analysis will be performed. This 
introductory chapter ends with the present section 1.4, the outline of the dissertation. 
 
Chapter 2 presents a selection of elements from the wider context that are deemed 
relevant for the analysis of (written) media representations of Spanish FDI. Section 2.1 
first reviews a number of socio-economic elements underlying Spain’s economic 
expansion in general. Section 2.2 then focuses on a number of socio-economic elements 
that are relevant for the analysis of the specific case of Repsol-YPF in Argentina. Section 
2.3 discusses the age-old discursive traditions that continue to have an impact on 
Spain’s international reputation. 
 
Chapter 3 is the first of the three empirical chapters in this dissertation. The analysis 
in this chapter sets out to study the use of historical references in newspaper accounts 
of Spanish Foreign Direct Investment. After a brief introduction to the chapter in 
section 3.1, section 3.2 first explores the foundations of the colonial metaphor scenarios 
(see also section 1.2.1). Section 3.3 presents the analysis of the English-language 
newspaper accounts of Spanish FDI in general (1990-2009), section 3.4 describes the 
analysis of the Argentine and Spanish newspaper accounts of the privatization and 
acquisition of YPF (1998-1999). Chapter 3 ends with a concluding remarks section 3.5 
which discusses some notable similarities and differences between the two corpora. 
 
Chapter 4 focuses on the discursive struggle over the legitimacy of the Repsol-YPF 
deal. After a brief introduction to the chapter in section 4.1, the discourse analytic 
model used for the analysis is outlined in detail in section 4.2. Then, section 4.3 first 
explores the discursive strategizing deployed by the most prominent social actors 
implicated in this acquisition process. In section 4.4, the analysis focuses specifically on 
the ways in which the (written) media in the two directly involved national 
environments discursively (re)presented and (re)constructed the Repsol-YPF case for 
their respective audiences. Chapter 4 ends with a concluding remarks section 4.5 in which 
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the findings of the analysis are linked to the broader perspective of the search for an 
appropriate balance between state and market in the economy. 
 
The concluding Chapter 5 fulfils a special role in this dissertation. The (written) 
media representation of the 2012 (partial) expropriation and renationalization of YPF is 
used here to both reflect and further build on the findings of the analysis presented in 
the empirical Chapters 3 and 4. After an introduction to the concluding chapter in 
section 5.1, section 5.2 looks at the data in the 2012 corpus from the perspective of the 
analysis presented in Chapter 3. Next, section 5.3 looks at the discursive underpinnings 
of the 2012 case from the perspective of the analysis presented in Chapter 4. The 
concluding Chapter 5 ends with a concluding remarks section 5.4 which discusses the role 
of the Spanish government in both the 1998-1999 and 2012 Repsol-YPF cases. 
 
The dissertation ends with a summary of the findings of the analysis presented in the 
analytical Chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
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Chapter 2  
Socio-economic and discursive perspectives on 
Spain’s economic expansion 
This chapter explores the wider context (geographical, historical, political and social) of 
the discursive (re)presentation and (re)construction of the events that are the object of 
analysis of this dissertation. The necessity to acquire a thorough knowledge about the 
wider context of the topic(s) under investigation is recognized by several strands of 
discourse analysis because the more we know about the topic(s) we study, the more 
subtle and finegrained our discourse analyses can become (see, for instance, Fairclough, 
1995; Verschueren, 2012; Wodak, 2001). However, the routine practice of including a 
section or chapter labelled background information, basic facts or preliminary observations at 
the beginning of a discourse analytic study is also often called into question 
(Blommaert, 1997; Verschueren, 1999). If one of the basic tenets of discourse analysis is 
that any description of reality is always partial, an abstraction and just one of many 
possible representations of the real world, then this also applies to the description of 
the wider context in which the texts/discourses under study were produced. Discourse 
analysts are not much different from journalists in this, as they will both inevitably 
foreground elements and background others in their attempts to describe the reality 
out there. This chapter presents a selection of elements from the wider context that are 
deemed relevant for the analysis presented in this dissertation because they provide 
insights into the reasons why in the past 25 years both scholars and media outlets from 
all over the world have been paying considerable attention to Spain’s economic 
expansion. 
 
The account presented in this chapter is based on a wide range of publications on the 
topic of Spanish Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), mostly from the field of International 
(Economic) Relations. The most important references include the multidisciplinary 
volume edited by Félix E. Martín and Pablo Toral (2005), and the books written by 
Spanish economist Ramón Casilda Béjar (2002) and US-based sociologist and political 
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economist with Spanish roots Mauro F. Guillén (2005). The Elcano Royal Institute has 
also been prolific in this area. This Madrid-based think-tank for international and 
strategic studies was founded in 2001 to analyse world events and trends from a 
Spanish, European and global perspective (see Elcano Royal Institute, 2014). One of the 
specific topics that the Institute focuses on is Spain’s international reputation, both in 
general and in the context of Spanish FDI. The most important references published by 
the Elcano Royal Institute include the books written by experienced British journalist 
William Chislett (2003, 2008b) and by Spanish sociologist and political scientist Javier 
Noya (2009). It should not come as a surprise that the (socio-economic) research on the 
expansion of Spanish firms and the international reactions to this phenomenon has 
been carried out predominantly from a Spanish perspective. Crucial references for the 
discussion of the Latin American reactions to the economic reforms that encouraged 
(Spanish) Foreign Direct Investment in the 1990s include the volumes edited by Jean 
Grugel and Pía Riggirozzi (2009b) and by Manuela Nilson and Jan Gustafson (2012). The 
chronology of the Repsol-YPF case emerged from the data in the 1998-1999 corpus and 
was supplemented by the coverage of Oil Daily, a specialized news source which focuses 
on the North and South American energy industry8. 
 
The first part of this chapter provides an overview of a number of influential socio-
economic perspectives on Spain’s economic expansion in general. Section 2.1.1 
discusses why Spanish companies went beyond their national borders in the 1990s and 
why they saw Latin America as their preferred investment destination. Section 2.1.2 
then goes deeper into this first wave of Spanish FDI. After the Latin American economic 
crises at the beginning of the 21st century, the Spanish investors started to diversify 
their investments by venturing into other parts of the world. This second wave of 
Spanish FDI is discussed in section 2.1.3. Then, section 2.1.4 gives an overview of the 
different reactions to the Spanish FDI, both in Spain and in Latin America. The 
Argentine perspective is discussed separately in view of the analysis of the 1998-1999 
and 2012 Repsol-YPF cases, which will be presented in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 
respectively. 
 
The second part of the chapter presents an overview of the contextual factors that 
led to the privatization of the Argentine oil company YPF and its subsequent acquisition 
by the Spanish company Repsol in 1999. Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 give a brief overview of 
the Spanish and the Argentine oil sectors respectively. The chronology of events of the 
Repsol-YPF case in 1998 and 1999 is presented in section 2.2.3. Then, section 2.2.4 
 
                                                     
8
 Oil Daily was accessed via the Highbeam Research Portal (www.highbeam.com). 
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discusses the difficult relation between the Spanish-Argentine company and the 
Argentine government between 2000 and 2011. This tense relationship eventually led to 
the expropriation of Repsol’s YPF shares in April 2012. This recent episode in the 
Repsol-YPF saga is discussed in section 2.2.5. The overview presented in sections 2.2.4 
and 2.2.5 are insightful for the analysis of the media representation of the (partial) 
expropriation and renationalization of YPF which will be presented in Chapter 5. 
 
The third and final part of this chapter discusses the origin, evolution and present 
influence of Spain’s discursive legacy, a stable stock of narratives and stereotypes about 
Spain and the Spaniards that have been transferred over the centuries from one 
generation to the next. The information presented in this part is particularly insightful 
for the analysis of the references to Spain’s (colonial) past in the context of Spanish FDI 
which will be presented in Chapter 3. Three influential discursive traditions can be 
identified. Section 2.3.1 discusses the Black Legend, section 2.3.2 the Spanish decadencia 
and section 2.3.3 the Romanticist vision of Spain. Finally, section 2.3.4 discusses how 
these three discursive traditions had, and continue to have, an impact on the 
international reputation of Spain and the Spaniards throughout the 20th and 21st 
centuries. 
2.1 Socio-economic perspectives on Spanish Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) 
2.1.1 Determinant factors of Spain’s economic expansion into Latin 
America in the 1990s: Push and pull factors 
Spain and Latin America have a so-called “special relationship” (Brysk, Parsons, & 
Sandholtz, 2002; Maestro, 2005). Centuries of migration flows have created strong 
cultural and linguistic ties between the Mother Country and its (former) colonies. Their 
shared history began on 12 October 1492, the day Christopher Columbus discovered the 
New World (even though he himself believed that he had found a new passage to Asia). 
The discovery of America marks the beginning of the colonial era in which Spain (and 
other European powers) invaded the continent and colonized its indigenous 
populations. 
 
The Spanish-American Wars of Independence, a series of armed conflicts against 
Spanish rule in the colonies between 1808 and 1829, symbolically mark the beginning of 
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the end of Spain’s colonial empire (Archer, 2000). The final blow came after the US 
victory over Spain in the Spanish-American War in 18989, when Spain had to cede the 
last remnants of its once vast colonial empire to the US: Cuba and Puerto Rico in the 
Caribbean, Guam and the Philippines in Asia. This came as a shock to Spain and the 
nation slumped into a deep moral, political and social crisis which came to be known in 
Spain as El Desastre (the Disaster). The defeat “discredited the country’s international 
prestige, making Spain more inward-looking than ever before” (Maestro, 2005, p. 91). 
 
In the middle of the 20th century, between the 1930s and 1950s, tens of thousands of 
political refugees fled the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) and the fascist government of 
the Franco dictatorship (1939-1975). Estimations indicate that the total number of 
political refugees rose to about one million and that “around 200,000 remained in exile” 
(Chislett, 2003, p. 23). The political refugees, often talented and highly educated men 
and women, were followed by a wave of economic migrants seeking employment and a 
better life between the 1950s and 1960s (Chislett, 2008b). This trend was reversed at the 
end of the 20th century. In the 1990s, many Latin Americans migrated to Spain because 
of the sustained economic growth of the Spanish economy. According to Chislett (2003, 
p. 40), “the number of legal Latin American residents in Spain (i.e. with their papers in 
order) rose from 83,257 in 1991 to more than 200,000 in 2003”. 
2.1.1.1 Push factors: How Spain’s economic miracle came about 
The 1980s were crucial for the development of Spain’s economic expansionist ambitions. 
It had just recently found its way out of the international isolation and backwardness of 
General Franco’s dictatorial regime that lasted for about 40 years (1936-1975). After the 
death of Francisco Franco, King Juan Carlos I, his successor as chief of state, played a 
crucial role in the democratic transition from authoritarianism to a parliamentary 
monarchy. 
 
Nevertheless, it is important to point out that even before this momentous political 
transition, “Spain had already experienced an extended period of accelerated economic 
growth and structural change” (Baklanoff, 1996, p. 107). In the late 1950s, Franco had 
come under increasing pressure to reform the country’s economic policy. He 
reorganized his government and a group of young ministers with radically different 
plans for Spain’s future came to power. They took command of key economic ministries 
and the commission that was responsible for the economic strategy. After this 
 
                                                     
9
 The conflict was the result of US intervention in the Cuban War of Independence against Spain (1895-1898). 
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reorganization, government controls over trade were reduced and closer economic 
relations with other countries were sought (Busky, 2000, p. 64). In 1958 Spain became a 
member of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and in 1959 it 
joined the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) (Baklanoff, 1996). In 
the 1960s, Manuel Fraga, a leading member of the liberalizing aperturistas, practically 
invented mass tourism by promoting Spain under the slogan Spain is different! (Chislett, 
2008a; Rosendorf, 2006). As a result, tourists started flocking to Spain’s beaches to 
escape their chilly home climates. 
 
The real rehabilitation came after Franco’s death, with the approval of the Spanish 
constitution in 1978 and the electoral victory of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party 
(PSOE) in 1982. In a relatively short period of time, Spain was transformed into a modern 
nation, with a consolidated democracy and a relatively high degree of integration with 
the rest of the world (Guillén, 2005). The accession of Spain to the European Union in 
1986 came fast and fundamentally changed the situation for the Spanish companies. 
Royo (2005, p. 64) argues that “the integration of Spain in the European [Economic] 
Community [EEC] was the catalyst for the final conversion of Spain into a modern 
Western-type economy”. The Spanish economy did undergo profound changes, allowing 
its modernization and integration into the globalized economy. The accession made 
Spain an avid recipient of European investments as the “tougher environment was 
underscored by an inward FDI boom in the first years after EU entry when hardly a 
week passed without an acquisition and it seemed that Spain was up for sale” (Chislett, 
2011, p. 3). Some sectors, such as pharma, textile or manufacturing, fell almost entirely 
into foreign hands (Vegas, 2006). Spanish companies were forced to raise their 
efficiency in order to successfully compete in the European common market. 
 
The strategic response to the threat of being acquired by a foreign competitor was to 
adopt a strategy of growth (Chislett, 2011). The liberalization of the Spanish economy 
gave Spanish companies the opportunity to do so. The government started several 
privatization programmes and initiatives that promoted consolidation. The aim was to 
create national champions10 in key sectors. The Spanish government believed that Spain 
needed efficient companies that would be able to compete with their European 
counterparts in the European common market, one of the most competitive markets in 
the world. This process of liberalization was further accelerated in the run-up to the 
introduction of the euro in 1999 (Vegas, 2006). 
 
                                                     
10
 In Vernon’s definition (1974, p. 11), a national champion is “an enterprise responsive to its national 
government's need and entitled to its national government’s support”. 
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However, the weighty Spanish companies began to face a new problem in their 
national economy. Various economic sectors in Spain began to show signs of saturation, 
particularly the banking and telecommunications sectors. The Spanish companies 
realized that they needed to grow to the size of respectable multinationals if they 
wanted to survive in the increasingly competitive globalized market,. Therefore, the 
Spanish companies started to align their activities with the two most important 
coordinates of the global economy: size and international dimension (Casilda Béjar, 
2001). Indeed, the possibility to diversify business activities by exploring new markets is 
an attractive option when the home market has become too small for your activities. 
 
The Spanish government also played a crucial role in the internationalization of the 
Spanish companies by encouraging them to make investments outside Spain in order to 
protect them from European competition. A defensive strategy was devised to stimulate 
the Spanish companies: 
The strategy of the Spanish government comprised a set of specific policies: a 
reform of the tax system, a number of public funds to subsidize or finance the 
direct investments of Spanish firms abroad, a system of public insurance to 
protect the investments from the risks of the host country, and bilateral and 
multilateral treaties for protection of investments by the governments of the 
main host countries. A tax reform to prevent double taxation of Spanish MNEs was 
implemented in the 1990s, in compliance with EU directive 435. (Toral, 2001b, p. 4) 
According to Toral (2008, p. 541), the Spanish government also provided the companies 
with cash so that they could fund their targeted mergers and acquisitions in Latin 
America. He claims, for instance, that Telefónica “received $1 billion in 1997, in time for 
its big acquisition of Telesp in Brazil” and that the Spanish government “justified these 
cash handouts to the European Union by arguing that they were compensation for 
agreeing to open up the Spanish telecommunications market before the deadline set by 
Brussels”. 
2.1.1.2 Pull factors: How Latin America became Spain’s favourite investment 
destination 
In addition to the Spanish push factors, there were also a number of decisive factors 
pulling Spanish and other foreign companies to Latin America. In fact, Spain was late to 
return to Latin America after the Spanish colonial empire completely fell apart in 1898, 
when it had to give up the last of its colonies. Before the First World War, Britain was 
the main foreign investor in Latin America, accounting for more than two-thirds of FDI 
in the region. After the Second World War, the United States became the region’s largest 
investor. The US investors concentrated “on the manufacturing sector and the 
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exploitation of natural resources, mainly mining and hydrocarbons” (Chislett, 2008b, p. 
147). 
 
In the 1980s, Latin America was characterized by historic transformations. During 
this period, about fifteen nations changed their political system from a dictatorial 
regime to a democratic government. These political changes also had economic 
consequences as those nations subsequently started to abandon their traditional 
economic models based on protectionist and state interventionist measures. Instead, 
they started to turn towards more market oriented economic models (Casilda Béjar, 
2002). Turning around the economic model became an even more important maxim 
after the Cold War had come to an end. The drying up of public sources of capital and 
the confrontation with economic malpractices and failures during the 1980s further set 
the Latin American process of economic reforms in motion (Naím & Lozada, 2002). 
 
In the 1990s, many Latin American leaders used the guidelines of the so-called 
Washington Consensus to reform their nations’ economies. The term refers to the 
background paper entitled What Washington means by policy reform, a text written by John 
Williamson (1990), a British economist working, at the time, for the Institute for 
International Economics, an international economic think tank based in Washington 
D.C. In this paper, Williamson lists a string of economic policy instruments that can be 
used as guidelines for both the governments of developing countries and international 
organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Inter-
American Development Bank (Casilda Béjar, 2002). The term came to be used in a 
broader and much more negative sense than Williamson himself had intended, as a 
synonym of neoliberal market fundamentalism. The ten policy instruments are listed in 
the following table. 
Table 6 The ten policy instruments of the Washington Consensus (Williamson, 1990) 
Fiscal deficits Trade policy 
Public expenditure priorities Foreign Direct Invesmtent 
Tax reform Privatization 
Interest rates Deregulation 




The leaders of many Latin American countries applied the set of economic measures of 
the Washington Consensus in an attempt to modernize their national economies by 
attracting foreign capital to the region11. In his book on the Spanish investments in 
Latin America, Casilda Béjar (2002) writes the following about the positive outcomes of 
these policies: 
Inflation was reduced to one digit in almost all of the countries. The fiscal 
discipline decreased the average fiscal deficit from 5 per cent of the GDP [Gross 
Domestic Product] to approximately 2 per cent and reduced the public debt from 
50 per cent of the GDP to less than 20 per cent. (Casilda Béjar, 2002, p. 70, my 
translation) 
The application of these reforms led to an unprecedented wave of privatizations of large 
state-run companies. Public services (electricity, oil and gas, telecommunications) and 
financial services (banks) were sold to the private sector. The privatization of these 
national companies was one of the most salient and controversial reforms because they 
attracted a lot of foreign bidders. According to Casilda Béjar (2002, p. 70), more than a 
thousand Latin American state companies were privatized between 1988 and 2000. Both 
the nature and the intensity of the economic reforms implemented by the Latin 
American governments and, of course, the favourable international economic 
environment, pulled a lot of foreign capital to the region. In 1990, Foreign Direct 
Investment amounted to $14 billion, by 1997 it had risen to $86 billion (Casilda Béjar, 
2002). 
 
And there were other factors. In the 1990s, international organizations started to 
consider Latin American countries as emerging economies. The creation of economic 
agreements such as NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement) between the 
US, Mexico and Canada in 1994, and Mercosur (Mercado Común del Sur or Southern 
Common Market) between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela in 1995 
gave Spanish and other foreign companies additional confidence. The explosive 
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 The implementation of the Washington Consensus’ policies did not always have the hoped-for effects on 
economic growth or reduction of poverty, to name just a few. This has led Naím and Lozada (2002) to describe 
the Latin American experience of the 1990s as characterized by “the good, the bad and the ugly”. They see the 
resurgence of democracy, the implementation and subsequent resilience of the market oriented reforms, the 
taming of inflation, the return of foreign investment to the region, and the unprecedented degree of economic 
integration inside the region as the positive effects of the reforms, but they also elaborate on the negative 
consequences, such as Latin America’s continued vulnerability to external economic shocks, a tepid and 
volatile record of economic growth, continued poverty and income inequality, and the weakness of the 
region’s public institutions. They also refer to the ugly: the new and challenging problems such as the surge in 
violence and crime in the region. 
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demographic trends in these Latin American countries also opened up market 
possibilities for international companies interested in expanding their activities. The 
Spanish companies saw in Latin America a unique opportunity to grow revenue and 
profits, particularly after the entry into the European Union had increased competition 
in their home economy. For example, in the ten-year period between 1992 and 2002, the 
consumption of electricity per person increased by 186% in Chile, by 84% in Peru and by 
71% in Argentina (Vegas, 2006, p. 4). 
 
There are also a number of pull factors that only apply to the Spanish companies. 
Some of these result from the shared history between Spain and Latin America (see also 
section 2.1.1). Indeed, the Spanish investors considered the existing cultural and 
linguistic bonds to be an important competitive asset because they facilitated transfer of 
knowledge, management practices and corporate cultures, and allowed for a faster and 
more efficient implementation of new technological tools (Casilda Béjar, 2002; Kogut & 
Singh, 1988). They assumed, for instance, that the knowledge, products and services 
they had developed in their home country could be easily transferred to the Latin 
American market because they shared the same language (Toral, 2008). Noya (2009) adds 
another factor related to the linguistic bond. He recalls that in the 1980s and early 
1990s, most Spaniards were not exactly fluent in other languages and certainly not in 
English. As a result, chances of success in non-Spanish speaking regions were relatively 
small12 (Noya, 2009, p. 318). 
 
Spanish political leaders have also played an important role in paving the way to 
Latin America for the Spanish investors. In 1981, the first foundations were laid for 
extensive cooperation between Spain and Latin America when the Spanish government, 
backed by King Juan Carlos I, began to plan the commemoration of the 500th anniversary 
of the discovery of the New World. These celebrations, called The quincentennial of the 
discovery of America: Encounter between two worlds, would be spread over a decade. They 
were a mainly a Spanish initiative, but they were organized in collaboration with Latin 
American governments. According to Baklanoff (1996, p. 111), the commemoration 
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 Brazil needs to be treated as a special case. The country also received substantial Spanish FDI in the 1990s 
(especially in the second half of the decade) but the official language is Portuguese, not Spanish. In terms of 
the economic conditions in the 1990s, Brazil was not different from the other Latin American countries. The 
same deregulation reforms inspired by the Washington Consensus were introduced and several state 
companies were privatized. Moreover, the language barrier between Spanish and Portuguese was less of an 
issue than between, for instance, Spanish and English. According to several Spanish managers Toral (2005, p. 
43) interviewed for his study, it was not that difficult for them to find employees who spoke Galician and who 
could, therefore, operate comfortably in a Portuguese-speaking environment.  
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“served as a point of departure for Spain’s long-term objective vis-à-vis Latin America: 
the creation of an Iberoamerican Community of Nations”. The first Ibero-American 
Summit was organized in 1991. In 1992, the decade-long festivities surrounding the 500th 
Anniversary of Columbus’ fateful voyage culminated in the founding of the 
Iberoamerican Community. These occasions proved to be excellent platforms to re-
explore the long-standing, but sometimes eroded ties between Spain and its former 
colonies (Alloza & Noya, 2004). 
 
Finally, Spanish executives were ideally positioned to transform and lead companies 
in industries under deregulation because their own experience in Spain had taught 
them how to compete under these circumstances (Chislett, 2011). The Spanish investors 
believed that the institutional context and the macroeconomic situation in Latin 
America after the implementation of structural reforms in the 1990s strongly resembled 
the situation in Spain in the 1980s. They believed, for instance, that they had developed 
valuable know-how on how to participate in privatization processes (Toral, 2008). 
2.1.2 The first wave of Spanish Foreign Direct Investment 
In the mid-1980s, when Latin America was in the middle of a deep economic depression 
(also called Latin America’s lost decade) and Spain was concentrating on its entry into the 
European Union, Spanish entrepreneurs invested an average of $100 million per year in 
Latin America (Baklanoff, 1996, p. 117). This changed at the beginning of the 1990s 
when, inspired by the Washington Consensus, Latin American governments started to 
implement deregulation programmes and liberalization policies. The opening up of the 
business environment in Latin America made it easier for foreign companies to make 
ambitious investments. In the 1990s, Spanish companies seized the opportunity to bid 
on state enterprises that the Latin American governments wanted to privatize. During 
this decade, the growth of Spanish FDI in Latin America and the Carribean was 
spectacular. It rose from $9.2 billion in 1990 to almost $100 billion in 1999. This means 
that more than 65% of Spanish FDI in the 20th century was in fact accumulated in the 
1990s (Casilda Béjar, 2002, p. 229). Therefore, as Casilda Béjar (2002) argues, it is 
completely justified to refer to the 1990s as the Spanish Golden Decade. 
 
During those years, Spain invested more in Latin America than any other country in 
the world except for the United States, but it must be added that the US economy was 
fifteen times larger than the Spanish economy (as measured by the size of its Gross 
Domestic Product) and that the US had already had more experience in Latin America 
(on both political and economic levels) during the second half of the 20th century 
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because of the geographical proximity. Latin America is indeed often called the United 
States’ backyard for a reason (Chislett, 2003). 
 
Spanish FDI in Latin America during the 1990s was characterized by a strong increase 
in acquisitions of state enterprises by Spanish multinationals. The bulk of the Spanish 
money was invested in services, especially telecommunications, energy and banking: 
sectors that were protected like Spain’s sectors once were and that began to be opened 
up and privatized in the 1990s (Chislett, 2003, 2008b). The Spanish wave of investments 
in the region began in 1990 when the Spanish telecommunications company Telefónica 
de España acquired Argentina’s ENTEL after privatization and reached a peak in 1999, in 
terms of amount of investments, when the Spanish oil company Repsol acquired 
Argentina’s YPF after privatization for around $15 billion (see also section 2.2.3). 
 
Between 1990 and 2000, eight large Spanish companies invested more than $85 billion 
in the region: Telefónica de España, Endesa, Repsol, Iberdrola, Gas Natural, Santander, 
Central Hispano, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria and Unión Fenosa (Casilda Béjar, 
2002). According to Durán (2005, p. 25), their actions had a “pull effect on smaller 
Spanish firms that also became multinationals in Latin America”. In 1994, Spanish 
investments in Latin America ($4.1 billion) surpassed the investments in the European 
Union ($2.8 billion) for the first time. By then, they represented 55% of total FDI in the 
region (Casas Gragea, 2001). Latin America became increasingly popular and other big 
companies such as Endesa, Iberdrola and Repsol followed Telefónica de España and also 
made their appearance in the mid-1990s. The Latin American acquisition strategies 
initiated by the Spanish banks in 1995 were also highly significant (Casilda Béjar, 2002). 
In 1997, FDI outflows exceeded inflows for the first time in Spain’s economic history. In 
1999 and 2000, for the first time in history, Spain surpassed the United States as the 
region’s biggest investor. 
 
Casilda Béjar (2002), refering to the 2001 UNCTAD report, states that in 1999, Spain 
became the world’s sixth biggest investor abroad ($43 billion). The United Kingdom 
came on top ($206 billion), ahead of the United States ($136 billion). In Latin America, a 
quarter of the FDI was made by Spanish companies. Table 7 shows in which Latin 
American countries Spanish companies invested during the 1990s. It shows the 
exponential growth in Argentina and Chile and the (sharp) falls in Peru and Puerto Rico 
at the end of the decade (Casilda Béjar, 2002). 
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Table 7 A decade of Spanish investments in Latin America (1990-1999) (Casilda Béjar, 2002, 
p. 249) 
 Spanish FDI ($ billion) 
1990 1995 1999 
Argentina 136 919 16,378 
Brasil 79 108 733 
Chile 22 57 3,682 
Colombia 3 24 455 
Mexico 82 242 321 
Peru 2 309 142 
Puerto Rico 111 458 312 
Venezuela 15 5 307 
As can be observed in Table 7, Argentina was the most popular country for Spanish 
investors in 1999. Repsol’s acquisition of YPF is probably the most emblematic example 
of this. Its $15 billion acquisition of the Argentine oil giant YPF was the largest single 
investment made by a single Spanish company until Telefónica’s $31 billion purchase of 
the UK mobile company O2 in 2006 (Chislett, 2008b). The YPF deal accounted for almost 
20% of Spain’s total FDI in Latin America between 1992 and 2001 (Chislett, 2003, p. 22). 
The second largest investment in 1999 was made in the financial sector (SCH and BBVA 
in Mexico). The telecommunications sector came in third place (Telefónica), followed by 
the utilities sector (Endesa, Iberdrola, Unión Fenosa and Aguas de Barcelona) (Casilda 
Béjar, 2002). 
 
At the beginning of the 21st century, Spanish companies were playing leading roles in 
telecommunications, electricity, water and financial services throughout Latin America. 
Moreover, the region was becoming increasingly important for the further development 
of these Spanish companies into significant players in the international corporate 
landscape. In 2000, Repsol-YPF’s sales in Latin America accounted for 25% of its total 
sales. In the case of Telefónica, the sales amounted to 57% (Chislett, 2003). By the early 
2000s, Telefónica had become the leading player in the Latin American 
telecommunications sector, Endesa the largest foreign producer of electricity in the 
region and Repsol-YPF the largest producer of oil and gas (Durán, 2005, p. 26). 
 
In 2000, the flow of FDI fell sharply compared to 1999, as can be observed in Figure 3. 
This downward trend can be explained in part by the effect of the multibillion dollar 
acquisition of YPF in Argentina. However, the financial crises in a number of Latin 
American countries between 1999 and 2002 also played a major role. 
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Figure 3 FDI by Spanish companies in Latin America (1990-2002) (Chislett, 2003, p. 21) 
The financial crises in Latin America at the beginning of the 21st century demonstrated 
how important the region had become, not only for the Spanish companies operating 
there, but for the entire Spanish economy. The Argentine default and devaluation of the 
peso in December 2002 made that painfully clear. Shares of the Spanish multinationals 
that were most exposed to the Argentine crisis dropped up to 20% more than their 
European competitors (Guillén, 2006). The capital loss for the Spanish companies due to 
the peso devaluation was estimated at $14 to $15 billion and the IBEX-35 index of the 
Madrid stock exchange, where most of the affected companies were listed, lost 48.1% in 
those three years (Vegas, 2006, p. 5). 
 
Unlike many other multinationals from other countries, the Spanish companies did 
not pull out of the region13. According to Chislett (2008b, p. 167), “they have 
demonstrated a notable capacity of resistance to the periodic crises that hit Latin 
America”. This does not mean, however, that the Spanish investors did not learn 
anything from these crises. In order to counterbalance future risks, the Spanish 
companies started to diversify their FDI. Instead of continuing to pour money into Latin 
America, they started to invest in other regions as well. 
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 Nevertheless, the Spanish economy remained highly sensitive to the developments in Latin America. On 22 
October 2008, the Ibex-35 dropped 8.1%, the second biggest fall in its history, after the Argentine government 
announced it would nationalise pension funds (Chislett, 2008a). 
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2.1.3 The second wave of Spanish Foreign Direct Investment 
The Spanish investments in the 1990s and early 2000s show a clear pattern in terms of 
geographical distribution. This pattern consists of two phases, divided by the Latin 
American financial crises at the beginning of the 21st century. In the first phase, starting 
at the beginning of the 1990s and flourishing at the end of the 20th century, Spanish 
companies focused mainly on acquisitions (after privatization) in Latin America. In the 
second phase, the Spanish companies started to diversify their investments into other 
parts of the world14, mainly in Europe, especially in the UK, in the US and, to a lesser 
extent, in Asia (Chislett, 2008b). 
 
The European Union is Spain’s main trading partner, especially after its entry into 
the Union in 1986. Nevertheless, it took until 2003 before the Spanish flow of FDI into 
the region really began to take off. The Spanish investors mainly turned to the UK 
because, according to Chislett (2008b), the UK economy was very attractive for Spanish 
companies because it was one of Europe’s most open markets, “with few protectionist 
instincts, unlike France and Italy, where Spanish companies and banks have run into 
countless obstacles”. 
 
The second wave of Spanish FDI was led by a number of large Spanish companies. In 
2004, Spain’s biggest bank Santander bought the leading UK-based mortgage bank 
Abbey National Bank in a deal valued at $15 billion (Guillén & Tschoegl, 2008). In 2006, 
electric utility company Iberdrola acquired ScottishPower and water and waste utility 
company Agbar purchased Bristol Water (Chislett, 2008b). That same year, construction 
and infrastructure company Ferrovial acquired the British Airports Authority (BAA) and 
Telefónica purchased O2, the largest mobile phone company. In fact, these two 
acquisitions accounted for 33.4% of the UK’s total FDI inflows of that year ($53.5 billion) 
(Chislett, 2008b, p. 169). Telefónica’s acquisition of O2 was the world’s second largest 
cross-border deal in 2006, Ferrovial’s purchase of BAA the third largest. Iberdrola’s 
acquisition of ScottishPower was the biggest in the first half of 2007 (Chislett, 2008b, p. 
169). 
 
Spanish companies have also entered the United States and Asia, albeit to a lesser 
extent. In 2007, Spain’s second largest bank Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA) 
 
                                                     
14
 This does not mean, however, that the Spanish investors totally ignored Latin America at the beginning of 
the 21st century. On the contrary, although a number of notable investments in Europe drew attention away 
from Latin America, Spain remained the second largest investor in the region, behind the United States 
(Fernández-Maldonado Mujica, 2006). 
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acquired the Alabama-based financial holding Compass Bancshares for approximately 
$9 billion (Chislett, 2011). In Asia, Spanish investors made small investments, almost all 
of them in China. Telefónica purchased a 5% stake in China Netcom, the country’s 
second largest fixed-line operator in 2005 (Chislett, 2008b). In 2006, BBVA acquired a 5% 
stake in Citic Bank, China’s seventh-largest lender (in terms of assets) and a 15% stake in 
Citic International Financial Holdings, its Hong-Kong-based offshoot for $1.3 billion 
(Chislett, 2008b). BBVA stepped up its holding in Citic Bank to 15% in two stages, 
through an agreement in 2008 and by exercising an option in 2009 (Dow Jones 
Newswires, 2012, 4 July). In 2008, Telefonica reached a 5.38% participation in China 
Unicom. This strategic alliance was strengthened in 2009, but the company sold a 4.56% 
stake in 2012 (Telefónica.com, 2014). These facts and figures illustrate the enormous 
progress the Spanish economy and its companies made in the second part of the first 
decade of the 21st century. In fact, Spain enjoyed a miraculous period of economic, 
political and social progress that had started in the 1980s (Chislett, 2008b). 
 
However, things were about to change. In 2007, Spanish FDI reached a historic peak 
of $137 billion (Chislett, 2012b, p. 15) but the Spanish economy was already starting to 
shrink dramatically at that moment. In 2008, it became clear that Spain had lived 
beyond its means for more than ten years (Chislett, 2012b). Initially, Spain’s spectacular 
2008 sporting summer15 drew attention away from the economic problems the country 
was facing, but in 2009, the country plunged into a deep recession16. According to 
Chislett (2012b, p. 2), the origins of this severe economic crisis were to be found in “a 
lopsided and unsustainable economic model, excessively based on a housing and 
construction boom which burst, and high levels of indebtedness, particularly among 
households and the private corporate sector”. The shortcomings of this unsustainable 
model led to a dramatic increase in unemployment rates: from 8% in 2007 to 25% in the 
third quarter of 201217 (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 2012). The Spanish economy 
only started to come out of this recession at the end of 2013. After nine consecutive 
quarters of declining output, Spain’s GDP rose 0.1% in the third quarter of 2013. A tiny 
improvement perhaps, but a keenly-awaited shift in the economic trajectory (Financial 
Times, 2013, 23 October). The economic recovery was confirmed by the results of the 
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 In just two months (July-August 2008), the national football team won the UEFA European Championship, 
Carlos Sastre won the Tour de France and Rafael Nadal triumphed at both Wimbledon and the Beijing Summer 
Olympics. 
16
 A recession is usually defined as two consecutive quarters of negative growth in real Gross Domestic 
Product. 
17
 In certain regions, these rates rose up to more than 30%: Andalucía, Canary Islands, Extremadura, and the 
two Spanish enclaves in Morocco, Ceuta and Melilla (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 2012). 
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first quarter of 2014, in which Spain’s national output rose 0.4%, the fastest growth rate 
in six years (Financial Times, 2014, 24 April). 
 
Despite the catastrophic reports on the state of their home economy around the year 
2010, the Spanish companies that had benefited from the growth in the 1990s to become 
solid multinationals continued to report excellent performance figures. The reasons for 
their good results are to be found in their decision to geographically diversify their 
investments. Thanks to this decision, they were able to withstand the recession 
relatively well (Chislett, 2011). More than 20 companies have achieved “leading 
positions in their respective fields in the global market” (Chislett, 2011, p. 2). According 
to Interbrand, a global branding consultancy, two of Spain’s largest multinationals are 
among the world’s 100 most valuable brands: Santander (76) and Zara (37), which is 
sometimes called the new Spanish empire on which the sun never sets (Interbrand, 2012). In 
the first half of 2012, the companies that form the Ibex-35 earned, as a whole, 60% of 
their revenues abroad: Acerinox (stainless steel) generated 92% of its revenues abroad, 
ACS (construction) 81% and Santander (banking) 79% (Chislett, 2012b, p. 14). 
 
All in all, Chislett (2012a, p. 11) qualifies the process of internationalization as “very 
positive” even though he does add two dramatic setbacks. In 2012, both the Argentine 
and Bolivian governments announced that they had decided to renationalize some of 
the utility companies that were privatized during the 1990s: Transportadora de 
Electricidad, a subsidiary of Red Eléctrica, in Bolivia, and YPF, a subsidiary of Repsol, in 
Argentina (see also section 2.2.5). 
2.1.4 Reactions to Spanish Foreign Direct Investment: Spain, Latin 
America and Argentina 
Spain’s leap onto the world economic stage in the 1990s came as a surprise to many 
observers. The international business media, including influential newspapers such as 
the Financial Times and the Wall Street Journal, paid considerable attention to the wave 
of Spanish investments in Latin America. Of course, the sheer volume of the Spanish FDI 
can be seen as one of the reasons why the Spanish business manoeuvres were 
considered newsworthy. There are, however, three other striking features that gave the 
Spanish investments much more visibility than those made by other foreign investors: 
their temporal, geographical and sectoral concentration (Alloza & Noya, 2004). The 
concentration in these three areas fed the idea of a renewed sphere of Spanish influence 
in Latin America. As a result, news media from all over the world started to compare the 
Spanish economic expansion at the end of the 20th century to the Spanish imperial 
expansion 500 years earlier. The analysis in Chapter 3 will go deeper into the popular 
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discursive representation of the Spanish investments in the 1990s as a reconquest or 
recolonization of the continent. 
 
The first of these factors is the temporal concentration. Contrary to the North 
American (US) investors, who had been consistently intervening (both politically and 
economically) in Latin America throughout the Cold War era, the Spaniards made their 
investments almost exclusively in a period of a single decade at the end of the 20th 
century. More than 65% of Spanish FDI invested in the 20th century was accumulated 
during the 1990s (Casilda Béjar, 2002). 
 
The second characteristic is the geographical concentration. In the 1990s, the Spanish 
investors set their sights almost exclusively on Latin America and on four countries in 
particular: Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico. Argentina was the largest recipient of 
Spanish FDI until 1999, when it was overtaken by Brazil. According to Noya (2009, p. 
316), citing data from 2007 published by the Inter-American Development Bank, 
Argentina and Brazil account for more than 60% of cumulative investment in the region 
(30% each). The third largest recipient is Mexico (16%), followed by Chile (9%). 
 
The most striking feature was the sectoral concentration. Two thirds of the Spanish 
FDI in Latin America were in telecommunications, banking and oil, gas and electricity 
(Guillén, 2006). The Spanish investments need to be situated in the context of the 
massive privatizations undertaken by the Latin American governments who were trying 
to reform their economies by applying the reforms proposed by the Washington 
Consensus. A great number of Spanish companies, which had outgrown their domestic 
market in Spain, took advantage of these privatization processes. As a result, Spanish 
companies became increasingly powerful in the public utilities sector of these Latin 
American countries. 
 
The sectoral concentration is probably what fuelled the idea of a Spanish reconquest 
the most. Spanish investors took over Latin American companies in highly visible and 
regulated sectors which are traditionally scrutinized by both politicians and opinion 
makers. Acquisitions in recently liberalized sectors are often politically controversial 
because some of these sectors have a clear tendency to become monopolies (Guillén, 
2001). Typically, governments try to keep some influence over the companies’ strategic 
decisions (such as price-setting). Some of these sectors are also of great importance for 
international relations (the energy sector in particular). Moreover, these sectors also 
have an immediate impact on local consumers because price increases are felt 
immediately, especially in countries where income distribution is highly unequal. As a 
result, in a number of Latin American countries, a large proportion of the population 
believed that Spanish companies actively and knowingly participated in the plundering 
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of the countries’ riches during the 1990s (Guillén, 2005). For many, the loss of control over 
these national companies was accompanied by a considerable loss of national pride. The 
analysis in Chapter 4 will, among other things, take a closer look at the discursive 
representation of these nationalistic feelings in the context of a specific Spanish 
acquisition of a Latin American company after privatization: Repsol’s 1998-1999 
acquisition of YPF. 
2.1.4.1 Spanish perspectives on Spain’s economic expansion 
Spaniards generally felt proud of the economic role the new Spanish multinationals 
came to play (Martín & Toral, 2005). Many Spanish managers at the time insisted that 
they saw the shared cultural-linguistic affinity as an important comparative advantage 
(Baklanoff, 1996). The long history of contacts on all levels between Spain and Latin 
America has indeed contributed to the forging of strong transatlantic ties. Social capital 
theory, for instance, also recognizes the importance of a common language and culture 
because shared values, and definitely a shared language, are shown to facilitate 
investments (Noya, 2009). According to Toral (2005), that is also how the Spanish 
investors thought about it in the 1990s. 
The managers of the Spanish firms interpreted that the common language, the 
predominantly Catholic religion, in both Spain and Latin America, and the similar 
education systems, based on the same principles and similar values, generated 
similar mindsets among the people on both sides of the Atlantic. Therefore, they 
concluded that it would be easier for them to operate in this cultural 
environment. Moreover, the linguistic and cultural similarity would also facilitate 
the interactions with the employees of their potential Latin American subsidiaries, 
and it would make it easier to move employees between the parent and the 
subsidiaries. (Toral, 2005, p. 40) 
They also claimed to have altruistic motivations, referring to the investment 
opportunities in Latin America as “a great chance to improve the economic and political 
environments of a region for which they felt a strong cultural and historical bond and 
affinity” (Martín, 2005, p. 268). 
 
The following quote, attributed to Ignacio Santillana, the CEO of Telefónica between 
1990 and 1996, also illustrates the Spanish managers’ reasoning behind the investments 
in Latin America. In the quote, he talks about the competitive advantage of the 
Spaniards compared to other foreign investors in the region. He also highlights the 
previously mentioned state of the domestic market in Spain, when the company needed 
to react quickly to adapt to the rapidly changing market conditions. In the second part 
of the quote, he goes on to refer to the enormous growth potential in Latin America, but 
he frames this in a particular way; as if the company is doing Latin America a favour. He 
  45 
claims that they “needed an urgent expansion of their telephone systems” and that the 
lacking infrastructure was “a problem” for these countries. Finally, Santillana also says 
that the believes that it was “a coincidence” that the wave of privatizations in Latin 
America coincided with Telefónica’s investments in the region. 
The internationalization of Telefónica was established on the basis of the 
competitive advantages that Telefónica had vis-à-vis the American and European 
operators. It was based on the ability to undertake important investment 
programs in short periods of time. In the decade of the 1980s, and especially in its 
last years, Telefónica faced a crisis of demand for telephones and telephone 
services in Spain. In this period, Telefónica had close to one million demands to 
install a telephone. This crisis forced Telefónica to develop efficiently large 
investment programs quickly. This know-how, which some characterized as 
“trench technology”, was very useful and extraordinarily attractive to satisfy the 
demands of the countries that needed an urgent expansion of their telephone 
systems, given the high demand of the people for telephones waiting to be 
installed. There was a coincidence, that the countries with these problems were 
involved in a process of privatization of the state-owned firms that provided the 
telecommunication services under condition of monopoly. (Santillana, 1997, p. 94; 
cited in Toral, 2005, p. 45) 
The link between multinationals’ location decisions, cultural ties and language has been 
explored by several economic studies (see, for instance, Barrios & Benito Ostolaza, 2008; 
Galan, González-Benito, & Zuñiga-Vincente, 2007). In their econometric study, Barrios 
and Benito Ostolaza (2008, p. 5) indicated that cultural ties “are found to increase the 
probability of Spanish firms investing in a given country by 44%, suggesting that both 
language and cultural links as a whole have indeed played a key role in promoting 
Spanish direct investment abroad”. 
 
But how did the Spanish public react to the Spanish investment drive in Latin 
America during the 1990s? Martín (2005) conducted two surveys in order to gauge 
perceptions and opinions of Spaniards regarding these investments. The first survey 
(conducted between 2002 and 2004) was an electronic questionnaire filled out by 648 
Spanish nationals, 353 US nationals and 752 respondents from various Latin American 
countries. The second survey was a telephone survey of 600 Spaniards in three mid-size 
cities in different Spanish regions, conducted in October-November 2004 and executed 
to corroborate the findings from the Spanish subsection of the first survey. 
 
From the first survey, Martín concluded that the general public in Spain did not 
recognize the link between cultural affinity (and altruistic motivations) and the Spanish 
investments in Latin America (only 20% did). However, the first survey did demonstrate 
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that the internationalization of the Spanish companies made the Spanish public very 
proud indeed. 
87% of the Spaniards feel either satisfied (24.53%) or proud (61.88%) of Spain’s 
economic role in the region. This finding is confirmed by the results of the second 
and shorter survey [...] where 86% of Spanish respondents are either satisfied 
(27.64%) or proud (58.67%) of Spain’s investment in Latin America since 1990. 
(Martín, 2005, p. 272) 
The opinions and perceptions of the Spanish public were in sharp contrast with those of 
the Latin American public, according to their answers to Martín’s first survey. His 
results illustrate the Latin American hurt feelings. 
77% of Latin American nationals feel either indifferent (22%) or dissatisfied (55%) 
with the new Spanish economic involvement in Latin America. (Martín, 2005, p. 
272) 
Moreover, 44% of Latin Americans defined the impact of Spanish FDI in Latin America 
for regional economic growth and development as “harmful”, while the vast majority of 
Spaniards (77.6%) defined the impact as “beneficial” (only 3.6% indicated that they were 
harmful) (Martín, 2005, p. 276). 
 
Several years later, various sources in the Spanish business sector started to admit 
that mistakes were made. Llorente18 (2008), for instance, wrote about some of these 
mistakes in a chapter on the communication strategies of Spanish companies during 
their move to Latin America. 
It is possible that some of our multinationals unconsciously showed contempt for 
the potential of their local competitors. Others even failed to realize that Spanish 
companies were not the first to discover Latin America. (Llorente, 2008, p. 452, my 
translation) 
In retrospect, many observers believe that seeing Latin America as the natural 
extension of Spain’s economy because of the linguistic and cultural similarities was 
“simply fallacious” (Guillén, 2005, p. 6) or a “fatal illusion” (Noya, 2009, p. 318). 
According to Noya (2009), the repetition of this argument as a self-evident mantra by 
Spanish investors created an illusion of closeness and it did not take long before 
misunderstandings started to poison the reputation of Spanish companies and, 
ultimately, of Spain as a country. 
 
                                                     
18
 José Antonio Llorente is the founder of Llorente & Cuenca, one of the largest communication consultancy 
companies in Spain and Latin America. 
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Spain’s international reputation indeed became a matter of concern for Spanish 
business people, government officials, media and the broad public at the beginning of 
the 21st century. In 2003, four different Spanish organizations joined forces in an effort 
to improve and manage the reputation of Spain abroad: the Madrid-based think tank 
Real Instituto Elcano, Dircom (Asociación de Directivos de Comunicación or the Association 
of Communication Managers), FMRE (Foro de Marcas Renombradas Españolas or Leading 
Brands of Spain Forum), ICEX (Instituto Español de Comercio Exterior or Spanish Institute of 
Foreign Trade). In their joint report, they stated that Spain’s current reputation was out 
of sync with reality. Therefore, they formulated a series of proposals for reputation 
improvement strategies (Elcano Royal Institute, 2003). However, the main conclusion 
was that “as a nation brand is a matter of state, beyond party or ideological differences 
because it affects everyone, it needed to be centrally coordinated with the involvement 
of both the public and private sectors” (Chislett, 2012a, p. 11). 
 
In the past, countries such as Finland, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United 
States carried out successful rebranding strategies (Chislett, 2008b). The US, for 
instance, created the Office of Global Communication (OGC) in 2002 in the aftermath of 
the Twin Tower terrorist attack and the subsequent War on Terror because the Bush 
administration believed that the country’s actions were misunderstood. The OGC was 
set up to coordinate and supervise Brand USA around the globe to alter its international 
reputation (van Ham, 2003). 
 
The FMRE (Foro de Marcas Renombradas Españolas or Leading Brands of Spain Forum) 
developed a strategy aimed at repositioning Spain’s reputation by unifying the efforts of 
three key agents: (i) competent public institutions and authorities, (ii) companies and 
brands and (iii) Spain Brand Honorary Ambassadors (key players from civil society) 
(Leading Brands of Spain Forum, 2014) (see also Vangehuchten and Crespo (2014) for a 
detailed analysis of the communicative aspects of the Spain Brand campaign). 
Internationally, the Spanish public institutions still enjoy a relatively good reputation as 
a result of the swift transition to democracy at the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 
1980s. There are also a number of Spanish companies that have become major players in 
their respective sectors, such as Telefónica (telecommunications), Santander (banking) 
and Inditex (fashion retail). Spain also produced a number of celebrities who have 
reached global stardom (in music, sports, film and others). According to Chislett (2012a), 
“all the elements are there”, but the most difficult part is to join and coordinate the 
efforts of these three agents. 
 
The socialist government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (2004-2011) was reluctant 
to implement the recommendations made by the FMRE. In June 2008, recognizing the 
need to improve Spain’s reputation in view of the worsening economic crisis, the 
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government announced that a public diplomacy commission would be established in 
2009. However, nothing was done to set it up (Chislett, 2012a). In June 2012, the 
conservative government of Mariano Rajoy (2011-present) created the post of Alto 
Comisionado de la Marca España (High Commissioner for the Spain Brand). One month 
later, Carlos Espinosa de los Monteros, a former CEO of Iberia and Daimler-Chrysler, 
took up this position, serving as Secretary of State under the wing of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Cooperation. In December 2012, the official website 
http://marcaespaña.gob.es was launched to improve Spain’s reputation in the global 
arena. In a press release issued by Marca España (Spain Brand), the High Commissioner 
stated that the negative impact of the profound economic crisis on the country’s 
reputation was temporary and that it would not affect its permanent value (Marca 
España, 2012, 20 December). 
2.1.4.2 Latin American perspectives on Spain’s economic expansion 
Latin Americans generally have a favourable opinion about Spain and the Spaniards 
thanks to the cultural and linguistic proximity. The conquest and colonial period, 
however, remain a blemish on the mutual relations between Latin America and Spain. 
For many Latin Americans, the sudden arrival of Spanish capital in the 1990s triggered 
the memory of colonial times. There is, indeed, no doubt that the first wave of Spanish 
investment in Latin America profoundly changed Spain’s international reputation, 
particularly in Latin America. 
 
Before the 1990s, Latin Americans saw Spain as very similar to their own nations in 
terms of development. The swift transition from dictatorship to democracy at the end of 
the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s was also viewed positively in Latin America. 
Spain’s political transition is still considered by some as a role model worthy of 
adopting, making the Spanish process synonymous with a successful regime 
change and a must-read for experts in what in some Latin American circles is 
called transitología. (Roy, 2005, p. 289, italics in original) 
The economic progress and modernization in Spain after the entry into the European 
Union were also seen as an inspiring example. When the first Spanish investors arrived 
in Latin America in the early 1990s, they were initially seen as promoters of economic 
growth and technological development (Guillén, 2005; Noya, 2002). 
 
This perception changed, however, when Spanish investors started to make massive 
and eye-catching investments in highly visible and recently deregulated sectors. 
According to Guillén (2005, p. 171) this bold move came unexpected from a country with 
an “inherited image of a backward if noble and friendly country” that for a long time 
had been “at the rear of Europe in terms of economic and social development”. In some 
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countries, the arrival of the Spanish investors stood in stark contrast to the image of the 
poor Spanish immigrant workers that had moved to Latin America in the 1950s and 
1960s in search of a better life. 
From the low-key bodega de la esquina and the isolated teachings in a university in 
Mexico, the new Spaniards came to Santiago de Chile with checkbooks in hand, 
selling portable phones in Lima, and making the water systems of Cartagena de las 
Indias work. (Roy, 2005, p. 295, italics in original) 
The Spanish companies did not always behave diplomatically and this resulted in 
accusations of “economic imperialism and blunt arrogance” (Roy, 2005, p. 292). 
According to Chislett (2003, p. 197), “there is anecdotal evidence to suggest that some 
executives have conducted themselves arrogantly”. The growing frustration with the 
Spanish investors affected the way Latin Americans saw Spain. Indeed, at the end of the 
20th century, Spain’s reputation in Latin America was inextricably linked to its 
investments in the region, with Spanish multinationals acting as their most important 
ambassadors (Guillén, 2005; Royo, 2005). 
 
The reasons why Spanish investors were perceived as new conquistadors are diverse 
and complex. Two categories can be distinguished: (i) general reasons, which affect all 
foreign investors, and (ii) specific reasons, for Spanish investors only. The general 
reasons include the growing dissatisfaction with liberal economic reforms and the 
financial crises in a number of Latin American countries at the beginning of the 21st 
century. The specific reasons include the high visibility of the Spanish investments and 
the high expectations Latin Americans had of them. 
 
The first general reason has to do with the liberal economic reforms introduced at 
the end of the 20th century. At the beginning of the 21st century, Latin Americans 
increasingly disagreed with the reforms of the Washington Consensus and the wave of 
privatizations that followed, especially in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and 
Venezuela (Guillén, 2006). According to Royo (2005, p. 76), “most Latin Americans 
believe that the free market reforms of the 1990s have done little to improve their living 
standards and have lost trust in their political leaders and institutions”. In 1998, 46% of 
the respondents to the Latinobarómetro survey believed that their country had 
benefited from the privatizations (Royo, 2005, p. 76). Five years later, in 2003, this figure 
had dropped to one in five (22%) (Noya, 2003, p. 21). Moreover, the lack of transparency 
in many of these privatizations led the general public to lose confidence in both the 
foreign companies buying the state enterprises and the ruling political classes putting 
them up for sale (Noya, 2009). The 2004 Latinobarómetro showed the degree of 
dissatisfaction with the privatization of public services in Latin America (Corporación 
Latinobarómetro, 2004, p. 42). The delegitimation reached its highest values in South 
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American countries such as Argentina and Bolivia, but the dissatisfaction was even 
greater in Central American countries. In Guatemala, for instance, 98% of the population 
was dissatisfied with the privatizations of public utility companies (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4 Latin American dissatisfaction with the privatization of public services 
(Corporación Latinobarómetro, 2004, p. 42) 
The second general reason is the occurrence of the financial crises in a number of Latin 
American countries at the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st century. The region, 
already scarred by poverty and inequality, suffered severely from these macroeconomic 
problems. As the privatizations often resulted in higher prices for consumers, the 
combination with a deep recession meant a disaster for a lot of Latin Americans, 
especially for the lower classes (Noya, 2009). The combination of the liberalization of the 
Latin American economies and the financial crises in the region at the end of the 20th 
century seriously hurt the national pride of a lot of Latin Americans. The foreign 
investors were “seen as a force undermining local and national sovereignty” (Guillén, 
2005, p. 172). In many countries, nationalism started to surge and, as a result, new 
governments with a populist stance came to replace the governments that had 
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implemented the reforms of the Washington Consensus in the 1990s19 (Colombo, 2011; 
Grugel & Riggirozzi, 2009a; Nilsson, 2012; Royo, 2005). 
 
The following reasons are specific to the Spanish investors. The first specific reason is 
the aforementioned high visibility of the Spanish investments during the 1990s (see also 
section 2.1.4). Spanish companies invested primarily in highly regulated sectors, 
acquiring former state-owned utility companies (telecommunications, water, 
electricity). These were highly visible industries for the average Latin American citizen 
because they were considered to be basic public services (Toral, 2005). With a large 
proportion of the population living below the poverty line, the Spanish business actions 
immediately had an enormous social impact (Royo, 2005). When the economic crises 
struck a few years later, the Spanish companies became an instant target for social 
discontent (Chislett, 2003). The 2004 Latinobarómetro showed the degree of 
dissatisfaction with the privatization of the public sector in Latin America (Corporación 
Latinobarómetro, 2004, p. 42). The delegitimation reached its highest values in South 
American countries such as Colombia and Argentina, but the dissatisfaction was even 
greater in Central American countries. In Guatemala, for instance, 98% of the population 
was dissatisfied with the privatizations of public utility companies. 
 
It also did not take long before testimonies of corrupt politicians and bribery found 
their way into the Latin American public opinion (see, for instance, Cecchini & Zicolillo, 
2002). According to Noya (2009), Spain’s reputation took such a serious hit in Latin 
America because of the frequent accusations that Spanish companies had abused their 
influence when they made dubious deals to acquire recently privatized companies. 
However, he is quick to point out that “our country” was not the driving force behind 
the Washington Consensus and that other foreign investors also participated in the 
“alleged looting” of the continent (Noya, 2009, pp. 334-335, my emphasis). 
 
The second specific reason has to do with the extremely high expectations Latin 
Americans initially had of the Spanish investments in their countries. The Spanish 
investors learned the hard way that cultural and linguistic proximity did not mean the 
same thing for Latin Americans. Whereas the Spanish investors considered cultural and 
linguistic proximity to be a competitive asset, for Latin Americans it meant that they 
expected the Spanish investors to behave differently than other foreign investors. 
 
                                                     
19
 In 1998, Hugo Chávez’s victory in the Venezuelan presidential elections was the first of a series of left-wing 
electoral successes in Latin America. Chile, Brazil, Ecuador, Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Peru, 
Paraguay, Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua followed. 
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Spanish investors were often compared to North American investors in the context of 
their FDI in Latin America (see, for instance, Alloza & Noya, 2004; Noya, 2004). For 
decades, US investors had shown little commitment towards improving local 
communities. They were often referred to as ugly Americans but, at the same time, that 
was the behaviour they had come to expect from North Americans. The situation was 
completely different for the Spanish investors. When they first came to the region, they 
were expected to behave differently, less aggressively than the US investors. Latin 
Americans saw the Spaniards as hermanos (brothers) and they hoped that they would be 
more committed to the welfare of the population and the modernization of the region 
(Alloza & Noya, 2004). When this turned out to be an illusion, it came as a great shock 
and after decades of blaming the US for the ills of their societies20, Latin Americans 
started pointing the finger to Spanish investors. The ugly American became the ugly 
Spaniard (Roy, 2005). 
 
The Spanish investors were indeed accused of behaving in authoritarian ways, 
treating local employees disrespectfully and showing little interest in their talents and 
competences. A common complaint was that management positions seemed to be out of 
reach for local managers because they were often replaced by Spanish expatriates 
(Alloza & Noya, 2004). These managerial decisions only reinforced the neocolonial 
reputation of the Spanish investors. Indeed, since the new owners of many of the 
recently privatized companies were Spaniards, they were “prone to accusations of 
dispossessing countries of their wealth, as happened during the colonial period” 
(Chislett, 2008b, p. 219). 
 
In 2000, the ENEAS project, a qualitative research programme funded by a group of 
Spanish multinationals that were experiencing difficulties in Latin America because of 
this new conquest syndrome, found that most Latin Americans evaluated the situation 
negatively (Noya, 2009). The neoliberal reforms of the 1990s were becoming 
increasingly unpopular and the Latin American public perception of the Spanish 
companies that benefited from them rapidly worsened. The accusations of monopolistic 
practices, repatration of profits and corruption intensified the negative evaluation of 
the Spanish business actions in the region (Royo, 2005). There were, of course, local 
differences. The attitudes worsened most intensively in those countries with a large 
presence of Spanish companies, such as Argentina and Peru. According to Guillén (2005, 
p. 173), “popular support for privatization fell from 51% to 33% in Brazil, from 51% to 
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 According to Roy (2005, p. 292), blaming the ills of their societies on the US is the old-fashioned excuse of 
“Latin American political radicals and most of the intellectual ranks”. 
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29% in Chile, from 44% to 22% in Peru, and from 32% to 12% in Argentina”. The 2003 
Latinobarómetro refers to Argentina as the “paradigmatic case” of popular 
dissatisfaction with the Spanish investments (Noya, 2003, p. 21). 
 
After this dark period in the aftermath of the Latin American economic crises at the 
beginning of the 21st century, the general economic context of the region improved 
significantly. Latin America experienced a few years of unprecedented economic growth 
which resulted in a decline in poverty rates. However, the business environment is still 
not very friendly to foreign investors (Chislett, 2008b) and end consumers continue to 
reject privatizations (Noya, 2009). The rise of nationalist feelings following the economic 
crises did not make it easier for Spanish and other foreign companies to operate in the 
region. In countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela and Argentina, foreign 
investors worried about the left-wing nationalist tone and incendiary speeches of 
government officials. Their concerns proved to be justified as some of these 
governments indeed intensified their criticism and eventually moved against some of 
the Spanish companies operating in their territory. In April 2012, President Cristina 
Fernández de Kirchner of Argentina renationalized the oil company YPF by 
expropriating the shares held by the Spanish company Repsol (see also section 2.2.5). A 
month later, President Evo Morales of Bolivia announced the nationalization of the 
Bolivian unit of the Spanish power transmission company Red Eléctrica Española. 
2.1.4.3 Argentine perspectives on Spain’s economic expansion 
Argentina is often cited as the paradigmatic example of the enormous impact of the 
Spanish investments on Spain’s reputation in Latin America (Chislett, 2003; Guillén, 
2005; Noya, 2004, 2009; Roy, 2005). Initially, Spain enjoyed a good reputation in 
Argentina. According to a survey conducted at the end of the 1980s in five Latin 
American countries, 80% of the Argentine respondents considered Spain to be similar to 
their own country. This percentage was higher than the Latin American average (76%) 
(Noya, 2002, p. 79). 
 
Between 1992 and 2000, Argentina became the main destination for Spanish FDI. 
Spanish companies such as Santander (banking), Endesa (electricity), Telefónica 
(telecommunications) and Repsol (oil and gas) made substantial investments in the 
country (Chislett, 2008b). The wave of Spanish investments in the second half of the 
1990s came as a surprise to many Argentine citizens, and to the rest of Latin America. 
According to Noya (2009, p. 336), Argentines found it particularly difficult to reconcile 
the Spanish investments with the stereotype of the poor Spanish immigrant workers or 
Gallegos as they were often called, particularly in Buenos Aires. The use of the word 
Gallegos dates from the mid-19th century when Galicians became the largest group of 
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Spanish immigrants, especially in the capital. The term is still used to this day but it has 
come to stand for all Spaniards and is often used in a derogatory way. Argentine jokes, 
for instance, are often about stupid Gallegos (see, for instance, Goebel, 2010). 
In the past, Argentines were used to seeing Spaniards, or Gallegos, working as 
doormen, domestic workers, shopkeepers and taxi drivers. The more bourgeois 
sectors are currently finding it difficult to believe that those who they still 
consider to be the children of their doormen are now playing such an important role 
in their country’s economy. The Spaniards, who had arrived with nothing more 
than a cardboard suitcase, espadrilles, berets and a passport, are now coming to 
run businesses, brandishing their degrees from the most prestigious European and 
North American universities. (Casas Gragea, 2001, p. 9, my translation, italics in 
original) 
A survey conducted by CECRA (Cámara Española de Comercio de la República Argentina or 
Spanish Chamber of Commerce in Argentina) showed that the dissatisfaction of the 
Argentine population towards the wave of privatizations rose from 27.5% in 1999 to 
60.5% in 2001 (Amado Suárez, 2003, p. 6). The 2004 Latinobarómetro reported that 75% 
of Argentines were dissatisfied with the privatizations in the public sector, whereas the 
Latin American average was 61% (Noya, 2009, p. 345). Indeed, at the beginning of the 21st 
century, Spain faced its most severe reputation crisis in Argentina. The Argentine 
population became increasingly hostile towards the Spanish companies that had 
benefited from the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s and tensions were growing. In 2002, 
for instance, two Argentine journalists published a controversial book in which they 
accused the Argentine government and both the socialist Felipe Gonzalez government 
(1982-1996) and the conservative Aznar government (1996-2004) of playing a crucial role 
in “the plundering of Argentina” (el explio de Argentina) (Cecchini & Zicolillo, 2002). 
 
According to Roy (2005, pp. 293-294) the hostilities reached such a level that 
Argentines even warned their visiting Spanish friends to avoid using the typical Spanish 
expressions vale (for okay) and to say subte when referring to the Buenos Aires 
underground system, instead of using metro, the common term in Spain. He gives a 
number of illustrative examples to prove the seriousness of the crisis. For instance, one 
popular form of protest against Spanish companies operating in Argentina, was the use 
of slogans such as ¡Gallegos fuera! (Away with Gallegos!) and Gonzalez y Aznar, el mismo 
perro con distinto collar (Gonzalez and Aznar: same dog, different collar). Iberia, the 
Spanish national airline, became one of the main targets of Argentine popular protests 
after it had made a mess of running Aerolíneas Argentinas and Austral, its sister 
company (Royo, 2005; Thwaites Rey, 2001). In 2001, Argentine citizens took to the 
streets (and football stadiums) with slogans such as Aerolíneas serán argentinas 
(Aerolíneas will be Argentine), a slogan which refers to the 1982 military conflict 
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between Argentina and Great Britain over the Falkland Islands (Las Malvinas son 
argentinas) 21 (Roy, 2005, pp. 293-294). 
 
These protests took place at the beginning of the 21st century, when Argentina was 
facing severe economic, social and institutional troubles. According to Roy (2005) 
Argentines have a long history of focusing on one social group that allegedly causes the 
ills of their society. Armony and Armony (2005, p. 44, italics in original) wrote that these 
social groups have included, at different points in time, “the intemperate immigrants, 
the ‘oligarchy’, the leftist ‘subversives’, the patria financiera, the armed forces, the state 
bureaucracy, and more recently, the ‘political class’”. At the beginning of the 21st 
century, they found a scapegoat in the foreign (particularly Spanish) investors who 
were held responsible for the country’s economic crisis. 
 
The economic crisis, and the social problems arising from it, also led to a deep 
political crisis in Argentina. The economic reforms of the Washington Consensus were 
implemented vehemently by the Argentine government of Carlos Menem, mainly 
between 1991 and 1999. The state’s influence on the economy was drastically reduced 
when a great number of state-owned enterprises were privatized22 (e.g. Aerolíneas 
Argentinas, Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones, Ferrocarriles Argentinos, Gas del 
Estado, YPF) (Wylde, 2011). When the economic crisis struck Argentina at the end of 
1999, Menem, and his neoliberal policies, were voted out of office. He was succeeded by 
Fernando de la Rúa (1999-2001), but the Argentine crisis was so severe that the country 
was virtually ungovernable. The poverty indicators skyrocketed and the Argentine 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell by more than 10% (Bernal-Meza & Fryba Christensen, 
2012). 
 
At the end of 2001, the people in Argentina massively took to the streets beating pots 
and pans (the so-called cacerolazos), demanding an end to the neoliberal economic 
policies implemented during the 1990s. These protests represented a general rejection 
of the establishment, which was unambiguously illustrated in their slogan ¡Que se vayan 
todos! (Away with them all!) (Dinerstein, 2003; Rovira Kaltwasser, 2010). De la Rúa was 
forced to resign in December 2001 after the cacerolazos. Argentina witnessed a series of 
remarkable events during that month, including the largest sovereign debt default in 
history ($155 billion) (Chislett, 2008b). 
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 The Falkland Islands are called las (Islas) Malvinas in Spanish. 
22
 According to Wylde (2011) the opening up of the economy had actually begun in 1988 under president Raúl 
Alfonsín (1983-1989). In 1983, he took office as president of Argentina after almost eight years of military rule. 
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In the space of a mere fifteen days, the country saw five presidents, the largest 
debt default the world has ever seen, the abandonment of the ten-year-old 
currency exchange regime that had formed the contractual basis of the whole 
Argentine economy since its inception in 1991 (Convertibilidad), and the 
devaluation of the peso. (Wylde, 2011, p. 437, italics in original) 
After a month of chaos, on 2 January 2002, Eduardo Duhalde (2002-2003) was appointed 
President of the Republic of Argentina by the Legislative Assembly. His task was to serve 
a few months until the chaotic situation of the country could be controlled. In the end 
he stayed in office for more than a year. He guided Argentina through a deep recession 
during 2002 and early 2003. Between 1998 and 2002, the country’s GDP fell by 18%. As a 
result, output in 2002 was similar to that of 1993 (Blázquez & Sebastián, 2004, p. 1). In 
2002, the Argentine economy contracted by a massive 10.9%. Official unemployment 
peaked at 21.5% (Wylde, 2011, p. 437). 
 
Foreign investors were inevitably hit by Argentina’s financial meltdown, even though 
the impact “was not as hard as some had anticipated, and it did not spread to the rest of 
Latin America” (Chislett, 2008b, p. 153). But what was the impact on the Spanish 
companies? After all, Argentina received more than 30% of the Spanish investments in 
Latin America during the 1990s (the same amount as Brazil, but the Argentine economy 
is smaller) (Blázquez & Sebastián, 2004). The largest Spanish companies operating in the 
country when the crisis broke were Repsol YPF, Santander Central Hispano, BBVA, 
Telefónica, Endesa, Gas Natural, Mapfre and Aguas de Barcelona. The share prices of all 
Spanish companies with large investments in the country took a severe beating 
(Chislett, 2008b). Even though the Spanish economy as a whole remained largely 
unaffected, some Spanish companies without operations in Argentina were also badly 
hit by the crisis. They suffered from the so-called stock-market financial contagion: 
investors no longer regarded investing in these Spanish companies as safe and wanted 
to let go of their assets as soon as possible (Blázquez & Sebastián, 2004). 
 
In terms of international relations, the Argentine financial crisis was characterized 
by mutual distrust between Spain and Argentina. For instance, when the Argentine 
government was forced to take extraordinary measures, a number of Spanish 
companies was hugely affected by them. One of these measures was the freezing of 
electricity and telephone prices (Chislett, 2008b). In response, a number of Spanish 
companies operating in the affected sectors (such as Aguas de Barcelona, Endesa, Gas 
Natural and Telefónica) “initiated an international arbitration against Argentina, 
accusing the government of breaking unilaterally the concessions that they gained 
during the 1990s, and of violating the law by freezing the tariffs of the services that they 
offer” (Royo, 2005, p. 75). The total amount of the claims for indemnification submitted 
by the Spanish firms was approximately $6.7 billion (Colombo, 2011, pp. 181-182). On the 
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other hand, the increasingly populist attitude of both the Argentine government and 
the Argentine Congress towards the Spanish investors also did not help to soften the 
crisis (Roy, 2005). Indeed, Spanish companies had become the scapegoat for the 
Argentine crisis in both political discourse and public opinion (Armony & Armony, 
2005). 
 
In May 2003, in a context marked by a wave of left-wing electoral victories in other 
Latin American countries, Néstor Kirchner won the presidential elections thanks to his 
promises to reverse the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s and radically change the 
country (Moreira & Barbosa, 2010). His political discourse focused on a “reassessment of 
the recent Menem decade in the 1990s and a public rejection of both the policies that 
led to the crisis and those that had dismantled many of the traditional social safety 
nets” (Wylde, 2011, pp. 437-438). His government set out to renationalize public utilities 
companies and facilitate the mobilization of local capital for domestic economic 
development (Colombo, 2011). 
 
This soon led to a clash between the Kirchner government and some of the sectors 
that had been favoured during the 1990s (Colombo, 2011). Foreign companies, especially 
Spanish multinationals, were accused of extortion and blamed for the ongoing energy 
crisis (Royo, 2005). At first, President Kirchner took a tough stance against these 
companies. In July 2003, as part of his first visit to Spain, Néstor Kirchner gave a speech 
at the influential Spanish Business Confederation (Confederación Española de 
Organizaciones Empresariales or CEOE) in Madrid, “including the use of the harshest 
language” (Roy, 2005, p. 294), as can be observed in the following excerpt of his speech. 
We must speak with absolute clarity here, because there is a lot of hypocrisy when 
the current situation is criticized. Several businessmen took part in what 
happened in the 1990s, and some of them are even present here today [...] 
Moreover, Spanish companies fared better than the Argentine. Many of the 
privatized utilities companies transferred their profits in dollars [back to Spain]. 
[...] Look, Argentina has a future with or without your help. If it is with your help, 
the better. Without your help it will be more difficult to recover, but we will move 
forward. (Kirchner, 2003; cited in Colombo, 2011, pp. 180-181, my translation) 
Néstor Kirchner’s tough stance did not improve relations between the two sides. Despite 
their animosities, a series of long and difficult negotiations was started between the 
Argentine government and the Spanish business sector. By the end of 2003, these efforts 
started to bear fruit. The Spanish managers of Repsol YPF, Aerolíneas Argentinas and 
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Telefónica all announced new investment plans for Argentina for the period 2004-200723 
(Colombo, 2011). It must be added, however, that the negotiators were helped by the 
recovery of the Argentine economy which also improved the profitability of the Spanish 
companies. 
 
Kirchner maintained an aggressive rhetoric of confrontation with those social sectors 
which he considered to be destructores de la patria (destroyers of the Fatherland) (the 
businessmen that during the 1990s had engaged in the privatization processes, but also 
the military and the Catholic Church) (Barbosa, 2010, pp. 28-29). At the same time, 
however, he also started to proclaim the need for capitalismo en serio (serious capitalism) 
(Wylde, 2011, p. 439). Indeed, Kirchner’s political project, the so-called Kirchnerismo, is 
often described as “a blend of market-friendly economics and a nationalistic political 
project to help structure state-society relations” (Wylde, 2011, pp. 446-447). Riggirozzi 
(2009) termed it “open economy nationalism”. Some of the principles and policies 
associated with neoliberalism were accepted and put into practice (Wylde, 2011), 
including: 
the importance of sound fiscal policy, the importance of low inflation, an 
awareness of the inefficiencies associated with many forms of state intervention, 
and state ownership, the acceptance of the primacy of the market in setting 
prices, the abandonment of economic protectionism in favour of at least relative 
economic opening and regional integration, and a general welcoming of foreign 
investment. (Panizza, 2005, p. 12; cited in Wylde, 2011, pp. 439-440) 
At the same time, however, Néstor Kirchner started negotiations with Spanish managers 
to recover some of the companies that were privatized during the 1990s. Eventually, this 
resulted in the renationalization of Aguas Argentinas, in which the Spanish company 
Aguas de Barcelona owned a minority share, and in the Argentine state’s purchase of 
shares in Aerolíneas Argentinas. There were also plans to “reargentinize” 
(reargentinizar) the oil company Repsol-YPF. These plans eventually led to the 
acquisition, in 2007, of a 15% stake in YPF by the Petersen Group, property of the 
Argentine Eskenazi family (see section 2.2.4). 
 
 
                                                     
23
 In fact, FDI in Argentina recovered quickly after it had been abruptly interrupted by the financial crisis. 
Colombo (2011, p. 184) cites a study published in 2007 by the Center for Production Studies (CEP) according to 
which in 2004 investment announcements were made for $5.3 billion. In 2007, this number reached $18 billion, 
representing an increase of 240%. Moreover, the investments were no longer based on mergers and 
acquisitions but the focus shifted to the formation of capital. Between 2003 and 2007, $1.7 billion was invested 
in M&As, whereas the formation of capital reached almost $9 billion (Colombo, 2011, p. 186). 
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In 2007, Néstor Kirchner announced that he would not seek a second consecutive 
term in office in order to let his wife, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, run as the 
governing Justicialist Party’s candidate. She won the presidential elections in October 
2007 with an election programme based on the continuation of the Kirchnerismo-
tradition established by her husband. However, when she took office, she had the odds 
against her. The global economic and financial crisis of 2008 dramatically slowed down 
the recovery of the Argentine economy that had characterized the presidency of Néstor 
Kirchner (Kaufman, 2011). As a result, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner was forced to take 
an increasingly interventionist approach in order to keep the government’s active social 
policies to reduce poverty in place, such as price controls on basic services (Riggirozzi, 
2009; Tussie, 2009). She was re-elected to a second term in October 2011. 
 
The death of her husband in November 2010 (he died of a heart attack at the age of 
60) and the fact that she was diagnosed with cancer in 2011 did not soften the often 
aggressive rhetorical style she had adopted from her late husband. She repeatedly 
courted controversy in her international relations. In 2010, for example, she criticized 
Britain over the Falklands dispute in a speech to the United Nations General Assembly. 
The most controversial move of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s second term came, 
however, when on 16 April 2012 she made a televised announcement that she was 
sending a bill to Congress titled “On Argentina’s Hydrocarbon Sovereignty” to 
expropriate Repsol’s majority stake in YPF (see section 2.2.5). 
 
The (partial) renationalization of the Argentine oil company, and the arguments used 
to reclaim it, were in line with the government’s political project to take back control 
over a number of privatized companies that were lost to foreign investors in the 1990s. 
Internationally, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s decision sparked a debate about the 
role of the state in the economy. Indeed, in the Western world, the dominant 
approaches to local development remain essentially market and foreign investment 
driven. When a national government, in contrast, explicitly advocates a more statist 
approach to local development, it means that it openly challenges the mainstream. As a 
result, such a government is bound to run into serious international opposition (Grugel 
& Riggirozzi, 2009a). That is exactly what happened in April 2012. In the concluding 
Chapter 5, the insights gained from the discourse analyses of the media representation 
of Spanish Foreign Direct Investment at the end of the 20th century (presented in 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4) will be put into the perspective of this more recent 
development. 
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2.2 Socio-economic perspectives on the Argentine and 
Spanish energy sectors 
The 1999 acquisition of the Argentine oil company YPF by its Spanish counterpart 
Repsol is a textbook example of the expansion of a Spanish company into Latin America 
in the 1990s. This section contextualizes this specific acquisition after privatization in 
view of the analysis of the media representations of the Repsol-YPF case which will be 
presented in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. The first two sections below will present a brief review 
of the most important events that preceded the acquisition in both the Spanish (section 
2.2.1) and the Argentine (section 2.2.2) energy sectors. In section 2.2.3, the various 
stages in the privatization and acquisition process during 1998 and 1999 will be 
explained in more detail. Section 2.2.4 will review the conditions under which the 
Spanish-Argentine company Repsol-YPF had to work in Argentina after the Argentine 
financial crisis. Finally, the Argentine government’s decision to expropriate Repsol’s 
stake in YPF in April 2012 will be discussed in section 2.2.5. 
2.2.1 The Spanish energy sector: A brief overview 
The Spanish State took control of its national oil industry in 1927 in order to guarantee a 
steady supply for the Spanish energy market (Toral, 2008). The situation did not change 
much until the 1980s, when the future entry into the European Union forced Spain to 
reorganise the sector in order to adapt it to EU competition rules (Contín, Correljé, & 
Huerta, 1999). The deregulation measures led to a major transformation of the Spanish 
oil and gas industry. When Spain entered the European Union in 1986, it wanted a 
company that would be able to compete successfully in the future single European 
market. Therefore, Spain first created a national champion in October 1987, with the 
Spanish State as its only shareholder, by merging five existing public oil companies into 
one: Repsol (Repsol.com, 2014). Then, this national champion could be privatized, a 
process which was initiated in February 1989. However, the European Union quickly 
raised concerns about the dominant position of the still partially state-owned company 
in the mid-1990s (Toral, 2008). 
 
The increasingly competitive domestic market and the lack of oil and gas reserves in 
Spain eventually pushed Repsol out of Spain. In the middle of the 1990s, the company 
developed a strategy to grow in upstream activities (the exploration and production of 
crude oil and natural gas) in order to become less dependent on other companies for 
raw materials. Following the Spanish corporate tradition of the 1990s, Repsol turned to 
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Latin America. In Repsol’s 1996 Annual Report, CEO Alfonso Cortina declared the 
following. 
South America is an emerging area on the world economic scenario, with a rapidly 
expanding energy market, where we believe we have clear competitive 
advantages [...] The idea behind this strategic expansion is to place Repsol as an 
integrated energy company in Latin America. (Cortina, 1996; cited in Toral, 2008, 
p. 533) 
In April 1997, Repsol’s privatization process was completed, even though the Spanish 
State retained a so-called golden share in the company24. One year later, after the 
Argentine government had announced its intention to fully privatize the Argentine 
(partly privatized) crude oil producing company YPF, Repsol immediately started to 
study the possibility of tendering an offer. The Spanish company first acquired a 
majority stake when it purchased the 14.9% package that the Argentine government had 
put on the market. A few months later, at the end of April, Repsol launched a takeover 
bid for the entire company. Repsol’s $15 billion offer was historical because it was the 
largest single investment by a Spanish company at that time25 (Chislett, 2008b, p. 118). 
The Argentine state retained a golden share in YPF and a representative on the Board of 
Directors of the integrated company Repsol-YPF. 
 
Some economic liberals were convinced that Repsol’s acquisition of YPF heralded the 
true beginning of international capitalism in Latin America. The fact that the largest 
Argentine company had been purchased by a company from Spain, the former colonial 
ruler, was seen as proof of the fact that Latin America had embraced the neoliberal 
reforms of the Washington Consensus (de las Casas, 2005). In Argentina, however, 
people were less convinced. The Argentine public opinion saw the (full) privatization of 
YPF as “a loss of a national treasure and a betrayal of kin” (Shever, 2008a, p. 705) (see 
also Chapter 3 and Chapter 4). In order to understand the Argentine perspective on the 
privatization and acquisition of YPF, it is necessary to give a brief overview of the 
Argentine energy sector as well. 
 
                                                     
24
 A golden share gives its owner the power to outvote all other shares in certain specific circumstances. 
Governments often retained a golden share in privatized former state-owned companies to protect them from 
hostile takeover bids. All golden shares held by European States were ruled illegal in 2003 by the European 
Court when they were deemed contradictory to the principle of free circulation of capital within the European 
Union. Following this ruling, the Spanish State could no longer exercise its golden share rights in Repsol (and 
in three other companies where they still existed: Endesa, Telefónica and Iberia) (Gómez Ansón & Bonet 
Madurga, 2006, p. 101). 
25
 Repsol raised resources on the stock market for this bid: a capital increase of $5.7 billion and the emission of 
Eurobonds worth $7.7 billion (Toral, 2008, p. 534). 
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2.2.2 The Argentine energy sector: A brief overview 
According to a popular Argentine urban legend, oil was accidentally discovered on 13 
December 1907 by a team of engineers looking for a potable water source near 
Comodoro Rivadavia in the province of Chubut, in the south of Argentina (Shever, 
2008b). The national oil company YPF was created in 1922 by President Hipólito 
Irigoyen. It was the first entirely state-run oil company in the world (Davidovich, 1996). 
General Enrique Mosconi, a firm believer in state ownership, was appointed as the first 
director of the company. According to Solberg (1979, p. 132), “his ideas had (and 
continue to have) a powerful impact on government oil policy, both in his homeland 
and in much of the rest of Latin America”. YPF was crucial for the success of Peronism, 
the political movement around Juan Perón and his second wife Eva Perón (1946-1955), 
characterized by protectionism and state control (Riggirozzi, 2009). In the Argentine 
national consciousness, the success of the state-run YPF is intrinsically linked to the 
golden age of industrial development. For decades, the company was run exclusively by 
Argentines and it became a symbol of national development and sovereignty. 
 
Over the course of the 20th century, the Argentine oil sector was subject to several 
policy reversals, alternating between state interventionism and economic liberalization. 
After a detailed analysis of these reversals, de las Casas (2005) concludes that, 
historically, Argentina cooperates with foreign firms (out of necessity) when its power 
status is low. However, when its status is high, it curtails the cooperation. At the end of 
the 1980s, YPF needed constant financial assistance from the Argentine state (Gadano, 
1998, p. 12). In August 1989, the government of President Carlos Menem started to plan 
the privatization of the national oil company. In 1993, the first phase of the 
privatization was completed when the Argentine state sold the majority of its YPF 
shares to private investors. The state participation in the company was reduced from 
100% to approximately 20% (Yi, 2008). The speed of the privatization process under 
President Menem was extraordinary. According to Calvert (1996, p. 150), the number of 
YPF employees was reduced from 52,000 in 1990 to 12,000 by mid-1992. 
 
In 1998, President Menem, still in function, announced that his administration 
intended to sell its shares in YPF. The Spanish company Repsol immediately showed 
interest. In January 1999, Repsol first bought the 14.9% package that was put up for sale 
by the Argentine government. At the end of April, Repsol made a surprise offer to buy 
the entire company. The government retained a golden share in YPF. According to 
Serebrisky (2003) this was necessary to gain political support for the privatization and 
to appease the concerns of the Argentine public opinion. However, the majority of 
Argentines were not reassured by this. It is important to recall, in this context, that the 
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privatization and acquisition of YPF took place at a moment when the neoliberal 
reforms of the Washington Consensus were rapidly losing support (see section 2.1.4.3). 
2.2.3 1998-1999: The privatization and acquisition of YPF 
In February 1998, the Argentine government announced its plans to sell its remaining 
20.3% stake in YPF during the second half of that year (retaining a golden share and a seat 
on the Board of the integrated company). From the beginning, several parties opposed 
the decision to fully privatize this national symbol, the management of YPF, led by CEO 
Roberto Monti, in particular. 
 
The first bump in the road was caused by the market volatility during the summer of 
1998. The government decided that it would not sell all of its shares through a public 
offering because of the sharp drop in world oil prices. In November, it announced that it 
would sell 14.9% of the stock to a single buyer because this could generate a lot more 
revenue than selling them on the international stock markets. In order to further 
enhance the attractiveness of the offer, the government also suggested to amend the 
company’s articles of association, which provided that any single shareholder with a 
larger holding than 14.9% was obliged to make a cash offer for the entire company. 
 
After this announcement, the memorandum of association became the subject of a 
heated dispute between the Argentine government and YPF management. The 
government wanted to amend the articles of association to allow the winning bidder of 
the 14.9% to acquire shares from other YPF shareholders through a stock swap, instead 
of having to pay for them in cash. The idea was always to try to maximize the price a 
company would be willing to pay for the government’s 14.9% stake in the company. The 
YPF management heavily opposed the government’s proposition. At the end of 
November 1998, the Argentine Minister of Economic Affairs, Roque Fernández, and the 
CEO of YPF, Roberto Monti, declared a truce after reaching a compromise. They agreed 
that the government could sell 14.9% of its stake in YPF to a single bidder if it no longer 
sought to alter the company’s memorandum of association. The YPF management 
believed that, as a result of this compromise, the company was safe from hostile 
takeover bids for the entire company because it was assumed that the big (foreign) 
competitors of YPF would be put of by the high price they would have to pay in cash if 
they wanted to launch such a bid. 
 
In December 1998, the Argentine government invited sixteen companies to place a 
bid on the 14.9% stake in YPF. Six of them eventually signed the confidentiality 
agreement that gave them (partial) access to YPF’s books. They had time until the end of 
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January to decide if they would submit a formal bid. On 20 January 1999, Repsol emerged 
as the sole bidder, offering a total of $2.01 billion for the 14.9% stake (Grosse, 2008, p. 
118). Repsol never made a secret of its desire to take over the whole company. The 
Argentine government had also been showing signs that it would support such an 
outcome. Alfonso Cortina, Repol’s CEO, quickly reopened the debate on YPF’s articles of 
association. He tried to convince Monti once more to change the memorandum so that 
it would be possible to take full control of the company through a stock swap instead of 
a cash offer. Monti, however, stuck to his guns. Feeling backed up by the articles of 
association, he continued to rebuff Repsol’s offer. He even added fuel to the fire by 
stating that, based on calculations stipulated in the company bylaws, Repsol would have 
to pay more than $40 per share to acquire the rest of YPF’s shares. Few believed that 
Repsol would be able to raise that amount of money. 
 
And yet, that is exactly what Repsol did. At the end of April 1999, Repsol launched a 
surprise all-cash offer for the remaining 85.1% of YPF, offering $44.78 per share (well 
above YPF’s all-time high stock price). Monti felt cornered and tried to delay the 
operation by hiring Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB) to provide a so-called fairness 
opinion about Repsol’s offer26. Finally, on 11 May, after going through the advisors’ 
report, the Board of Directors of YPF dropped its opposition to Repsol’s cash offer. 
Monti issued a statement in which he declared that Repsol’s offer was “the best option 
to achieve value for our shareholders under current market conditions” (La Nación, 
1999, 11 May). As a result, Repsol could finally take full control of YPF. Overnight, it 
became the seventh largest oil company in the world. 
 
However, that did not mean that Repsol could suddenly manoeuvre freely. At about 
the same time, Argentine officials started to raise their concerns about the potential 
dominance of Repsol in the Argentine energy market. Repsol already owned 66% of 
Argentine oil and gas producer Astra Capsa, which owned 93% of service station chain 
Eg3. In June 1999, the Argentine political agenda was dominated by the attempt to 
finally pass an anti-monopoly bill, a project that had been languishing for four years and 
that would force Repsol to divest assets to keep the playing field level. On 18 June, 
Repsol sent out a press release in which it officially stated that it would comply with the 
Argentine government’s demands to divest some of its Argentine assets. On 8 July, 
Repsol communicated that an integration committee had been created to lead the 
integration process and that the company name would be changed to Repsol-YPF to 
 
                                                     
26
 A fairness opinion is “a professional opinion provided by a third party, typically an investment bank, on 
whether the price offered in an acquisition, merger, etc. is fair” (OED Online, 2014). 
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portray the company’s new status. With this communication, Repsol closed a period of 
six hectic months after it had emerged as the sole bidder for the Argentine 
government’s 14.9% stake in Argentina’s largest company. 
2.2.4 2000-2011: Steering through rough waters 
The economic climate in Argentina rapidly worsened after 1999. When the financial 
crisis hit Argentina really hard in 2001, the Argentine public opinion turned against the 
neoliberal policies of the 1990s, and particularly against the foreign investors that had 
benefited from the privatizations (Chislett, 2003). This general feeling of discontent 
eventually paved the way, in May 2003, for the electoral victory of Néstor Kirchner and 
his promise to reverse the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s. In spite of the critique 
coming from Argentina, Repsol-YPF repeatedly declared that it remained committed to 
Argentina, and to Latin America in general. Its managers repeatedly stressed that the 
company was able “to respond quickly to economic and political shocks and to negotiate 
with the governments on a regular basis” (Toral, 2008, p. 539). 
 
However, according to Amado Suárez (2003, p. 7) some multinationals operating in 
Argentina, such as Repsol-YPF, tried to respond to the pressures coming from the 
increasingly skeptical Argentine public opinion by making changes to their 
communication strategies. She points out that the Spanish company decided to no 
longer present itself in Argentina as a global company by using its full name Repsol-YPF. 
The name Repsol was considered to have too much of a Spanish ring to it and was no 
longer used in the company’s official public communication in Argentina27. The 
company went even further in its Argentina-tailored communication strategy when it 
became the main sponsor of Argentina’s national football team under the slogan YPF. 
Más que sponsor, hincha oficial de la selección (YPF. More than a sponsor. Official fan of the 
team). 
 
Repsol’s acquisition of YPF in 1999 was the company’s most ambitious investment 
programme. Since then, its investments abroad have been more modest (Chislett, 2011). 
Moreover, the Latin American financial crisis showed that the company had become too 
exposed to the region. Following the example of many other Spanish companies, Repsol 
 
                                                     
27
 Amado Suárez (2003) does add that Repsol never admitted that this change was influenced by the evolution 
of Argentine public opinion. The full name was also still used in communications for specialized audiences, 
such as shareholders, for whom it remained important to observe the global character of a multinational. 
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diversified its activities by expanding into the Middle East, Africa and North America at 
the beginning of the 21st century (Chislett, 2008b). Repsol did continue to have a strong 
connection with Argentina but, as de las Casas (2005) observed, the tensions in Latin 
America, and in Argentina in particular, continued to grow. He evidenced this claim by 
referring to the government of Néstor Kirchner, which had started to impose more 
taxes on Repsol in 2004. 
 
In 2007, the Argentine government finally succeeded in facilitating the mobilization 
of local capital for domestic economic development when the Argentine company 
Grupo Petersen, belonging to the Argentine Eskenazi family, bought a 14.9% stake in 
YPF. The government of Néstor Kirchner labelled this the partial “reargentinization” 
(reargentinización) of the former state-owned company28. Repsol explained the entry of 
the Eskenazi family to its shareholders by declaring that the company would benefit 
from the Grupo Petersen’s experience with operating in a regulated market29. In May 
2011, the Eskenazi family acquired an additional 10%, increasing its stake to 25.5%. 
Repsol did remain the majority shareholder (57.43%). 
2.2.5 2012: The expropriation of Repsol’s YPF shares 
From the moment Néstor Kirchner came to power, the Argentine government’s 
relationship with the Spanish-Argentine company Repsol-YPF became tense. At the 
beginning of 2012, the tensions peaked when both provincial and federal authorities 
started to put more and more pressure on Repsol-YPF, and other foreign oil companies, 
to boost investments in order to raise oil and gas production. They threatened to take 
away their concessions if they did not comply. After months of mounting pressures, 
President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner finally announced the expropriation of 51% of 
YPF shares on 16 April. The government only expropriated Repsol shares. The shares 
owned by the Argentine company Grupo Petersen (25.46%) and by other minorities 
(17.09%) escaped the expropriation. Repsol went from owning 57.43% of YPF to little 
more than 6%. 
 
 
                                                     
28
 The use of this term stands in contrast to the use of the term extranjerización (denationalization) which was 
often used in the context of the wave of privatizations at the end of the 1990s (see also Chapter 4). 
29
 In an article published on 4 May 2008, the Argentine quality newspaper La Nación referred to a press release 
issued by Repsol in which the Spanish company declared that “[t]he Petersen Group is the ideal partner for 
Repsol YPF because of its experience in regulated markets, its industrial and financial structure and its 
knowledge of the country’s reality, along with its 85 years of existence” (La Nación, 2008, 4 May). 
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The Argentine government legitimated its decision by focusing on two arguments: it 
denounced Repsol’s lack of investment in the Argentine oil fields and simultaneously 
stated that it wanted to recover control over a natural resource. Several analysts, 
however, also referred to another key element in the Argentine government’s decision 
to renationalize YPF. In November 2011, Repsol-YPF announced that it had made its 
biggest ever oil discovery in the Vaca Muerta formation in the province of Neuquén 
(Bermejo García & Garciandía Garmendia, 2012). 
 
Antonio Brufau, Repsol’s CEO, expressed his deepest dissatisfaction with the decision 
taken by the Argentine government. He also warned the Argentine government that 
Repsol would initiate legal actions against Argentina and that it would, in any case, 
demand just compensation for the damages and harm caused. Repsol calculated the value 
of YPF at $18.3 billion (Bermejo García & Garciandía Garmendia, 2012). The Argentine 
move against Repsol also caused a major dispute between the Argentine and Spanish 
governments. The Spanish government saw the expropriation of Repsol’s shares as an 
attack on the vital interests of the Spanish companies and, by extension, of the Spanish 
nation. Several Spanish officials warned that Argentina’s decision was an act of 
aggression against Spain that would not go unpunished (see also Chapter 5). 
 
Many Argentines supported the decision taken by their government. In the first days 
after the announcement, the University of Buenos Aires’ Centre for Public Opinion 
Research (Centro de Estudios de Opinión Pública or CEOP) conducted an opinion poll about 
the (partial) renationalization of YPF. 74% of the Argentine respondents were in favour 
of the expropriation of 51% of the YPF shares. Moreover, 67.5% wanted YPF to become a 
fully state-owned company again. 23.5% wanted it to be a private company with 
national capital. A mere 2.6% wanted it to be a private company with foreign capital. 
Only 24.8% believed that Repsol had managed the company well (Página12, 2012, 22 
April). These results were published by Página 12, a centre-left Argentine quality 
newspaper which was supportive of the Kirchner government (Dominguez, 2012, p. 80). 
The results illustrate the importance of YPF for the Argentine national consciousness. 
For many Argentines, YPF had become one of the most emblematic symbols of the 
looting of their country by foreign investors as a result of the implementation of the 
economic reforms of the 1990s. 
 
It is important to stress, however, that there was also a part of the Argentine public 
opinion that did not support the (partial) expropriation and renationalization of YPF 
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(see also Chapter 5)30. Argentine quality newspapers that were more critical of the 
Kirchner government, such as Clarín and La Nación (see Cuestas et al., 2009), reported, 
for instance, that government officials arrived at YPF’s headquarters in Buenos Aires 
immediately after the announcement with a list of names of Repsol employees who 
were asked to leave the building immediately (Bermejo García & Garciandía Garmendia, 
2012). 
 
Finally, in February 2014, after almost two years of ongoing tension between the 
Argentine government and the Spanish company Repsol, the two parties reached a 
compromise. On 27 February, President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner signed an 
agreement to pay Repsol a compensation of $5 billion in instalments through sovereign 
bonds by 2033. As part of the agreement, Repsol dropped the international judicial and 
trade complaints it had filed against Argentina (see Clarín, 2014, 28 February; El País, 
2014, 28 February). 
2.3 Discursive perspectives on Spain’s economic expansion 
When the Spanish investors started to make eye-catching investments in Latin America, 
the international news media were quick to compare them to the conquistadors known 
from the history books. The discursive traditions surrounding the discovery and 
colonization of the New World proved to be crucial for the stereotypical representation 
of the Spaniards as forceful aggressors at the end of the 20th century in the context of 
Spain’s economic internationalization. 
 
In order to understand the origins of Spain’s international reputation (and the 
prevailing stereotypes about the country), it is crucial to go back in time. Not only is 
Spain one of the first European nation-states, it is also one of the first European nations 
to have a pronounced reputation (Chislett, 2008b; Noya, 2002). The reputation of a 
nation (and its people) is usually more determined by age-old discursive traditions than 
 
                                                     
30
 In the concluding Chapter 5, a corpus of newspaper articles on the 2012 (partial) expropriation and 
renationalization of YPF will be analysed in greater detail. The analysis will, for instance, reveal the 
differences between on the one hand, the Argentine quality newspapers Clarín and La Nación and, on the 
other hand, the Argentine quality newspaper Página 12. 
  69 
by recollections of recent events. Since Spain has played a major role in European and 
World history, the country has been both admired and envied. Through the centuries, 
numerous tales and myths have transferred these mixed feelings about Spain and the 
Spaniards from one generation to the next. This stable stock of socio-culturally 
grounded narratives and stereotypes makes up Spain’s discursive legacy, which can be 
defined in broad terms as a well-established, repetitive, restrictive and culturally 
recognized way of writing and/or talking about a particular issue over time (Coy, 
Woehrle, & Maney, 2008, pp. 163-164). 
 
Three discursive traditions have been particularly influential. The oldest tradition is 
the one associated with Spain’s powerful empire in which the sun never set. In this 
discursive tradition, Spain’s European rivals, mainly protestant countries, described the 
country (and its people) as arrogant, inefficient, intolerant, violent and profoundly 
religious (section 2.3.1). In the second tradition, the French Enlightenment thinkers of 
the 18th century built upon the first tradition to construct their criticisms towards 
Spain. They attacked the country’s relics from medieval times such as the religious 
intolerance of the Inquisition, the cruelty of the colonization of the New World and the 
country’s irresponsible political ambitions (section 2.3.2). The third discursive tradition 
is to be found in the Romanticist vision from the 19th century, when Spain was seen as 
an exotic and oriental country (section 2.3.3). Section 2.3.4 will illustrate how these 
three discursive traditions continued to have an impact on Spain’s international 
reputation throughout the 20th and the 21st centuries. 
2.3.1 The Black Legend: Spain as a cruel and intolerant country 
The term Black Legend refers to a style of (historical) writing that demonizes Spain and 
the Spaniards. The term itself dates from the early 20th century but the history of the 
Black Legend is much older (Greer, Mignolo, & Quilligan, 2007; Keen, 1969). Julián 
Juderías, a Spanish sociologist and historian, coined the term in a book called The Black 
Legend and historical truth (1914) (La Leyenda Negra y la verdad histórica). In his book, 
Juderías spoke out against what he considered the malicious, unfair and biased 
representation of Spain and the Spaniards at the hands of foreign writers. 
By the black legend, we mean the atmosphere created by the fantastic tales about 
our country that have seen the light in almost all countries; the grotesque 
descriptions that have always been given of the character of the Spaniards as 
individuals and as a collectivity; the denial, or, at least, the systematic ignorance 
of everything that is positive and honorable about us in the various 
manifestations of our culture and art; the accusations that in all periods have been 
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leveled against Spain, being based in exaggerated events that are either 
misinterpreted or totally false. (Juderías, 1914; cited in Cowans, 2003, p. 111) 
Before going deeper into what Juderías called “fantastic tales”, two points must be made 
clear from the beginning. First, the word “Legend” (Leyenda) in Juderías’s term is 
unquestionably ill-chosen. Even though it may be true that some of the accounts of the 
practices of Spanish conquistadors and inquisitors contain “grotesque descriptions”, the 
basic tenets of the Black Legend are still substantially accurate. As such, as Keen (1969, 
p. 719) argues, “it is no legend at all, and the term lacks scientific descriptive value”. 
Second, it is true that, as a result of the European anti-Spanish sentiment in the 16th and 
17th centuries, the equally brutal history of other European colonizers is sometimes 
ignored. Spain’s brutality in the conquest of the New World was by no means unique, as 
several historians have shown, but the Spanish colonial empire was, indeed, the first 
(Greer et al., 2007). 
 
The rise of the Spanish empire began at the end of the Middle Ages when Spain 
became an extremely powerful empire after the discovery and the subsequent 
colonization of the New World at the end of the 15th century. In the 16th century, after 
Spain had become the undisputed power in Europe, the Spanish Kings ruled over a vast 
empire in which the sun never set. This caused envy among the other European rulers. 
In addition, the Spanish devotion to military Catholicism caused deep hatred among the 
increasing number of Protestants in Northern Europe, particularly in the United 
Provinces and England. The animosity against Spain reached a peak when Philip II took 
military action against the Protestant revolt in the United Provinces. In 1567, he sent 
the Duke of Alba to the region to stamp out heresy and political unrest. Alba 
immediately instituted a reign of terror and the violence against the people of the 
Netherlands has been historicized in prose and print, depicting the Spanish soldiers and 
administrators as “violent ruffians” (Arnade, 2008, p. 215). 
 
The same Catholic ambitions drove Philip II to plot against England in the 1580s to 
overthrow the heretic Elizabeth I. He wanted to stop her from intervening in the 
Spanish Netherlands and to protect the Spanish sea communications with its overseas 
colonies against English privateers. After Elizabeth I ordered the execution of the 
Catholic Mary, Queen of Scots, Philip II swore to invade England to place a Catholic 
monarch on the throne. In order to reach his goal, he assembled a powerful fleet that 
came to be known as the Spanish Armada. In the summer of 1588, the Spanish Armada 
was famously defeated by the English fleet. In English and Dutch eyes, the victory was 
an affirmation of Protestant superiority over their Spanish foes and in a further attempt 
to denigrate the Spaniards, the Protestants started to refer with heavy irony to the 
“Invincible Armada” (Martin & Parker, 1999, p. 243). 
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The Protestant North also found inspiration to discredit Spain in the accounts of 
depredations against the indigenous populations in America. For instance, the Duke of 
Alba’s violent repression of the Protestants in the United Provinces was compared to 
the atrocities committed by the Spanish conquistadors in the New World (Schmidt, 
2001). Ironically, the Protestant condemnation of the Spanish violence benefited from a 
Spanish source which questioned the legitimacy of the Spanish imperial enterprise in 
the New World (Greer et al., 2007). In 1552, the Spanish Dominican friar Bartolomé de las 
Casas had published his Brevísima relación de la destrucción de las Indias (Brief account of the 
devastation of the Indies) in Seville, an eyewitness account of the brutal practices that 
accompanied the Spanish conquest and colonization of the island of Hispaniola 
(modern-day Dominican Republic and Haiti). De las Casas described the Spaniards, for 
instance, as “wolves, tigers, or lions that had been starved for many days” and accused 
them of “acting like ravening beasts, killing, terrorizing, afflicting, torturing, and 
destroying the native peoples, doing all this with the strangest and most varied new 
methods of cruelty, never seen or heard of before” (de las Casas, 2008 [1552], p. 62). 
 
Passages like these made this document, and other texts published by de las Casas, 
extremely useful tools for the Protestants to further discredit the Spanish empire, its 
foreign policy and its people (Shaskan Bumas, 2000). As a result, the Brief account became 
a cornerstone of the Black Legend and de las Casas’ Latin text was reprinted, translated 
quickly and disseminated widely across Northern Europe (Greer et al., 2007; Schmidt, 
2001). According to Rummell (1998, p. 17), the translations were “usually somewhat 
loose, and at times exaggerate Las Casas’ rhetoric in order to more fully condemn the 
Spanish”. 
 
Another cornerstone of the Black Legend is Theodore de Bry. When his copper-plate 
engravings depicting the massacres unleashed by the Spanish conquistadors were added 
to the German edition of the Brief account in 1597, the message of the Spanish cruelty 
was spread out to every corner of Europe, to the literate and illiterate alike (Keen, 1969; 
Shaskan Bumas, 2000). García Cárcel (1992) even argues that these engravings have 
contributed more to the creation and diffusion of the Black Legend than the content of 
de las Casas’ Brief account of the devastation of the Indies. 
 
According to López de Abiada (2007) there never existed a concerted international 
anti-Spanish propaganda campaign but there undoubtedly existed various discursive 
traditions which sought to demonize and discredite Spain in the 16th and the first part of 
the 17th centuries, when Spain was at the height of its hegemony. The anti-Spanish 
feelings which circulated in other nations, particularly in the Protestant North of 
Europe, formed the basis for a consistently negative reading of Spain’s international 
politics. As a result, Spain became a “typological emblem of religious and political 
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intolerance, tyranny, misrule, conspiracy, cruelty, barbarity, bloodthirstiness, 
backwardness, slothfulness, and degeneracy” (DeGuzmán, 2005, p. 5). When the Spanish 
Inquisition finally banned de las Casas’ Brief account in 1660, the Jesuit Minguijón 
justified the decision by stating that foreigners used these “terrible” representations of 
the Spanish soldiers to “call Spaniards cruel and ferocious” (Torres, 2010, p. 88). 
2.3.2 The Spanish decadencia: Spain as the most backward country in 
Europe 
The decline of the Spanish empire marked the beginning of a new phase in Spain’s 
international reputation in Europe. In the second half of the 17th century, Spain was no 
longer the powerful empire it had been during the 16th century, often called the Spanish 
Golden Age. The decline of Spain has led to a long-lasting discussion among historians. 
Its roots have been traced back to Philip II, Charles V, or even to the Catholic Monarchs 
Ferdinand and Isabella (Elliott, 1961). Philip II’s failed attempt to invade England in 1588 
with his so-called Invincible Armada is sometimes seen as one of the first cracks in the 
dominance and hegemony of Spain in Europe. However, the Treaty of the Pyrenees 
(1659), which put an end to the Franco-Spanish War (1635-1659), is more often cited as a 
crucial turning point in Spain’s history. It was the first time that the House of Bourbon, 
with King Louis XIV of France, prevailed over King Philip IV’s House of Habsburg. When 
Philip IV ascended the throne in 1621, Spain was still a colonial superpower, whereas at 
the time of his death in 1665, it was a “structurally unsound and failing empire, besieged 
by a world of competitors and predators” (Stradling, 1988, p. xv). The decline of Spain as 
a world power came with a long period of socio-economic difficulties, often called la 
decadencia española (see, for instance, De Nigris, 2005). 
 
According to Kamen (1978, p. 25), “the concept of decline has never been free from 
strong political prejudices, and its dissemination owes a great deal to those very sources 
that created the Black Legend”. The idea of a Spanish empire in decline was especially 
welcomed in France, where the defeats inflicted upon the Spanish forces boosted the 
French sense of honour. The existing negative stereotypes from the 16th century were 
carried over into the writings of Enlightenment thinkers such as Montesquieu, Voltaire 
and Diderot (López de Abiada, 2007). Given their intellectual influence in 18th century 
Europe, their criticisms towards the Spanish backwardness had an important effect on 
the country’s international reputation. The article on Spain in the late-18th-century 
Encyclopédie Méthodique, written by Masson de Morvilliers, provides a clear example of 
the contempt the French philosophers felt for Spain. He concluded his lengthy account 
on Spain by asking the following (rhetorical) question. 
  73 
What do we owe to Spain? In two centuries, in four, in ten, what has she done for 
Europe? (Masson de Morvilliers, 1782; cited in Kamen, 1978, p. 31) 
In their writings, the Enlightenment thinkers attacked Spain’s irresponsible political 
ambition, the harmful effects of the Spanish colonization, the economic inefficiency of 
the Spanish ruling classes, and the legendary religious intolerance. Voltaire, for 
instance, often railed against the injustice of the Inquisition. In his essay Of the 
Inquisition, he also accused the Spaniards of committing atrocities: “The popes erected 
this tribunal with a political view, and the Spanish inquisitors added cruelty to it” 
(Smollet & Francklin, 1761, p. 146). 
2.3.3 The Romanticist vision: The exaltation of Spain as an exotic 
country 
After France had replaced Spain as the dominant power in Europe and Spain sank 
further into its decadencia, the negative stereotypes were no longer pushed to further 
extremes. On the contrary. At the end of the 18th century and particularly in the 19th 
century, European Romanticism reinterpreted the existing clichés. The aspects that 
were once criticized and seen as deficiencies explaining the decline of the empire were 
now considered virtues. The stereotypical cruelty and fanaticism cultivated by Dutch 
and English Protestants in the 16th and 17th centuries became glorified as “Spanish 
courage, unbreakable spirit and sense of honour” (López de Abiada, 2007, p. 245). 
Whereas the Enlightenment thinkers criticized the inefficient economy and poor 
infrastructure, the Romanticists extolled the Spanish decadencia arguing that the 
Spanish culture was still close to its origins, untarnished by industrialization.  
 
In the Romanticist discursive tradition, the exotic aspects of Spanish culture, 
unknown to foreigners, were exalted: the flamenco dance, the corrida or taurine games, 
the gitanos or gypsies and the Arabic influences in Spain, particularly in Andalusia, the 
country’s most southern region. A popular French phrase at the time, attributed to the 
French writer Alexandre Dumas, was: “Africa begins at the Pyrenees” (Colmeiro, 2002, p. 
130). One of the most important aspects of the exotic Romanticist vision of Spain is the 
country’s oriental character, which explains the sensuality of the dances, the origins of 
the musical tradition and the exuberant architecture of the Alhambra and the 
Generalife in Granada, to name the two best known examples.  
 
Many European Romantic writers found inspiration in this mythical Andalucía. The 
popularity of two Spanish icons can be traced back to this prolific discursive tradition: 
Don Juan and Carmen. The classic tale of Don Juan was revived in the Romantic Era by 
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Lord Byron’s epic poem Don Juan (1821) and Alexandre Dumas’ play Don Juan de Maraña 
(1831). Carmen is best known as the main character of the opera Carmen written by the 
French composer George Bizet and performed for the first time in Paris in 1875. The 
opera was based on the novella with the same title, written by French writer Prosper 
Mérimée, which had been published thirty years earlier (1845). The American writer 
Washington Irving also treasured this Romantic Spain, as can be gleaned from his Tales of 
the Alhambra (1832). 
2.3.4 The influence of Spain’s discursive legacy on the country’s 
international reputation in the 20th and 21st centuries 
The previous sections have shown that Spain’s discursive legacy consists of two 
completely opposite positions. On the one hand, there are two exceptionally critical 
discursive traditions. In Protestant writings dating from the 16th and 17th centuries, 
Spain was depicted as an arrogant, intolerant and profoundly religious European 
country. In the 18th century, the French Enlightenment continued this critical tradition 
by describing Spain as the most backward country in Europe. On the other hand, there is 
the overly romantic idea of Spain as an exotic, seductive and magical place, different 
from the rest of Europe. This positive discursive tradition was cultivated in the writings 
of European Romanticists dating from the late 18th and 19th century. These three 
influential discursive traditions form the basis of the present day stereotyped views of 
Spain held abroad. Different stereotypes can be mobilized, depending on the context 
and the message that is to be conveyed. This section will illustrate how these 
archetypical discursive traditions were reactivated in certain specific contexts in the 
20th and 21st centuries. 
 
The Romanticist vision of Spain continues to resonate until this day. In the middle of 
20th century, the American writer and journalist Ernest Hemingway gave this discursive 
tradition new impetus. Hemingway had a great fascination for Spain and he extensively 
described the Spanish culture in his work: the nature, the wine, the food, the fiestas, etc. 
He also worked as a war correspondent for the North American Newspaper Alliance 
during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). His passion for bullfighting became legendary 
through his non-fiction book Death in the Afternoon (1923). Because of this continuous 
Romanticist discursive tradition, Spain is still associated with such stereotypes as 
flamenco, fiesta and siesta. 
 
The Romanticist vision is undoubtedly beneficial for the country’s tourism industry 
but there are a number of negative side effects to be mentioned as well. The Made in 
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Spain label, for instance, does not sell well, because Spain is often seen as an inefficient 
country, incapable of producing high quality goods and services and is often not taken 
seriously (see, for instance, Chislett, 2008a; Puig & Fernández Pérez, 2009; Torres, 2010). 
Indeed, Spain is seen as a hot country: creative and passionate, but also inefficient 
compared to the cold countries, such as Germany and the UK, which are seen as 
efficient, regorous and serious (Chislett, 2008a, p. 19). The alleged Spanish laziness is 
also a case in point. The Spanish expression mañana is legendary and the announcement 
that the Spanish central government would abolish the traditional siesta made headlines 
around the globe. The New York Times (2006, 1 January), for instance, wrote that For 
many in Spain, siesta ends. Chislett (2008b) wrote about a similar anecdote. 
In October 2007, Adam Crozier, chief executive of Royal Mail, accused striking 
workers of ‘Spanish practices’ – an expression implying that they had invented all 
sorts of ruses to avoid doing a full day’s work. The Spanish embassy in London 
made its displeasure known. (Chislett, 2008b, pp. 214-215) 
When in 2007-2008 the Spanish economy crashed and entered into a deep recession, the 
international news media again tapped into the Romanticist discursive tradition. The 
Economist (2006, 6 November), for instance, published an article entitled Spain - After the 
fiesta. The Financial Times (2009, 17 February) used a similar headline for an article 
about the recession in Spain: Spain’s recession - After the fiesta. 
 
The archetype of the Black Legend also resurfaced in different contexts throughout 
the 20th century. This discursive tradition is an inseparable part of Spanish history and 
Spain still bears the consequences of the British and Dutch Protestant propaganda from 
the 16th and 17th centuries. These kind of historical bad international reputations “sleep 
lightly and are easily awakened” (O'Shaughnessy & Jackson O'Shaughnessy, 2000). In 
fact, the Black Legend already had a first revival in the early 19th century at the time of 
the Latin American Wars of Independence. The Latin American Creoles, for instance, 
exploited the myth of Eldorado. For the freedom fighters, the continent represented the 
treasure that was stolen by the Spaniards and they saw it as their duty to recover it 
(Torres, 2010). 
 
In 1898, the Black Legend resurfaced in the United States in connection with the 
Spanish-American War (Greer et al., 2007). Embroiled in a conflict over Cuba, the 
Americans revived the violent nature of the Spanish soldiers to incite American public 
opinion against Spain. The American propaganda ploys included a new edition of de las 
Casas’ cornerstone publication Brevísima relación de la destrucción de las Indias. The 1898 
edition published in New York was given a new, unambiguous title: An historical and true 
account of the cruel massacre and slaughter of 20,000,000 people in the West Indies by the 
Spaniards (Hanke, 1953, p. 28). 
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During the Spanish Civil War, commentators denounced the atrocities committed by 
either the nationalists or the republicans, depending on which side they were on 
(Cazorla-Sánchez, 2005; Núñez Florencio, 2005). This, again, caused a revival of the Black 
Legend. However, the picture is more complex here. Cruelty and violence were often 
described as being an integral part of the Spanish identity, but the origins of these 
Spanish characteristics were explained by referring in equal part to the legacy of the 
Inquisition (Black Legend) and the bull ring (Romanticism) (Buchanan, 2007). Franco, a 
devout Catholic, was compared to Philip II31 (Preston, 1995), but foreigners also had 
romantic ideas about the primitive life in Spain. The works of Hemingway provide some 
interesting examples of this. Moreover, the exotic stereotypes (playa, fiesta) were 
exploited by the Franco regime when it started to promote mass tourism in the 1960s 
with the famous slogan Spain is different! (Chislett, 2008a; Rosendorf, 2006). 
 
After the Spanish Civil War and the Second World War, Spain stayed out of 
controversial military disputes on the international stage and after Franco died in 1975, 
the transition to democracy was achieved with little bloodshed (Chislett, 2008a). 
However, it did not take long before the Black Legend returned yet again, but not in a 
military context. This time, the strong economic growth of the Spanish economy in the 
1990s stimulated another revival of the memories of Spain’s colonial past (Lucena 
Giraldo, 2006). Chapter 3 will go deeper into the use of these stereotypical, socio-
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 In fact, Franco’s propaganda aparatus also frequently compared El Caudillo to mythical figures from the past 
because of their nationalist fervour and imperialism, such as El Cid, Charles V and Philip II (Preston, 1995). 
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Chapter 3  
Of conquistadors, armadas and bull runs: Spain’s 
discursive legacy in newspaper accounts of 
Spanish Foreign Direct Investment 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter is built around the observation that several authors of popular and 
academic publications on the topic of Spain’s economic expansion towards Latin 
America in the 1990s compared the contemporary Spanish investors to the Spanish 
conquistadors known from the history books. The chapter sets out to explore the use of 
these historical references in newspaper articles published on the topic of Spanish 
Foreign Direct Investment. The case of Spain’s economic expansion is used to further 
investigate the use of socio-culturally informed metaphorical projections in media 
discourse (Nerlich, 2011; Nerlich & Koteyko, 2010; Zinken et al., 2008). The analysis aims 
to contribute to this field of study by further illustrating how some of these historical 
references can be seen as discourse metaphors which evoke particular (colonial) metaphor 
scenarios (see also section 1.2.1). For instance, when the contemporary Spanish investors 
are depicted as Spanish conquistadors of the past, this representation has the potential 
to activate a whole set of assumptions about the participants (i.c. Spaniards – Latin 
Americans) and their roles in these scenarios (i.c. aggressors – victims). 
 
Before embarking on the empirical analysis, section 3.2 will explore the foundations 
of these colonial metaphor scenarios. Two elements are crucial for diving into the 
common socio-cultural background knowledge about Spain’s colonial history: the 
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tendency of the (written) media to emphasize possible conflict scenarios and the 
tendency to represent cross-border business manoeuvres as confrontations between 
nations. The first two sections will review some of the work that has been done on the 
(written) media’s conventionalized use of conflict metaphors (section 3.2.1) and of 
(supra)nation metonyms to set up national frames of reference (section 3.2.2). After 
reviewing these elements separately, section 3.2.3 will explain how their combination 
can be used to introduce the highly emotive factor of a (potential) loss of control over (a 
portion of) a nation’s sovereign territory. Section 3.3.5 will explore how this emotive 
framing can, in turn, serve as the basis for the introduction of historical references to 
conflicts and wars dating from Spain’s colonial past. 
 
In the empirical part of this chapter, two different sets of data will be explored to 
study the (written) media’s discursive representation of Spanish FDI as confrontations 
between Spain and other nations and/or regions( research topic 1) and the use of 
historical references to Spain’s colonial past in (written) media discourse on Spain’s 
economic expansion (research topic 2). 
 
The first dataset comprises a selection of 80 English-language newspaper articles 
with a broad focus on Spanish FDI between 1990 and 2009 (for a description of the 
corpus, see section 1.3.1; the analysis will be presented in section 3.3). This corpus offers 
rich material because the English-language perspective on the Spanish investors 
changed during this period. Initially, the English-language journalists could write from 
an outsider perspective about the Spanish investments in Latin America (see section 
2.1.2). This perspective changed, however, when the Spanish investors started to 
diversify their investments by expanding into other parts of the world, including 
English-speaking countries such as the United States and, mainly, Great Britain (see 
section 2.1.3). Moreover, in his analysis of British editorials about the Spanish 
investments in Great Britain, Valdeón García (2007) found that some writers included 
historical references to the Spanish Armada and Sir Francis Drake32. Thus, his study 
shows that the media did not link the Spanish investments exclusively to the Spanish 
conquest of the New World but also to other elements from Spain’s rich history of 
violent confrontations dating from its colonial past. Therefore, one of the goals of the 
analysis of the English-language data is to reveal which historical events can serve as 
the source domain for the colonial metaphor scenarios. The other goals are to gain more 
insights into the use of conflict and national frames to construct appealing stories on 
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 Sir Francis Drake was one of the high commanders of the English fleet that defeated the Spanish Armada in 
1588. 
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the topic of Spanish FDI and to reveal whether colonial metaphor scenarios were used to 
convey either a positive or a negative evaluation of the Spanish investors. 
 
The second dataset comprises a selection of 330 Spanish-language newspaper articles 
with a more narrow focus on one particular acquisition (after privatization) process: 
Repsol’s acquisition of YPF between 1998 and 1999. This Spanish-language corpus 
consists of two subcorpora. The first subcorpus contains a selection of 220 newspaper 
articles published by two Argentine newspapers: Clarín and La Nación. The second 
subcorpus contains a selection of 110 newspaper articles published by two Spanish 
newspapers: Cinco Días and El País (for a description of the Spanish-language corpus, 
see section 1.3.2; the analysis will be presented in section 3.4). Cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions often attract the attention of the media and society in general because they 
can potentially result in clashes of both corporate and national cultures. The analysis of 
the Argentine and Spanish newspaper articles aims to gain more insights into the use of 
conflict and national frames in (written) media representations of Repsol’s cross-border 
acquisition of the Argentine company YPF. The other goal is to reveal if and how the 
Argentine and Spanish journalists drew on Spain’s colonial past in Argentina in their 
accounts of the Repsol-YPF case. 
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3.2 Conflict metaphors, (supra)nation metonyms and 
metaphor scenarios in (written) business media discourse 
3.2.1 Conflict metaphors in (written) media discourse 
Ever since Lakoff and Johnson (1980) published their seminal work on (conceptual) 
metaphors, the scholarly interest in metaphors has continued to grow. One of those 
popular areas of interest is the use of metaphors in written business media discourse 
(Charteris-Black & Musolff, 2003; Greco, 2009; Herrera Soler, 2008; Koller, 2004; Rojo 
López & Orts Llopis, 2010; White & Herrera, 2003, 2009). A lot of these studies report on 
the dominance of one particular metaphor structure under which different mappings 
can be grouped: BUSINESS IS WAR. 
 
A metaphoric correspondence represents a relationship across conceptual domains. 
In the following example, the verb to fight is taken from the source domain of WAR to 
refer to the target domain of BUSINESS ACTIVITY. The correspondence between the two 
domains can be illustrated by the simple IS LIKE-test (Gibbs, 1994): Microsoft’s resistance 
to Apple’s claims IS LIKE a fight (see also Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) ARGUMENT IS WAR). 
Microsoft fights Apple’s claims33 
Greco (2009) suggests that this metaphor structure be considered a lower mapping in 
the hierarchical structure of CONTEST/CONFLICT, which includes BUSINESS IS WAR, BUSINESS IS 
A COMPETITION and BUSINESS IS A GAME/SPORT. BUSINESS IS WAR metaphors characterize 
business as “a vigorous or violent contest for differing gains” (Greco, 2009, p. 205). They 
can be used to emphasize both the mental capacity of humans to develop cunning 
strategies and the physical capacity to defend or gain a strategic territory (White & 
Herrera, 2003, p. 301). BUSINESS IS A COMPETITION and BUSINESS IS A SPORT/GAME metaphors 
focus on “the physical and mental strength of participants in order to defeat the 
opponent” (Greco, 2009, p. 205). The source domain of these metaphors are popular 
strategy games such as chess and poker. 
 
This chapter analyses newspaper accounts of Spanish FDI. Often, the writers of these 
texts focus on a specific business activity: mergers and acquisitions. The deployment of 
metaphors in M&A-related business media discourse has been amply studied (see, for 
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 The emphases (italics and bold) in all these fragments are mine. 
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instance, Fusari, 2010; Hirsch, 1986; Hirsch & Andrews, 1983; Koller, 2002, 2005; Negro 
Alousque, 2010, 2011; Riad & Vaara, 2011). Most of these studies show that metaphor use 
in coverage of this specific economic activity corresponds to the general picture in 
business media discourse: M&A IS CONFLICT. According to Boyd (2003), accounts of 
mergers and acquisitions often follow similar storylines. 
[V]ulnerable companies are attacked by raiders pursuing targets with bold 
strategies. The target company’s management, under fire, often attempts defense 
using weapons such as poison pills, golden parachutes, and divestiture of the 
target company’s crown jewels, all the while hoping desperately for a white 
knight to rescue the embattled company and, in the process, save the jobs of the 
entrenched management. (Boyd, 2003, p. 249) 
As can be observed in this citation, one can draw on a rich variety of metaphorical 
mappings to link the source domain of CONFLICT to the target domain of M&A. Moreover, 
these chains of conceptually related metaphors “are partly accounted for by metaphoric 
entailment, meaning that a conceptual metaphor can give rise to a range of different 
linguistic expressions” (Koller, 2005, p. 209). 
 
Several studies have identified another metaphoric correspondence which is also 
used frequently in written business media discourse. With this mapping, mergers or 
acquisitions are described as M&A IS MARRIAGE34 (Koller, 2005; White & Herrera, 2003), 
M&A IS ROMANCE (Fusari, 2010) or M&A IS LOVE (Negro Alousque, 2010). Several scholars 
have pointed out that stereotypical gender roles often underlie the use of these 
metaphors in M&A-related texts (see, for instance, Hirsch, 1986; Koller, 2004; White & 
Herrera, 2003). Usually, the acquiring company is described as a man with macho 
attitudes, whereas the target company is accorded the female gender. Koller (2005) also 
observed that the M&A IS MARRIAGE metaphor structure also centres on aggressive 
movement because marriage is often established as a union the targeted company is 
coerced into. The aggression “is exclusively male and directed, in more or less 
attenuated ways, against a weaker company depicted as static and female” (Koller, 2005, 
p. 218). Linguistic realizations of this metaphor structure include the description of a 
targeted company as a “sleeping beauty” or “a bride brought to the altar” (Hirsch, 1986, 
p. 815). Koller (2002) also found that metaphors of marriage and romance often co-occur 
with warfare metaphors in (written) media accounts of mergers and acquisitions. 
 
                                                     
34
 Demers, Giroux, and Chreim (2003) also looked into “narrations of corporate marriages” in the context of 
mergers and acquisitions. They analyzed the way in which top managers in the Canadian financial services 
sector legitimate change through what they call “wedding narratives” in official announcements intended for 
employees. 
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Based on her analysis of M&A-related (written) media discourse, Koller (2003, 2004) 
proposed the high hierarchical structure of M&A IS EVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE. The structure 
includes three metaphorical correspondences which are often centred on the idea of 
aggressive action in an evolutionary struggle for survival: FIGHTING (viz. WAR), MATING 
(viz. MARRIAGE) and FEEDING35. 
[T]he key to evolutionary success lies in size; companies which are not big enough 
become victims by being either extinguished (as expressed by metaphorical 
expressions of FIGHTING and FEEDING) or coerced into a union with an adversary (as 
conveyed by the MATING metaphor). (Koller, 2003, p. 218) 
Negro Alousque (2010) analysed a bilingual corpus of newspaper articles on mergers and 
acquisitions published in the Financial Times and El País. She found that metaphor 
structures are used frequently in both English and Spanish (written) media accounts of 
corporate alliances and that the metaphoric conceptualizations are similar in both 
languages. She corroborated these findings in a study in which she specifically looked at 
the newspaper coverage of the 2005-2007 takeover saga of Endesa, the largest Spanish 
electric utility company, again in the Financial Times and El País (Negro Alousque, 
2011). In both studies, she found that the writers in both the English-language and 
Spanish-language communities drew on a rich repertoire of metaphoric expressions. 
The most common metaphor structure she identified was M&A IS WAR, but the M&A IS 
LOVE metaphor structure came in as a strong second. The following examples (and 
translations) are taken from Negro Alousque (2011, p. 75). 
Eon plunges into battle (WAR) for Endesa. 
 
Tras dos días de negociaciones, E.ON anunció el fin de la contienda (WAR). 
(After two days of negotiations, E.ON announced the end of the battle) 
 
The bid for Endesa heated up with the arrival of a new suitor (LOVE). 
 
Después de haber cortejado (LOVE) [E.ON] a Acciona, [...]  
(After E.ON had courted Acciona, [...]) 
In summary, these studies show that journalists often use metaphorical language when 
they write about business manoeuvres such as mergers and acquisitions and that they 
can draw on a range of different linguistic expressions which often denote aggressive 
movement. Most of these studies have focused on English-language data, but the studies 
conducted by Negro Alousque (2010, 2011) indicate that Spanish-language journalists 
 
                                                     
35
 The idea of aggressive movement in the FEEDING metaphor can be found in verbs such as to devour, to gobble, 
to gorge (Koller, 2003, p. 183). 
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tap into the same source domains when they write about similar news events. In the 
analytical sections of this chapter, the two corpora will be scrutinized to explore the use 
of conflict metaphors by English-language journalists in the broad context of the 
Spanish economic expansion between 1990 and 2009 (section 3.3) and by Spanish-
language journalists in the specific context of the privatization and acquisition of YPF 
(secion 3.4). 
3.2.2 (supra)Nation metonyms in (written) media discourse 
Metonymy is often considered a reference point phenomenon: a linguistic construction in 
which a cognitively salient aspect, the reference point, or source, is highlighted to 
provide mental access to another conceptual entity, the target (see, for instance, 
Radden, 2005, p. 11). Several linguistic studies have argued that a lot of metonymic links 
have become conventionalized in our understanding of the social world (Cornelissen, 
2008; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Markert & Nissim, 2006). The metonymic reading of 
location names, for instance, is very common (Markert & Nissim, 2002; Musson & Tietze, 
2004), particularly in media discourse. In the following headline, which refers to the 
2012 European Football Championship final, Italy and Spain stand metonymically for 
their respective football teams. 
Italy lost to Spain 
The cue to this metonymic reading is to be found in the linguistic and extra-linguistic 
context of this headline. The fact that this article appeared in the sports section at the 
time of the 2012 European Championships forms an essential part of the extra-linguistic 
basis for this metonymic reading. However, the headline itself also contains a linguistic 
cue to this particular reading. The verb to lose paves the way for the reader to interpret 
these locations as animate entities and not as purely geographical references, because 
the verb requires human agency. As such, both the context and the verb trigger the 
metonymic reading of these locations as the Italian and Spanish national football teams. 
The cognitively salient aspect which is highlighted to provide mental access to the 
metonymic target is the nationality of the two teams. 
 
In social scientific discussions of nationalism and national identity, the social 
constructivist idea of the nation as a mental construct and an imagined community, 
instead of being fixed and stable in history and society, has become increasingly 
influential (Anderson, 2006 [1983]; Billig, 1995). More specifically, various studies have 
investigated newspaper discourse for the role it plays in the continuous discursive 
(re)production and (re)construction of this imagined construct (Bishop & Jaworski, 
2003; De Cillia, Reisigl, & Wodak, 1999; Li, 2009). These studies draw heavily on Billig’s 
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(1995) concepts of “hot” and “banal” nationalism. In Billig’s view, a national frame of 
reference can be flagged either explicitly or implicitly. The explicit “hot” nationalism is 
reserved for the “outbreaks of ‘hot’ national passion, which arise in times of social 
disruption and which are reflected in extreme social movements” (Billig, 1995, p. 44). 
However, nations can be flagged in much more indirect ways as well. As Billig explains, 
the everyday, common sense use of the definite article the in, for example, the news and 
the weather in fact shows that these sections are being framed from an implicit national 
perspective. In these sections, a national audience is implied. 
A homeland-making move transforms meteorology into the weather. And the 
weather [...] must be understood to have its deictic centre within the homeland. 
‘The weather’ appears as an objective, physical category, yet it is contained within 
national boundaries. (Billig, 1995, p. 117, italics in original) 
In other sections, nations are referred to explicitly, as a routine and banal mechanism to 
set up national frames of reference. It looks like these national frames of reference are 
routinely used as a means to understand and make sense of the complexity of our 
contemporary globalized world. It seems that the globe is too big for us to conceptualize 
so that we need to cut it into more manageable pieces: nations and supranational 
geopolitical regions (Europe, Asia, South America, Latin America, etc.). According to 
Billig (1995, p. 112), these national frames of reference are “semantic conventions” used 
to “depict a world of national actors, in which nations, courtesy of their governmental 
leaders, speak and act”. This can be easily observed when checking the sections World 
news or Foreign news in any given newspaper. Billig, for instance, analysed a number of 
newspapers published on Monday 28 June 1993, the day President Clinton ordered US 
war-planes to bomb Bagdad. He describes how the written press not only depicted the 
United States and Iraq as the main actors, but also reported on the reactions of other 
nations. These national frames of reference are often built around nation metonyms, 
when nations (and their governments) are portrayed as single actors. Consider the 
following example which is taken from Billig (1995, p. 112). The nation referents Britain 
and Russia stand metonymically for their respective governments (viz. BRITAIN-FOR-
BRITISH GOVERNMENT), whereas the region metonymic compound American allies stands for 
the governments of an unspecified number of sovereign nations on the American 
continent. 
Britain, Russia and other American allies expressed firm support (The Times) 
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These (supra)nation metonyms are frequently used in (written) media accounts 
discussing international events to set up this “banal” national frame of reference36. In 
fact, they are so common that they easily pass unnoticed. This way, the account can be 
built around an easily recognizable reference point of one geographical location versus 
another. According to Bishop and Jaworski (2003), this framing at the level of the nation 
has become inevitable and natural as it determines our conceptualizations of the world 
we live in (and also our place within it). In our contemporary thinking, this form of 
(banal) nationalism has become ubiquitous and, to our minds, a world without nations 
has become “an unimaginable impossibility” (Bishop & Jaworski, 2003, p. 247). 
Moreover, these national frames of reference can also be used to add drama to news 
stories because they enable journalists to represent international business manoeuvres 
as conflicts between nations rather than between organizational entities. Numerous 
studies have indeed shown how the media, in general, often emphasize conflicts and at 
times even polarize debates as a means to attract attention and readership, particularly 
in politically charged contexts (see, for instance, Neuman, Just, & Crigler, 1992; 
Patterson, 1993; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). 
 
In summary, even though (supra)national frames of reference often pass unnoticed, 
they are an essential prerequisite to go from “banal” nationalism to “hot” nationalism. 
In the analysis of the two corpora, special attention will be paid to the ways in which 
journalists refer to the (perceived) nationality of the companies involved in the business 
manoeuvres they describe. However, the real interest in the use of these national 
frames of reference lies in the fact that they can be used to add extra drama to these 
news stories when, for instance, a cross-border M&A is depicted as a conflict between 
two nations instead of as a confrontation between two private companies. 
  
 
                                                     
36
 These banal national frames of reference have often been studied in the sense of the almost imperceptible 
and routine rhetoric of national belonging in the binary opposites Our-Their, Us-Them, and Here-There. These 
have been studied in general in newspaper discourse (Billig, 1995; Petersoo, 2007; Rosie, Macinnes, Petersoo, 
Condor, & Kennedy, 2004) and more specifically in studies on the dispersion of national belonging in the 
sports pages (Bairner, 2001; Bishop & Jaworski, 2003; Blain, Boyle, & O'Donnell, 1993; Blain & O'Donnell, 1998). 
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3.2.3 The combination of conflict metaphors and (supra)nation 
metonyms in (written) media discourse 
In media accounts of mergers and acquisitions, setting up narrative frames of winners 
and losers has been identified as a common journalistic practice as journalists 
instinctively search for interesting angles to construct good and appealing stories 
(Hellgren et al., 2002; Vaara & Tienari, 2002). In the case of cross-border M&As, 
journalists often go one step further and exploit national frames of reference through 
which these investments can be played out at national or supranational levels. This 
discursive framing brings in the highly emotive factor of a (potential) threat to a 
nation’s sovereign territory and integrity. 
 
The previous sections 3.3.2 and 3.2.2 have shown that the use of conflict-related 
metaphors and (supra)nation metonyms in business media discourse is pervasive and 
conventionalized. Let us now reconsider the headline used in section 3.2.1 to illustrate 
the BUSINESS IS CONFLICT metaphor structure. 
Microsoft fights Apple’s claims 
When read literally, this headline cannot be interpreted satisfactorily. However, there 
are two linguistic elements which are key for the clash resolution here (Evans, 2010). 
There is the metonymic reading of the company name Microsoft, triggered by the human 
agency verb to fight, and there is the conflict verb to fight which, when used in a business 
context, triggers the conventionalized BUSINESS IS CONFLICT metaphor structure. What is 
important here is that the metonymic reading of the company name makes it possible 
to attribute agency to the organization. Thus, metonymy allows for powerful human 
agency verbs to be used in combination with company names (Cornelissen, 2008). In this 
respect, Riad and Vaara (2011, p. 758) write about “the mutually motivating and 
reinforcing relationship between metonymy and metaphor” because the “metaphorical 
frame motivates the deployment of metonymy” and, in turn, “the metonymy […] 
reinforces the strength of the frame”. In their study, Riad and Vaara identified a number 
of varieties of nation metonymy in (written) media accounts of international M&As and 
concluded that “metonymy is a central, but poorly understood linguistic resource that is 
frequently used to (re)produce national cultural differences in representations of 
international M&As” (Riad & Vaara, 2011, p. 764). 
 
Indeed, (supra)national frames of reference seem to be firmly established in business 
media discourse (Riad & Vaara, 2011; Riad et al., 2012). Finding national frames of 
reference in media discourse on international business events may seem rather “banal” 
at first, probably because they can be considered a highly conventionalized pattern in 
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media representations of these events. Nevertheless, it can also be observed that these 
national frames of reference sit somewhat uneasy with the ever increasing globalization 
(or transnationalization) of the economy. According to Desai (2009) it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to maintain the claim that companies are firmly rooted in their 
homelands. Until recently, it was not too difficult to compile a list of defining 
characteristics of what made a firm belong to particular nation (where it was 
incorporated, where it was listed, the nationality of its investor base, the location of its 
headquarters). This is becoming more and more difficult as it looks like a lot of 
multinationals no longer consider these characteristics to be bound to one nation. 
Indeed, as Desai (2009, pp. 1271-1272) observed, “national identities can mutate with 
remarkable ease and firms are unbundling critical headquarter functions and 
reallocating them worldwide”. 
 
However, Desai clearly only focuses on the business side of the spectrum whereas 
there are other forces at work at the same time. Processes of organizational 
globalization are generally characterized by two underlying counter forces (Naisbitt 
(1994) called this “the global paradox”). According to Ailon-Souday and Kunda (2003, p. 
1073), globalization transcends national boundaries only in theory, because this 
“blurring of national boundaries is continually counterbalanced by social and cultural 
forces that sustain them”. De Cillia et al. (1999, p. 170) made a similar point when they 
wrote that “the process of globalization seems to be accompanied by […] a premodern 
sense of community, of deeply emotional and atavistic patriotic feelings toward one’s 
nation”. 
 
In any case, national frames of reference seem to be extremely effective in reducing 
the complexities of contemporary global business realities (Kuronen et al., 2005; Riad & 
Vaara, 2011; Tienari et al., 2003). Moreover, they can also be used to attract attention, 
particularly when they are used in combination with conflict-related metaphorical 
structures. The combination of these two elements makes it possible to frame a business 
event as a conflict between (supra)national entities instead of between corporate 
entities. In the empirical sections of this chapter, the data in the English-language 
corpus (section 3.3) and in the Spanish-language corpus (section 3.4) will be explored to 
reveal how the journalists used this rhetorical technique in their news reports on the 
Spanish international business manoeuvres. 
 
In the following section, it will be shown how this emotive framing can be taken one 
step further. Indeed, the discursive representation of a cross-border business 
manoeuvre as a conflict between two nations can serve as the basis to tap into the 
common socio-cultural background knowledge of conflicts and wars between the 
nations/regions involved in the process. As a result, the business event can be 
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introduced into a broader socio-culturally grounded scenario with normative 
assumptions about such elements as the participants and their roles (Musolff, 2006). 
3.2.4 The combination of conflict metaphors and (supra)nation 
metonyms to build colonial metaphor scenarios 
This section draws on the findings of the studies looking into conflict metaphors and 
(supra)nation metonyms in (written) business media discourse, described in the 
previous sections, to decompose the essential features of the colonial metaphor scenarios 
evoked by colonial discourse metaphors which were at times used in the context of Spain’s 
economic internationalization. This section will focus specifically on a real example 
from the English-language corpus: the headline and lead of an article published by the 
Financial Times in 1999. 
[headline] Return of the conquistador 
[lead] This time round the Spaniards are invading Latin America in search of its 
corporate treasures, and the tensions are growing (Financial Times, 1999, 29 June) 
For this article, the journalist used Repsol’s acquisition of YPF to explore the bigger 
picture of the wave of Spanish investments in Latin America at the end of the 1990s. In 
the text, the journalist literally refers back to the Spanish conquest of the continent 
when he writes that “[t]he impact of the new conquistadors has been as swift and sudden 
as that of their forebears 500 years ago” (my emphasis). The headline and lead of this 
particular article contain all the elements needed to explore the three elements that 
work together to build these colonial metaphor scenarios: conflict metaphors, 
(supra)nation metonyms and discourse metaphors. 
 
Let us first consider the combination of conflict metaphors and (supra)nation 
metonyms in one particular sequence of the lead. In this sequence, the warfare 
metaphorical verb structure to invade is combined with both a nation (Spaniards) and a 
supranation metonym (Latin America). 
[...] the Spaniards are invading Latin America [...] 
It is important to bear in mind that the extra-linguistic context at the time this article 
was published provided the reader with the essential clues to interpret this sequence. 
This fragment is part of the lead of an article published by the Financial Times at the 
time when the internationalization of Spanish companies was a hot topic in the 
international news media. As a result, the reader would have known that this sequence 
was not to be read literally because Spain, of course, did not invade Latin America with 
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military force at the end of the 1990s. Should the reader not have possessed the 
necessary background knowledge, the body of the article also gives the necessary 
information to interpret this sequence. 
 
First, the metonymic chains in the Spaniards and Latin America must be unravelled. In 
the body of the article, Repsol’s acquisition of YPF is put into the broader perspective of 
acquisitions made by Spanish companies in Latin America, especially in Chile and 
Argentina. The article talks about the activities of “Spain’s energy, telecommunications 
and banking groups” and specifically mentions Endesa and Repsol. On the other hand, 
the article also specifically mentions the Chilean companies Enersis, CTC and Endesa de 
Chile and the Argentine company YPF, which have all been acquired by Spanish 
companies. In the sequence taken from the lead, the organizations are reduced to one 
salient aspect of their (multi-layered) identities (Cornelissen, 2008). The inhabitants of 
Spain (Spaniards) stand metonymically for the Spanish companies, whereas the 
supranational location name Latin America stands for the Latin American companies. The 
metonymic chains are represented in Figure 5. 
 
[Repsol, Endesa, …]  [Enersis, CTC, Endesa de Chile, YPF, …] 
 




           (salient aspect = ‘nationality’) 
[Spanish companies]  [Chilean and Argentine companies] 
 




           (REGION-FOR-COMPANIES) 
[the Spaniards]  [Latin America] 
Figure 5 Metonymic chains in the lead of the 1999 Financial Times article 
In business media discourse, companies are often treated as representatives of specific 
nationalities (Kuronen et al., 2005; Riad & Vaara, 2011; Riad et al., 2012). In this lead, 
considering that the article was published in the context of the first wave of Spanish FDI 
at the end of the 1990s, the location names stand metonymically for an unspecified 
number of Spanish multinationals which are targeting an unspecified number of 
companies located in Latin America. In the metonym Spaniards, the (perceived) 
nationality of the acquiring multinationals is the cognitively salient aspect which allows 
for them to be grouped under this common denominator (or hyperonym). As such, the 
metonymic chain is as follows: SPANIARDS-FOR-SPANISH COMPANIES. Indeed, a lot of these 
multinationals were former Spanish state companies, they still had their headquarters 
in Spain and they were often run by management teams that consisted mainly out of 
Spaniards. Alternatively, the nation metonym could be used: SPAIN-FOR-SPANISH 
COMPANIES (i.c. Spain invades Latin America). 
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The metonymic chain is more complex for the reference to the Latin American 
companies. The (headline) writer did not choose to treat these companies as 
representatives of their respective (perceived) nationalities. Instead, the metonymic 
chain is taken to the supranational level. The writer may have considered it rhetorically 
more efficient to focus on the supranational Latin American identity of these companies 
as their most salient representative characteristic. Thus, the whole region comes to 
stand metonymically for an unspecified number of Latin American companies: LATIN 
AMERICA-FOR-LATIN AMERICAN COMPANIES. 
 
After unravelling the metonymic chains, it is now time to return to the lead and focus 
on the combination of the nation/region metonyms (the Spaniards; Latin America) and 
the conflict metaphorical verb structure (to invade). This verb, when read in a business 
context, can be seen as instantiating the conventional BUSINESS IS CONFLICT metaphor 
structure. The metonymic chains (SPANIARDS-FOR-SPANISH COMPANIES and LATIN AMERICA-
FOR-LATIN AMERICAN COMPANIES) are particularly interesting here because the inhabitants 
and region metonyms further instantiate the conventional BUSINESS IS CONFLICT metaphor 
structure (to invade). They introduce these Spanish cross-border business manoeuvres 
into the frame of a warlike international or interregional conflict: one nation’s army 
invading the territory of another nation or region. Several studies have shown that this 
emotive framing is used frequently in business media discourse (Hellgren et al., 2002; 
Kuronen et al., 2005; Tienari et al., 2003). According to Riad and Vaara (2011, p. 759), 
“[m]etonymy enables the two domains to intersect by extending the confrontation from 
organizations to nations”. 
 
After taking a close look at one particular sequence in the lead to illustrate the 
emotive framing achieved by combining a conventional conflict metaphor structure 
with (supra)nation metonyms, everything is in place to show how this framing can be 
taken one step further. Indeed, the combination of conflict metaphors and 
(supra)nation metonyms can be used as the sound basis for the introduction of a 
scenario which is grounded in our broader socio-cultural understanding of international 
conflicts in world history. Let us now consider the entire headline and lead. 
[headline] Return of the conquistador 
[lead] This time round the Spaniards are invading Latin America in search of its 
corporate treasures, and the tensions are growing. (Financial Times, 1999, 29 June) 
In this fragment, the firm basis for the colonial metaphor scenarios is to be found in the 
depiction of these business manoeuvres as a confrontation between a nation and a 
region by means of the two (supra)nation metonyms, the Spaniards and Latin America, 
and the conflict metaphorical verb structure to invade. However, the entire headline and 
lead present a more complex picture because they further also efficiently activate a 
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socio-culturally grounded scenario with a rich conceptual structure: the discursive 
legacy related to the original conquistadors who discovered and invaded the New World 
in the 16th century. As such, the Spanish business manoeuvres are introduced into the 
scenario of a warlike international conflict which links the Spanish investors and their 
actions in the 1990s to the Spanish conquistadors and their actions some 500 years 
earlier. This link is made explicit in the headline through the word return. 
 
The conventional BUSINESS IS CONFLICT metaphor structure is enriched with this socio-
culturally grounded background information to form the more specific metaphor 
structure (INTERNATIONAL) BUSINESS IS COLONIZATION37. A crucial feature of this structure is 
“the domination of a territory with its corresponding implications” (White & Herrera, 
2003, pp. 303-304). The characteristics of this metaphor structure are consistent with 
the dictionary entry for the verb to invade as “to enter in a hostile manner, or with 
armed force; to make an inroad or hostile incursion into…” (OED Online, 2014). 
 
Based on the common socio-cultural background knowledge of this landmark 
historical event, the Spanish investors of the present are compared to the Spanish 
conquistadors of the past: the 20th century Spanish investors ARE LIKE the 16th century 
Spanish conquistadors. As was already explained in section 1.2.1, this historical 
comparison fits the definition of a discourse metaphor perfectly. The source domain 
(the conquest) undoubtedly occupies an important place in socio-cultural imagination 
and the target domain (the Spanish investments in Latin America) was a salient socio-
cultural topic at the time. Moreover, the source concept (conquistadors) is much older 
than the target concept (investors). 
 
The headline and lead of the Financial Times article also illustrate that the discourse 
metaphor of the conquistadors is only one element in a broader metaphor scenario. 
Indeed, the journalist does more than establishing a simple source-target connection 
between the conquistadors and the investors. In the lead of this article, for instance, the 
scenario is further enriched with the metaphorical description of the Latin American 
target companies as corporate treasures. Thus, the journalist draws on a series of mini-
narratives that are connected to the discursive legacy of Spain’s colonial past. These 
mini-narratives provide “a stable stock of metaphors, stories and images” (Nerlich & 
Koteyko, 2010, p. 43). In Figure 6, the metaphorical projections in the headline and lead 
of this article are added to the previously described metonymic chains. 
 
                                                     
37
 In fact, this specific metaphor structure could also be considered a lower mapping in Greco’s (2009) high 
hierarchical structure of BUSINESS IS CONFLICT which was discussed in section 3.2.1. 
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[Repsol, Endesa, …]  [Enersis, CTC, Endesa de Chile, YPF, …] 
 




           (salient aspect = ‘nationality’) 
[Spanish companies]  [Chilean and Argentine companies] 
 




           (REGION-FOR-COMPANIES) 
[the Spaniards]  [Latin America] 
 
 (acquiring companies 




 (target companies 
       ARE LIKE treasures) 
 
Return of the conquistador  […] in search of its corporate treasures 
Figure 6 Metonymic chains and metaphorical projections in the headline and lead of the 
1999 Financial Times article 
The question remains, however, how newspaper journalists used these metaphor 
scenarios when they wrote about Spain’s economic internationalization. According to 
Nerlich and Koteyko (2010), metaphor scenarios can be used in different and contrasting 
ways. In their study, they observed that journalists used the cowboy scenario in news 
stories about carbon offsetting to highlight either the romantic or the dangerous 
aspects of the Wild West (see also section 1.2.1). 
 
In theory, the colonial metaphor scenarios can also be used to either praise or 
discredit the Spanish investors. The meaning given to the new conquistadors discourse 
metaphor can differ when different qualities of the Spanish investors are highlighted. 
Depending on which qualities best fit the general message the journalist wants to 
convey, the Spanish investors can be metaphorically represented as either forceful 
aggressors or audacious pioneers. In any case, in the example cited above, the 
representation of the Spanish investors and their actions as the “return of the 
conquistador” and the fact that they are “in search of its [Latin America’s] corporate 
treasures” certainly points towards the first interpretation and adds to the emotive 
framing of this story. 
 
Now that all the crucial elements for building colonial metaphor scenarios have been 
outlined and discussed in detail, we can move on to the analysis of the two sets of data 
that were compiled to explore the journalistic use of Spain’s colonial past in media 
discourse on Spain’s economic expansion. The analysis of the two data sets will be 
presented separately in sections 3.3 and 3.4. 
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3.3 Conflict metaphors, (supra)nation metonyms and 
metaphor scenarios in English-language newspaper 
accounts of Spanish Foreign Direct Investment (1990-
2009) 
3.3.1 Introduction 
The first empirical section in this chapter sets out to study the use of Spain’s colonial 
past in an English-language corpus containing 80 newspaper articles with a broad focus 
on Spanish Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the period between 1990 and 200938 (for a 
description of the corpus, see section 1.3.1). In this 20-year period, the Spanish economy 
went through a profound revolution39. At the beginning of the 1990s, Spanish companies 
started to venture outside their domestic borders as a result of the increased 
competition after Spain’s accession to the European Union in 1986. In this first phase, 
the Spanish investors looked to expand into Latin America, not only because of the 
existing cultural and linguistic bonds, but also because a lot of these Latin American 
nations were starting to open up their economies for foreign investment under the 
impulse of the Washington Consensus. By the end of the decade, Spain had surpassed 
the United States as the region’s largest investor. At the beginning of the 21st century, 
the Spanish companies suffered greatly from the Latin American financial crises 
because of their heavy exposure to the region. However, they did recover from this 
setback and learned from the experience. By 2005, the Spanish companies started to 
diversify their investments and looked to other regions such as Europe and Asia. 
 
These three distinctly different phases can also be observed in the three peaks in the 
English-language corpus (see the timeline represented in Figure 1 on p. 18). In 1998, the 
Spanish investors made a number of eye-catching investments in Latin America (7/80 
articles, 9%). In the years 2001-2002, the English-language journalists published quite a 
lot of articles on the Latin American financial crises and the implications for the Spanish 
companies (20/80 articles, 25%). The highest peak in the corpus is for the year 2006 
 
                                                     
38
 The analysis of the headlines of the newspaper articles in the English-language corpus already appeared in 
the volume Metaphor and Intercultural Communication (2014) edited by Musolff, MacArther and Pagani (see 
Vandenberghe, Goethals, & Jacobs, 2014). 
39
 For a detailed account of the Spanish Foreign Direct Investment at the end of the 20th and beginning of the 
21st century, see section 2.1. 
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when the English-language newspapers paid considerable attention to the wave of 
Spanish investments in Great Britain (16/80 texts, 20%). 
 
Several studies have shown how journalists often include historical references in 
news stories about contemporary events involving different nations. Brownlie (2012), 
for instance, showed how British newspapers at times bring up the Norman Conquest at 
stressful moments in Franco-British relations. Numerous studies have also scrutinized 
the sports pages looking for historical references in the media coverage of European and 
World Football Championships (see, for instance, Bishop & Jaworski, 2003; Crolley, Hand, 
& Jeutter, 2000; Maguire, Poulton, & Possamai, 1999). Both Maguire et al. (1999, p. 113) 
and Crolley et al. (2000, p. 75) write that, considering the historical rivalry between 
Spain and England, the most predictable historical comparison to make in the context of 
an England-Spain match is the one tapping into the pre-existing narrative of the 
Spanish Armada. Bishop and Jaworski (2003, p. 252) show how the British quality press 
at times used the socio-culturally charged term Jerry to refer to the players of the 
German football team. Analysing the media discourse surrounding German BMW’s 
controversial decision to dispose of its British subsidiary Rover in 2000, Halsall (2008, p. 
801) also observed how the British press activated a rich repertoire of historical 
references to the two World Wars (as in, for instance, the socio-culturally loaded 
headline Don’t mention the car). In his analysis of British comment columns and editorials 
on the topic of the arrival of Spanish capital in Great Britain (as part of the second wave 
of Spanish FDI), Valdeón García (2007) found that the Spanish investors were compared 
to both the conquistadors and the Spanish Armada.  
 
The following three research questions will guide the analysis in this section: 
RQ1: How did the English-language journalists use emotive framing in written 
media discourse on Spain’s economic expansion (1990-2009)? 
 
RQ2: Which historical events serve as the source domain for the colonial metaphor 
scenarios set up by the English-language journalists in the context of Spain’s 
economic expansion (1990-2009)? 
 
RQ3: Did the English-language journalists use the colonial metaphor scenarios to 
convey a positive or a negative evaluation of the Spanish investors? 
In the following sections, the data in the English-language corpus will be used, first, to 
separately discuss the elements that are crucial for setting up a conflict frame which can 
be further enriched with elements related to the socio-culturally grounded narratives of 
the metaphor scenarios. Section 3.3.2 will look into the conflict metaphors in the 
corpus, section 3.3.3 will go deeper into the national frames of reference and section 
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3.2.3 will go further into the emotive framing when the Spanish investments abroad are 
represented as belligerent confrontations between nations/regions. 
 
Then, the analysis will go on to reveal how the English-language journalists built on 
this emotive framing to construct appealing stories on the topic of Spain’s economic 
internationalization by tapping into the discursive legacies of Spain’s colonial past. As a 
result of these discursive traditions (often commonly referred to as the Black Legend), 
Spain has, until today, a harsh and cruel reputation in the English-speaking world (see 
also section 2.3.1). The analysis will show that the combination of the separately 
developed concepts discourse metaphor and metaphor scenario has an added value for the 
study of socio-culturally informed metaphorical projections in media discourse. 
3.3.2 Conflict metaphors in the English-language corpus 
Several previous studies looking into the use of conflict metaphors in English-language 
business media discourse show how business decisions are often represented 
metaphorically as aggressive movements in an evolutionary struggle for survival (see 
section 3.2.1). According to Koller (2003, 2004), the high hierarchical structure of M&A IS 
EVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE includes three metaphorical correspondences: FIGHTING (viz. WAR), 
MATING (viz. MARRIAGE) and FEEDING. The analysis of the English-language newspaper 
articles on Spain’s economic expansion between 1990 and 2009 confirms that the 
WAR/FIGHTING structure is also the most frequently identified structure in this corpus 
(see Table 8). 
Table 8 M&A IS EVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE in the English-language 1990-2009 corpus 
 English-language 
corpus (80 texts) 
M&A IS EVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE 62 texts 
(77.5%) 
- FIGHTING (viz. WAR) 60 texts 
(75%) 
- FEEDING 6 texts 
(7.5%) 
- MATING (viz. MARRIAGE) 1 text 
(1%) 
White and Herrera (2003, p. 301) provide a further distinction in the FIGHTING category. 
They write that this metaphor structure can be used to emphasize both the mental 
capacity of humans to develop cunning strategies and the physical capacity to defend or 
attack a strategic territory. In this corpus, there are far more instances in which the 
 96 
physical capacity of humans is taken as the source domain for these metaphor 
structures. 
[body] Repsol's assault on YPF will this year help push total direct investment to 
more than $ 40bn. (Financial Times, 1999, 29 June) 
 
[body] The companies are leading the charge into new territory […] (Financial 
Times, 2004, 15 June) 
 
[body] This implies that it would welcome Gas Natural returning with a better 
offer for Endesa, perhaps backed by new allies. (Financial Times, 2006, 23 
February) 
In fact, there is only one fragment in the corpus in which the mental capacity of humans 
is used as the source domain. 
[body] While the energy companies themselves attempt to formulate strategy, 
BBVA and its rival La Caixa have been plotting and scheming. (Times, 2000, 19 
October) 
In this corpus on international business manoeuvres, there is also an abundant use of 
nations, nationalities and other geopolitical references. The following fragments 
illustrate not only this international framing but also further illustrate Koller’s (2003, 
2004) framework of EVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE in business media discourse. The examples 
given above illustrate that the FIGHTING component was often used with company names. 
However, as the examples given below illustrate, in the corpus, the FEEDING and MATING 
components were always used with references to nations, nationalities or supranational 
geopolitical regions. 
[body] Spanish companies are hungry for (FEEDING) European assets to counter their 
exposure to Latin American risk. (Financial Times, 2005, 26 October) 
 
[body] Now its [Spain’s] firms are swallowing up (FEEDING) UK banks, airports, train 
lines, power companies and telecommunications firms [...]. (Express, 2006, 18 
December) 
 
[body] When Edesur was privatized in the mid-1990s, Endesa won a “sweetheart” 
deal (MATING) from the Argentine government [...]. (Financial Times, 2001, 24 
December) 
The sweetheart deal is the only MATING example found in this corpus. The use of the 
ROMANCE source domain in this fragment is similar to the use Fusari (2010) found in her 
British/American corpus of newspaper articles on the bankruptcy and privatization of 
the Italian airline Alitalia between August 2008 and January 2009. In fact, the use of this 
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metaphor can be considered to be lexicalized because the term sweetheart deal also 
appears in the Oxford English Dictionary. 
Designating a contract, agreement, etc., arranged privately (i.e. without genuine 
collective bargaining) by trade unions and employers which is beneficial to 
themselves but prejudicial to the interests of the workers. (OED Online, 2014) 
The following section will go deeper into the use of (supra)nation metonyms and 
national frames of reference in the English-language newspaper articles in the corpus. 
3.3.3 (supra)Nation metonyms in the English-language corpus 
This section will explore the abundant use of nations, nationalities and other 
geopolitical references in the English-language corpus. This banal observation again 
shows how news stories on international business manoeuvres are often built on 
(supra)national frames of reference. References to nations, nationalities and geopolitical 
regions are easy to find and are so common that they can easily pass unnoticed. In the 
following, the data in the English-language corpus will be used to show that these 
national frames of reference can be set up to reduce the complexity of global business 
relations. 
 
Nationality and other geopolitical references are often used to simplify complex 
storylines because it is an easily digested reference point. In news texts, this can be 
done by introducing direct national references, such as the adjective European, creating 
the region metonymic compound European market and the direct references to the 
geopolitical regions the Caribbean and Central and South America. 
[body] [...] Iberia Airlines, which opened a hub in Miami this year to service its 
European market and connect with flights to the Caribbean and Central and South 
America. (Miami Herald, 1992, 29 November) 
It looks like these (supra)national frames of reference are routinely used as a means to 
understand and make sense of the complexity of our contemporary globalized world. It 
seems that the globe is too big for us to conceptualize so that we need to cut it into more 
manageable pieces: geopolitical regions and nations. They are used to build the account 
around reference points that are more easily recognizable in order to reduce the 
complexity of the story. For instance, the reference to Central and South America in the 
excerpt above can be considered rhetorically more efficient than a list with all the 
nations in that geopolitical region. 
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These (supra)national frames of reference are often found in news stories on 
international politics. The following fragment is about presidential elections in a 
number of Latin American countries. The country names in this fragment can be 
interpreted as nation metonyms. They appear in combination with human agency verbs 
(to hold elections, to go to the polls) which trigger the metonymic reading of these location 
names. 
[body] Chile held the first round of presidential elections last weekend. Voting in 
Mexico is scheduled for July, and Venezuela goes to the polls in December. 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Peru hold general elections in 2006. (International 
Herald Tribune, 2005, 13 December) 
National frames of reference are also often found in the context of international 
business manoeuvres (Risberg et al., 2003; Tienari et al., 2003). It is striking to find that, 
in certain cases, companies continue to be identified as representatives of a particular 
nation (Kuronen et al., 2005), especially considering the claim made by economic 
theorists such as Desai (2009) that it becomes increasingly difficult to think of 
multinationals in terms of their nationality. Still, the (perceived) nationality of 
companies is still often highlighted as one of the most salient aspects of their (multi-
layered) identities (Cornelissen, 2008). 
 
In the following fragment, the companies are explicitly identified as being Spanish 
through the use of the national identifier Spain’s [organization]. The direct geographical 
references to the countries in which the Spanish companies made their investments 
also contribute to the national frame of reference (i.c. in Chile, Argentine and Brazil). In the 
second sentence, these three geographical reference points are merged into the 
supranational reference point the region which can be seen as metonymically standing 
for an unspecified number of Latin American companies which had been acquired by 
Telefónica (REGION-FOR-COMPANIES). 
[body] Endesa, Spain’s largest utility made investments in Chile, Argentina and 
Brazil. The national telecommunications giant, Telefonica, cut a broad swath 
through the region. So did some of Spain’s biggest media companies, like Grupo 
Prisa. (New York Times, 2003, 29 June) 
In the next excerpt, taken from the Herald of Scotland, the author summarizes an 
unspecified number of companies into the reference Spanish companies. Thus, the 
(perceived) nationality is taken as the common salient feature or the common identifier 
for these companies. As a result, the companies are described as representatives of the 
Spanish nationality and this reference point is contrasted with anything beyond the 
national boundaries of that particular nation. In this case, the deals are described as 
being completed outside their own borders. 
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[body] Spanish companies completed deals worth dollars -64.9bn (GBP34.2bn) 
outside their own borders in 2005, up 69-per cent on the previous 12 months. 
(Herald of Scotland, 2006, 15 November) 
Alternatively, the journalist could have made the decision to further summarize Spanish 
companies into a nation metonym: Spain completed deals worth […]. This choice is 
operationalized in the following examples, in which the nation referent Spain can be 
interpreted as standing metonymically for an unspecified number of Spanish 
companies. These two fragments were published as the headline of two different articles 
about the economic success of Spain’s most important companies. 
[headline] Spain comes into play in the world arena of power (Times, 2000, 19 
October) 
[headline] Can Spain sustain economic success? (International Herald Tribune, 
2005, 1 April) 
These findings confirm that the use of nation metonyms are indeed a pervasive 
journalistic practice (Riad & Vaara, 2011). It is important to note, however, that these 
nation metonyms are in fact “fuzzy references” (Lecolle, 2001). Often, it is impossible to 
decipher the exact referent of the nation metonym. When using these nation 
metonyms, journalists seem to be referring not only to the Spanish companies, but also, 
at the same time, to the government and/or the people of these nations, or even to 
more abstract concepts such as their national economy. According to Lecolle (2001, p. 
167), readers will interpret these fuzzy references according to their knowledge of the 
context. The more the reader knows about a certain topic, the more precise his or her 
interpretation of the metonym can be. 
 
Alternatively, these nation metonyms can be replaced by inhabitants metonyms. 
Again, these metonyms focus on the Spanish nationality as the salient common feature, 
which is considered to be the most representative common characteristic of the group. 
The following examples illustrate this. The first example was published as a headline. 
The other examples appeared in the body of a news text. 
[headline] Spaniards holding firm on sizable investments in Brazil (New York 
Times, 1999, 19 February) 
 
[body] In Latin America, the Spaniards can seize positions they could never aspire 
in Europe or Asia. (Financial Times, 1998, 19 January[a]) 
 
[body] In Hungary, Spaniards have invested Euros 3.5bn since 2004. (Financial 
Times, 2007, 22 August) 
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It is not entirely clear to whom the journalists are referring, but what is important here 
is that, again, the Spanish nationality is taken as the salient common feature. Another 
important observation in these excerpts is that, when writing about Spanish 
investments in other parts of the world (viz. outside their own borders), the targeted 
nations and/or supranational geopolitical regions are also identified (in Brazil; in Latin 
America; in Europe or Asia; in Hungary). Thus, these fragments show how (supra)national 
frames of reference are in fact formed on the basis of a combination of direct 
(supra)national references (in Brazil; in Europe), (supra)nation metonymic compounds 
(Spanish investors; European companies) and (supra)nation metonyms (Spaniards; Europe). 
 
Crucially, when using (supra)nation metonyms to refer to companies, these corporate 
entities are treated as representatives of specific nationalities because their national 
and organizational affiliations are taken as one (Kuronen et al., 2005; Riad et al., 2012). 
As a result, the individual specificities of the companies are “masked under simplified 
national-level frames” (Riad et al., 2012, p. 752). The nation metonym Spain could, in 
theory, refer to all Spaniards, even though readers usually will realize that the metonym 
must not be read as literally including all Spaniards, because the proportion may range 
from all to a few (see Radden, 2009, p. 207). The same holds for the nation metonymic 
compound Spanish companies. Even though this reference is already more specific, it 
remains a reductive statement. The representation that is discursively constructed by 
this compound is one where potentially any Spanish company shares every single 
attribute with any other Spanish company. As such, it “conceals the diversity of 
individuals and organizations and homogenizes the pluralism in various societies and 
their businesses” (Riad & Vaara, 2011, p. 752). When organizational and national 
affiliations are taken as one, a particular story can be framed as a conflict between 
nations rather than between organizational entities. In the following section, the 
potential of the combination of conflict metaphors and (supra)nation metonyms to 
construct appealing stories about these international business actions will be further 
explored. 
3.3.4 The combination of conflict metaphors and nation metonyms in 
the English-language corpus 
This section will go deeper into the combination of conflict metaphors and national 
frames of reference. Previous research already showed how journalists routinely build 
on national frames of reference when discursively (re)presenting and (re)constructing 
international business manoeuvres (Hellgren et al., 2002; Risberg et al., 2003). Kuronen 
et al. (2005) also argued that journalists not only draw on this framing to reduce 
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complexity, but also to add extra drama to their news stories. National frames of 
reference are crucial in this process. Indeed, nation metonyms and warfare 
metaphorical constructions mutually shape and reinforce the emotive framing of these 
international business events as confrontations between nations and/or geopolitical 
regions (Riad & Vaara, 2011). 
 
In the following fragment, taken from the lead of a Financial Times article, the 
confrontation between the Argentine airline Aerolíneas Argentinas and the Spanish 
airline Iberia is played out on a national level. The warfare metaphorical construction 
battle is combined with the nation metonym Spain. As is often the case, this nation 
metonym is a fuzzy reference (Lecolle, 2001) because even after reading the body of the 
article (not reproduced here) it remains unclear who the writer of the lead refers to: the 
Spanish company Iberia or the Spanish government. 
[lead] Aerolineas Argentinas carrier expected to file for protection against 
creditors amid battle with Spain (Financial Times, 2001, 16 June) 
In a national frame of reference in which nations stand metonymically for the 
companies involved, metaphorical attacks introduce the news story into an emotively 
charged narrative frame of territorial threats and potential losses of national 
patrimony. In this frame, the foreign acquiring companies are never friendly, and their 
metaphorical attacks threaten to “wrest organizations from their rightful nation” (Riad 
& Vaara, 2011, p. 756). When using this narrative frame, journalists play the fear card, 
either implicitly or explicitly. This has great rhetorical potential because readers can 
identify easily with a threat to national territory and integrity, even if they do not 
actually live in the territory that is metaphorically under attack (Riad et al., 2012). 
 
In the following headline, published at the time Spain attempted to diversify its 
investments into Europe (the second wave of Spanish FDI, see also section 2.1.3), the 
headline writer also uses this emotive framing. The Spanish companies, metonymically 
described as the Spaniards, are cast in the role of the aggressor. They are described as 
carefully observing the possibilities to expand into Europe, much like a predator looking 
for a weaker animal in a group of possible preys (i.c. European companies) before 
launching the attack. 
[headline] Spaniards cast their eyes around Europe (Financial Times, 2005, 1 April) 
The next excerpts are taken from the body of two different articles. In the first, the 
business moves are explicitly described as Spanish, aggressive and sometimes controversial. 
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This aggressive framing is further continued in the verb structure to make inroads in 
which is explained in the dictionary as “a hostile attack; a raid” (OED Online, 2014)40. In 
the second excerpt, Santander is identified as a Spanish bank. The geopolitical region of 
the action is identified on a national level as the UK The move of the Spanish bank is 
described metaphorically as a bold foray into, which is explained in the dictionary as “a 
sudden attack or incursion into enemy territory, especially to obtain something; a raid” 
(OED Online). The aggressive framing is further continued in blazed a trail. 
[body] Santander’s purchase was the latest in a series of aggressive and sometimes 
controversial moves by Spanish companies to make inroads in Latin America. 
(Miami Herald, 2000, 22 November) 
 
[body] Santander’s bold foray into the UK was the first cross-border, cross-
currency deal attempted by a Spanish bank in Europe, and it blazed a trail for other 
companies to follow. (Financial Times, 2005, 26 October) 
Another important consequence of this emotive, and indeed aggressive, framing is that 
reactions to these foreign investors can be described as stirrings of nationalism and 
patriotism. Billig reserves the explicit “hot” nationalism for the “outbreaks of ‘hot’ 
national passion, which arise in times of social disruption” (Billig, 1995, p. 44). The 
Spanish investors were indeed not always welcomed in the regions where they invested, 
particularly in Latin America at the end of the 1990s (see also sections 2.1.4.2 and 
2.1.4.3), but also in Europe at the time of the second wave of Spanish FDI. In the corpus, 
reference is made to the concept of economic nationalism, to patriotic sentiment and 
even to anti-Spanish feelings, particularly in the context of Spanish investments in 
Argentina. 
[body] As the most visible foreign investors in Argentina, the Spanish are bearing 
the brunt of that popular backlash. And they are starting to fear that an upsurge 
in economic nationalism could endanger their investments. (Financial Times, 
2001, 13 June) 
 
[body] Spanish companies, which have more than Dollars 40bn invested in 
Argentine banks, telecommunications, electricity and oil companies, say they are 




                                                     
40
 White and Herrera (2003, p. 304) identified a similar verb structure (forging inroads) as pertaining to their 
BUSINESS IS COLONIZATION metaphor structure: “pushing into new territory, forging inroads, being a trailblazer or 
achieving world domination”. 
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[lead] The French concept of “economic patriotism” appears to be winning a 
growing number of converts across Europe (Financial Times, 2006, 23 February) 
Until now, the data in the English-language newspaper corpus have been used to 
explore how journalists used conflict metaphorical structures and (supra)nation 
metonyms in their news reports about Spanish FDI. The analysis has shown how they 
used and combined these two elements to add drama to their stories. Indeed, this 
framework makes it possible to describe the business actions between acquiring and 
target companies as an international conflict in which a belligerent nation threatens the 
territorial integrity of another nation or region. The next section will explore how the 
English-language journalists further exploited this emotive framing in the context of 
Spain’s economic internationalization between 1990 and 2009 by including historical 
references to Spain’s colonial past. 
3.3.5 Colonial metaphor scenarios in the English-language corpus 
Vivid metaphors are a well-known stylistic resource to pull potential readers into 
reading the body of an article. They are also used to make complicated news events 
more accessible by comparing them to similar events. The function of metaphors as 
attention getters and complexity reducers contribute to the “highly expressive, vivid, 
and inventive style” of print media discourse (Koller, 2004, p. 3). The analysis of the 
corpus of English-language newspaper articles on Spanish FDI between 1990 and 2009 
reveals that the writers of these texts at times added an extra dimension to the already 
emotively charged framework in which conflict frames are combined with 
(supra)national frames of reference. 
 
In 30 of the 80 newspaper articles in the corpus (37.5%), the international conflict 
frame of Spain versus another nation or region was used as the basis to introduce 
different historical references and metaphorical projections which can be linked to 
well-known and deeply entrenched socio-culturally informed mini-narratives or 
metaphor scenarios (Musolff, 2006) related to Spanish history. These scenarios can thus 
be filled with different discourse metaphors to metaphorically describe the participants 
and the roles they are enacting. The analysis will reveal how, in this corpus, the Spanish 
acquiring companies were described as new conquistadors or as a Modern Armada who 
recolonized or plundered target companies all over the world. These corporate targets 
were at times referred to as corporate treasures or as El Dorado. 
 
The analysis of the colonial metaphor scenarios will be presented in two sections. 
First, the analysis will unveil which three historical events serve as the source domain 
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for the colonial metaphor scenarios in the English-language corpus (section 3.3.5.1). In 
the second section, the analysis will focus on the ways in which the English-language 
journalists used the colonial metaphor scenarios (section 3.3.5.2). 
3.3.5.1 The Discovery, the Armada and the Spanish-American War 
The analysis reveals that the English-language journalists used Spain’s colonial history 
as the source domain to construct historical comparisons between the actions of the 
contemporary Spanish investors and the actions of their ancestors in 37.5% of the 
articles in the corpus. These results are similar to the results of Valdeón García’s (2007, 
p. 73) analysis of British comment columns and editorials on the Spanish investments in 
Great Britain, published by four British quality newspapers (The Times, The Guardian, 
The Independent and The Daily Telegraph) between 2005 and 2006. Even though he 
approached the texts differently, he also found that the British press referred to either 
the conquistadors or the Spanish Armada in 40% of the texts in his corpus (a total of 100 
texts). 
 
The analysis of this corpus of English-language newspaper articles on Spain’s 
economic internationalization between 1990 and 2009 (a total of 80 texts), reveals that 
the writers referred to three salient, well-known and more or less specific historical 
moments: the discovery of the so-called New World in 1492 (and the subsequent 
colonization of these newfound territories), the Spanish Armada that sailed against 
England in 1588 and the Spanish-American War which resulted in Spain ceding its last 
remaining colonies to the United States in 1898. Table 9 shows how many times these 
historical references are found in the corpus of 80 English-language newspaper articles 
on the Spanish economic expansion (1990-2009). 
Table 9 The three source domains of the colonial metaphor scenarios in the English-
language 1990-2009 corpus 
 English-language  
corpus (80 texts) 
COLONIAL METAPHOR SCENARIOS 30 texts 
(37.5%) 
- Spain’s colonial empire (discovery (1492)  
and subsequent colonization of the New World) 
25 texts 
(31.5%) 
- Spanish Armada (1588) 7 texts 
(9%) 
- End of Spain’s colonial empire (1898) 





  105 
References to the conquest and colonization are found throughout the corpus. The first 
mention is found in an article about Spanish companies venturing into Argentina 
(Financial Times, 1990, 2 October). The last reference in this corpus is found in an article 
about the Spanish investments in Asia (Financial Times, 2008, 15 October). The Spanish-
American War is mentioned in the context of the Spanish investments in Latin America 
only. The Spanish Armada, on the other hand, is mostly used in articles on the wave of 
Spanish investments in Great Britain in 2006. 
 
The only article in which the Armada is used in the context of the Spanish 
investments in Latin America is in the very first article in the corpus. The article is 
about the fact that Spanish companies were taking advantage of the economic reforms 
in Argentina under the impulse of the Menem government. In this text, the author 
introduces a number of historical references to Spain’s rich history of violent 
confrontations between Spain and other nations and regions. In the text, the discursive 
legacy of the conquest and colonization of Latin America is used as the source domain, 
but the headline of the article is firmly built on the mini-narrative of the Spanish 
Armada. 
[headline] Modern Armada enters Argentina (Financial Times, 1990, 2 October) 
The headline nicely illustrates how the combination of nation metonyms and warfare 
metaphorical language (i.c. Spain enters Argentina) can be taken one step further to add 
extra drama to the news story. The headline activates the narrative frame of Spain’s 
internationalization in the past. The socio-culturally grounded scenario serves as the 
basis to turn the nation metonym Spain into the discourse metaphor Modern Armada. 
This historical reference stands metaphorically (and metonymically) for the Spanish 
acquiring companies. In turn, Argentina stands metonymically for the Argentine target 
companies. As in the case of the Return of the conquistador headline discussed in section 
3.2.4, the Modern Armada reference fits the definition of a discourse metaphor perfectly. 
The Spanish Armada is definitely a salient image with an important place in socio-
cultural imagination, the metaphor is used to highlight a salient socio-cultural topic in a 
context of social upheaval and the source concept is much older than the target 
concept. 
 
In the first paragraph of this Financial Times article, the writer also refers to the 
commemorations of the discovery of the Americas which were going to be organized in 
1992. Even though this second historical reference cannot be considered a discourse 
metaphor, the historical references to Columbus and particularly to the fact that the 
companies are returning to Argentina have the potential to further activate the socio-
culturally grounded scenario of Spain’s colonial past and its (historical/mythical) 
reputation as a conquering nation. 
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[body] Two years before Spain celebrates the 500th anniversary of Christopher 
Columbus’ journey to the Americas, Spain’s public companies are returning to take 
control of key sectors of the Argentine economy. (Financial Times, 1990, 2 
October) 
But why is the historic reference to the Spanish Armada used in the headline of an 
article which is about Spanish investments in Argentina? Surely, the link with the 
conquest of the Americas, as in the first paragraph of the text, is a more predictable one 
to make. After all, at the time the journalist wrote this article, the Spanish-American 
relations were repeatedly in the news because of the commemorations of Columbus’ 
voyage to be held in 1992. Perhaps the Armada discourse metaphor was used because 
the newspaper believed that this historical reference would be more readily available in 
the minds of its Anglo-Saxon readership. It is, in any case, striking to find this reference 
to the Spanish Armada in this context. Indeed, the analysis reveals that this headline is 
in fact an exception. Apart from this article, the English-language writers of the texts in 
this corpus only tapped into the mini-narratives related to the Armada when they wrote 
about the Spanish economic expansion into Great Britain (2006). 
 
The following sections will describe how the three historical events were used in the 
corpus. The references to the discovery and colonization of the New World were 
identified throughout the corpus. They were mainly, but not exclusively, used to refer 
to the Spanish business actions in Latin America. The references to the Spanish-
American War were only used in the context of the Spanish FDI in Latin America. The 
Spanish Armada was mainly used in news stories about the wave of investments in Great 
Britain in 2006. 
 
The discovery (1492) and colonization of the New World 
The analysis of the newspaper articles in the corpus reveals that the socio-culturally 
grounded mini-narratives related to the discursive legacy of the Spanish medieval 
actions in the so-called New World were mostly, although not exclusively, used to 
describe the wave of Spanish investments in Latin America at the end of the 1990s. The 
following headlines were all published at the end of the 20th century. In these fragments, 
the English-language headline writers refer to the discovery of the Americas after 
Christopher Columbus had undertaken his famous voyage to the West and the 
subsequent colonization of the continent by using both the English words conqueror and 
explorers and the Spanish conquistador to refer to the Spanish investors. These four 
headlines also contain elements which make the link between the past and the present 
explicit: return, new and once more. 
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[headline] Return of the conqueror (Financial Times, 1997, 5 March) 
 
[headline] The new Spanish explorers (Financial Times, 1998, 19 January[a]) 
[headline] Conquistadores once more (Financial Times, 1998, 19 October) 
 
[headline] Return of the conquistador (Financial Times, 1999, 29 June) 
The analysis also reveals the use of more references to colonial times in the body of 
these texts. In some of these articles, the mini-narratives related to the Spanish 
conquest are further enriched by introducing other colourful structures referring to the 
shared history between Spain and Latin America. In the following three excerpts, the 
journalists use the source domain of Spain’s colonial past to comment upon the 
contemporary wave of Spanish investments in Latin America. The business manoeuvres 
of the Spanish companies are described as a Spanish expedition, a Spanish reconquest, a 
recolonization of the continent. In the fragment published on 29 June 1999, the target 
company is metaphorically described as a bastion and a treasure (viz. corporate equivalent 
of the crown jewels). 
[body] Telefonica pioneered the Spanish expedition with interests mainly in Peru, 
Argentina, Chile and now Brazil. (Financial Times, 1998, 19 October) 
 
[body] The Spanish reconquest of Latin America appears unstoppable. The latest 
bastion to fall into Spanish hands is YPF, the privatised energy group and 
Argentina’s corporate equivalent of the crown jewels. […] In the 1990s, Spain’s 
energy, telecommunications and banking groups have recolonized vast swathes of 
the continent. (Financial Times, 1999, 29 June) 
 
[body] During this “reconquest” of Latin America, they invested an estimated 
Dollars 30bn in Argentina, snapping up everything from airlines to banks to 
telecommunications companies. (Financial Times, 2001, 13 June) 
In one article, the scenario of the conquest is exploited to write an appealing story 
about the opposite movement. On 8 March 2000, the Financial Times published a story 
about how a Brazilian company had launched a takeover bid on the Spanish internet 
company Terra Networks. In the following example, the journalist inverts the usual 
roles of the participants in the colonial metaphor scenarios. The counterattack of the 
usually victimized Latin Americans on the Spaniards is depicted as a success. 
[headline] Counterattack in cyberspace 
[lead] Latin Americans hit back at Spanish ‘reconquest’ with online challenge to 
Terra (Financial Times, 2000, 8 March) 
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The creation and dissemination of these colonial metaphor scenarios can be explained 
by the existence of international “news waves”. Fishman (1980) showed how news 
coverage of crimes was framed as crimes against the elderly on a small scale initially 
and how this representation was then picked up by other news media. He called this 
journalistic phenomenon a “news wave”. Interestingly, the journalists at times 
explicitly or implicitly refer to the fact that the link between the contemporary Spanish 
investors and the conquistadors of the past was not a novel creation. In this respect, 
Thompson (1995, p. 111) writes about the “relatively high degree of self-referentiality 
within the media, in the sense that media messages commonly refer to other media 
messages or to events reported therein”, a process he labelled “extended mediazation”. 
 
In the article published by the New York Times on 15 February 1998, the journalist 
explicitly mentions how a Colombian magazine tapped into a colonial metaphor 
scenario to describe the Spanish investments as the second Spanish conquest. The writer 
does not mention the name of the publication, nor the article, but s/he is probably 
writing about the article Expotecnia: la segunda conquista published on 1 May 1995 by the 
Colombian magazine El Tiempo. This Colombian article is about the inauguration of an 
important Spanish trade fair in Bogotá, the capital city of Colombia, organized by ICEX 
(Instituto Español de Comercio Exterior or Spanish Institute of Foreign Trade). In the 
fragment, the New York Times journalist does go one step further than merely quoting 
the Colombian magazine. S/he is also fully responsible for introducing the explicit 
comparison between the tools used by the contemporary investors (checkbook and 
satellite dish) and the weapons used by the medieval conquistadors (cross and sword). 
[body] If it was the cross and the sword that inspired Spain’s initial foray into the 
Americas 500 years ago, it is the checkbook and the satellite dish that are leading 
what one Colombian magazine calls “the second Spanish conquest”. (New York Times, 
1998, 15 February) 
The following fragments were also published at the end of the 20th century. Here, the 
English-language journalists also point to Latin America as the region where the 
historical comparison was created. The references are, however, less specific than in the 
fragment from the New York Times above. In fact, they could be seen as a metonymic 
chain going from the more specific reference to the Colombian magazine in the New York 
Times, over the less specific reference to some Latin Americans in The Washington Post, 
to the all-inclusive reference in the Financial Times: Latin Americans. 
[body] Spanish companies have acquired companies in Latin America at a fast pace 
in recent years, and some Latin Americans have dubbed the acquisition spree the 
“reconquest”. (Washington Post, 2000, 14 February) 
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[body] Latin Americans have got used to Spanish companies buying their businesses 
in a process they have dubbed the “reconquest”. (Financial Times, 2000, 8 March) 
Later, when Spanish companies started to diversify their investments and looked to 
other regions, the English-language journalists at times referred back to the first wave 
of Spanish investments in Latin America. In the following example, the journalist again 
refers to the (alleged) Latin American origins of the discourse metaphor. 
[body] Spaniards snapped up banks, electric utilities, telephone companies and 
road concessions. Latin Americans called it “the reconquest”. (New York Times, 
2007, 25 November) 
In the next two fragments, the journalists do not refer to the origins of the colonial 
metaphor scenarios, but the fragments do illustrate that it was not uncommon to find 
these historical comparisons in the context of the Spanish wave of investments in Latin 
America at the end of the 20th century. 
[body] Spanish companies, especially in the telecommunications, energy and 
banking sectors, made major investments in Latin America during the 1990s, 
buying numerous privatized companies. The era was dubbed Spain’s “Reconquest” 
of the region. (Miami Herald, 2005, 3 October) 
 
[body] They began expanding overseas in the mid-1990s when Spaniards were 
described, not always fondly, as the new “conquistadors” of Latin America. 
(Financial Times, 2006, 14 February) 
The analysis also reveals that the English-language journalists continued to use the 
mini-narratives related to the Spanish explorations in Latin America when Spanish 
companies ventured into other regions after they had recovered from the Latin 
American financial crises at the beginning of the 21st century. The following fragments 
are taken from two different articles about the Spanish companies’ first attempts to 
expand into Europe. In the first excerpt, the Spanish companies are, again, 
metaphorically represented as new conquistadors. In the second excerpt, the colonial 
metaphor scenario is further exploited by depicting the companies as Spanish 
conquistadors who are riding out again to conquer new worlds. The writer of this fragment 
adds that, this time, they are venturing into Europe (viz. old world). 
[body] To be cautious: it may be premature to hail the new conquistadores from a 
handful of moves. (Financial Times, 2005, 1 April) 
 
[body] The Spanish conquistadors are riding out again to conquer new worlds – or 
perhaps in this case – old world is the better term. (New Zealand Herald, 2006, 14 
June) 
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The Spanish-American War and the end of Spain’s colonial empire (1898) 
Apart from the year 1492, the year in which Columbus discovered the New World, the 
English-language journalists also tapped into the discursive legacy surrounding another 
significant year in Spain’s history. In 1898, the Spanish-American War put an end to 
Spain’s colonial empire. The US victory forced Spain to relinquish claims on Cuba and 
cede its last remaining colonies (Guam, Puerto Rico and the Philippines) to the United 
States. In Spain, this initiated a deep moral, political and social crisis which came to be 
known in Spain as El Desastre (the Disaster). 
 
The analysis of the three newspaper articles in which these historical references are 
found reveals that the writers of these texts did not exclusively tap into the source 
domain of the end of Spain’s colonial empire. The following fragment is taken from the 
article introduced by the headline Return of the conqueror (Financial Times, 1997, 5 
March). The excerpt reveals that the reason to refer to the end of Spain’s colonial 
empire was the approaching centenary of the end of the Spanish-American War to be 
celebrated in 1998. Moreover, the Spanish companies are referred to through the 
inhabitants metonym the Spanish. Again, the link between the past and the present is 
made explicit by stating that they are back. 
[body] As they approach 1998 - the centenary of the end of their Latin American 
empire, when the last possessions of Cuba and Puerto Rico were humiliatingly lost 
to the US - the Spanish are back in a big way. (Financial Times, 1997, 5 March) 
The second fragment is taken from an article introduced by the headline Spanish firms 
revive Latin American conquest (Washington Post, 2000, 14 February). In the article, the 
Spanish-American War is mentioned explicitly when the journalist writes that Spain “is 
challenging the United States for regional influence for the first time since the Spanish-
American War in 1898”. In the excerpt, the journalist contrasts the end of Spain’s 
colonial empire to the fact that the Spaniards returned to the area 100 years later. The 
Spanish companies are represented through the nation metonym Spain and their 
business strategy (mergers and acquisitions) are explicitly compared to the war strategy of 
conquistadors (swords and gunpowder). 
Now, more than 100 years after the last of their rebellious colonies won 
independence, Spain is back in Latin America - doing with mergers and acquisitions 
what it once did with swords and gunpowder. (Washington Post, 2000, 14 February) 
In one headline in the corpus, the historical reference to the end of Spain’s colonial 
empire is more specific and hence more difficult to decipher than the much better 
known socio-cultural narratives related to the Spanish conquest of Latin America. The 
headline was used to introduce a news report about the wave of Spanish investment in 
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Latin America. The article was published exactly 100 years (to the date) after a historic 
event which changed the future for both Spain and the United States. In the second part 
of the headline, Spain stands metonymically for a number of Spanish companies. The 
first part of the headline cannot be characterized as a discourse metaphor, but the 
sequence does refer to a historic, popular phrase which is likely to resonate in the minds 
of the North American readership of the New York Times. 
[headline] Forget the Maine. Spain is back (New York Times, 1998, 15 February) 
In this article, the New York Times journalist uses a salient historical event in the 
history of Spanish-American relationships as an attention grabber. The USS Maine was a 
US battleship which had been sent to Cuba to protect US interests during the Cuban 
revolt against Spain. On 15 February 1898, the battleship was blown up and destroyed, 
killing nearly three quarters of the crew. Even though until today, the cause of the 
explosion remains unclear, the American public opinion quickly blamed Spain (Schmidt, 
2005, pp. 29-30). This led to an emotional outburst around the country, which was 
popularized in the phrase Remember the Maine. To hell with Spain!. The sinking of the USS 
Maine was one of the events which eventually led to the Spanish-American war. The 
journalist makes the historical reference explicit in the very first lines of the article. 
[body] THE explosion of the battleship Maine in Havana harbor 100 years ago today set 
the stage for Spain’s retreat from the last remnants of its empire in the New 
World, and for the emergence of the United States as a global power. Yet as the 
American Century draws to a close, a resurgent Spain is once again flexing its 
muscles in Latin America and pushing aside any lingering memories of “El 
Desastre,” as the Spanish-American War is often called there. (New York Times, 
1998, 15 February) 
 
The Spanish Armada or Spain’s failed attempt to invade England (1588) 
When the Spanish investors ventured into other parts of the world (2005-2006) after 
they had recovered from the scare of the Latin American financial crises at the 
beginning of the 21st century, the English-language newspapers in the corpus showed 
particular interest in the upsurge of Spanish investments in Great Britain in 2006. Some 
of the English-language newspapers in the corpus could no longer write from a safe 
outsider perspective as their own national territory/patrimony were suddenly 
threatened by this new wave of Spanish investments. This time, the English-language 
journalists again used vivid metaphorical constructions to describe the Spanish 
investors but they tapped into a different set of mini-narratives which can be seen as 
(historically) more appropriate to describe a business conflict between Spain and Great 
Britain: the (failed) invasion of the Spanish Armada. 
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The Spanish Armada is the term commonly used to refer to the Spanish fleet that 
sailed against England in 1588 to overthrow Elizabeth I and reintroduce Catholicism, to 
stop her from intervening in the Spanish Netherlands and to protect the Spanish sea 
communications with its overseas colonies from English privateers. With the exception 
of the first article in the corpus (Financial Times, 1990, 2 October), all references to the 
Armada are found in articles that were published in 2006 on the topic of Spanish 
investments in Great Britain. In this respect, it is also insightful to refer to Valdeón 
García’s (2007) study of a corpus of 100 British editorials and comment columns on the 
topic of the arrival of Spanish capital in Great Britain. He also found that the British 
media had “the tendency to reproduce and disseminate pre-existing narratives of the 
relationship between Britain and Spain” (Valdeón García, 2007, p. 79) and that the 
British quality newspapers used the source domain of both the Spanish Armada and the 
Spanish conquest to write about the wave of Spanish investments in Great Britain. 
 
The following examples are the headlines of three different newspaper articles 
published by British newspapers on the topic of the Spanish investors. In all three 
headlines, the Armada is used to metaphorically describe the Spanish companies that 
had acquired British companies in 2006. 
[headline] The corporate Armada is on its way to Britain (Herald of Scotland, 2006, 
3 April) 
 
[headline] Armada of acquisitions heralds new reign of Spain (Herald of Scotland, 
2006, 15 November) 
 
[headline] The new GBP 30bn Spanish Armada (Express, 2006, 18 December) 
In the following fragment, the journalist explicitly compares the Spanish business 
manoeuvres to those of the Spanish fleet and, at the same time, stresses the difference 
between the two actions: whereas the 16th century attempt notoriously failed, the 
modern invasion was proving to be more successful. In this excerpt, the Spanish 
investors are represented through the discourse metaphor (new) raiders. 
[body] Unlike the unsuccessful attempt to conquer England in 1588, the new raiders are 
making significant gains. (Financial Times, 2006, 14 February) 
Influenced by anti-Spanish discursive traditions, often commonly referred to as the 
Black Legend, non-Spaniards in the Middle Ages described the Armada with heavy irony 
as the Invincible Armada. The fleet proved anything but invincible as it was defeated by 
the English. This ironic reading is also found in the following headline in which the 
headline writer adds at last, suggesting that even though the Spanish attempt to get a 
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foothold in Great Britain failed in the 16th century, they were more successful at the 
beginning of the 21st century. 
[headline] Spain’s ship comes in at last (Times, 2006, 8 June) 
This headline works as an attention getter for an article about the acquisition of BAA (a 
UK airport operator) by Ferrovial (a Spanish engineering and infrastructure 
management company). In the first part of the excerpt below, taken from the beginning 
of the article, the journalist explains the historical reference to the Spanish Armada by 
referring to an anecdote about Sir Francis Drake, one of the high commanders of the 
English fleet. Then, in the second part of the sentence, the journalist goes on to further 
exploit the socio-culturally grounded narrative related to this historic event. The 
business action of the Spanish company Ferrovial taking over the British company BAA 
is described in powerful and aggressive terms by using the verb to plunder. The target 
company becomes, in turn, one of the richest jewels in British business. Thus, the author 
fully exploits the pre-existing socio-cultural narrative of the Spanish Armada in which 
the Spanish investors (implicitly) play the part of plundering pirates and the British 
acquiring company that of a pirate’s treasure. Moreover, the words at last from the 
headline are also further explained by stating that the latest Spanish attempt to invade 
Britain looked as if it was going to be successful. 
[body] However, unlike the Spanish fleet that was defeated after Sir Francis Drake 
famously finished a game of bowls in 1588, the latest Spanish attempt to plunder one 
of the richest jewels in British business looks as if it is going to be successful. 
(Times, 2006, 8 June) 
In the following fragments, the journalists draw on the same source domain to 
introduce a number of colourful nautical elements. The journalist of The Guardian 
Unlimited mentions the Spanish acquisition of BAA together with historical references 
to the Armada and to Sir Francis Drake and further exploits the scenario of Armada 
when s/he describes the Spanish company as being prepared to board a British firm. The 
Herald of Scotland journalist uses the discourse metaphor corporate Armada to refer to 
the wave of Spanish investments in the UK in 2006. S/he also exploits the scenario by 
describing the Spanish companies as being manned by […] executive captains. The 
journalist writing for The Express uses the same technique to add drama to the news 
story when s/he describes the actions of the Spanish companies in UK territory in 2006 
as Spain’s new Armada and the Spanish government’s tax breaks as putting extra wind in 
the sails of its “new Armada”. 
[body] Old-fashioned British traditionalists might have found themselves 
muttering about Sir Francis Drake and the Spanish Armada last week as yet another 
Spanish company, this time Ferrovial, prepared to board a British firm. (Guardian 
Unlimited, 2006, 13 February) 
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[body] UK plc […] is grappling with a veritable corporate Armada, manned by a 
new generation of shrewd and internationally-oriented executive captains. 
(Herald of Scotland, 2006, 15 November) 
 
[body] And the absurdly generous 30 per cent tax breaks the Spanish government 
offers to firms taking over foreign companies have put extra wind in the sails of 
its new Armada. (Express, 2006, 18 December) 
Thus, in their attempts to construct good and appealing news stories on the Spanish 
business manoeuvres on British soil, the English-language journalists tapped into the 
source domain of a famous historical encounter between the two nations. In one of the 
articles, the journalist explicitly points out that the fact that the British press exploits 
the image of the Spanish Armada should not come as a surprise because the comparison 
between the historic and the contemporary encounter is a predictable one to make (see 
also Crolley et al., 2000; Maguire et al., 1999). 
[body] When Spanish construction group Ferrovial emerged last week as a 
potential bidder for BAA, the UK airport operator, the British press predictably 
labelled it part of a corporate Spanish Armada raiding British assets. (Financial 
Times, 2006, 14 February) 
So far, the analysis revealed that the English-language journalists at times tapped into 
the source domain of Spain’s colonial history to add some drama to their news stories 
about the Spanish economic expansion in the period 1990-2009. The analysis showed 
that the Spanish investors in Latin America were at times represented in a socio-
culturally grounded narrative related to the discursive traditions surrounding the 
discovery and colonization of the New World. Later, the Spanish investors venturing 
into Great Britain were introduced in a similar scenario inspired by the discursive 
traditions surrounding the Spanish Armada’s (failed) attempt to invade Britain. The 
analysis also revealed that the journalists at times referred to the end of Spain’s colonial 
empire as a result of the Spanish-American War. Thus, the analysis revealed that the 
English-language journalists tapped into these socio-culturally grounded narratives 
when they wrote from both an outsider perspective (viz. Spanish investments in Latin 
America) and an insider perspective (viz. Spanish investments in Great Britain). The 
next section will explore whether the colonial metaphor scenarios were only used to 
convey an image of the Spanish investors as forceful aggressors or whether they were 
also used to represent them as audacious pioneers. 
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3.3.5.2 The use of colonial metaphor scenarios in the English-language corpus. 
Forceful aggressors or audacious pioneers? 
This section will explore how the English-language journalists used the colonial 
metaphor scenarios in their news stories about Spanish Foreign Direct Investment. In 
the corpus, there are a number of fragments which show that metaphor scenarios can 
be used differently depending on which side of the story the author wishes to highlight 
(see also Nerlich & Koteyko, 2010). This section will also explore the link between these 
metaphor scenarios and national stereotyping, and the potential consequences of these 
stereotypical representations for international relations. 
 
What most of the examples that have been discussed until now have in common is 
the representation of the Spanish investors as the powerful agents of controversial (and 
often emotionally charged) business actions. The following two fragments are taken 
from the headline and lead of two articles on the topic of the Spanish companies’ 
expansion into Latin America. In the first example, the Spanish companies are described 
as leading a new onslaught on Latin America. In the second example, the headline writer 
not only describes the Spanish investors as invading Latin America in search of its corporate 
treasures but also refers to the growing tensions between the Spaniards and the Latin 
Americans. 
[headline] Return of the conqueror 
[lead] Nearly a century after the end of Spain’s empire in Latin America, its 
companies are leading a new onslaught on the region (Financial Times, 1997, 3 
March) 
 
[headline] Return of the conquistador 
[lead] This time round, the Spaniards are invading Latin America in search of its 
corporate treasures, and the tensions are growing (Financial Times, 1999, 29 June) 
Similarly, the historical references to the Spanish Armada in the context of Spain’s 
internationalization into Great Britain in 2006 can be interpreted as to instil fear in the 
British people because, as Valdeón García (2007, p. 74) writes, it is an image which 
“traditionally haunted Britain”. This socio-culturally grounded emotive framing can 
also be observed in the following headline. 




In the headline referring to the USS Maine, the transition of the second part of the 
popular phrase To hell with Spain! into Spain is back! can also be interpreted as denoting a 
certain fear for what the Spaniards are going to do to the Latin American economies. 
[headline] Forget the Maine. Spain is back! (New York Times, 1998, 15 February) 
These historical comparisons encourage the readers to activate well-known mini-
narratives which are richly loaded with encyclopaedic and socio-cultural information 
(Musolff, 2006). In the context of the Spanish economic internationalization, it means 
activating the rich, albeit stereotypical, historical context of Spain’s imperialism from 
the past and, consequently, transposing upon the Spanish investors the stereotypical 
image of the aggressive conquistadors as invaders of foreign territories. 
 
Of course, the English-language journalists mainly used these scenarios for rhetoric 
and stylistic reasons. However, it is also important to note that the journalistic use of 
these historical comparisons has important consequences for representations of 
national identities which, in turn, may also have an impact on intercultural relations 
(Le, 2006). Metaphor scenarios and discourse metaphors can indeed be seen as 
“important tools for carrying a set of historical memories and commonplaces from one 
generation to the other” (Hellsten, 2009, p. 197). As a result, the (national) cultural 
prejudices and preconceptions that are firmly rooted in these scenarios are also 
transferred. Edy (1999) also noted that there are dangers associated with the journalistic 
use of historical comparisons because they “can be constructed so that the outcome of 
certain courses of action in response to the current problem appear predictable”. 
Indeed, the very use of the historic comparison, and its perceived usefulness in media 
discourse as a predictor of the future, seems to rely on a broader cultural commonplace, 
namely that history repeats itself. 
 
It can also be added that the Spanish investors may have contributed to the 
stereotypical negative representation as new conquistadors as they did make some crucial 
errors at the beginning of their economic internationalization when they ventured into 
Latin America. In the following fragment, the writer refers to the behaviour of some of 
these investors in Latin America. 
[body] Unfortunately, Spanish companies have not always behaved diplomatically 
overseas, particularly in Latin America, where they own swathes of the banking, 
telecommunications and energy sectors, and have sometimes behaved like new 
conquistadors. (Financial Times, 2003, 6 January) 
In any case, the analysis reveals that the English-language journalists focused mostly on 
the stereotypical aggressive nature of the Spaniards when they wrote about the Spanish 
economic expansion. Obviously, this dramatic framing is also in line with the 
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conventional use of conflict metaphorical language in business media discourse in 
general and in news stories on mergers and acquisitions in particular (see section 3.2.1). 
 
Still, the data in the corpus also show that the journalists, at times, used colonial 
metaphor scenarios to frame Spain’s economic internationalization in a more positive 
way. This may come as a surprise because of the strong influence of the discursive 
traditions aiming at discrediting Spain since the early stages of its colonial empire (see 
section 2.3.1). At times, the Spanish investors were also admired and lauded for their 
audacity. In the following headline of an article about the Spanish investments in Latin 
America, for instance, the Spanish investors are metaphorically described as the new 
Spanish explorers. This discourse metaphor is certainly more positively charged than the 
more frequently identified new conquistadors discourse metaphor. In the body of the text, 
the adventurous qualities of the Spanish explorers are highlighted. However, in this 
article, the author also describes the Spanish business manoeuvres by using the more 
violent metaphorical construction high-profile forays into Latin America. 
[headline] The new Spanish explorers 
[body] They have since become more adventurous and a new corporate culture 
has grown up. [...] The move abroad has been led by the biggest Spanish 
companies, with high-profile forays into Latin America. (Financial Times, 1998, 19 
January[a]) 
The following headline and lead were published in the context of the second wave of 
Spanish FDI. In the headline, the boldness or economic courage and fearlessness of the 
Spanish investors is admired. In the lead there is also a (more subtle) historical 
reference in building empires beyond national borders. 
[headline] New boldness that make Spanish business stand out 
[lead] Spanish groups are building empires beyond national borders with the aim 
of diversification. (Financial Times, 2005, 14 June) 
In one of the articles about the Spanish investments in Great Britain, the writer of the 
lead also compares the former, backward Spain to the new, outward looking Spain by 
highlighting its successful conversion into one of Europe’s strongest economies by 
buying UK firms and relying on expat ingenuity. 
[headline] The new gbp 30bn Spanish Armada 
[lead] It used to be a laidback country of sun and fun. But here we reveal how 
Spain, once the weakest economy in Europe, has now become one of its strongest – by 
buying UK firms and relying on expat ingenuity (Express, 2006, 18 December) 
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Thus, the data in the corpus also show that colonial metaphor scenarios can also be used 
to give a more positive evaluation of the Spanish economic expansion (see also Nerlich 
& Koteyko, 2010). The mini-narratives related to Spain’s colonial empire can be used to 
highlight different qualities of the Spanish investors when they are used to trigger 
different elements stored in the shared socio-cultural background knowledge about 
Spain’s history. Depending on which aspects best fit the news story, the journalist can 
choose to frame the Spanish investors as forceful aggressors or as audacious pioneers. These 
two different mini-narratives can even be combined in one and the same article, as in 
the Financial Times article about the Spanish explorers (Financial Times, 1998, 19 
January[a]). 
 
The lead of the Express article cited above (The new gbp 30bn Spanish Armada) also 
points towards the discursive reproduction of another Spanish stereotype which stems 
from a different discursive tradition: the Romanticist vision of Spain in the 19th century 
(see section 2.3.3). It must be noted, however, that the colonial metaphor scenarios were 
identified in more articles (30/80) in this corpus than the Romanticist metaphor 
scenarios (5/80) (see also Table 9 on p. 104). 
 
As a result of the Romanticist discursive tradition, Spain is still seen today as an 
exotic and seductive place, as a country of sun, sand and folklore. The analysis of the 
texts in the corpus shows that the English-language journalists also tap into this deeply 
entrenched stereotypical view of Spain. Indeed, Spain is still very often seen as an 
inefficient country, incapable of producing high quality goods and services (Chislett, 
2008a). In the following examples, the references to these Spanish stereotypes are used 
to emphasize the contrast between Spain’s (alleged) backwardness in recent history and 
its sudden transformation into an economic superpower. The fragments, which were 
published in 2006 and 2007, can be seen as illustrations of the deep-rootedness of these 
stereotypes about Spain and the state of its economy. 
[body] Not so long ago most British sunseekers saw Spain as a country of donkeys, 
castanets and cheap sangria. (Express, 2006, 18 December) 
 
[body] Industry in Spain? Surely there’s not much to be said about that? The 
country is renowned for sun, sea, wine, flamenco, fiestas and bullfights. But 
industry, finance and technology? (Financial Times, 2007, 24 October) 
In the corpus, the references to the Romanticist vision can be linked to two different 
socio-culturally grounded source domains. On the one hand, there are the mini-
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narratives linked to the folkloric tradition of bull fighting, which is found referring to 
the Spanish investments abroad in the headline of one article in the corpus41. On the 
other hand, there is the climatological element of the sun, which is used creatively in 
the headline of another article in the corpus. 
 
Bulls and taurine games still play an important, yet ambiguous, role in Spain. In the 
introduction of her book, Carrie Douglass (1997) writes about how Spaniards showed 
mixed reaction when she told them about her research topic. On the one hand, she 
writes, there were those who “threw their arms in exasperation at the foreigner’s 
interest in bullfights” (Douglass, 1997, p. 5). Indeed, for many tourists, bullfights and 
other taurine games are exotic forms of entertainment that are considered synonymous 
with Spain42. On the other hand, Douglass also writes that other Spaniards assured her 
that “the bull was the totem of Spain, that fiestas revolve around the bull, and that 
bullfights were a sublime art” (Douglass, 1997, p. 5). In any case, in two of the texts in 
the corpus, the English-language journalists also considered the image of the bull 
attractive enough to use it in an article about the diversification of Spanish investments 
into regions outside of Latin America (China, Russia, India). In the following headline, 
the Spanish companies are generically referred to through the nation metonym Spain 
whereas their business endeavours are described metaphorically through the Spanish 
folkloristic tradition of the bull run. 
[headline] Spain’s amazing bull run (Calgary Herald, 2006, 25 June) 
In the next example, the journalist creatively uses the socio-cultural background 
knowledge that many English-language people will have about Spain, particularly in 
Great Britain: the idea that Spain is synonymous with sun. The article is about the fact 
that, in 2003, Spain was the exception in Europe when its GDP was expected to grow 
more than double than that of the Eurozone. The headline links the adjective sunny to 
both this positive trend and the stereotypical view of Spain as an exotic, sunny and 
warm country. 
[headline] Spanish investors enjoy sunny returns (Financial Times, 2003, 2 August) 
  
 
                                                     
41
 The source domain of the Spanish bull is also used in another newspaper article, not to describe the 
economic expansion of Spanish companies but to refer to the privatization of a number of Spanish state-
owned companies: “Strutting and posturing like bullfighters, Spain’s energy companies are having their day in the 
arena” (Times, 2000, 19 October). 
42
 Ernest Hemingway certainly played a role in spreading this stereotype, as was explained in section 2.3.4. 
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3.3.6 Conclusion 
The results of the analysis presented in this section both confirm and extend the 
findings of earlier studies. In this corpus of English-language newspaper accounts of 
Spain’s economic internationalization in different geopolitical regions between 1990 
and 2009, the writers of these texts indeed often resorted to metaphorical structures 
denoting aggressive movement (BUSINESS IS EVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE). The analysis also 
confirmed that the source domain of FIGHTING/WAR is used more often than the source 
domains of FEEDING or MATING. Moreover, when discursively (re)presenting and 
(re)constructing the different cases of Spanish mergers and acquisitions, the journalists 
often referred to the (perceived) nationality of both acquiring and target firms. As such, 
they set up (supra)national frames of reference through which companies can be 
discursively constructed as representatives of specific nations or regions. The writers of 
the English-language newspaper articles in the corpus not only used this technique to 
reduce the complexity of the business realities they were describing but also to add 
extra drama to their news stories. 
RQ1: How did the English-language journalists use emotive framing in written media 
discourse on Spain’s economic expansion (1990-2009)? 
The analysis revealed that the English-language journalists drew on the combination of 
conflict metaphors and (supra)national frames of reference to discursively (re)present 
and (re)construct the international business manoeuvres of a number of Spanish 
companies as violent confrontations between nations rather than between corporate 
entities. This emotively charged narrative frame has great rhetorical potential because 
readers can identify easily with a threat to national territory and integrity, even if they 
do not actually live in the territory that is metaphorically under attack, as is the case for 
the English-language discursive representations of Spanish FDI in Latin America at the 
end of the 20th century. 
 
At times, the English-language journalists went further in their search for interesting 
angles to construct good and appealing stories when they tapped into the discursive 
legacy of Spain as a conquering nation. In the texts, the contemporary business actions 
of the Spanish investors were compared to significant military campaigns undertaken 
by their ancestors. In the most striking fragments in the corpus, the Spanish acquiring 
companies and their business targets were introduced as participants in a series of pre-
existing socio-culturally grounded narratives with normative assumptions about the 
outcome of the actions. 
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RQ2: Which historical events serve as the source domain for the colonial metaphor 
scenarios set up by the English-language journalists in the context of Spain’s economic 
expansion (1990-2009)? 
In this English-language corpus, the journalists tap into the socio-cultural knowledge of 
three salient historical moments from Spain’s colonial history: the discovery of the New 
World in 1492 (and its subsequent colonization), the failed attempt to invade England in 
1588, and the Spanish-American War in 1898 which marks the end of Spain’s colonial 
empire. 
 
The historical references to the conquest of the so-called New World were first used 
in the context of the Spanish investments in Latin America in the 1990s. However, the 
same mini-narratives were also used to describe the Spanish expansion into other 
regions at the beginning of the 21st century. The source domain of the Spanish-
American War was only used in the context of the Spanish investments in Latin America 
at the end of the 20th century. The decision to include precisely these historical 
references may not only be motivated by the historical similarities between the events, 
but also by the fact that Spanish-American relationships were repeatedly in the news in 
the 1990s. First, there was the 500th anniversary of Columbus’ first Voyage to the West in 
1992 and, later, the commemorations of the end of Spain’s colonial empire (El Desastre) 
in 1998. 
 
The references to the Spanish Armada were mainly used in the context of the Spanish 
wave of investments in Great Britain in 2006. Surely, as one of the journalists in the 
corpus also writes, this is a predictable historical comparison to make. After all, the 
Spanish Armada still resonates as the symbol of all the conflicts Spain and 
England/Great Britain have had over the centuries. 
 
In any case, two clear trends can be identified. The use of the source domains can be 
linked to the field of action of the two waves of investments: the Spanish conquistadors 
are used to describe the Spanish investors in Latin America, the Spanish Armada is used 
for their compatriots venturing into Great Britain. However, there are also exceptions to 
this rule. The new conquistadors discourse metaphor was also used to describe Spanish 
business actions in other parts of the world. The Armada was used once in an article 
about the Spanish FDI in Argentina (Financial Times, 1990, 2 October). The USS Maine 
was used in an article about the Spanish investments in Latin America in general (New 
York Times, 1998, 15 February). 
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RQ3: Did the English-language journalists use the colonial metaphor scenarios to convey 
a positive or a negative evaluation of the Spanish investors? 
The analysis revealed that colonial metaphor scenarios can be used to highlight 
different characteristics of the Spanish investors’ move abroad. When expanding 
companies are compared to soldiers and armies in business media discourse, they can be 
described as bloodthirsty, greedy and aggressive when taking over companies. However, 
the broad source domain of soldiers and armies also contains more positively charged 
mini-narratives. These can be used to describe expanding companies as audacious, 
adventurous, daring and determined when entering new markets. 
 
In this corpus, the authors predominantly pushed the Spanish investors into the role 
of the forceful aggressors. This can be explained by the fact that Spain still has a harsh 
and cruel reputation in the English-speaking world as a result of the discursive legacy of 
its colonial past, often commonly referred to as the Black Legend. The analysis also 
shows how these deeply rooted (national) cultural prejudices and preconceptions are 
still used to colour international relations between Spain and other geopolitical regions. 
This study of English-language newspaper discourse about Spain’s economic expansion 
between 1990 and 2009 also proves how stable these national stereotypes are. It must be 
added, however, that there are also a number of fragments in this corpus in which the 
Spanish investors are admired and lauded for their audacity, but they represent only a 
small fraction in this corpus. Moreover, these more positive representations are often 
used together with the more negative ones. 
 
The analysis also found evidence of the use of a different set of deeply rooted 
national stereotypes about Spain which stem from a different discursive tradition: the 
widespread Romanticist vision of Spain. The elements in the corpus tap into the 
stereotype of Spain as an exotic tourist destination and into the folkloric tradition of 
taurine games. The fact that the Romanticist vision is not used as often as a source 
domain as the Black Legend can also be seen as further proof of the pervasiveness of the 
conflict frame in business media discourse, particularly in accounts of international 
business manoeuvres. Clearly, the historical references to belligerent encounters 
between Spain and other nations/regions dating from its rich colonial history are 
rhetorically more effective in a conflict frame than references tapping into the 
Romanticist discursive tradition. 
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3.4 Conflict metaphors, (supra)nation metonyms and 
metaphor scenarios in Argentine and Spanish newspaper 
accounts of the 1998-1999 privatization and acquisition of 
YPF 
3.4.1 Introduction 
The second empirical section in this chapter sets out to study the use of emotive 
framing and particularly the use of socio-culturally grounded metaphor scenarios in the 
Spanish-language corpus containing 330 newspaper articles which focus on the 
privatization and acquisition of YPF. The acquisition process started in 1998 and was 
completed in 1999 (for a description of this corpus, see 1.3.2). The Repsol-YPF case was 
chosen because it can be seen as the culmination of Spain’s process of economic 
internationalization during the 1990s. At the same time, the acquisition also marks the 
end of the first wave of Spanish Foreign Direct Investment. Repsol’s acquisition of YPF 
was the last big cross-border purchase by a Spanish company before a severe economic 
and financial crisis struck Latin America43 (see section 2.1). 
 
There is evidence that Spanish-language authors also tap into the source domain of 
Spain’s colonial past when they write about the corporate activities of Spanish 
companies in Latin America. Consider, for instance, the use of the word reconquista in 
the title of Casas Gragea’s (2001) academic article on the Spanish investments in Latin 
America, or the use of the term nuevos conquistadores in the titles of the socio-critical 
works of the Argentine journalists Cecchini and Zicolillo (2002) and of Greenpeace 
España (2009). This section seeks to find an answer to the question whether Argentine 
and Spanish journalists tapped into Spain’s discursive legacy to write about the Repsol-
YPF case and whether the two subcorpora are markedly different or similar in this 
respect. The analysis of the English-language corpus (section 3.3) revealed that colonial 
metaphor scenarios can be used to write either positively or negatively about the 
Spanish investors. Did the Spanish journalists use colonial metaphor scenarios to 
highlight the adventurous qualities of the Spanish explorers? And did the Argentine 
 
                                                     
43
 Repsol held this record until Telefónica paid €26 billion, or $31 billion, in 2006 to purchase the O2 mobile 
telephony operator in the UK, Germany and Ireland (see section 2.1.3). 
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journalists, on the contrary, use them to emphasize the aggressive nature of the Spanish 
investors? 
 
Thus, the main question to be answered in this section is whether the Argentine and 
Spanish journalists drew on Spain’s colonial past in Argentina to construct appealing 
stories on the topic of a specific Spanish cross-border business manoeuvre in Latin 
America. The analysis of the English-language corpus already revealed that there are 
two crucial elements to set up this emotive framing: conflict metaphors and national 
frames of reference. Therefore, the analysis will be presented in two separate sections. 
The first section 3.4.2 will explore the use of the emotive factor of a threat to national 
territory and integrity in the two subcorpora. Then, the use of the colonial metaphor 
scenarios will be explored in section 3.4.3. 
 
The following three research questions will guide the analysis in this section: 
RQ1: How did the Argentine and Spanish journalists use emotive framing in their 
newspaper accounts of the 1998-1999 Repsol-YPF case? 
 
RQ2: Did the Argentine and Spanish journalists use colonial metaphor scenarios in 
their newspaper accounts of the 1998-1999 Repsol-YPF case? 
 
RQ3: Did the Argentine and Spanish journalists use the colonial metaphor 
scenarios to convey a negative or a positive evaluation of the Spanish investors? 
3.4.2 Emotive framing in Argentine and Spanish newspaper accounts of 
the 1998-1999 Repsol-YPF case 
3.4.2.1 Emotive framing in the Argentine subcorpus 
The analysis of the Argentine subcorpus reveals that conflict metaphors are indeed used 
in the Argentine newspaper articles on the Repsol-YPF case. The majority of the 
newspaper articles in the Spanish-language corpus report on the various stages in the 
acquisition process and, as such, often focus on the differences in opinion between the 
most important parties involved in the process44. In particular, the management of 
Repsol and YPF are (metaphorically) fighting each other over control of the Argentine 
company. This power game is often discursively represented by using conflict metaphors. 
 
                                                     
44
 Section 4.3 in the following chapter will further look into these differences. 
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The following two headlines are firmly based on the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphorical 
structure. 
[título] Tregua entre YPF y Repsol (Clarín, 1999, 3 March) 
 [headline] Ceasefire between YPF and Repsol 
 
[título] La guerra del management (Clarín, 1999, 13 June[d]) 
 [headline] Management at war 
The Argentine journalists also use warfare metaphorical constructions when they write 
about the companies’ actions. In the following two fragments, the actions of both Repsol 
(the aggressor) and YPF (the victim) are described by drawing on the source domain of 
war. In the first excerpt, YPF is described as preparing para la guerra (preparing for war). 
In the second, Repsol is described as preparing su ofensiva sobre YPF (preparing its attack 
on YPF). 
[cuerpo] […] YPF se prepara para la guerra, previendo una toma hostil por parte de 
Repsol […]. (La Nación, 1999, 17 February) 
[body] […] YPF is preparing for war in expectation of a hostile takeover by Repsol […] 
 
[cuerpo] Cuando Repsol preparó su ofensiva sobre YPF, el barril estaba a 12 
dólares. (Clarín, 1999, 14 July) 
 [body] When Repsol prepared its attack on YPF, the barrel was at 12 dollars. 
In a number of fragments, the journalists build a larger piece of text around the source 
domain of war. In the following fragment, the Clarín journalist uses several different 
warfare metaphorical constructions to write about the ongoing process. 
[cuerpo] En YPF velan armas por las dudas de que no contesten desde Madrid, 
confiaron a Clarín quienes comandan las tropas y están listos para la guerra. ¿Qué 
artillería tienen? Alistamos los cañones – contaron – […]. (Clarín, 1999, 9 February) 
[body] Those who are in command of the troops and ready for war admitted to 
Clarín blades are being sharpened at YPF, just in case there is no response from 
Madrid. What kind of artillery do they have? We are preparing the cannons, they 
said, […] 
Clearly, the Argentine journalists make use of warfare metaphorical structures when 
they write about the privatization and acquisition of YPF. As far as the other two 
subdomains in Koller’s (2003, 2004) framework of M&A IS EVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE are 
concerned, M&A IS FEEDING and M&A IS MATING, they seem to be used less frequently in 
the Argentine subcorpus. The source domain of MATING is used in one La Nación article 
in which YPF is described as una novia indecisa (an indecisive bride). This article was 
published at the time the Board of Directors of YPF decided to study Repsol’s all-cash 
offer for another week before making a final decision as to whether YPF would 
recommend its shareholders to accept or reject Repsol’s offer (see also section 2.2.3). 
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[cuerpo] Como una novia indecisa, el directorio de YPF se hace esperar. (La 
Nación, 1999, 4 May[a]) 
 [body] Just like an indecisive bride, YPF’s board is taking it’s time. 
The analysis also reveals that, next to the use of these rather conventional conflict 
metaphors, the Argentine journalists also draw firmly on an emotively charged 
narrative frame based on a local/foreign dichotomy (Riad & Vaara, 2011). As was already 
observed in the corpus of English-language newspaper articles, multinationals involved 
in cross-border business manoeuvres are often assigned a nationality (Kuronen et al., 
2005). In the corpus of newspaper articles on the privatization and acquisition of YPF, 
this can be found, for instance, at the time when the newspapers reported on a series of 
multinationals that had shown interest in buying the 14.9% stake that the Argentine 
government had put up for auction. 
[cuerpo] El informante, que solicitó que no fuera revelado su nombre, expresó 
además que la compañía petrolera española Repsol, el holding argentino Perez 
Companc y el Ente Nazionale de Idrocarburi (ENI), de Italia, se mostraron 
interesados en adquirir el paquete accionario […]. (La Nación, 1998, 27 October) 
[body] The informant, who preferred to remain anonymous, further mentioned that 
the Spanish oil company Repsol, the Argentine holding Perez Companc and the Ente 
Nacionale de Idrocarburi (ENI) of Italy, showed interest in acquiring the share 
package […]. 
This observation may seem banal but the following fragments illustrate that this 
national identification serves as the basis to discursively construe the Repsol-YPF case 
as a matter of Us versus Them. In the Argentine newspapers, Us stands for 
Argentine/local companies whereas Them stands for Spanish/Italian/etc. companies. In 
other words, Them stands for foreign companies. In the following excerpts, the potential 
buyers of YPF are described on the basis of a local/foreign dichotomy. 
[cuerpo] Antes que la carta parta hacia despachos del extranjero y algún escritorio 
local, la lista de supuestos interesados engorda día a día. (Clarín, 1998, 6 November) 
[body] Until the letter is sent out to offices abroad and to some local ones, the list of 
supposedly interested parties will grow every day. 
 
[cuerpo] Fueron invitadas 16 petroleras. Hay extranjeras, la local Perez Companc y 
los actuales accionistas de YPF. (Clarín, 1998, 9 December) 
[body] 16 oil companies were invited. There are foreign companies, local Perez 
Companc and the current shareholders of YPF. 
On the one hand, this dichotomy can be seen as forming part of the banal national frame 
of reference that is routinely set up in this type of business news stories. On the other 
hand, however, it can also pave the way for a more emotionally charged framing. In the 
following fragment, a mild feeling of loss can be identified in the way the journalist 
  127 
frames the news that the government invited 15 oil companies to bid for YPF, but only 
one of them is a local, Argentine company (Perez Companc)45. The other 14 oil companies 
are, therefore, implicitly described as foreign. 
[cuerpo] El Gobierno invitó a 15 petroleras, sólo una de ellas de capitales 
argentinos, para ofertar por el 14,99 por ciento de las acciones de YPF, […]. (La 
Nación, 1998, 27 November) 
[body] The government invited 15 oil companies, only one of them with local capital, 
to bid for the 14.99 per cent of YPF shares. 
From the beginning, the loss of ownership over YPF is a real issue in the Argentine 
newspapers46. At times, the Argentine journalists also bring in the highly emotive factor 
of a threat to national territory and integrity when they bring the confrontation 
between the two organizations to the level of their nation47. In the following headlines, 
the Spanish company Repsol is represented through the inhabitants metonym los 
españoles (the Spaniards). YPF’s (perceived) nationality is not made explicit here. 
[título] Los españoles, detrás de YPF (Clarín, 1998, 28 July) 
 [headline] The Spaniards are after YPF 
 
[título] Más tironeos entre YPF y los españoles (Clarín, 1999, 2 March) 
 [headline] The tug-of-war between YPF and the Spaniards continues 
When Repsol launched its all-cash offer to acquire the whole company, Clarín published 
a headline in which one of the ultimate symbols of national sovereignty is used: the flag 
(Riad & Vaara, 2011). The whole idea of planting a flag in the ground means as much as 
claiming sovereignty over a particular territory. In this case, the metaphor of a Spanish 
flag waving above the Argentine company YPF also symbolizes Argentina’s loss of 
control over their company. Thus, the emotive framing in this headline is again based on 
a combination of a warfare metaphorical image (una bandera – a flag) and a national 
frame of reference (una bandera española – a Spanish flag). 
[título] Una bandera española en YPF (Clarín, 1999, 2 May[a]) 
 [headline] A Spanish flag at YPF 
 
                                                     
45
 Chapter 4 will go deeper into the difference between outright forms of evaluation (inscribed evaluation) and 
fragments which have the potential to trigger an evaluative reaction in the reader via processes of attitudinal 
inference (invoked evaluation) (see section 4.2.2.2 for a discussion of the theoretical basis and of a number of 
fragments from the Spanish-language corpus). 
46
 The loss of ownership over YPF is one of the aspects that will be analysed in detail in Chapter 4. 
47
 That is, the nation these organizations are perceived to represent. 
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La Nación also published a number of headlines through which the emotionally charged 
loss of control over the former national company is conveyed. In the first example, 
Repsol is explicitly identified as a Spanish company, whereas YPF is referred to by 
simply using its name. In the second example, Repsol is metonymically referred to 
through the inhabitants metonym los españoles (the Spaniards). This time, YPF is 
described as la compañía más grande del país (the country’s largest company). This 
representation not only illustrates YPF’s status as an important national symbol but also 
strengthens the Argentine hurt feelings caused by the idea of the Spaniards running 
YPF in the future. 
[título] La española Repsol ya controla YPF (La Nación, 1999, 23 June[a]) 
 [headline] Spanish Repsol already in control of YPF 
 
[título] La compañía más grande del país ya es de los españoles (La Nación, 1999, 25 
June) 
 [headline] The country’s largest company is now owned by the Spaniards 
The loss of control over YPF is also clearly present in the metaphorical constructions in 
[certain] hands or in(to) the hands of, particularly when they are used to discursively 
represent a confrontation between private companies as a confrontation between 
nations (see also Riad & Vaara, 2011). In the following fragments, the metaphorical 
constructions a manos de and en manos de are used together with the inhabitants 
metonym los españoles. 
[cuerpo] Según puede leerse en el contrato de compraventa del 14,99% de acciones 
estatales que pasaron a manos de los españoles, en enero último, […] (La Nación, 
1999, 14 May) 
[body] As can be read in the contract of sale of the state’s 14.9% shares that ended up 
in the hands of the Spaniards last January, […]. 
 
[cuerpo] La operación, que finalizará hoy, a las 18, hora de Buenos Aires, ya habría 
puesto en manos de los españoles el 90 por ciento de los papeles en juego. (La 
Nación, 1999, 23 June[a]) 
[body] It is rumoured that the operation, which will be wrapped up today at 6 pm 
Buenos Aires time, already has put 90 per cent of the shares in the hands of the 
Spaniards. 
In a number of articles, Repsol’s acquisition of YPF is used as a stepping stone to 
consider the bigger picture of the role of the Spanish investors in the privatization 
processes of a number of Argentine companies over the years, as a result of the 
economic reforms implemented by the successive Menem governments. The following 
excerpt is the headline of a Clarín article in which the journalist writes about the 7% of 
the Argentine economy that is en manos españolas (in Spanish hands). 
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[título] El 7% de la economía, en manos españolas (Clarín, 1999, 9 May) 
 [headline] 7% of the economy, in Spanish hands 
The following headlines were published by La Nación. They also put the hurt feelings 
caused by the loss of YPF into a broader perspective. However, La Nación mainly draws 
on the local/foreign dichotomy to write about what the newspaper calls el proceso de 
extranjerización (the process of denationalization) of large parts of the Argentine 
economy. Thus, these headlines take a broader perspective by taking into account the 
business manoeuvres of all foreign investors operating in Argentina and not just those 
of the Spanish investors. 
[título] La Argentina extranjera (La Nación, 1999, 9 May[e]) 
 [headline] Argentina, owned by foreigners 
 
[título] Nacionales y extranjeras (La Nación, 1999, 2 September[b]) 
 [headline] National and foreign companies 
 
[antetítulo] Crece el proceso de extranjerización (Clarín, 1999, 2 September) 
 [subheader] The process of denationalization increases 
So far, the analysis of the Argentine subcorpus showed that the Argentine journalists 
used both conflict metaphors and national frames of reference in their news stories 
about Repsol’s acquisition of YPF and that these two elements can be combined to bring 
in the emotive factor of a threat to national territory and integrity. This emotive 
framing in the Argentine newspaper articles can be seen as giving an insight into the 
Argentine hurt feelings caused by the loss of control not only over YPF but over a 
number of Argentine companies. Indeed, this emotive framing was also found in news 
stories in which the Repsol-YPF case was used as a stepping stone to write about the 
broader picture of not only the Spanish but all foreign investors operating in the 
country. 
3.4.2.2 Emotive framing in the Spanish subcorpus 
The analysis of the Spanish subcorpus reveals that conflict metaphors are also used in 
the Spanish news stories on the privatization and acquisition of YPF. In the following 
two fragments, one taken from El País and one from Cinco Días, the journalists tap into 
the source domain of WAR when they write about battle strategies, veterans and attacks. 
[cuerpo] Una línea de combate que, para Monti y sus colegas, se basa en resistir 
cuanto haga falta, aprovechando la ventaja que les da el hecho de que los 
accionistas (fondos de inversión) se expresan a través del actual consejo que ellos 
conforman. (El País, 1999, 7 March) 
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[body] A combative attitude which, for Monti and his colleagues, is based on 
resisting as much as necessary, taking advantage of the fact that the shareholders 
(investment funds) express themselves through the current board they are part of. 
 
[cuerpo] Pero ese blindaje iba a resultar muy delgado, sobre todo para alguien que, 
como Cortina, es un veterano del mundo de los negocios. La fase final de la 
ofensiva empezó a precipitarse a comienzos de marzo, luego de que Cortina asistió 
por segunda vez a una reunión del directorio de YPF. (Cinco Días, 1999, 3 May[d]) 
[body] But this armour would turn out to be very thin, especially for someone who, 
like Cortina, is a veteran in the business world. The final phase of the attack started 
at the beginning of March, after Cortina participated in a YPF board meeting for the 
second time. 
In the following fragment, taken from a Cinco Días opinion piece about Repsol’s future 
role on the world stage, the writer uses the source domain of FEEDING to describe the 
major changes the global energy sector was going through at the end of the 20th 
century. 
[cuerpo] En este sector, además, disponer de un potente músculo financiero no 
parece representar garantía alguna frente a un competidor voraz, como se ha 
evidenciado en el caso de la francesa Elf […]. (Cinco Días, 1999, 6 October[a]) 
[body] Furthermore, flexing your powerful financial muscle in this sector does not 
seem to provide any guarantees when confronted with a voracious competitor, as 
has been the case with the French company Elf […]. 
The analysis also reveals that the Spanish journalists also described the companies that 
are contending to acquire the 14.9% package as representatives of a particular nation 
(Kuronen et al., 2005). 
[cuerpo] La española Repsol, la italiana Ente Nazionale de Idrocarburi (ENI), las 
norteamericanas Enron y Consolidated Natural Gas, así como la argentina Perez 
Companc son las sociedades que han llegado a la fase final del concurso. Por el 
contrario, las francesas Elf y Total, las norteamericanas Exxon y Texaco, así como 
British Gas han optado por retirarse. (Cinco Días, 1998, 11 December[b]) 
[body] Spanish Repsol, Italian Ente Nazionale de Idrocarburi (ENI), North-American 
Enron and Consolidated Natural Gas, as well as Argentine Perez Companc are the 
companies that made it to the final phase of the tender. By contrast, French Elf and 
Total, North-American Exxon and Texaco and British Gas have decided to withdraw. 
Thus, these fragments show that the Spanish newspapers also drew on national frames 
of reference when they wrote about this particular cross-border business manoeuvre. 
However, the following headlines and leads reveal that the Spanish journalists used 
these national frames mainly to assign a nationality to the two implicated companies: 
Repsol is a Spanish company, YPF is an Argentine company. The conflict between the 
different parties involved is present in these headlines (and leads) but the tensions are 
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played out more as a conflict between two companies than as a conflict between YPF 
and the Spaniards, as in some of the Argentine headlines cited in the previous section 
3.4.2.1. 
[título] Pulso entre Repsol y los accionistas de YPF 
[entradilla] La española lucha con los propietarios de la petrolera argentina por su 
control. (El País, 1999, 7 February) 
 [headline] The battle between Repsol and the YPF shareholders 
[lead] The Spanish company is wrestling the owners of the Argentine oil company for 
control 
 
[título] Hostilidades cordiales entre Repsol e YPF 
[entradilla] La empresa española rechaza la propuesta argentina de aplazar su toma de 
control total y ésta no accede a modificar los estatutos. (El País, 1999, 7 March) 
 [headline] Cordial hostility between Repsol and YPF 
[lead] The Spanish company rejects the Argentine proposal to postpone its full takeover 
and [the Argentine company] refuses to amend the articles of association 
Thus, in the Spanish newspaper articles, the tense relations between the different 
parties involved are not framed at the level of the nation and the Spanish journalists do 
not play the fear card. Unlike their Argentine colleagues, they do not see the dominance 
of the Spanish companies in the Argentine economy as a problem. On the contrary. 
Another aspect that is often highlighted in the Spanish subcorpus is Repsol’s future size 
and, hence, the fact that the company is going to play a more important role in the 
global energy market after the acquisition of YPF. 
[cuerpo] Hay que reconocer que no es frecuente que una empresa española aspire a 
colocarse entre las diez primeras del mundo en su sector. (Cinco Días, 1999, 3 
May[a]) 
[body] It must be admitted that it is not common for a Spanish company to aspire 
being among the ten biggest players globally in its sector. 
As such, the Spanish newspapers are found to be displaying a different kind of emotive 
framing; one that lets the Spanish pride in the economic expansion of their company 
shine through48. In the following excerpt, the Spanish pride in Repsol is extended to the 
Spanish pride in all expanding Spanish companies. The writer emphasizes that the 
Spanish investors are playing an important part in the modernization of the Argentine 
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 The discursive construction of a collective feeling of Spanish national pride in the Spanish newspaper 
corpus as a result of the economic expansion strategies of Spanish companies at the end of the 20th century 
will be more thoroughly explored in Chapter 4. 
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economy (see also section 2.1.4.1). Interestingly, the writer uses the nation metonym 
Spain instead of the more specific referent Spanish investors. 
[cuerpo] En la actualidad las empresas con capital español generan en torno al 7% del 
PIB argentino, lo que unido al aporte tecnológico para la modernización de los 
servicios públicos y de la industria han convertido a España en uno de los grandes 
protagonistas del proceso de reformas económicas de este país. (Cinco Días, 1999, 
3 May[b]) 
[body] Currently, Spanish companies generate approximately 7% of the Argentine GDP. 
Together with the technological contribution towards the modernization of public 
services and the industry, Spain has become one of the main protagonists of the 
country’s economic reform process. 
In summary, the analysis of the Spanish subcorpus revealed that Spanish journalists also 
used conflict metaphors and national frames of reference in their news stories about the 
privatization and acquisition of YPF and that these elements can be used to introduce 
emotion into the news reports. The analysis also revealed, however, that the emotive 
framing in the Spanish subcorpus was not based on the combination of conflict 
metaphors and national frames of reference. In the Spanish subcorpus, the conflict was 
represented at the level of the companies, even though their (perceived) nationalities 
were often explicitly mentioned as well. The emotive framing, then, can be found in the 
feeling of national pride which emanates from the positive descriptions regarding the 
economic expansion of Repsol and other Spanish companies (their companies) and the 
role these companies were playing in the modernization of the national economies in 
which they were investing49. 
3.4.3 Colonial metaphor scenarios in Argentine and Spanish newspaper 
accounts of the 1998-1999 Repsol-YPF case 
3.4.3.1 Colonial metaphor scenarios in the Argentine subcorpus 
The analysis of the emotive framing identified in the Argentine subcorpus, presented in 
section 3.4.2.1, already showed that the Argentine journalists at times used emotive 
framing when they combined conflict and national frames in order to evoke a sense of 
national loss in the context of foreign (often Spanish) direct investment in their 
country. Thus, all the elements seem to be in place to tap into the shared colonial past 
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 In Chapter 4 the Spanish-language corpus will be analysed in detail in order to identify similarities and 
differences in the Argentine and Spanish discursive (re)construction of the Repsol-YPF case. 
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between Argentina and Spain to construct good and appealing news stories on the 
Repsol-YPF case. In the Argentine subcorpus, there are indeed a number of historical 
references to Spain’s past in the region although there are far fewer than expected. 
After all, the analysis in section 3.3.5 revealed that some of the English-language 
journalists explicitly referred to Latin America as the region where the colonial 
metaphor scenarios originated. However, in the Argentine subcorpus, the scenario is 
identified in only 8 of the 220 newspaper articles (3.5%). 
 
There is one Argentine article, published by Clarín, which is built entirely on a 
colonial metaphor scenario. The text is about the Spanish investments in general and is 
introduced by the headline Cómo se despliega la Reconquista española? (How does the Spanish 
reconquest unfold?) The discourse metaphor reconquista española in the headline sets the 
scene for the news story. In the first paragraph, the Spanish companies are 
metaphorically described as being pushed back on their boards again to reconquer the 
continent with more force than ever. The construction with volver (again) immediately 
clarifies to the reader that this is a historical comparison because it makes the link 
between the past and the present explicit. 
[título] ¿Cómo se despliega la reconquista española? 
[cuerpo] La saturación de su mercado interno y una mayor competencia en una 
Europa de moneda única hicieron que las empresas españolas se vuelvan a subir a los 
barcos y desplieguen con más fuerza que nunca la reconquista de América. […] 
La reconquista comenzó en 1990, cuando Telefónica se alzó con la región sur de la 
ex ENTel. (Clarín, 1999, 30 May[a]) 
 [headline] How does the Spanish reconquest unfold? 
[body] The saturation of its internal market, as well as increased competition in 
Europe after the introduction of the single currency, pushed Spanish companies back 
on their boats and brought back the focus, more than ever, on the reconquest of 
America. […] 
The reconquest began in 1990, when Telefónica took over the southern region of the 
former ENTel. 
The article also contains a reference to the Spanish Armada. This again shows that the 
Armada imagery indeed forms part of the colonial metaphor scenarios. In the following 
fragment, some of the leading Spanish companies in Latin America are described as los 
capitanes de la nueva Armada Invincible (the captains of the new Invincible Armada). In 
this excerpt, the link between the past and the present is made by adding the word 
nueva (new). 
[cuerpo] Repsol, Endesa, Telefónica, BBV y Banco Santander son los capitanes de la 
nueva Armada Invencible. (Clarín, 1999, 30 May[a]) 
[body] Repsol, Endesa, Telefónica, BBV and Banco Santander are the captains of the 
new Invincible Armada. 
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There are more articles in the Argentine subcorpus in which the Repsol-YPF case is used 
to provide a broader picture of the Spanish investments in Argentina. However, apart 
from the Clarín article discussed above, these texts are not built on colonial metaphor 
scenarios. In the other Argentine articles in which the scenario is found, the historical 
comparisons are included as isolated references. In the next excerpt, Argentina and 
Latin America, being the recipients of Spanish investments, are described as la nueva 
Eldorado de la rentabilidad (the new Eldorado of profitability). 
[cuerpo] En España, el BBV tiene participaciones clave en la eléctrica Iberdrola 
(7,5%), en la propia Repsol (9,9%) y en Iberia (7%), todas compañías que ven en 
nuestro país o el resto de Latinoamérica la nueva Eldorado de la rentabilidad. (Clarín, 
1999, 13 June[c]) 
[body] In Spain, BBV owns key participations in electrical company Iberdrola (7.5%), 
in Repsol (9.9%) itself and in Iberia (7%), all companies that see our country and the 
rest of Latin America as the new Eldorado of profitability. 
The following historical comparisons were also introduced as isolated references into 
the news reports. In the first excerpt, Repsol’s acquisition of YPF is metaphorically 
described as una conquista española (a Spanish conquest). In the other excerpts, however, 
the acquisition is again used to refer to the broader picture of the Spanish investments 
in Argentina during the 1990s. 
[cuerpo] Pero el tema del día fue la conquista española. (La Nación, 1999, 5 May[a]) 
 [body] But the topic of the day was the Spanish conquest. 
 
[cuerpo] Aquí, sin ley antitrust, no hay limitaciones para que Repsol absorba YPF e 
incluso sume más compañías al reinado español que conquistó 14 firmas 
energéticas locales en los últimos cuatro años. (Clarín, 1999, 9 May[a]) 
[body] With no antitrust law, there are no limitations for Repsol to absorb YPF and 
even for it to add more companies to the Spanish imperium that has conquered 14 
local energy companies in the past four years. 
 
[cuerpo] En América Latina, como una demostración clara del alcance de la nueva 
conquista española, Repsol eleva sus activos de 5.000 a 16.000 millones de dólares. 
(Clarín, 1999, 13 June[f]) 
[body] As a clear demonstration of the new Spanish conquest’s reach, Repsol has 
raised its assets in Latin America from 5 to 16 billion dollars. 
In sum, colonial metaphor scenarios were identified in the Argentine subcorpus, but not 
as often as expected. The fragments cited above show how colonial metaphor scenarios 
were mostly used to describe the business manoeuvres of the generic category of all 
Spanish investors operating in the country. As such, these findings confirm the results 
of the analysis of the English-language newspaper articles in section 3.3. There may be 
another reason why the Argentine journalists did not tap as often into colonial 
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metaphor scenarios as was expected. Whereas the English-language journalists 
predominantly focused on the role of the Spanish investors in Latin America, the 
writers of the Argentine texts focused more on the loss of control over large parts of the 
Argentine economy as a result of the economic reforms implemented in the 1990s. 
 
In this respect, it is also interesting to take a closer look at a different metaphorical 
construction. In 5 articles in the Argentine subcorpus, YPF is metaphorically 
represented as one of grandmother’s jewels. This comparison was used exclusively by 
Clarín journalists and only appeared in the newspaper discourse at the beginning of the 
acquisition process. After Repsol bought the 14.9% stake in January 1999, it was not 
found again. 
[cuerpo] De acuerdo a los analistas, el gobierno argentino no necesita por ahora 
desprenderse rápido y mal de esa joya de la abuela. (Clarín, 1998, 14 August) 
[body] According to analysts, for now the Argentine government does not need to 
sell one of its grandmother’s jewels this quickly and cheaply. 
 
[cuerpo] En medio de la incertidumbre que envuelve a los mercados por la crisis 
brasileña, el Gobierno enfrentará esta tarde una verdadera prueba de fuego con la 
venta de una de las últimas joyas de la abuela que le quedan al Estado: el 14.99% de 
las acciones de YPF. (Clarín, 1999, 20 January) 
[body] In the middle of the uncertainty in global markets as a result of the Brazilian 
crisis, this afternoon the government will face a real test with the sale of one of the 
last of grandmother’s jewels that the state still possesses: 14.99% of YPF’s shares.  
 
[cuerpo] Recién en el quinto llamado de los funcionarios, apareció un sonriente 
representante de Repsol que acercó el sobre con la millonaria oferta por una de las 
últimas joyas de la abuela que sacó a remate el Gobierno. (Clarín, 1999, 21 January) 
[body] It was not until the fifth call from the functionaries that a smiling 
representative from Repsol appeared with an envelope containing the billion dollar 
offer for one of the last of grandmother’s jewels that the government has put up for 
auction. 
The source domain of the metaphorical construction vender una de las últimas joyas de la 
abuela (selling one of the last of grandmother’s jewels) is not Spain’s colonial past but 
family. The construction is similar to the phrase “selling the family silver” which is often 
attributed to the former British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. At a dinner party he 
attended in 1985, he (allegedly) compared Margaret Thatcher’s privatization plans to 
“selling off the family silver” (Turner, 2000, p. 17). Both constructions can be used in 
contexts where a national government intends to privatize a national company, 
especially if this company achieved iconic national-treasure status in the home country. 
This is certainly the case for YPF, one of the first national oil companies in the world 
and a symbol for what Argentina, and its people, can achieve. In this construction, the 
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sentimental value attributed to YPF is compared to the sentimental value attributed to 
valuable family possessions, such as the jewels belonging to one’s grandmother. Any 
price that would be put on these objects would always be less than the price that would 
be assigned by anyone caring for it. The same can be said about the (full) privatization 
of iconic companies such as YPF. 
3.4.3.2 Colonial metaphor scenarios in the Spanish subcorpus 
The analysis of the emotive framing identified in the Spanish subcorpus revealed that 
the Spanish journalists, at times, wrote about the Repsol-YPF case with a certain feeling 
of national pride (see section 3.4.2.2). In theory, the Spanish journalists could use 
colonial metaphor scenarios to compare the feelings of national pride in Repsol’s 
economic expansion to the feelings of pride in the Spanish-led discovery of the New 
World 500 years earlier. However, the analysis of the Spanish subcorpus reveals that the 
Spanish journalists writing for El País and Cinco Días did not actively use colonial 
metaphor scenarios in their news reports on the Repsol-YPF case50. 
 
There is, however, one Spanish article in which the discursive legacy of Spain’s past 
in the region is identified (1/110). The fragment is found in a quote attributed to the 
president of the Spanish Chamber of Commerce in Argentina (CECRA) in an article about 
an award ceremony organized by his organization. Both the President of the Chamber of 
Commerce Antonio Donadeu and the Spanish Ambassador to Argentina Carlos Carderera 
gave a speech at the event. First, the ambassador emphasized that the Spanish 
companies were committed to improving Argentina’s economic situation. After the 
ambassador, the president of the Chamber of Commerce took the stage to deliver his 
speech. In the fragment, the journalist writes about an embarrassing slip of the tongue 
when Donadeu proclaimed that the Spanish companies considered themselves to be 
emperadoras (emperors) of the Argentine companies, whereas he meant to say operadoras 
(operators) of the companies. 
[cuerpo] El embajador Carderera hizo hincapié en la relación de compromiso: “Los 
españoles hemos apostado por Argentina hasta el punto de que, si las cosas fueran 
mal en este país, no sólo irían mal para las empresas españolas, sino también para 
España, porque nuestras inversiones son para quedarse”. Lástima que después de 
tanto esfuerzo por limar asperezas con los argentinos el presidente de la Cámara, 
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 In the Concluding remarks section at the end of this chapter (section 3.5), the findings of a follow-up search 
will be presented. This extra search was performed in order to find out if the Spanish news media ever used 
colonial metaphor scenarios in the broader context of Spain’s economic expansion. The focus was exclusively 
on the use of the nuevos conquistadores discourse metaphor in the Spanish quality newspaper El País. 
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Antonio Donadeu, tuviera un ligero desliz cuando señaló que “las empresas 
españolas son solamente emperadoras…, operadoras!, perdona, de las empresas 
argentinas”. (Cinco Días, 1999, 17 May) 
[body] Ambassador Carderera emphasized the commitment in its relationship: “We, 
the Spaniards have chosen for Argentina to the point that, if things were to go badly 
in this country, not only would it affect Spanish companies but also Spain as a 
whole, because our investment is here to stay”. It is unfortunate that after so much 
effort to smooth things over with the Argentines, the President of the Chamber, Antonio 
Donadeu, should misspeak when highlighting that: “the Spanish companies are just 
emperors…, operators!, excuse me, of the Argentine companies”. 
The anecdote illustrates two things. First, even though colonial metaphor scenarios 
were not actively used by the Spanish journalists, the slip of the tongue does illustrate 
how Spaniards (both high-ranked officials and journalists) were very much aware of its 
existence in the context of the Spanish investments in Latin America. Second, the 
journalist’s reaction to the (unintended) historical reference shows that s/he was aware 
that the Spanish investments were not always warmly welcomed by Latin Americans 
(and Argentines in particular). In the otherwise positive atmosphere of the award 
ceremony, the slip of the tongue is seen as a missed opportunity to (finally) smooth 
things over with the Argentines. 
 
Again, one of the reasons why colonial metaphor scenarios were not found in the 
Spanish subcorpus might be that most of the texts are specifically about the 
privatization and acquisition of YPF and not about the Spanish investments in general, 
as was the case for the English-language articles analysed in section 3.3. Moreover, the 
analysis in section 3.4.2.2 also showed that the Spanish journalists did not represent the 
conflict between the two companies as a confrontation between nations. The Spanish 
journalists preferred to write about the Repsol-YPF case as a prime example of the 
internationalization of their economy. Colonial metaphor scenarios could, in theory, be 
used to emphasize some of the positive characteristics of the Spanish investors 
(audacious, adventurous, determined, etc.). However, the analysis did not find any 
historical reference in this sense in this selection of newspaper articles published by El 




This section presented the analysis of a selection of both Argentine and Spanish 
newspaper articles on the topic of one particular acquisition (after privatization): 
Repsol’s acquisition of YPF between 1998 and 1999. The main question to be answered 
was whether the Spanish-language journalists used colonial metaphor scenarios in their 
news stories about the Repsol-YPF case. First, the analysis set out to find the 
foundations of the colonial metaphor scenarios. As was explained in section 3.2, a 
conflict frame and a national frame of reference are the two elements that are usually in 
place when Spain’s colonial past is used as the source domain to represent these Spanish 
business actions. After scrutinizing both subcorpora looking for conflict and/or nation-
based emotive framing, the analysis was taken one step further to reveal whether and 
how the Spanish-language journalists used colonial metaphor scenarios in their news 
reports about the Repsol-YPF case. 
RQ1: How did the Argentine and Spanish journalists use emotive framing in their 
newspaper accounts of the 1998-1999 Repsol-YPF case? 
The analysis of the two subcorpora showed that the Argentine and Spanish newspapers 
drew on a different kind of emotive framing when they wrote about the Repsol-YPF 
case. Conflict frames and national frames of references were indeed identified in both 
subcorpora, but these elements were not always combined in exactly the same way to 
introduce emotive framing into the news reports. 
 
The Argentine newspapers did draw on the combination of a conflict and a national 
frame to emotively frame this news event as a threat to the Argentine nation’s 
sovereign territory and integrity. Among the most notable examples are the headline 
with the Spanish flag and those with the construction in Spanish hands. At times, the 
Argentine journalists broadened their scope and referred to all foreign investors 
operating in the country. These elements contribute to the Argentine newspapers’ 
highly emotive framing which revolved around the loss of control over YPF and other 
Argentine companies at the expense of Spanish and other foreign companies. 
 
The Spanish newspapers also used both conflict frames and national frames of 
reference in their texts. However, the Spanish journalists represented the acquisition as 
a conflict between private companies and not as a confrontation between nations. Does 
this mean that the Spanish journalists did not use emotive framing in their news 
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reports? Not exactly51. There are a number of fragments which reveal a sense of national 
pride on the part of the Spanish journalists, for instance when they wrote in positive 
terms about the internationalization strategies of Repsol and other Spanish companies. 
RQ2: Did the Argentine and Spanish journalists use colonial metaphor scenarios in their 
newspaper accounts of the 1998-1999 Repsol-YPF case? 
The colonial metaphor scenario was identified in the Argentine subcorpus, although in 
far fewer articles and fragments than expected. The analysis showed that the scenario 
was almost always used in the context of the Spanish investments in general. Since the 
articles in the corpus are specifically about the privatization and acquisition of YPF, this 
partly explains why the Argentine journalists drew less on this particular type of 
emotive framing than expected. Another explanation may be found in the fact that the 
general focus of the newspaper articles in the Argentine subcorpus was more on the 
feelings of national loss over YPF than on the aggressive business strategies of the 
Spanish investors. The analysis also showed that the Argentine hurt feelings served as 
the basis of another metaphorical construction for which the source domain is not 
Spain’s colonial past, but family. At the beginning of the acquisition process, YPF was at 
times represented as one of grandmother’s jewels. The basis for this construction is the 
sentimental value attributed to the Argentine oil company and, hence, the hurt feelings 
that inevitably came with the sale of this national treasure. 
 
In the Spanish subcorpus, the colonial metaphor scenario was identified once, 
although the analysis showed that the writer of that particular article did not actively 
draw on the scenario. The historical reference was found in a quote attributed to a high-
ranked Spanish official who made an embarrassing slip of the tongue when he talked 
about the Spanish companies as the emperors of the Argentine companies instead of the 
operators. Again, one of the reasons why the scenario was not found more often can be 
found in the specific topic of the articles (privatization and acquisition of YPF). The 
analysis also showed that the conflict between the two companies was not represented 
at the level of the nation in the Spanish subcorpus. This can be taken as an indication 
that the colonial metaphor scenario in the context of Spanish FDI is indeed usually built 
on the combination of a conflict frame and a national frame of reference. 
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 The discursive representation of this Spanish national pride will be more thoroughly investigated in 
Chapter 4. In any case, this comparative analysis of the Argentine and Spanish newspaper articles on Repsol’s 
acquisition of YPF already shows that the newspapers in the two news environments presented their readers 
with a different perspective on the case. The ways in which the newspapers discursively (re)presented and 
(re)constructed the privatization and acquisition of YPF for their respective audiences will be analysed in 
great detail in Chapter 4, in particular in section 4.4.3. 
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RQ3: Did the Argentine and Spanish journalists use the colonial metaphor scenarios to 
convey a negative or a positive evaluation of the Spanish investors? 
In the Argentine subcorpus, colonial metaphor scenarios were used to convey a negative 
evaluation of the Spanish investors. The Argentine journalists mainly used the scenario 
to emphasize the massiveness of the Spanish investments and the more general feeling 
of national loss as a result of the opening up of the Argentine economy. Thus, it should 
not come as a surprise that the scenario was not found to be used to write about the 
positives that could potentially come from this process, even though, theoretically, this 
would be possible. 
 
The Spanish journalists did not use colonial metaphor scenarios to convey a positive 
evaluation of the Spanish investors either. In the only Spanish fragment in which a 
historical reference was identified, the colonial slip of the tongue was used to comment on 
the difficult relations between the Spanish investors and the people in Argentina at the 
end of the 1990s. The fragment shows that the writer was not only aware of the fact that 
these scenarios were indeed used in the context of the Spanish investments, but also 
that s/he was aware of the negative connotations of these scenarios in the context of 
the Spanish FDI in Argentina (and, by extension, in the whole Latin American region). 
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3.5 Concluding remarks to Chapter 3 
The starting point of this chapter was the observation that Spain’s economic expansion 
towards Latin America at the end of the 20th century was at times compared to Spain’s 
colonial past in the region. The analysis set out to explore the use of these socio-
historically informed metaphorical projections in newspaper discourse about the 
internationalization of Spanish companies. In a first section, the foundations of the 
colonial metaphor scenarios were explored (section 3.2). Conflict metaphors are used to 
set up a conflict frame and nation metonymy is used to set up national frames of 
reference. These elements can be combined to bring the emotive factor of a (potential) 
loss of control over (a portion of) a nation’s sovereign territory into a text. This emotive 
framing can then form the basis for the introduction of historical references to conflicts 
and wars dating from Spain’s colonial past. The two empirical sections set out to further 
explore the use of this particular emotive framing in two different sets of data: an 
English-language corpus containing a selection of articles with a broad focus on Spanish 
FDI between 1990 and 2009 and a Spanish-language corpus containing a selection of 
Argentine and Spanish newspaper articles with a specific focus on the privatization and 
acquisition of YPF between 1998 and 1999. The conclusions after the analysis of these 
two data sets were presented in sections 3.3.6 and 3.4.4 respectively. 
 
In this final section of the chapter, I would like to reflect on one similarity and one 
difference between the two data sets. First, the two data sets are similar in terms of the 
use of conflict metaphors and national frames of reference. Second, the two data sets 
are different in terms of the use of colonial metaphor scenarios. The absence of the 
scenario in the Spanish subcorpus in particular makes it relevant to take a look at a 
selection of Spanish newspaper articles with a broader perspective than the texts on the 
Repsol-YPF case in the Spanish subcorpus. 
 
It is of course difficult to compare the English-language and the Spanish-language 
data sets since they cover a different topic. The English-language newspaper articles are 
about the Spanish investments in general, the Spanish-language texts are about one 
specific acquisition performed by a Spanish company. Still, it is revealing to find that 
the English-language and Spanish-language data are similar in that the source domain 
of CONFLICT is often used in the news stories about cross-border business actions in both 
data sets. As such, the findings presented in this chapter confirm and extend the 
findings presented by Negro Alousque (2010, 2011). Her comparative analyses of M&A-
related newspaper articles published in the Financial Times and El País showed that the 
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metaphoric conceptualizations were similar in both newspapers. The analysis of the 
Spanish newspaper discourse presented here confirms these findings. 
 
The second point I wish to address in this final section is the remarkable difference in 
the use of colonial metaphor scenarios in the three data sets. The analysis revealed that 
the scenario was identified in 37.5% (30/80) of the English-language, in 3.5% (8/220) of 
the Argentine and in 1% (1/110) of the Spanish newspaper articles. Even though it is 
difficult to compare the data sets, these numbers can be interpreted as pointing towards 
the relevant finding that colonial metaphor scenarios were used more often in the 
context of the Spanish FDI in general (the English-language texts) than in the context of 
a specific Spanish acquisition process (the Spanish-language texts). Indeed, the analysis 
of the Argentine subcorpus also revealed that the scenario was used mainly in 
newspaper articles which took Repsol’s acquisition of YPF as a stepping stone to 
consider the broader picture of all Spanish investments in Argentina. 
 
In the Spanish subcorpus, there are not a lot of newspaper articles that are similar to 
these Argentine texts. In order to find out if the Spanish news media ever used colonial 
metaphor scenarios in the broader context of Spain’s economic expansion, a follow-up 
search was performed. In this extra search, the focus was on one particular discourse 
metaphor in one Spanish quality newspaper. The Google search engine was used to 
collect a number of newspaper articles published by El País in which the discourse 
metaphor nuevos conquistadores was used. This newspaper was chosen not only because 
it is Spain’s top-selling newspaper but also because it is widely regarded as one of the 
most influential newspapers in the Spanish-speaking world (Paffey, 2010). The search 
query “nuevos conquistadores” site:elpais.com/diario produced 29 articles published 
between 1980 and 201252. 
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 This follow-up search was performed on Tuesday 14 February 2013. The references of these newspaper 
articles are also included in the Corpora section at the end of this dissertation (Follow-up search “nuevos 
conquistadores”site:elpais.com/diario). 
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Figure 7 Follow-up search “nuevos conquistadores”site:elpais.com/diario 
The search reveals that the discourse metaphor nuevos conquistadores does appear in a 
number of articles published by the Spanish newspaper El País. These numbers do not 
tell much about how the Spanish journalists used this particular discourse metaphor. A 
close reading of the articles reveals that the discourse metaphor was used in the context 
of Spanish Foreign Direct Investment in 13 of the 29 texts (45%). The discourse 
metaphor was also used in very different contexts such as tourism and international 
politics. 
 
In the first article in this follow-up corpus, the Black Legend was actively and 
explicitly used to describe to local population of Menorca’s aversion to mass tourism. In 
the text, the journalist describes how the inhabitants of the district of Ciudadela came 
up with a strategy to speak badly of their beautiful region because they did not want to 
fall victim to the same tourist experiences as in Ibiza or Palma de Mallorca. 
[cuerpo] Prefieren la leyenda negra a seguir recibiendo la visita de nuevos turistas, 
conquistadores para ellos, de los que luego, a lo mejor, hasta se hacen amigos 
entrañables. […] Mas llegaron los nuevos conquistadores, dispuestos a ganar otra 
batalla, mercantil y jipiosa, igual o parecida a la de Ibiza. (El País, 1980, 31 August) 
[body] They prefer the Black Legend to continuing to receive visits from new 
tourists which they see as conquistadors but that later may become loved friends. 
[…] The new conquistadors kept arriving, willing to win another commercial and 
hippyish battle, much like the one on Ibiza. 
Later, the Black Legend was referred to in the context of the Pinochet case. In 1998, the 
former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet was indicted for human rights violation in his 
native Chile by Spanish magistrate Baltasar Garzón. In Chile, Garzón’s efforts lead to an 
outbreak of anti-Spanish sentiments because the Chileans felt that the Spaniards were 











País published an article on this matter. The anti-Spanish feelings are mentioned in the 
lead of the article. In the body of the text, renowned Chilean historian Sergio Villalobos 
is quoted explaining how the Spanish interference brings back memories from colonial 
times. This fragment illustrates the Latin American use of colonial metaphor scenarios 
in contexts in which the international relations between Spain and its former colonies 
are challenged. 
[entradilla] El sentimiento antiespañol crece alentado por el Ejército y sectores de la 
derecha 
[cuerpo] “El caso Pinochet ha sido explotado por la prensa y la televisión, por el 
Ejército y por los grupos pinochetistas, que han desatado una cruzada contra 
España”, dice el historiador Sergio Villalobos. “Es una campaña artificial, porque 
el chileno común no quiere saber nada de Pinochet, pero ha dado resultados. Han 
resucitado viejas consignas que recuerdan que Chile no es colonia de nadie, y se acusa 
a los españoles de actuar como nuevos conquistadores”. (El País, 1999, 25 
September) 
[lead] The anti-Spanish sentiment grows, encouraged by the army and certain right-
wing areas 
[body] “The Pinochet case has been exploited by newspapers and television, by the 
army and by Pinochet supporters, which have unleashed a crusade against Spain”, 
says historian Sergio Villalobos. “It is an artificial campaign, as the common Chilean 
does not want anything to do with Pinochet, but it has been effective. It has revived 
old slogans that remind the fact that Chile is no-one’s colony, and the Spaniards are being 
accused of acting like new conquistadors”. 
When we take a closer look at the fragments in which colonial metaphor scenarios are 
used in the context of the Spanish investments abroad, it is interesting to see that the El 
País journalists at times introduced the discourse metaphor to comment upon the use of 
the historical comparisons that others had drawn in relation to the Spanish investors. 
The comments of the Spanish journalists also illustrate their concerns for the potential 
negative consequences of these stereotypical representations. 
 
The newspaper published three opinion pieces under the headline Los nuevos 
conquistadores (El País, 2000, 22 February; El País, 2002, 14 February; El País, 2012, 17 
April). The writers of these texts explicitly link the discourse metaphor to la agresividad 
(the aggressive nature – El País, 2012, 17 April) and los desmanes (the excesses – El País, 
2002, 14 February) of Spanish investors operating in Latin America. These fragments 
show that the Spanish media at times wrote about the use of the discourse metaphor in 
the context of Spanish FDI by non-Spaniards to focus on the negative characteristics of 
the Spanish investors. 
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[cuerpo] [...] se vuelve a hablar de los desmanes de las multinacionales españolas 
rebautizando a sus representantes como ‘los nuevos conquistadores’ [...] (El País, 
2002, 14 February). 
[body] […] people are again starting to talk about the excesses of the Spanish 
multinationals, referring to their representatives as “the new conquistadors” […]. 
 
[cuerpo] [...] errores cometidos por una minoría y la agresividad en ejecuciones de 
los planes revertieron en la producción de una etiqueta de perfil negativo. Los nuevos 
conquistadores habían regresado. (El País, 2012, 17 April). 
[body] […] mistakes committed by a minority and the aggressive nature of the 
execution of plans have reactivated the negative label. The new conquistadors had 
returned. 
Interestingly, in four of these El País articles, the writers explicitly refer to the English-
speaking world as the region were the discourse metaphor was used with most 
enthusiasm. These articles were not only found in the context of the wave of Spanish 
investment in Great-Britain (2005-2006), but also in the context of the Spanish 
investments in Latin America at the end of the 1990s. 
[cuerpo] En este sentido, los bancos españoles han desplazado de la zona a los 
norteamericanos; el Santander, por ejemplo, es el tercer grupo de América Latina 
por volumen de actives; el BBV, el cuarto. Esta presencia, junto a la de otras 
empresas españolas (hasta ahora fundamentalmente públicas, como Endesa, 
Repsol, Telefónica, lo que le da un carácter peculiar) hace que algunos medios de 
comunicación anglosajones hayan hablado de los nuevos conquistadores. (El País, 
1997, 1 June) 
[body] In this sense, the Spanish banks had displaced the North Americans from the 
area. Santander, for example, is the third most important group in Latin America 
with regards to asset volume and BBV is fourth. This presence, together with that of 
other Spanish companies (up until now mainly service-sector companies, such as 
Endesa, Repsol, Telefónica, giving them a peculiar status) has caused some Anglo-
Saxon media to speak of the new conquistadors. 
 
[cuerpo] La nueva estrategia pasa por desprenderse de la imagen de “nuevos 
conquistadores” que tanto explota esa prensa anglosajona siempre dispuesta a reeditar 
“la leyenda negra española”. (El País, 2006, 14 March) 
[body] The new strategy is to cast off the image of the “new conquistadors” which has 
been exploited thoroughly by the Anglo-Saxon press which is always keen on reviving “the 
Spanish Black Legend”. 
 
[cuerpo] Como consecuencia de todo ello […] España había podido erigirse en lo 
que los británicos llegaron a denominar los Nuevos Conquistadores, recordando a 
quienes hace 500 años vincularon amplios territorios americanos a la Corona 
Española. (El País, 2009, 27 May) 
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[body] As a result […] Spain has been able to rise to what the British have come to call 
the New Conquistadors, in reference to those who linked vast territories in the 
Americas to the Spanish Crown some 500 years ago. 
The fourth article, an opinion piece published on 22 February 2000 under the headline 
Los nuevos conquistadores, deserves special attention here. The writer of this text 
explicitly mentions a number of influential English-language media outlets that 
published various articles on the topic of the Spanish investments in Latin America in 
which the Spanish business manoeuvres were linked back to the conquest of the New 
World. In the following fragment, the author is very explicit in voicing his/her 
displeasure with the representation of the Spanish investors abroad as s/he gives the 
English-language journalists a good dressing down. First, the Spanish author believes 
that the fact that the English-language journalists all tap into the same source domain 
speaks volumes about their (lack of) creativity. Moreover, s/he also comments on the 
important consequences of the discursive legacy of the Black Legend for Spain’s 
international relations. Indeed, the resurgence of these deeply rooted stereotypes (the 
ruthless cruelty of the Spanish conquest and the Spanish conquistadors’ greed for gold) 
in the context of the Spanish investments means that they are again passed on to a new 
generation. 
[body] En este fin de los años noventa, grandes medios de comunicación en lengua 
inglesa, Time, Washington Post, Financial Times, Wall Street Journal y The 
Economist, entre otros, han venido publicando extensas informaciones, 
reportajes, análisis o artículos de inusitado aliento histórico sobre el pasado y el presente 
de América Latina y España. Y con una unanimidad que lo dice todo del ingenio de 
sus autores, esos textos juegan siempre con la idea de los “nuevos” 
conquistadores” y “la nueva reconquista”, para titular digresiones varias sobre la 
vuelta de los españoles a América con la presunta intención de hacer de nuevo 
suyo el mundo hispanohablante. Pero esta vez no como en el siglo XVI con la 
espada y la cruz, sino enarbolando el talonario de inversiones y el conocimiento 
de los expertos. 
En todos esos escritos hay, además, elementos invariablemente comunes que 
revelan el inamovible saber que sólo se adquiere en la infancia: “La despiadada 
crueldad” de la conquista española, y la “avidez de oro de los conquistadores”. (El 
País, 2000, 22 February). 
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[body] Now, at the end of the nineties, English-language mass media such as Time 
Magazine, the Washington Post, the Financial Times, the Walls Street Journal and 
the Economist, among others, have been publishing extensive information, reports, 
analyses or articles of an unusually historical nature about the past and present of Latin 
America and Spain. As a showing of the creativity of their authors, these texts 
unanimously play with the idea of the “new conquistadors” and “the new 
reconquest” when referring to various digressions regarding the return of the 
Spaniards to America with the supposed intention of making the Spanish-speaking 
world its own once again. However, this time it is not using the sword and the cross, 
but rather its investment chequebook and the knowledge of experts. 
Furthermore, all these writings invariably contain common elements that reveal the 
irremovable knowledge that can only be picked up during childhood: “the ruthless cruelty” 
of the Spanish conquest and “the conquistadors’ greed for gold”. 
In summary, these fragments provide further insights into the ways in which Spanish 
journalists (writing for El País) used historical references to the conquistadors in their 
news reports on Spain’s economic internationalization. The main finding is that Spanish 
journalists did not actively use the discourse metaphor. Instead, they wrote about how 
non-Spaniards used the discourse metaphor to describe the Spanish investors venturing 
outside their national borders. Interestingly, these fragments show that the Spanish 
journalists mainly pointed at their historical rivals in the English-speaking world for re-
editing the Black Legend at the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st century. 
Moreover, the analysis of these additional fragments also illustrates that the Spanish 
journalists were displeased with the reproduction and dissemination of the stereotype 
of the aggressive Spanish conquistadors in the context of Spain’s economic expansion. 
As such, these fragments also illustrate the Spanish concern with the reputation of their 
investors operating abroad (see also section 2.1.4.1). 
 
  149 
Chapter 4  
Discursive (de)legitimation in cross-border M&As: 
The discursive struggle over the legitimacy of the 
1998-1999 Repsol-YPF deal 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter is built around the observation that cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
at times stir up feelings of national pride (winner’s perspective) and national loss (loser’s 
perspective) in the nations that are directly involved in the deal (Hellgren et al., 2002; 
Vaara & Tienari, 2002). This is particularly the case when the companies involved 
operate in strategic sectors, such as, for instance, airlines (Vaara, Kleymann, & Seristö, 
2004), car manufacturers (Halsall, 2008), mining enterprises (Zhu & McKenna, 2012) and 
oil companies (this dissertation). These companies are often closely connected to 
feelings of national belonging. In 1998 and 1999, the attempts of the Spanish oil 
company Repsol to acquire the Argentine oil company YPF filled the Argentine and 
Spanish newspapers for months. 
 
The analysis of the use of emotive framing in the Argentine and Spanish newspaper 
accounts of the privatization and acquisition of YPF in Chapter 3 already revealed that 
the newspapers adopted a markedly different perspective on the Repsol-YPF case. On 
the one hand, the analysis unveiled an Argentine feeling of national loss in the 
emotively charged metaphorical description of the Argentine oil company YPF as one of 
grandmother’s jewels and in the equally charged metaphorical construction in Spanish 
hands which brings this business action at the level of the nation. On the other hand, the 
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analysis also unveiled a Spanish feeling of national pride in a number of fragments in 
which the Spanish journalists wrote in positive terms about Spain’s economic expansion 
at the end of the 20th century. 
 
This chapter will present a thorough analysis of the ways in which different parties in 
the two directly involved national environments, including the (written) media, 
positioned themselves vis-à-vis the privatization and subsequent acquisition of the 
Argentine oil company YPF by the Spanish oil company Repsol. The data for the analysis 
in this chapter consist of a selection of newspaper accounts on the Repsol-YPF case 
published by two Argentine and two Spanish quality newspapers (see section 1.3.2 for a 
description of the corpus). The discourse analytic model used to uncover differences 
and similarities between the two subcorpora is a methodology developed to identify and 
code different argument topics that were presented to either legitimate or delegitimate 
the privatization and acquisition of YPF. The method used can be understood as a 
qualitative content and thematic analysis of newspaper accounts that is theoretically 
and methodologically embedded in both Critical Discourse Analysis and Appraisal 
Theory. The research approach is abductive, meaning that there is a constant 
movement between theory and empirical data (Van Maanen, Sørensen, & Mitchell, 
2007). 
 
The discourse analytic model draws primarily on earlier studies conducted by the 
Finnish School53 and is based on the notion of discursive strategizing (see also section 
1.2.2). Following Tienari et al. (2003), discursive strategizing is defined here as the 
presentation of different argument topics by social actors who try to persuade or 
convince an intended audience of their point of view. These argument topics can be 
linked to the two discourses that dominate discussions of cross-border M&As: 
rationalistic and (societal-) nationalistic discourse. The proponents and opponents of the 
acquisition thus engage in a discursive struggle over the legitimacy of the deal which is 
also discursively (re)presented, (re)constructed and commented upon by the media in 
the two directly involved news environments. 
 
In section 4.2, the discourse analytic model used for the analysis of the newspaper 
accounts will be outlined in detail. First, the crucial theoretical notions that form the 
basis for this model will be presented in section 4.2.1: discourse, and more specifically 
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 The work of the Finnish School was already introduced in section 1.2.2. The studies with a clear focus on the 
discursive underpinnings of cross-border M&As have been crucial for the analysis presented in this chapter, 
particularly their conceptualization of rationalistic and (societal-)nationalistic discourse as the two dominant 
discourses in cross-border M&A-contexts. 
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what is meant by rationalistic and (societal-)nationalistic discourse in M&A-contexts 
(section 4.2.1.1), argument topics (section 4.2.1.2), social actors (section 4.2.1.3) and 
journalistic objectivity and stance (section 4.2.1.4). Then, section 4.2.2 will give an 
overview of how the discourse analytic model was operationalized for the finegrained 
analysis of the Argentine and Spanish newspaper accounts of the Repsol-YPF case. The 
different stages in the coding process are presented in section 4.2.2.1. The typology of 
rationalistic and nationalistic argument topics that was arrived at after going through 
these stages is also presented in this section. As the coding process requires an 
interpretive effort from the analyst, it was also deemed necessary to provide a detailed 
account of the coding procedures used for the analysis of the data. Therefore, a number 
of fragments from the corpus will be discussed and analysed in detail in section 4.2.2.2. 
 
The discourse analytic model is used to achieve the two main analytical goals of this 
chapter. The analysis will be presented in sections 4.3 and 4.4. The first goal is to reveal 
the discursive strategizing deployed by the most prominent social actors implicated in 
this acquisition process54 (section 4.3) (research topic 3). The analysis will reveal which 
argument topics were used to legitimate and/or delegitimate the deal and how they 
were presented by these social actors. The discursive strategizing was reconstructed 
from the statements as they appeared in the Argentine and Spanish newspaper articles. 
Special attention will be paid to the ways in which proponents of the deal reacted to the 
discursive attacks launched by their opponents (relegitimation) and to the special role 
of the Argentine government as one of the main proponents of selling its remaining 
shares in YPF to a (foreign) company. Indeed, even though Tienari et al. (2003) previously 
stated that it would be useful to examine the role and influence of political actors in 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions more closely, the special role of the government 
in an acquisition after privatization has not received much attention in the studies 
conducted in the Finnish research tradition55. As such, the specificities of this case study 
offer an excellent opportunity to gain more insight into these discursive processes.  
 
The second goal of this chapter is to provide a detailed account of the ways in which 
the (written) media in the two directly involved national environments carved out 
“‘different lines of vision’ from the unlimited potential of context” (Verschueren, 2012, 
p. 58) when they discursively (re)present and (re)construct a cross-border acquisition in 
a highly regulated, strategic and symbolic sector such as the oil industry (section 4.4) 
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 That is, the social actors that most prominently feature in the newspaper articles in both subcorpora. 
55
 One notable exception is the study of the 1998 merger in the Nordic paper and pulp sector between 
privately-owned Swedish Stora and state-owned Finnish Enso (Vaara et al., 2006). The special role of the 
Finnish government was, however, not the main focus of this research paper. 
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(research topic 4). Following Vertommen et al. (2012), the analysis in this section is 
based on the assumption that patterns of evaluative options can be uncovered by 
investigating how journalists foreground certain discourses/argument topics and/or 
pay more attention to the social actors who mobilize these discourses or present these 
argument topics. In order to uncover similarities and differences, a comparative, cross-
textual approach is required. As such, the analysis in section 4.4 aims to uncover the 
ways in which the Argentine and Spanish (written) media reported differently on the 
Repsol-YPF case. 
4.2 Outlining the discourse analytic model 
4.2.1 Four crucial theoretical notions 
4.2.1.1 Discourse 
The term discourse is used in a variety of different ways and across a range of disciplines 
(Baker & Ellece, 2011, pp. 30-31). Following the research tradition of the Finnish School, 
I also adopt Fairclough’s understanding of discourse as “the language used in 
representing a given social practice from a particular point of view” (Fairclough, 1995, 
p. 56). Adopting this definition entails that differently positioned social actors might 
represent social life in different ways because they might be drawing on different 
discourses (Fairclough, 2001a). These discourses are not articulated explicitly but they 
do leave traces when a social actor talks or writes about some aspect of social life. These 
traces can be found in the use of evaluative language, metaphorical constructions, the 
inclusion/exclusion of specific information, the foregrounding/backgrounding of 
particular voices, etc. (see, for instance, Blommaert, 2004; Martin & White, 2005; 
Vertommen et al., 2012). 
 
Discourses are not merely referential, they are also constitutive of social reality. They 
are “language reflecting social order but also language shaping social order, and shaping 
individuals’ interaction with society” (Jaworski & Coupland, 1999, p. 3). When social 
actors represent social life, they can only choose between a finite number of existing, 
context-specific discourses (Vaara & Monin, 2010). Vaara and Tienari (2004) also focus 
on these two aspects in their definition of discourses. 
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We see discourses as one important area of social practice. Whether written or 
spoken, they are constitutive in a variety of ways. Discourses, in fact, (re)produce 
knowledge, culture, identities, subjectivities and power relationships in social and 
societal settings. At the same time, specific social actors are very much 
constrained and even disciplined by the available resources and practices – of 
which they are often unaware. (Vaara & Tienari, 2004, p. 343) 
Several studies in the research tradition of the Finnish School have looked into the 
discourses surrounding cross-border mergers and acquisitions. As was already 
explained in section 1.2.2, these studies have identified two dominant discourses that 
are generally drawn upon when social actors represent mergers and acquisitions: 
rationalistic and (societal-)nationalistic discourse. These discourses are closely linked to 
two of the most prominent, and contradictory, pressures multinational companies have 
to deal with: global and local interests (Vaara & Tienari, 2011, p. 371). These studies also 
stress that these two dominant discourses are not to be seen as arbitrary but rather as 
“constitutive elements of MNCs [multinational companies] as institutions and 
organizations” (Vaara & Tienari, 2011, p. 385). On the one hand, multinationals are both 
products and agents of globalization. Not only are they the result of global pressures, 
they also actively mobilize rationalistic discourse to gain acceptance for their actions. 
On the other hand, nationalistic discourse also frequently appears in and around 
multinational companies. This discourse can be mobilized by the multinational (or its 
supporters) to promote a business action at a local level, or by opponents to express 
their disagreement with a corporate decision. 
 
The two dominant discourses in cross-border M&A-contexts can be linked to two 
particular worldviews. Rationalistic discourse can be linked to the ideas and principles 
of global capitalism, (societal-)nationalistic discourse to those of economic nationalism. The 
research of the Finnish School has identified rationalistic discourse as the most 
dominant discursive framework within which (international) mergers and acquisitions 
are described in the media. This discourse can be linked to what Fairclough (2000) calls 
the discourse of global capitalism, a discourse infused with the ideas and principles of 
neoliberalism56. 
 
                                                     
56
 Definitions of neoliberalism abound in contemporary literature of many disciplines. Phelan (2007, p. 8) 
describes neoliberalism in broad terms as a “loose but conceptually coherent term for describing a global, 
Western-led shift in power from nation-state to market structures”. At times, the concepts of neoliberalism, 
capitalism and globalization are taken as synonyms. Some scholars have indicated that there are important 
differences between these concepts. However, since a detailed account of the similarities and differences 
would lead this discussion too far, I refer to the overview given by Tienari and Vaara (2005, pp. 421-426). In 
this dissertation, I will use the label (neoliberal) global capitalism. 
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This discourse includes a narrative of progress: the ‘globalized’ world offers 
unprecedented opportunities for ‘growth’ through intensified ‘competition’, but 
requiring unfettered ‘free trade’ and the dismantling of ‘state bureaucracy’ and 
‘unaffordable’ welfare programmes, ‘flexibility’ of labour, ‘transparency’, 
‘modernization’ and so forth. (Fairclough, 2000, p. 148) 
A dominant discourse, however, always competes against alternatives. In the context of 
international mergers and acquisitions, nationalistic discourse has been identified as a 
powerful counterforce to the dominant discourse of (neoliberal) global capitalism 
(Hellgren et al., 2002; Tienari et al., 2003; Vaara & Tienari, 2002, 2011). In a similar vein, 
Fairclough and Thomas (2004, p. 387) write that globalization discourse is often 
challenged by counter-discourses such as nationalism and trade protectionism. 
 
Nationalistic discourse, as identified in the studies of the Finnish School (see also 
section 1.2.2), can be linked to the ideas and principles of economic nationalism. In the 
literature (particularly of international business and political science), several related 
concepts can be found, such as economic patriotism and consumer ethnocentrism (see 
Akhter (2007) and (Clift & Woll, 2012) for recent overviews). I will draw on the concept 
of economic nationalism, which Baughn and Yaprak (1996) defined in broad terms as 
[…] the adoption of an “us first,” in-group versus out-group distinction relating to 
“our companies,” “our products,” “our jobs,” and “our workers.” […] The 
readiness to support nationalist economic policy is a function of the perceived 
economic threat posed by foreign competition. (Baughn & Yaprak, 1996, p. 772) 
4.2.1.2 Argument topics 
Proponents and opponents can tap into rationalistic and/or nationalistic discourse 
when they want to voice their opinion about an M&A-related corporate action. Often, 
they will present several different arguments in order to convince an audience. Thus, 
the basis for discursive strategizing is argumentation (Hellgren et al., 2002). Someone 
can present a good reason to support a certain proposition (PRO) or a good reason to 
reject a proposition (CONTRA). As discursive strategizing is an ongoing and dynamic 
process, a proponent of the deal can present new arguments as a response to an 
opponent’s delegitimation strategy (relegitimation) or even change position. The 
studies in the Finnish research tradition that looked into discursive strategizing used a 
variety of terms that all seem to be referring to the same idea. Table 10 gives an 
overview of these terms. 
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Ahonen (2009), Ahonen et al. (2011), Erkama and Vaara (2010), 
Joutsenvirta and Vaara (2009), Kuronen et al. (2005), Tienari et 
al. (2003), Vaara and Monin (2010), Vaara and Tienari (2002), 
Vaara et al. (2004) 
Theme Ahonen et al. (2011), Hellgren et al. (2002), Tienari et al. (2003), 
Vaara and Tienari (2002) 
Topic Tienari et al. (2003), Vaara and Tienari (2004) 
Claim Hellgren et al. (2002), Kuronen et al. (2005) 
Issue Hellgren et al. (2002), Risberg et al. (2003) 
In this dissertation, the term argument topic will be used to refer to the argument’s core 
message that is coded into a linguistic expression. The core message can, of course, take 
different linguistic forms in that the core can be expressed either explicitly, when the 
argument topic is triggered by a word or a combination of words, or implicitly, when no 
such triggers are directly observable. 
 
Previous studies looking into the interplay between rationalistic and nationalistic 
discourse in cross-border M&A-contexts have come up with (case specific) typologies of 
argument topics belonging to these discourses (Halsall, 2008; Hellgren et al., 2002; 
Tienari et al., 2003; Vaara & Tienari, 2002, 2011). Table 11 presents a number of 
characteristic argument topics belonging to these two dominant discourses. 




















Characteristic of this discourse are the company-level considerations 
focusing attention, mainly, on the means to create economic value. 
 
Characteristic argument topics 
- the inevitability of global restructuring 
- the size of the company after the integration 
- the creation of economic value for the newly integrated company 
- the increased efficiency after cutting costs 




















Characteristic of this discourse is the link to the national cultures of the 
implicated companies and the consequences of the deal for the wider social 
and economic (local/national) environment in which the M&A takes place. 
 
Characteristic argument topics 
- the dominant position of the acquiring company (in the home market) 
- the potential loss of jobs (at the target company) 
- the loss of national control (over a local company) 
 
4.2.1.3 Social actors 
The notion of social actors was coined by van Leeuwen (1996, 2008) to refer to the 
participants of social practices. The notion is also relevant in the study of discursive 
strategizing because both proponents and opponents can be seen as social actors that 
can “mobilize specific discourses to pursue specific ends” (Tienari et al., 2003, p. 379). 
Again, it is important to stress that the social actors in M&A-contexts are influenced by 
and have to work with a limited number of available, context-specific discourses (Vaara 
et al., 2004; Vaara & Monin, 2010). 
 
In M&A-contexts, different social actors can tap into either rationalistic or 
nationalistic discourse to either legitimate or delegitimate a particular deal (Hellgren et 
al., 2002; Tienari et al., 2003). These social actors try to promote a particular perspective 
on a given reality by presenting specific argument topics in order to try and convince a 
target audience of their respective point of view. In their media analysis of an 
acquisition process in the Nordic banking sector, Tienari et al. (2003) examined the 
discursive strategizing of the most important social actors that participated in the 
public debate on this particular deal. Their findings are presented in Table 12. 
Table 12 Social actors and their positioning vis-à-vis a particular acquisition process in the 
Nordic banking sector (Tienari et al., 2003) 
Top management The talk and actions of top managers and board members 
are often the primary focus of media attention. 
These social actors deploy discursive strategizing to justify, 
gain acceptance for and legitimate their decision to engage 
in an M&A-operation. 
Employees Employees and their representatives are the traditional 
counterforces to top management. 
Union representatives of the target company often oppose 
the organizational change processes envisioned by the 
acquiring company because these might lead to job losses. 
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Political actors Political social actors can be either in favour or against a 
particular M&A-deal. 
- Competition officials can play a crucial role in the 
materialization of certain business deals, especially 
when a deal is expected to shake up the market. 
- Government officials can be in the same position as 
top managers when state-owned companies are 
privatized in these cases, they will also present 
legitimating argument topics in order to gain 
acceptance fort his decision. 
Experts57 Experts, such as economists and financial analysts, are also 
an influential category of social actors implicated in M&A-
processes.  
They can be either in favour or against the deal. 
The ways in which social actors will tap into rationalistic and/or nationalistic discourse 
to either legitimate or delegitimate unfolding changes may appear to be straightforward 
at first sight, in that it may be easy to predict that proponents of the deal (for instance, 
the acquiring company’s top management) will present rationalistic argument topics to 
legitimate the deal, whereas opponents of the deal (for instance, the target company’s 
union representatives) will present nationalistic argument topics to delegitimate the 
deal. 
 
Tienari et al. (2003), however, found that the picture is in fact far more complex. 
They found that one and the same social actors can draw on different discourses at 
different times. Their analysis showed, for instance, that the top management of Merita-
Nordbanken (MNB), a Swedish-Finnish bank, presented both rationalistic and 
nationalistic argument topics in order to gain acceptance for their attempt to acquire 
the Norwegian Christiania Bank og Kreditkasse (CBK). They also speculate about the 
possibility that these discourses were aimed at different stakeholders. 
By emphasizing both shareholders’ interests (“a good return on investments and 
better customer service”) and Norwegian interests more generally (“remains an 
independent bank in Norway), the management of MNB can be interpreted to 
have mobilized rationalistic and nationalistic discourse in arguing for their claims 
and purposes. It may also be speculated that rationalistic argumentation was targeted at 
decision makers in business (globally and locally) and potential Norwegian private 
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 Journalists often draw on the authority of expert sources to enhance the credibility of news stories and to 
give them more depth and substance (Albæk, 2011; Berkowitz, 2009; Boyce, 2006) (see also section 4.4.3.2). 
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shareholders, whereas nationalistic argumentation was targeted at politicians and bank 
customers in Norway. (Tienari et al., 2003, p. 385, my emphasis) 
Thus, this study revealed how the acquiring company not only mobilized rationalistic 
discourse, even though it did remain the dominant discourse in its discursive 
strategizing. The findings also showed how the top management of the acquiring 
company also included nationalistic discourse in order to, probably, appease hurt 
feelings in Norway, the target company’s (local/national) environment. The strategic 
mixing of these discourses even seems to contribute to the acceptability of rationalistic 
discourse in cross-border M&A-contexts, and hence the dominance of this discourse, as 
“it seems to be difficult to overcome the forces driving toward international industrial 
restructuring legitimated by the dominant rationalistic discourse, especially when this 
discourse is skilfully seasoned with nationalist sentiment” (Tienari et al., 2003, p. 391). 
 
Most of the studies looking into discursive strategizing in cross-border M&A-contexts 
reconstruct the discursive strategizing of social actors involved in a cross-border M&A-
process on the basis of statements as they appeared in (written) media texts. When 
discursive strategizing is analysed through media discourse, it is important to take into 
account that the statements that are analysed have already passed through the prism of 
the media. First, this has implications for the social actors that can be identified. 
Traditionally, the media pay more attention to elite social actors (Davis, 2000; Manning, 
2001; Sigal, 1986). As a consequence, a number of non-elite social actors are likely to 
figure less prominently in the media coverage and some may even be left out altogether. 
Second, this also has implications for the analysis of the statements made by the social 
actors. Journalists will choose to foreground certain elements and background others. 
Some aspects will not even make it into the media discourse. This inevitably means that 
it is impossible to reconstruct every single aspect of the discursive strategizing deployed 
by every social actor in a particular case. 
 
Indeed, the media does not (and cannot) include every single social actor. Also, when 
a social actor is referenced in the (written) media, his or her discursive strategizing will 
often not appear in full nor verbatim. Statements can appear as paraphrases or ideas 
can be taken over without attributing them to an external source. A comparative 
analysis of the ways in which the (written) media in two different news environments 
reconstructed the discursive strategizing of crucial social actors can provide valuable 
insights into the different beliefs, feelings and conceptions about a particular news 
event that shine through the media texts (Vertommen et al., 2012) (see also section 
4.4.3.1). This is no trivial matter because for most people, the knowledge they have 
about, for instance, these high-profile international business manoeuvres is a 
knowledge derived largely from the media (Thompson, 1990). 
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The empirical data of this chapter will be presented in two parts. The first part will 
focus on the discursive strategizing deployed by the four social actors that figure most 
prominently in both the Argentine and Spanish media coverage of the privatization and 
acquisition of YPF (section 4.3). Two social actors were characterized as the proponents 
of the deal: the Argentine government and the Spanish acquiring company Repsol. Two 
social actors were frequently quoted voicing concerns and were therefore categorized 
as opponents of the acquisition: the Argentine target company YPF and the Argentine 
political opposition. The analysis will reveal how these social actors deployed discursive 
strategizing to legitimate or delegitimate the deal and how they responded to discursive 
attacks. Special attention will be paid, on the one hand, to the ways in which proponents 
responded to discursive attacks and, on the other hand, to the role of the Argentine 
government as one of the main proponents in this acquisition after privatization. The 
second part will focus on the crucial differences in the coverage of this news event in 
the two news environments that are directly involved in the Repsol-YPF case: Argentina 
and Spain (section 4.4). Before embarking on the empirical analyses, it is essential to 
consider some crucial ideas about the ways in which the media discursively (re)present 
and (re)construct reality, and, in particular, the reality of mergers and acquisitions. 
4.2.1.4 Journalistic objectivity and stance 
Modern mainstream journalism professes a professional paradigm that stresses the 
importance of impartiality, neutrality, objectivity and fairness. However, these 
professional notions also have a long tradition of being criticized for their 
epistemological assumptions of positivism and empiricism. From a constructionist 
perspective, discursive representation cannot be objective or neutral since there is not 
one authentic, true version of the events which could be reported58 (see Berger & 
Luckmann, 1967). The myth of (total) journalistic objectivity is recognized not only by 
scholars, but also by journalists themselves (see, for instance, Bell, 1991; Peterson, 2001; 
White, 2006) 
 
Journalism is necessarily an interpretive profession. Van Hout and Jacobs (2008, p. 68) 
describe news production as a process of entextualization in which journalists extract 
(decontextualize) material from sources, and subsequently insert them 
(recontextualize) into a (new) news discourse. As this is an active process, journalists 
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 Some scholars, putting all criticisms of objectivity aside, do stress that there still is a valid demand for 
unbiased distance and balance. Hackett and Zhao (1997, p. 130), for instance, write that they “can recognize 
that all knowledge is constructed and nevertheless affirm the possibility of distinguishing between ‘truer’ and 
‘falser’ depictions of reality – in the sense of identifying more or less coherent and comprehensive accounts”. 
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can choose to foreground certain elements, background others, or leave elements out 
(Blommaert, 2004). As language users, journalists carve out “‘different lines of vision’ 
from the unlimited potential of context” (Verschueren, 2012, p. 58). Several linguistic 
studies investigating (written) media texts from a discourse analytic perspective59 have 
indeed demonstrated that “all journalism is ultimately opinion journalism in that it is 
always possible to detect signs of authorial stance even in so-called ‘hard-news 
reporting’” (Pounds, 2010, p. 107). 
 
Recently, Van Hout, Pounds, and Vertommen (2012, p. 55) defined journalistic stance 
in broad terms as “the linguistic and visual means that journalists exploit to craft 
experiences and involvement, outsource emotional labor, voice their or other people’s 
opinions or otherwise align with the audience”. Vertommen et al. (2012) showed how 
journalistic stance also determines the selection of certain topics, sources, and quotes 
over other possible topics, sources, and quotes. Their definition of journalistic stance 
not only includes the linguistic (and visual) means that can be traced in the discourse, 
but also “the journalistic assessment as to (i) whether particular information is worth 
mentioning in the article, and (ii) whether or not the information will be covered in 
substantial detail” (Vertommen et al., 2012, p. 132). They argue for a comparative, cross-
textual approach in order to reveal different representations of the same news event60, 
thus gaining insight into the information a particular journalist does not refer to 
compared to others, and into the (relative) detail of description used by the media 
professionals under investigation. 
 
But how do these different lines of vision come about? According to Peterson (2001, p. 
201), “[j]ournalists interpret the social world in the act of representing it and they do so 
by interpreting the social contexts through which they apprehend the world they are 
representing” (my emphasis). Indeed, since journalists are integrated into a given 
society they are not only media producers, but also media audiences (Nossek & 
Berkowitz, 2006) and they are, as a result, subject to the same social pressures as the rest 
of society (Kempf, 2002). Journalists as text producers are influenced by the broad social 
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 In particular, studies in the tradition of Systemic Functional Linguistics (Fowler, Hodge, Kress, & Trew, 
1979), Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough, 1995, 2001b; van Dijk, 1988, 1998) and Appraisal Theory (Martin 
& White, 2005; Thomson et al., 2008; White, 2012). 
60
 Perrin (2012, p. 136) does add to this that “comparative approaches still fail to explain what exactly is 
filtered out, who does it, how and why gatekeeping and stancing happen”. Process analysis, as he rightly 
points out, can help researchers to overcome the limitations of discourse analysis (see also Philo, 2007; Van 
Hout & Macgilchrist, 2010). Vertommen et al. (2012) indeed complemented their text analysis with 
ethnographic data (interviews). This perspective lies, however, beyond the scope of the analysis presented in 
this dissertation. 
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context in which they operate. They do not report on events from an external point of 
view, but rather function as representatives of the society in which they live and work, 
and as delegates of the culture they share with the community they produce their texts 
for (Carey, 2000). This is where national belonging comes back into the picture. 
Journalists also, implicitly or explicitly, express their own national identity in news 
reports (see Billig, 1995). They particularly tend to do so when they report on 
international conflicts which directly affect their own nation. From the perspective of 
war reporting, Zandberg and Neiger (2005) write about the professional dilemma 
journalists face when confronted with a crisis situation. Their study showed how 
journalists live in a cultural duality of journalism and society. Even though there are 
clear differences between covering a military conflict and reporting on a tense cross-
border M&A-deal, I believe the following assertion also holds true for business media 
journalists. 
On the one hand, the professional community calls upon the journalists to tell a 
story that will be, or will appear to be, factual, objective and balanced. Although it 
is known that this cannot be fully achieved, these values are still at the core of the 
profession’s ideology. On the other hand, the national-cultural community calls 
upon the journalist to take part in the conflict, to be its representative and its 
weapon in the battle of images and soundbites – to tell an unbalanced, unobjective 
story. The journalists are torn between two contradictory desires: the professional desire 
for objectivity and the national desire for solidarity. (Zandberg & Neiger, 2005, p. 131, 
my emphasis) 
Other studies have indeed shown that this is also the case in other types of inter-
national confrontation as in, for example, cross-border mergers and acquisitions. 
Risberg et al. (2003, p. 125) observed, for instance, that “confrontations are played out at 
organizational and national levels, identifying categories for Us and Them for the 
readers to identify with” (see also Chapter 3). In their study of the media discourse 
surrounding the merger between Swedish Astra and British Zeneca, Hellgren et al. 
(2002) found that the media on the winning side (i.c. the British media) represented the 
merger in a rational, neutral and matter-of-fact way, whereas the media on the losing 
side (i.c. the Swedish media) tended to include more nationalistic considerations as well. 
 
As was already mentioned in the previous section, it is indeed no trivial matter how 
the (written) media discursively (re)present and (re)construct these high-profile 
business manoeuvres (Hellgren et al., 2002; Vaara & Tienari, 2002). Media texts provide 
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widely accessed and therefore societally important representations of M&As61. On the 
one hand, media texts often present multiple perspectives on a given topic. As such, 
they provide access to the discursive strategizing deployed by different social actors to 
either legitimate or delegitimate a particular deal. On the other hand, the media also 
play an important role in the construction of meaning around business events. The 
media discursively represent and (re)produce particular versions of reality, for instance 
by promoting particular voices and marginalizing and excluding others (Blommaert, 
2004; Martin & White, 2005; Vertommen et al., 2012). If the media predominantly give 
voice to managerial concerns about competitiveness and efficiency (rationalistic 
discourse), their audiences might be more easily convinced of the necessity of the 
merger or acquisition. If, by contrast, the media focus on potential layoffs and/or 
competition concerns ((societal-)nationalistic discourse), their audiences might be 
persuaded towards a more critical position and reject the deal (Vaara & Tienari, 2002). It 
is important, however, to emphasize that every media message has the potential to 
trigger different evaluative reactions depending on who is on the receiving end because 
the interpretation may vary both across and within different interpretive communities. 
 
The analysis in section 4.4 will cross-textually compare the Argentine and Spanish 
newspaper accounts in the corpus in order to reveal the, potentially, different beliefs, 
feelings and conceptions about the Repsol-YPF case that either explicitly or implicitly 
shine through the texts produced in the two directly implicated news environments 
(Vertommen et al., 2012). The main focus will be on the ways in which different 
argument topics and social actors were introduced into the newspaper articles in the 
corpus. Section 4.4.2 will first take a closer look at the editorials in the corpus. Editorials 
are characterized by a more argumentative writing style which is substantially less 
common on the news pages (Breeze, 2013; Martin & White, 2005; Thomson et al., 2008). 
If the newspapers in both news environments indeed approached this case from 
different angles, their different perspective should be most clearly observable in these 
argumentative texts. In section 4.4.3, the news reports in the corpus will be closely 
analysed. These reports are characterized by a less explicitly evaluating writing style 
(Martin & White, 2005; Thomson et al., 2008). Following Vertommen et al. (2012), the 
analysis will particularly focus on the ways in which certain social actors and argument 
topics are foregrounded, and others backgrounded. 
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 Vaara and Tienari (2004, p. 345) argue that the “value of media texts has seldom been recognized in IB 
[International Business] studies, in which interview material tends to strongly dominate qualitative analyses”. 
Some studies in the Finnish reasearch tradition have combined the analysis of media texts with other sources 
of data, such as company documents, interviews and observations (see, for instance, Vaara et al., 2004; Vaara 
& Tienari, 2011). 
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4.2.2 Operationalizing the discourse analytic model 
4.2.2.1 Data extraction and coding categories 
The analysis of the Argentine and Spanish newspaper articles on the 1998-1999 Repsol-
YPF case proceeded in stages (for a description of the corpus, see section 1.3.2). As in 
most forms of qualitative research, the analytic effort was recursive and non-linear 
(particularly the coding processes). There was also a constant movement between 
theory and empirical data (meaning that the research approach was abductive, see Van 
Maanen et al., 2007). Still, it is possible to identify six different phases. 
 
First, the articles in the corpus were read, together with a series of specialized news 
sources, academic essays and reference works, to gain a thorough understanding of the 
socio-economic and discursive perspectives on Spain’s economic expansion in the 1990s 
in general and on the privatization and acquisition of YPF in 1998 and 1999 in particular 
(for a detailed overview of these perspectives, see Chapter 2). 
 
In the second stage, the texts were approached by means of an analytical tool for 
qualitative data analysis called open coding (Titcher, Meyer, Wodak, & Vetter, 2000). This 
tool was introduced in grounded theory research and refers to the first systematic 
analysis and categorization of raw research data (see Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Following 
this procedure, everything that was deemed of interest for the analysis was coded into 
preliminary categories. All coding was done using the qualitative data analysis software 
tool NVivo. This programme enables researchers to bring order to the traditionally 
messy nature of managing and analysing vast quantities of qualitative data. It 
incorporates functions for text searching, coding (and easily retrieving coded 
segments), memo writing and data visualization (charts, graphs, models, etc.) (Bazely & 
Jackson, 2013). After importing the newspaper articles into the programme, a 
preliminary analysis was conducted. In this phase, the texts were scanned to identify 
and code recurring (argument) topics. 
 
The third stage was a more in-depth analysis of the data. This phase was less bottom-
up and more theory-driven. The categories of argument topics identified in the previous 
stage of open coding were compared to a series of typologies from other studies of 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions (Halsall, 2008; Hellgren et al., 2002; Tienari et al., 
2003; Vaara & Tienari, 2002, 2011). After this comparative effort, some of the categories 
were reorganized (merged into one, split up, etc.). Some categories were not found in 
these typologies because these studies are always case-specific. Some of these case-
specific categories were deemed relevant for the analysis of the Repsol-YPF case and 
were therefore taken up for the analysis of the newspaper articles. For other categories 
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it was decided to leave them out of the analysis. This demonstrates the added value of 
the bottom-up approach in the preliminary stages of the analysis, because relevant 
categories would have been missed if a purely theory-driven approach had been used. 
 
In the fourth phase, the argument topics were categorized under the two dominant 
discourses identified in earlier discourse analytic studies of cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions: rationalistic and (societal-)nationalistic discourse (see sections 1.2.2 and 
4.2.1.1). Table 13 shows the typology that was arrived at after going through these 
stages. 
Table 13 The two dominant discourses and their argument topics in the newspaper articles 

























Inevitability (of global restructuring) 
Complementarity and Synergy 
Efficiency and Costs 
Size (of the company after integration) 
Growth (creation of economic value for the newly integrated company) 
Strategic decision (an informed decision, not reckless) 
Timing 
Price bid for the acquisition 

























Contribution to the Argentine State Treasury 
Confidence in Argentina 
Reinvestments in Argentina 
Competition 
(Repsol-YPF’s dominant position in the Argentine energy market) 
Ownership 
(YPF’s loss of independence) 
Employment 
(loss of YPF jobs) 
It is important to stress that the typologies that can be found in the literature, and 
hence also the one set up for this analysis, are always subject to critical scrutiny. I thus 
concur fully with Tienari et al. (2003) when they write the following: 
We do not intend to search for ultimate truths, neither do we regard our work as 
exhaustive. Rather, we hope to search for plausible, coherent, and theoretically 
grounded interpretations on discourse and their use. (Tienari et al., 2003, p. 381) 
In the fifth phase, the articles were read through again, this time with the specific aim 
of identifying and coding the argument topics that were deemed to be relevant for this 
study. Relevant fragments were selected and coded (i) if the semantic content could be 
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sorted into positive valence (an argument topic presented to legitimate the deal) or 
negative valence (an argument topic presented to delegitimate the decision) (see Zhu & 
McKenna, 2012) and (ii) if the semantic content of the fragment fitted into one of the 
argument topics in Table 13. The relevance of the fragments was checked by asking the 
question Why? (see also van Leeuwen, 2007, p. 93): Why is it a good idea to privatize/acquire 
YPF? / Why should YPF be privatized/sold to a private company? (argument topics presented 
to legitimate the decision), or, alternatively, Why is it a bad idea to privatize YPF? / Why 
should YPF stay in local hands? (argument topics presented to delegitimate the decision). 
Volmari (2009, p. 42) mentions the because indicator test, a similar test to verify whether 
an argument makes sense in relation to the main argument: it is a good idea to privatize 
YPF because ... or it is a bad idea to privatize YPF because ... More details about the coding 
procedures will be provided in the following section 4.2.2.2. 
 
In a sixth phase, after the time-consuming identification and selection of relevant 
argument topics, the coded fragments were checked again to see if the journalists had 
linked the argument topics to particular sources. These extra codes were necessary in 
order to be able (i) to identify the social actors that most frequently appeared in the 
newspaper discourse and (ii) to shed light on their discursive strategizing. The matrix 
coding query in NVivo was used to link the social actors to the argument topics 
identified in the corpus. 
 
One final comment in this section is about the way in which the comparative cross-
textual analysis of the Argentine and Spanish newspaper articles was operationalized. 
This was done by comparing the frequency with which the argument topics were 
presented and, consequently, the frequency with which rationalistic and/or 
nationalistic discourses were mobilized in both media environments. As such, after the 
qualitative identification of the argument topics (and, hence, the two dominant 
discourses) in the newspaper texts following the guidelines of the discourse analytic 
model’s coding procedures (that is, examining every relevant fragment in the context of 
the article in which it appeared; see also section 4.2.2.2 for a detailed account of these 
procedures), the codes were quantified in an effort at “quantizing” the data (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994, p. 43). The inclusion of this numerical evidence was helpful to unveil 
patterns in the ways in which the discourses/argument topics were introduced into the 
newspaper texts. It is important to specify that the aim was to reveal in how many 
articles each of the argument topics that were taken up for the analysis could be 
identified (see Table 13). The number of times an argument topic was identified within a 
particular text was not counted. 
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4.2.2.2  Coding procedures: Theoretical basis and examples from the corpus 
The coding process necessarily requires an interpretive effort from the analyst. For the 
analysis of the newspaper accounts of the Repsol-YPF case, this was particularly true for 
the fifth stage, in which an informed decision had to be made about which fragments to 
include and which ones not to include. Therefore, it is deemed necessary to provide a 
detailed account of the coding procedures used for the analysis of the data. In the 
following, the theoretical basis behind the coding procedures will be clarified. Then, a 
number of examples from the corpus will be discussed to further illustrate, in detail, 
how these coding procedures were operationalized. This discussion will be threefold. 
First, two tables will be provided (one for rationalistic and one for nationalistic 
discourse) in which each argument topic is linked to a number of short examples 
(triggers) and to a number of full fragments from the corpus. The fragments in these 
tables stand out as outright forms of evaluation (inscribed evaluation). Second, a 
number of fragments from the corpus will be discussed. These fragments were 
particularly difficult to code because they have the potential to trigger an evaluative 
reaction in the reader via processes of attitudinal inference (invoked evaluation: 
provocation and evocation). Third, the identification and coding of the social actors in 
the news texts will be explained. 
Theoretical basis 
In order to make an informed decision about whether a particular fragment could be 
considered as containing an evaluative statement (PRO or CONTRA) or not, the 
guidelines of Appraisal Theory were found to be particularly useful (see Martin & White, 
2005; Thomson et al., 2008; White, 2006, 2012). Appraisal is a framework developed 
within the Systemic Functional Linguistics paradigm to analyse the various linguistic 
realizations of evaluative meanings in language use. According to Bednarek (2006, p. 32), 
“it provides the only systematic, detailed and elaborate framework of evaluative 
language”. One of the framework’s fundamental principles relates to distinguishing 
between direct (inscribed) and indirect (invoked) means of evaluation. Often, it is possible 
to identify outright forms of evaluation in a text. These are directly inscribed through 
the use of attitudinal lexis (e.g. good, bad, excellent, corrupt, etc.). However, fragments 
can also be implicitly evaluative when less outright forms of evaluation are used and 
“which may rely on the reader to supply particular inferences” (White, 2012, p. 59). 
Identifying and coding invoked forms of evaluation is often challenging. However, these 
implicit evaluations are too valuable to be left out of the analysis. In this respect, I 
concord with Martin and White (2005) when they write that: 
[a]t first blush it might seem that analysing the evaluation invoked by ideational 
selections introduces an undesirable element of subjectivity into the analysis. On 
the other hand, avoiding invoked evaluation of this kind amounts to a suggestion 
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that ideational meaning is selected without regard to the attitudes it engenders – 
a position we find untenable. (Martin & White, 2005, p. 62) 
In fragments of invoked evaluation, the evaluative meaning is triggered rather than 
being explicitly inscribed. The category of invoked evaluation is further subdivided into 
provoked and evoked evaluation. The subcategory of provoked evaluation is for those 
fragments which trigger a positive or negative assessment “via material which, while 
evaluative, is not of itself positive or negative – for example, via intensification, 
comparison, metaphor or counter-expectation” (White, 2006, p. 40). The subcategory of 
evoked evaluation is for those fragments which trigger a positive or negative assessment 
“via purely experiential (‘factual’) material which, as a result of being selected and 
brought into focus within the text, has the potential to trigger a positive or negative 
reaction in the reader via processes of attitudinal inference62” (White, 2006, p. 40). The 
following two examples illustrate these two subcategories. 
Provocation (counter-expectation; just days after construes surprise on the part of 
the journalist author): Telstra has withdrawn sponsorship of a suicide prevention phone 
service – just days after announcing a $2.34 billion half-yearly profit. 
 
Evocation (purely informational content): George W. Bush delivered his inaugural 
speech as the United States President who collected 537,000 fewer votes than his opponent. 
(White, 2006, p. 40) 
When coding the material, no distinction was made between provoked and evoked 
evaluation. The main goal was to decide whether a fragment could be seen as containing 
implicit evaluating statements or, in other words, whether a fragment could be coded as 
PRO or CONTRA the deal. The guidelines of Appraisal Theory were found to be useful to 
make this decision and were of great help for the coding of the fragments. 
 
In order to ensure confidence in the coding, an inter-coder reliability test was 
conducted. In this test, two coders checked the reliability of the codes applied to the 
selected fragments in 10% of the corpus. During a first training session, nine articles 
were read and coded by two researchers (one Flemish researcher, fluent in Spanish, and 
one native Spanish-speaking researcher). During the training session, the codes were 
discussed and the coding was trained. The inter-coder reliability test was performed on 
10% of the corpus. One coder read and coded 12 articles, the other coder analysed 11 
texts. In these 33 articles, 164 fragments were indicated by the author of this 
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 Note that this is a careful expression and by no means is it stated that these fragments always trigger this 
evaluative assessment. Some readers might read these fragments in fact as neutral, and no positive or 
negative reaction will be triggered. 
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dissertation. For each fragment, the coders identified the valence of the fragment 
(legitimating ‘PRO’ or delegitimating ‘CONTRA’) and selected one or more argument 
topics from the typology set up for this specific case study. Using Cohen’s Kappa (1960) 
and Landis and Koch’s Kappa Benchmark Scale (1977), this test produced a substantial 
agreement for the argument topics (k=0.82) and an almost perfect agreement for the 
valence of the fragments (k=0.91). 
 
As is usual in research where the analysis is carried out by a single individual, an 
intra-coder reliability test was also carried out (see, for instance, Sreedharan, 2009). For 
this test I recoded the nine articles used for the training session. The test was 
undertaken two months after the completion of the coding process (April 2012). It 
produced satisfying results, with an almost perfect agreement for the argument topics 
(k=0.90) and perfect agreement for the valence of the fragments (k=1.00). 
 
In the following, I will shed light on the coding procedures by discussing a number of 
relevant examples from the corpus. First, there are two tables with fragments 
containing linguistic elements which make them stand out as outright forms of 
evaluation (inscribed evaluation). Second, a number of examples from the corpus will be 
discussed to further explain why they were interpreted as having the potential to 
trigger an evaluative reaction (evoked evaluation). Third, some fragments are also 
discussed to illustrate how they were linked to social actors. 
Inscribed evaluation: Examples from the corpus 
The two tables on the following pages give an overview of the two discourses under 
study here, rationalistic and nationalistic discourse, and the argument topics 
categorized under them. For each argument topic, it is specified how they are mostly 
used in the corpus (either to legitimate or delegitimate the deal). For a number of 
argument topics, it was deemed useful to include an extra clarifying note (e.g. Price bid / 
Competition / Ownership / Employment). The triggers are short stretches of discourse (real 
examples from the corpus) which reveal the core message of the argument topic. In the 
full examples, the evaluative elements that indicate the valence of the fragments (PRO 
or CONTRA) are underlined. Where possible, four full examples are given: legitimation 
in both an Argentine and a Spanish fragment, and delegitimation in both an Argentine 
and a Spanish fragment. Obviously, this is only possible for the argument topics that are 
used in the corpus to both legitimate and delegitimate the deal. Not all argument topics 
were found to be used that way. The original Spanish-language text on which the 
analysis was performed is provided together with an English-language translation of the 
fragments. 
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Table 14 Rationalistic argument topics in the 1998-1999 corpus: An overview 
RATIONALISTIC ARGUMENT TOPIC TRIGGERS EXAMPLES FROM THE CORPUS 
Inevitability (of global restructuring) 
[mainly presented to legitimate the 
deal] 
PRO: oleada mundial de 
fusiones petroleras (global 
wave of mergers in the oil 
sector); esta etapa de 
globalización de la economía 
(this phase of globalization of 
the economy); imparable 
reordenación del sector 
petrolero internacional 
(unstoppable reshuffle of the 
international oil sector) 
PRO-Ar: En un mundo de pocos y fuertes, Repsol está obligada a crecer, 
integrarse, ganar dimension y achicar gastos. En la Argentina puede hacerlo. 
(Clarín, 1999, 9 May[a]). 
In a world with few and strong players, Repsol is forced to grow, become more 
integrated, gain dimension and reduce costs. In Argentina it can do all of this. 
PRO-Es: Sin duda, Repsol estaba poco menos que obligada a responder 
estratégicamente a una tendencia sectorial de concentración, que ha 
impulsado diversas fusions y adquisiciones en los últimos meses. (Cinco Días, 
1999, 3 May[a]) 
It is clear that Repsol was practically forced to strategically respond to a tendency 
towards concentration in the sector, which has generated several mergers and 
acquisitions over the last months. 
Complementarity and Synergy 




las fortalezas de ambas 
compañías (mutually leverage 
the strengths of both 
companies); corregir los 
desequilibrios que ambas 
compañías padecen (correct 
the lack of balance that both 
companies suffer); uniendo la 
fortaleza de Repsol […] con 
la de YPF (unite the strengths 
of Repsol […] with those of YPF) 
PRO-Ar: Cortina – que reemplazó a Juan Crespi – hizo una detallada 
exposición sobre […] la “excepcional” sinergia que existe entre las dos 
companies. (La Nación, 1999, 3 February) 
Cortina, who replaced Juan Carlos Crespi, spoke elaborately about […] the 
“exceptional” synergy between the two companies. 
PRO-Es: Además, Repsol deja cubiertas sus carencias de reservas de crudo y 
multiplica por cuatro su capacidad de exploración y producción, según 
Ibersecurities y Bestinver. En la misma línea se muestra Vicente Santillana, 
de Urquijo Bolsa, que asegura que “el negocio de Repsol se complementa 
perfectamente con el de YPF”. (Cinco Días, 1999, 22 January[b]) 
Furthermore, Repsol covers its lack of crude oil reserves and multiplies its exploration 
and production capacity by four, according to Ibersecurities and Bestinver. Vicente 
Santillana of Urquijo Bolsa, who says that “Repsol’s business is perfectly 
complementary to that of YPF”, thinks along the same lines. 
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Efficiency and Costs 
[mainly presented to legitimate the 
deal] 
PRO: potencial ahorro de 
costos (potential cost savings); 
costes operativos podrán 
reducirse (operational costs 
could be reduced) 
PRO-Ar: Entre los puntos a favor de esa operación, Santander Investment 
mencionó el potencial ahorro de costos que traería la operación. Santander 
dice: Habrá un alto potencial de ahorro de costos. (Clarín, 1999, 13 June[b]) 
Santander Investment mentioned potential cost savings as one of the positive features 
of this operation. Santander says: The potential for cost savings will be high. 
PRO-Es: Ayer, los expertos del sector aplaudieron esta decision estratégica de 
la compañía española y recalcaron que le supondrá un importante ahorro de 
costes. (El País, 1999, 22 January) 
Yesterday, the sector experts applauded the Spanish company’s strategic decision and 
highlighted that it would entail important cost savings. 
Size (of the company after integration) 
[mainly presented to legitimate the 
deal] 
PRO: entre las top ten del 
mundo (among the top ten in 
the world); la suma […] 
formará la décima petrolera 
mundial (the merged company 
[…] will be the tenth oil 
company in the world); escalar 
posiciones en el ranking 
mundial (climb positions on 
the global ranking) 
PRO-Ar: El precio de la oferta es de 44,78 dólares por acción y […] su objetivo 
es “crear una compañía energética líder mundial”. (La Nación, 1999, 30 April) 
The price of the bid is 44.78 dollars per share and […] its goal is to “create a global 
leading energy company”. 
PRO-Es: La integración con YPF […] permitirá al grupo entrar en el selecto 
club de las diez petroleras mundiales más grandes. (Cinco Días, 1999, 25 
March) 
The integration with YPF […] will allow the group to enter the select club of the ten 
biggest oil companies in the world. 
Growth (creation of economic value for 
the company) 
[mainly presented to legitimate the 
deal] 
PRO: pretende multiplicar 
los negocios (aims to multiply 
business); con más capacidad 
de crecimiento (with 
increased capacity for growth); 
aumento en los beneficios 
(increased benefits) 
PRO-Ar: “Como resultado de la adquisición de YPF, Repsol ha dado un paso 
gigantesco para convertirse en una compañía mucho más grande, más 
balanceada y con más capacidad de crecimiento”, dijo el president de la 
petrolera con sede en Madrid, Alfonso Cortina. (La Nación, 1999, 25 June) 
 “As a result of the acquisition of YPF, Repsol has made huge steps towards converting 
itself into a company that is much bigger, more balanced and with a higher capacity 
for growth”, said Alfonso Cortina, the President of the Madrid-based oil company. 
PRO-Es: Para Repsol […] se trata de obtener que al menos un 46% de los 
accionistas de YPF se pasen de su lado. Esto es, quedarse con la empresa y 
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lanzarse a un crecimiento sin límites en el mercado petrolero de América 
Latina. (El País, 1999, 7 March) 
For Repsol […] the objective is to get at least 46% of the shareholders on board. This 
will allow them to take over the company and reap the benefits of unlimited growth on 
the Latin American oil market. 
Strategic decision 
[mainly presented to legitimate the 
deal] 
PRO: buena opción 
estratégica (good strategic 
option); gran acierto 
estratégico (great strategic 
success); en línea con su 
política de […] (in line with its 
[…] policy) 
PRO-Es: Una fusión entre Repsol y la petrolera argentina YPF es valorada 
como una buena opción estratégica por Santander Investment. (Cinco Días, 
1998, 29 September) 
A merger between Repsol and the Argentine oil company YPF is considered a good 
strategic option by Santander Investment. 
Timing (related to the broader picture 
of the global economy/energy sector) 
[positive evaluation: presented to 
legitimate the deal] 
[negative evaluation: presented to 
delegitimate the deal] 
PRO: conviene vender ahora 
(it is a good time to sell); el 
timing es bueno (the timing is 
good) 
CON: un afán recaudatorio 
no justifica una venta a los 
apurones (the zeal to 
maximize the revenue does not 
justify a rushed sale); sería 
mejor colocar los papeles en 
un momento en el que estén 
más fuertes (it would be better 
to sell the shares at a time when 
they are stronger); es un mal 
momento para que el Estado 
se desprenda de sus 
tenencias (it is a bad time for 
PRO-Ar: Roque considera que conviene vender ahora […]. (Clarín, 1998, 28 
November) 
Roque said that it is a good time to sell […]. 
PRO-Es: […] señalaban los expertos de Renta 4, que añadían: “[…] también es 
cierto que el timing de la operación es bueno”. (Cinco Días, 1999, 3 May[c]) 
[…] highlighted the experts at Renta 4, who added: “[…] it is also true that the timing 
of the operation is good”. 
CON-Ar: Además, sería mejor colocar los papeles en un momento en el que 
estén más fuertes, con un precio del crudo más alto. (La Nación, 1998, 30 
October) 
Furthermore, it would be better to sell the shares at a time when they are stronger, 
with crude oil at a higher price. 
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the state to part with its 
possessions) 
Price bid for the acquisition (especially 
presented by experts) 
[acceptable: presented to legitimate (or 
relegitimate) the deal] 
[too high: presented to delegitimate the 
deal] 
[NOTE: when Argentine government 
officials presented this argument topic, 
it was implied that the revenue would 
be to the benefit of the Argentine state; 
see nationalistic argument topic 
Argentine State Treasury] 
PRO: el precio […] no es 
excesivamente elevado (the 
price […] is not excessively 
high); una oferta estupenda 
(an outstanding bid) 
CON: pagaron demasiado por 
el 14,99% (they paid too much 
for 14.99%); elevado precio de 
la operación (high price for 
the operation); una cifra que 
[…] la petrolera española no 
está en condiciones de 
afrontar (a number that […] 
the Spanish oil company is not 
in a position to handle) 
PRO-Ar: No son chauchas y palitos, mensuró Menem el total posible por la 
venta de la principal compañía del país. (Clarín, 1999, 2 May[c]) 
It is not a small change, Menem said about the potential total amount for the sale of 
the country’s main oil company. 
PRO-Es: […] medios consultados señalan que mayoritariamente el consejo 
estimó que la oferta de Repsol era aceptable y muy atractiva para los 
accionistas de la compañía andina. (Cinco Días, 1999, 5 May) 
[…] sources indicated that the majority of the board members considered Repsol’s bid 
to be acceptable and very attractive to the Andean company’s shareholders. 
CON-Ar: A Repsol le costará muy caro entrar a YPF por la ventana, indicant 
sobre un eventual copamiento hostil en lugar de una fusion seria. Ya pagaron 
demasiado por el 14,99% del paquete. (Clarín, 1999, 9 February) 
In reference to a potential hostile takeover instead of a serious merger, it was 
mentioned that it would be very expensive for Repsol to enter YPF through the back 
door. They already paid too much for the 14.99% of the package. 
Repsol’s acquired debt 
[mainly presented to delegitimate the 
deal (viz. too high)] 
CON: Repsol no puede 
afrontar ese costo sin 
aumentar peligrosamente su 
deuda (Repsol cannot afford 
that cost without dangerousely 
increasing its debt); 
empeoramiento del rating 
de Repsol (worsening of 
Repsol’s rating); reducir la 
calificación crediticia de 
Repsol (reduce Repsol’s credit 
rating) 
CON-Ar: Las calaficadoras de riesgo que analizan la marcha de los negocios de 
Repsol no aprobaron la entrada de la petrolera en YPF. Standard & Poor’s, 
Fitch-IBCA y Moody’s decidieron someter a revisión, para una possible rebaja, 
sus notas sobre la deuda de la compañía. (La Nación, 1999, 22 January) 
The rating agencies that analyse the evolution of Repsol’s business did not approve 
YPF’s takeover of the oil company. Standard & Poor’s, Fitch-IBCA and Moody’s decided 
to review and potentially lower their debt credit rating of the company. 
CON-Es: La agencia de calificaciones Moody’s ha rebajado de AA3 a A2 la 
deuda a largo plazo de Repsol y ha mantenido otras notaciones por esta 
operación dada su elevada cuantía. (Cinco Días, 1999, 25 June) 
Moody’s rating agency has lowered Repsol’s long-term debt from AA3 to A2 and has 
changed its rating because of the importance of this operation. 
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Table 15 Nationalistic argument topics in the 1998-1999 corpus: An overview 
NATIONALISTIC ARGUMENT TOPIC TRIGGERS EXAMPLES FROM THE CORPUS 
Contribution to the Argentine State 
Treasury 
[positive evaluation: presented to 
legitimate (or relegitimate) the deal] 
[questioned: presented to delegitimate 
the deal] 
PRO: Economía espera 2.800 
millones de dólares frescos 
(Foreign Affairs expects new 
investment in the amount of 2.8 
billion dollars) 
CON: captar fondos […] que 
contribuyan a paliar su crisis 
presupuestaria (receive 
money […] that will help resolve 
its budget crisis); no se puede 
usar la plata para cancelar 
deuda ni para tapar baches 
fiscales (the money cannot be 
used to cover fiscal gaps) 
PRO-Ar: El Gobierno espera recaudar US$ 2.300 millones (Clarín, 1998, 23 
October) 
The government hopes to raise 2.3 billion dollars 
PRO-Es: Para el Gobierno, la OPA de Repsol sobre YPF es una fiesta: no solo 
porque los 13.400 millones de dólares de la operación suponen el mayor 
negocio jamás realizado en Argentina, sino que equivalen al total de las 
inversiones españolas recibidas desde 1990. (Cinco Días, 1999, 3 May[d]) 
From the government’s point of view, Repsol’s takeover bid for YPF is a godsend: not 
just because the 13.4 billion dollar operation is the biggest transaction in the history of 
Argentina, but also because it equals all Spanish investments in the country since 
1990. 
CON-Ar: El Gobierno se hizo de 2000 millones de dólares que seguramente 
irán a tapar el agujero de las cuentas públicas en el presente ejercicio. (La 
Nación, 1999, 17 February) 
The government received 2 billion dollars which will certainly be used to cover the gap 
in this year’s public accounts. 
Confidence in Argentina 
[mainly presented to legitimate the 
deal] 
PRO: señal de firmeza y 
profundización del modelo 
económico (signs of strength 
and advance of the economic 
model); remarcó la confianza 
de los inversores (renewed 
investor trust); el compromiso 
de Repsol por América 
Latina es indiscutible 
(Repsol’s commitment to 
PRO-Ar: Para Menem, el avance de Repsol refleja la confiabilidad que la 
Argentina despierta entre los inversores. (Clarín, 1999, 2 May[d]) 
According to Menem, Repsol’s push is proof of Argentina’s trustworthiness in the eyes 
of investors. 
PRO-Es: Por su parte, Daniel Montamat, ex president de YPF y actual 
consultor, subraya que es una apuesta a largo plazo en Argentina y “un gesto 
claro de confianza hacia futuras administraciones y de madurez del sector 
petrolero”. (El País, 1999, 5 May[b]) 
Daniel Montamat, former President of YPF and currently a consultant, claims that this 
is a long-term commitment to Argentina and a “clear gesture of trust towards future 
administrations and a show of the oil industry’s maturity”. 
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Latin America is 
unquestionable) 
Reinvestments in Argentina 
[mainly presented to legitimate the 
deal] 
PRO: efecto cascada sobre el 
resto de las acciones 
cotizantes (domino effect on 
the rest of the listed shares); 
efecto beneficioso sobre los 
demás papeles de la Bolsa 
(beneficial effect on the rest of 
the stock market); el efecto 
YPF volvió de regar de 
dinero al mercado bursátil 
(the YPF effect has sprayed the 
stock market with money) 
PRO-Ar: Martín Redrado […] se mostró medianamente optimista. Esto traerá 
un efecto cascada sobre el resto de las acciones cotizantes. (Clarín, 1999, 2 
May[d]) 
Martín Redrado […] was moderately optimistic. This will have a domino effect on the 
rest of the listed shares. 
PRO-Es: Quienes defienden la operación sostienen que tendrá consecuencias 
positivas para la economía argentina. Por ejemplo, BCP Securities vaticina 
que provocará un efecto riqueza al liberar 8.000 millones de dólares (cerca de 
1,27 billones de pesetas) […]. (El País, 1999, 5 May[b]) 
Those who are in favour of the operation claim it will have a positive effect on the 
Argentine economy. BCP Securities, for example, proclaims it will generate a wealth 
effect by freeing up 8 billion dollars (close to 1.27 trillion pesetas) to the market as a 
result of the sale of YPF’s shares. 
Competition (Repsol-YPF’s dominant 
position and hence the possibility of 
reduced competition in the Argentine 
energy market) 
[mainly presented to delegitimate the 
deal] 
[NOTE: in the Spanish newspapers, the 
Repsol-YPF’s dominant position is at 
times evaluated positively as a 
leadership position] 
CON: para que ningún grupo 
tuviera una posición 
predominante (so no group 
has a dominant position); la 
empresa española dominará 
más del 50% del negocio 
petrolero local (the Spanish 
company will dominate 
more than 50% of the local 
oil business); Repsol […] 
tendrá que desprenderse de 
algunos activos (Repsol […] 
will have to part with some 
assets) 
CON-Ar: Los empresarios que aún mantienen su capital nacional o aquellos 
multinacionales con décadas en la Argentina critican el fomento a un 
eventual monopolio que implica la operación. (Clarín, 1998, 9 August) 
The businessmen who still have their national capital or those multinationals that 
have been in Argentina for decades are critical of this fostering of a monopoly that 
may be generated as a result of this operation. 
CON-Es: El retraso por el que optó el directorio de YPF ha sido utilizado por 
algunos grupos politicos para criticar la OPA de Repsol, y basándose 
prioritariamente en la posición que logrará en el mercado argentino. (Cinco 
Días, 1999, 5 May) 
The delay imposed by YPF’s board of directors has been used by some political gropus 
to criticize Repsol’s takeover bid, based primarily on the position it will obtain on the 
Argentine market. 
PRO-Es: Y para Repsol, que ya tiene el 60% de Astra, la entrada en YPF 
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PRO: la entrada en YPF 
supondría el liderazgo (their 
participation in YPF will alow 
them to lead the pack) 
supondría el liderazgo en los mercados argentino y peruano. (Cinco Días, 
1999, 25 November) 
     Repsol, which already has a 60% participation in Astra, will lead the Argentine and 
Peruvian markets, thanks to its entry into YPF. 
Ownership (YPF’s loss of 
independence) 
[mainly presented to delegitimate the 
deal] 
[NOTE: this topic includes several 
subtopics, ranging from protectionist 
observations made by Argentine 
politicians, to YPF’s intentions to 
protect the continuity of its 
management] 
CON: dispersión de 
compradores (scattering of 
buyers); mantener la 
propiedad de YPF en muchas 
manos (keep ownership of YPF 
in many hands); tal vez mude 
la sede de la compañía 
(potential move of the 
company’s headquarters); 
Monti […] intenta impedir 
que una multinacional tenga 
un fuerte peso en la gestión 
(Monti […] tries to stop 
multinationals from having a 
strong influence on the 
management) 
CON-Ar: Igual, el presidente de la petrolera, Roberto Monti, más de una vez 
propagandizó las ventajas de mantener las tenencias dispersas en muchas 
manos. Sería una forma de evitar el copamiento, gradual o de shock, de una 
competidora de afuera en el manejo de la líder de exportación y 
facturaciones de la Argentina. (Clarín, 1998, 20 October) 
However, on several occasion, the oil company’s President, Roberto Monti, praised the 
advantages of keeping the ownership dispersed among many different parties. It 
would be a way to avoid a gradual or immediate takeover by a foreign competitor of 
Argentina’s leading company in both export and billing. 
CON-Es: Mientras, arrecia en Argentina la oposición a la toma del citado 
paquete por una empresa extranjera. (Cinco Días, 1999, 25 November) 
Meanwhile, in Argentina the opposition to said share package being bought by a 
foreign company is increasing. 
Employment (loss of YPF jobs) 
[mainly presented to delegitimate the 
deal] 
[NOTE: in the Spanish newspapers, this 
topic is at times included 
(factually/rationally) in the 
rationalistic Efficiency and Costs 
argument topic: e.g. “permitiría una 
fuerte reducción de costes (y una 
CON: reconoció que […] 
habrá reducción de personal 
(acknowledged that […] there 
will be staff reductions); los 
empleados de YPF esperan a 
Repsol con incertidumbre y 
temor (the employees of YPF 
await Repsol with uncertainty 
and fear) 
CON-Ar: La toma de control de YPF por parte de Repsol, hace poco más de dos 
meses, despertó temores de recorte de personal y despedidos entre los 
trabajadores de la petrolera local. (La Nación, 1999, 9 September) 
Repsol’s takeover of YPF, just over two months ago, raised concerns of staff reductions 
and layoffs among the employees of the local oil company. 
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disminución de la plantilla de hasta 
6.300 empleados)” (would allow for a 
significant cost reduction (and a reduction 
of total staff to 6,300)) 
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Invoked evaluation: Examples from the corpus 
In the full examples in Table 14 and Table 15, the evaluative elements which indicate the 
valence of the fragments were printed in bold. In most of the examples, these stretches 
of discourse make the fragments stand out as outright forms of evaluation (inscribed 
evaluation). However, the most difficult fragments to code are those that have the 
potential to trigger an evaluative reaction in the reader via processes of attitudinal 
inference (invoked evaluation: provocation and evocation). It is therefore deemed useful to 
consider a number of fragments from the corpus in order to shed light on the way in 
which the coding procedures were operationalized (particularly in the fifth phase 
selection and coding of relevant fragments as described above in section 4.2.2.1). 
 
The first fragment is taken from an article published in the Argentine daily Clarín on 
23 October 1998 under the title El Estado venderá el 15% de YPF en un solo paquete (The state 
will sell its 15% stake in YPF in one package). Despite the fact that this appears to be a 
factual sentence – it does not contain any specifically evaluative marker – the fragment 
was still coded as a delegitimating argument topic under the label Ownership (loss of 
independence). 
[entradilla] Según las ofertas en danza, el control de YPF podría quedar en manos 
de italianos o españoles. (Clarín, 1998, 23 October) 
[lead] According to current bids, control of YPF could end up in the hands of Italians 
or Spaniards. 
Coding this sentence as a delegitimating argument topic is the result of an interpretive 
effort. The fragment needs to be interpreted in the context of the whole Argentine 
newspaper article and even more broadly, in the context of the Clarín’s discursive 
(re)construction of the Repsol-YPF case. In this context, the fragment has the potential 
to evoke a negative evaluation of the loss of ownership in those, most probably 
Argentine, readers who bring a particular set of beliefs about economics, national 
identity and, especially, the symbolic importance of YPF for Argentina and its people. In 
this lead, the writer creates a category of Them (Italians or Spaniards) which is 
contrasted to an implicit category of Us for the readers to identify with. As such, the loss 
of ownership can be considered to be implicitly described as problematic in this 
fragment. The implied contradiction between Our hands and Their hands (see also 
Chapter 3) illustrates how the semantic content of this sentence has the potential to 
trigger a nationalistic, protectionist reading of the lead of this article. 
 
The following three fragments are taken from an article published by the Spanish 
newspaper Cinco Días. They further illustrate why invoked evaluation should not be 
excluded from the analysis. The general tone of this article has the potential to produce 
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a generally positive evaluation of Repsol’s acquisition of YPF. The article (which is not 
reproduced here) is in fact made up of a number of rationalistic argument topics 
focusing attention on the advantages of the deal for Repsol, the acquiring company. In 
the first fragment from this article (the second paragraph), three different rationalistic 
argument topics can be identified: Size (of the company after integration), Growth 
(creation of economic value for the company), and Efficiency and Costs. The combination 
of these rational, company-level considerations clearly have the potential to trigger a 
positive evaluation of the acquisition of YPF. 
[cuerpo] Repsol multiplicará por más de cuatro sus reservas probadas de gas y 
crudo con la incorporación de la argentina YPF, y éstas se elevarán a 4.226 
millones de barriles equivalentes de petróleo. La empresa resultante quedará 
entre las ocho primeras privadas por ese capítulo y en el noveno puesto por 
producción de hidrocarburos [Size]. Y es que crecer en reservas es una de las bases 
de la OPA, la más cuantiosa realizada por una empresa española [Growth]. Según el 
presidente de Repsol, Alberto Cortina, se trata de “un proyecto de crecimiento 
[Growth], aunque con la integración se logre reducir costes e inversiones [Efficiency 
and costs]”. (Cinco Días, 1999, 3 May 1999[c]) 
[body] Repsol has more than quadrupled its proven gas and crude oil reserves by 
incorporating the Argentine YPF, up to the equivalent of 4,226 million barrels of oil. 
As a result of the acquisition, the merged company will become the eighth largest 
private oil company and the ninth biggest hydrocarbon producer [Size]. Growing 
reserves is one of the cornerstones of the takeover bid, the biggest one ever by a 
Spanish company [Growth]. According to the President of Repsol, Alberto Cortina, it’s 
a “growth project [Growth], even through the integration allows for a reduction of 
costs and investments [Efficiency and costs]. 
The article’s potential to trigger a generally positive evaluation of the deal also has an 
influence on the interpretation of the following sentence. While factual, the sentence 
was still interpreted as having an evaluative potential because of its immediate co-text 
in this particular article (for instance, the legitimating rationalistic argument topics 
highlighted in the fragment above). This sentence was coded as a legitimating 
rationalistic argument topic under the label Efficiency and Costs. 
[cuerpo] Los costes operativos podrán reducirse entre 300 y 350 millones de 
dólares al año. (Cinco Días, 1999, 3 May[c]) 
 [body] Operational costs may be reduced by 300 to 350 million dollars per year. 
In fact, the only critical note in this article comes from a fragment in which the 
journalist refers to the dominant position of Repsol in the Argentine market, and the 
fact that, as a result, Repsol will have to sell assets. This fragment was coded as a 
delegitimating nationalistic argument topic under the label Competition. 
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[cuerpo] Además, con la integración de YPF y la también argentina Astra, de la que 
Repsol tiene el 66% del capital, el grupo tendrá que vender o intercambiar 
posiciones en el mercado andino, y prioritariamente en el de estaciones de 
servicio. (Cinco Días, 1999, 3 May 1999[c]) 
[body] Furthermore, thanks to the integration of YPF and the other Argentine 
company Astra, for which Repsol controls 66% of the capital, the group will have to 
sell or exchange positions in the Andean market, with a priority in the petrol 
stations. 
The legitimating rationalistic Efficiency and Costs argument topic has a delegitimating 
(societal-)nationalistic counterpart in the form of the category of Employment (loss of 
YPF jobs). This argument topic is only found in the Argentine corpus. The following 
fragment was coded as a delegitimating nationalistic argument topic because the 
newspaper’s questions about the cost cuts and the downsizing of corporate structures 
were interpreted as a possible Argentine (societal-)nationalistic concern for the effects 
they might have on the target company’s employment situation. 
[cuerpo] Por las prohibiciones de la Comisión Nacional de Valores de Buenos Aires, 
que impiden formular declaraciones mientras dure la oferta pública de Repsol 
para comprar acciones de YPF, ningún ejecutivo de Repsol quiso contestar 
preguntas de Clarín referidas a los recortes de gastos y achicamientos de 
estructuras que afectarán a YPF. (Clarín, 1999, 5 June) 
[body] As a result of the restrictions imposed by the National Securities Commission 
of Buenos Aires which prohibit public declarations for the duration of the public bid 
by Repsol to buy YPF shares, none of the Repsol Executives was willing to answer 
questions by Clarín regarding cost and structural reductions that would affect YPF. 
In the next fragment, taken from the Spanish newspaper Cinco Días, the loss of jobs is 
explicitly mentioned in the context of the considerable reduction of costs, which 
appears in a quote attributed to Santander Investment in which the company describes 
the advantages of the M&A-deal. Therefore, this fragment was coded as a legitimating 
rationalistic Efficiency and Costs argument topic. 
[cuerpo] Santander Investment destacaba la complementariedad de Repsol e YPF. 
Entre las ventajas de la fusión, resaltaba las siguientes: […] permitiría una fuerte 
reducción de costes (y una disminución de plantilla de hasta 6.300 empleados). 
(Cinco Días, 1999, 3 May[d]) 
[body] Santander Investment highlighted the complementary nature of Repsol and 
YPF. The following advantages of the merger were highlighted: [...] which would 
allow for considerable cost reductions (and a staff reduction of up to 6,300 
employees). 
As in the previous example taken from a Spanish newspaper article (Cinco Días, 1999, 3 
May[c]), the news text (not reproduced here) is filled with different legitimating 
rationalistic argument topics (Complementarity and Synergy, Efficiency and Costs, Growth, 
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Size, Strategic decision, Timing). The only critical note in this article appears in a fragment 
in which the journalist refers to the rating agencies who voiced concerns about the 
company’s increased debt levels. As such, even though for the most part of the article, 
the readers get to read legitimating rationalistic argument topics, they are also exposed 
to voices that are more critical of the acquisition. This fragment was therefore coded as 
a delegitimating rationalistic Repsol’s acquired debt argument topic. 
[cuerpo] Los únicos reparos a la operación vienen de las agencias calificadoras de 
riesgos, lo que resulta lógico dado el volumen de endeudamiento que asume 
Repsol, al menos provisionalmente (hasta que amplíe capital, emita convertibles y 
venda activos no estratégicos). Fitch IBCA ha sido la primera en reducir la 
calificación crediticia de Repsol. (Cinco Días, 1999, 3 May[d]) 
[body] The only reservations about the operation came from the rating agencies, 
which is logical considering the amount of debt Repsol is incurring, at least 
temporarily (until it converts capital, issues convertibles and sells off non-strategic 
assets). Fitch IBCA was the first to reduce Repsol’s credit rating. 
Of course, the legitimating rationalistic tone of the largest part of the article clearly has 
the potential to position the readers to make a positive evaluation of the acquisition. 
Acknowledging and inserting the critique of an influential social actor does not change 
the general tone of this article. On the contrary, the journalist nuances the 
delegitimating argument topic presented by the rating agencies63. Their comments are 
represented as exceptions to the generally positive reactions (for instance in los únicos 
reparos a la operación vienen de […]). Moreover, the debt levels are described as temporary 
shortcoming (al menos provisionalmente). 
 
Social actors: Examples from the corpus 
After the identification and selection of the relevant argument topics, the coded 
fragments were scrutinized again to check if they could be linked to particular sources64. 
The identification of social actors is easiest when the journalist introduces a direct or an 
indirect quote into the news text. 
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 The journalistic use of expert opinion will be analysed in section 4.4.3.2. The comparative analysis of these 
quotations will provide interesting insights into the newspapers’ different perspectives on the event. 
64
 This means that not all social actors that are referenced in the newspaper corpus were coded. Only the 
social actors that presented at least one argument topic that was deemed relevant to be taken up for the 
analysis (see Table 13 on p. 164) were coded as relevant social actors. Even though every argument topic that 
was attributed to a specific source in the newspaper articles was given a social actor code, section 5.3.1 will only 
present the analysis of the discursive strategizing deployed by the four social actors that figure most 
prominently in the Argentine and Spanish newspaper accounts of the Repsol-YPF case. 
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In the following fragment, the El País journalist introduces a direct quote attributed 
to Guillermo Harteneck, the President of the Argentine National Securities Commission. 
The direct quote is signalled by the preposition según (according to) and by quotation 
marks. The quoted individual is introduced in the text by means of an appositive 
construction. The first part of this construction specifies the social role of the individual 
that is referred to, the second part reveals the identity of the individual by using the 
proper name. 
[cuerpo] Según el presidente de la Comisión Nacional de Valores de Argentina, Guillermo 
Harteneck, la OPA de Repsol “cumple con todos los requisitos legales” exigidos para 
ese tipo de operaciones. (El País, 1999, 8 May) 
[body] According to Guillermo Harteneck, the President of the Argentine National Securities 
Commission, Repsol’s takeover bid “meets all legal requirements” for this type of 
operations. 
In the next fragment, the Cinco Días journalist uses the verb to defend to refer to the 
repeated efforts of Roberto Monti (YPF’s CEO) to prevent stakeholders from altering the 
company’s memorandum of association (the Argentine government in particular). 
[cuerpo] Monti ha defendido, y por el momento ha salido triunfante, el 
mantenimiento de los estatutos de YPF. (Cinco Días, 1999, 20 January) 
[body] Monti has defended the decision to leave YPF’s memorandum of association 
unaltered and so far he has been successful. 
Of course, journalists do not only refer to individuals by using proper names. For the 
identification of social actors in the newspaper corpus, it was also important to look for 
other nominal expressions used to refer to human beings. The CEOs of the two 
companies, for instance, were referred to with a whole range of different lexical terms65. 
In the following fragment, the journalist refers to the CEO of the Spanish company 
Repsol without identifying him explicitly by using his proper name, Alfonso Cortina. Of 
course, journalists will only use referential variety when they have already properly 
introduced the social actor in the foregoing text (not reproduced here). 
[cuerpo] El empresario dijo estar “totalmente complacido por las seguridades 
jurídicas que nos han dado a la comunidad inversora en cuanto a la seguridad 
jurídica de las inversiones realizadas. No veo posibilidad de una crisis potencial en 
nuestra relación con el futuro gobierno”. (La Nación, 1999, 24 November[b]) 
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 In a conference paper, Vandenberghe and Vande Casteele (2010) analysed the ways in which the Argentine 
newspapers referred to Alfonso Cortina and Roberto Monti, the CEOs of Repsol and YPF respectively. 
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[body] The executive said he was “completely satisfied with the legal assurances that 
we received regarding the legal certainty of the investments. I see no possibility of a 
potential crisis in our relationship with the future government”. 
Often, journalists do not attribute quotes to individuals but to the organization or 
institution to which they belong. In the next fragment, for instance, the indirect quote 
of a Repsol statement is introduced by the preposition según (according to). 
[cuerpo] Según Repsol con la absorción de YPF quedarán octavos entre las grandes 
petroleras del mundo. (Clarín, 1999, 30 April) 
[body] According to Repsol, after acquiring YPF they will be the eighth biggest oil 
company in the world. 
The NVivo software tool was used to set up tree structures for important social actors. 
As such, in the Spanish corpus, the social actor category for the Spanish company 
Repsol includes fragments that can be attributed to both the generic referent Repsol 
and the CEO of the company, Alfonso Cortina. 
Repsol 
o Repsol (generic) 
o Cortina (CEO) 
In the Argentine corpus, the picture is already more complicated. The Argentine 
journalists not only attribute statements to the company (generic) and its CEO, Alfonso 
Cortina. The social actor category for Repsol also includes two spokespersons, José 
García Perrote and Simeón Vadillo, and one of the members of Repsol’s Board of 
Directors, Ramón Blanco. 
Repsol 
o Repsol (generic) 
o Cortina (CEO) 
o Blanco (member of the Board of Directors) 
o García Perrote (spokesperson) 
o Vadillo (spokesperson) 
The most extensive social actor categories are the categories for the Argentine 
government and for the Argentine opposition. These categories are too broad and too 
diverse to be discussed separately here. Let us consider, by ways of example, the tree 
structure of the category for the Argentine government in the Spanish subcorpus66. 
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 The tree structure for the Argentine government in the Argentine subcorpus is much more extensive. 
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Argentine Government (Partido Justicialista) 
o Argentine government (generic) 
o Menem (President) 
o Guadagni (Secretary of Industry, Trade and Mining) 
o MacKarthy (Secretary of Energy) 
o Ministry of Economic Affairs 
• Ministry of Economic Affairs (generic) 
• Fernández (Minister of Economic Affairs) 
• Quiroga López (Undersecretary of Banking and Insurance) 
The analysis revealed that four (elite) social actors figure most prominently in both the 
Argentine and Spanish subcorpus of newspaper articles on the Repsol-YPF case. 
Main proponents of the deal 
o The Argentine government 
o The Spanish acquiring company Repsol 
 
Main opponents of the deal 
o The Argentine target company YPF 
o The Argentine political opposition  
In order to reveal the discursive strategizing of these four prominent social actors, the 
matrix coding query in NVivo was used. This tool makes it possible to link the social 
actors to the argument topics identified in the corpus. Moreover, the elaborate tree 
structures set up for the identification of both the social actors and the argument topics 
makes it possible to study the social actors’ discursive strategizing at different levels. 
The analysis of the discursive strategizing will be presented separately from the 
comparative cross-textual analysis (sections 4.3 and 4.4 respectively). 
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4.3 Discursive strategizing of the four prominent social actors 
in the 1998-1999 Repsol-YPF case 
4.3.1 Introduction 
This section focuses on the discursive strategizing of the four most prominent social 
actors in the Repsol-YPF case. The analysis will reveal how these social actors presented 
argument topics in their attempts to either legitimate or delegitimate Repsol’s 
acquisition of YPF. Where possible and relevant, the analysis will also shed light on the 
way in which some of these social actors engaged in a discursive struggle over the 
legitimacy of the deal. At times, social actors may feel forced to adapt their discursive 
strategizing because of certain pressures they feel from other social actors. At these 
moments, they may respond to these discursive attacks (that is, opponents presenting 
delegitimating argument topics) by mobilizing relegitimating discourse. 
 
This section seeks to both complement and extend the findings of earlier studies into 
the discursive strategizing of social actors in the context of cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions. Not only did these studies find that rationalistic discourse was mainly 
mobilized by proponents, and (societal-)nationalistic discourse by opponents of a 
certain deal, they also found that proponents often mobilize a mix of these two 
discourses in order to gain acceptance for their decision (see Hellgren et al., 2002; 
Tienari et al., 2003). 
 
The analysis will extend the findings of earlier studies in two ways. First, this case 
study presents an opportunity to focus on the special role of the government in an 
acquisition after privatization. The case under scrutiny here is indeed different from the 
cases analysed in previous studies. Repsol’s cross-border acquisition of YPF was 
performed after the Argentine government decided to sell its remaining stake in the 
(semi-privatized) Argentine oil company. The Argentine government thus played a 
crucial role in the Repsol-YPF case as one of the main proponents of the deal. In 
previous studies, national governments did not play such a prominent role67. Second, in 
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 Tienari et al. (2003, p. 391) already suggested that this would be an interesting area for further research as 
“the intersection of business and politics remains an underresearched area in management and organizations 
literature”. Despite this useful suggestion, few studies have looked into the discursive elements at work in 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions after privatization. One notable exception is perhaps the study 
conducted by Vaara et al. (2006) […] 
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the analysis, a distinction will be made between the discursive legitimating and 
relegitimating efforts of the main social actors. This distinction allows for a deeper and 
more detailed understanding of the discursive strategizing in cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions. 
 
The following three research questions will guide the analysis in this section: 
RQ1: How do social actors deploy discursive strategizing to legitimate or 
delegitimate this cross-border acquisition after privatization? 
 
RQ2: How do social actors respond to the discursive attacks launched by other 
social actors (relegitimation)? 
 
RQ3: What do these findings tell us about discursive strategizing in cross-border 
acquisitions in general, and cross-border acquisitions after privatization in 
particular? 
In the Spanish-language newspaper accounts of the Repsol-YPF case, two prominent 
social actors adopted a legitimating perspective on the privatization and acquisition of 
YPF: the Argentine government and the Spanish acquiring company Repsol. Two other 
prominent social actors adopted a more delegitimating perspective: the Argentine 
target company YPF and the Argentine political opposition. In the following, the 
proponents’ and opponents’ discursive strategizing will be explored in detail. The whole 
corpus of Spanish-language newspaper articles is taken into consideration for the 
analysis of the social actors’ discursive strategizing. This means that the analysis in this 
section will discuss the mobilization of the two dominant discourses (and the 
presentation of argument topics belonging to them) by the four prominent social actors 
on the basis of the fragments coded in both the Argentine and Spanish newspaper 
articles68. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
[…] on the 1998 merger in the Nordic paper and pulp sector between privately owned Swedish Stora and state-
owned Finnish Enso. However, the special role of the Finnish government was not the main focus of their 
study. 
68
 The differences between the Argentine and Spanish subcorpora in terms of the newspapers’ positioning vis-
à-vis the discursive strategizing deployed by the four prominent social actors in the 1998-1999 corpus will be 
further examined in section 4.4.3.1. 
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4.3.2 Legitimating perspective: The Argentine government 
The Argentine government was the party that initiated the process under study here69. 
Its decision in February 1998 to put its remaining shares up for sale paved the way for 
the Spanish company Repsol to, first, acquire a controlling stake of 14.9% in January 
1999 and, later, launch a surprise all-cash offer to buy the whole company in April 1999. 
Indeed, the fact that the Argentine government played a crucial role as one of the main 
proponents of the privatization and acquisition is what makes this study different from 
previous analyses into the discursive underpinnings of cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions. 
Table 16 The Argentine government’s discursive strategizing in the 1998-1999 Repsol-YPF 
case 

























Inevitability (of global restructuring) 2 
Complementarity and Synergy 1 
Efficiency and Costs 0 
Size 0 
Growth 0 
Strategic decision 0 
Timing 9 
Price bid for the acquisition 3 
























Contribution to the Argentine State Treasury 22 
Confidence in Argentina 4 








Previous studies have shown how the proponents of an M&A-deal usually mobilize a 
mix of rationalistic and nationalistic discourse, whereas the opponents of a deal almost 
exclusively mobilize nationalistic discourse. However, in this case, the analysis of the 
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 For an overview of the different stages in process of the privatization and acquisition of YPF, see section 
2.2.3. 
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Argentine government’s discursive strategizing clearly shows how it mainly mobilized 
nationalistic discourse in order to gain acceptance for its decision. The Argentine 
government is found presenting argument topics in 21% of the texts in the 1998-1999 
corpus (70/330). The numbers in Table 16 show that the government mainly presented 
the nationalistic argument topics Competition (34/70; 48.5%) and Contribution to the 
Argentine State Treasury (22/70; 31.5%). 
 
The following sections will show how the Argentine government was found to be 
presenting these argument topics in the corpus of newspaper accounts of the Repsol-
YPF case. The analysis of the coded fragments will reveal that the government mainly 
presented the Contribution to the Argentine State Treasury argument topic to legitimate the 
deal, whereas it presented the Competition argument topic mainly to relegitimate its 
decision (that is, as a reaction to the delegitimating Competition argument topic 
presented by the opponents).  
 
Legitimation and relegitimation: Contribution to the Argentine State Treasury 
The nationalistic argument topic Contribution to the Argentine State Treasury is one of the 
topics that was used to either legitimate or delegitimate the deal (see also Table 15 on p. 
173). A close reading of the fragments shows that the Argentine government was 
looking to maximize the revenue from the privatization. At times, this strategy was 
criticized by opponents who presented the delegitimating argument topic that 
privatization only causes a single, one-off increase in revenues70. The Argentine 
government felt forced to counter these external pressures. As a result, in the 
newspaper articles, the government is also found mobilizing relegitimating discourse in 
reaction to the presentation of the delegitimating Contribution to the Argentine State 
Treasury argument topic. 
 
According to the newspapers, the Argentine government initially wanted to sell its 
shares on the international stock markets so that no other company would come to 
dominate Argentina’s most valuable company. However, when Repsol started to show 
interest, the Spanish company immediately stated that it preferred to buy a large 
package of shares. The YPF memorandum of association stipulated that any company 
that wanted to purchase more than 14.9% of YPF was obliged to make a bid for the full 
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 One of the opponents who presented the delegitimating nationalistic argument topic Contribution to the 
Argentine State Treasury is the Argentine political opposition. In the analysis of this social actor’s discursive 
strategizing in section 4.3.5, this particular argument topic will not be discussed because it is overshadowed by 
the delegitimating nationalistic argument topics Ownership and Dominant position. 
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100% of the company. This rule was intended to avoid that the whole company would be 
purchased by a financially stronger competitor. The YPF management immediately 
stated that under no circumstances would it permit the memorandum of association to 
be amended71. Repsol’s proposal did appeal to the Argentine government, however, 
particularly because of the market volatility during the summer of 1998. The 
government was looking for a way to make as much money as possible from the 
privatization. It was reasoned that selling the shares in one package could generate a lot 
more revenue than selling them on the international stock markets. 
[cuerpo] Ayer, dos técnicos de Economía presentaron las ventajas de una de las últimas 
privatizaciones que dejarán buena plata. Los secretarios Emilio Cáceres y Alejandro 
Quiroga López relataron la oferta española y hablaron del concurso de precios para 
darles lugar a otros interesados. (Clarín, 1998, 23 October) 
[body] Yesterday, two experts from the Ministry of Economic Affairs presented the 
advantages of one of the latest privatizations that will yield a considerable amount 
of funds. Secretaries Emilio Cáceres and Alejandro Quiroga López discussed the Spanish 
bid and talked about the public tender in order to give other interested parties the 
chance to participate. 
 
[cuerpo] La Argentina espera obtener entre 2600 y 2700 millones de dólares por la 
venta del 14,9 por ciento de las acciones de la ex compañía petrolera estatal YPF, 
según manifestó ayer una fuente del Palacio de Hacienda. (La Nación, 1998, 27 October) 
[body] A source at the Palacio de Hacienda stated yesterday that Argentina hopes to 
obtain between 2.6 and 2.7 billion dollars for the sale of 14.9 per cent of the formerly 
state-owned oil company’s shares. 
The Argentine government’s plan to sell the shares to one oil company was 
diametrically opposite to how both the YPF management and the Argentine political 
opposition approached the privatization of the Argentine company. They wanted to see 
the shares end up in the hands of many individual shareholders. Moreover, the 
government had the additional problem of having to react to the concerns of a number 
of social actors according to whom the government desperately needed the money to 
ease its budget crisis. 
[cuerpo] La disputa entre el Gobierno y el actual directorio de YPF, encabezado 
por Roberto Monti, estalló porque Economía quiere vender en bloque los títulos, 
para asegurarse un precio más elevado y captar fondos (se habla de hasta 2.800 
millones de dólares) que contribuyan a paliar su crisis presupuestaria. (Clarín, 
1998, 24 November) 
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 A detailed analysis of the discursive strategizing deployed by YPF representatives will be presented in 
section 4.3.4. 
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[body] The argument between the government and the current board of YPF, led by 
Roberti Monti, reached a head because the Ministry of Economic Affairs wants to sell 
off the shares in blocks in order to obtain a higher price and to receive funds (an 
amount of up to 2.8 billion dollars is mentioned) that will help resolve its budget 
crisis. 
The government felt forced to react to this critique. In the following fragment, the 
Minister of Economic Affairs, Roque Fernández, tries to counter the critique by 
emphasizing that the money would go to the Social Security and to a local trust fund. 
The minister’s implicit message here is that the Argentine people will benefit from the 
privatization. The delegitimating argument topic is implicitly present in the polyphonic 
verb descartar (to dismiss) through which the minister is represented as reacting to a 
critique voiced by a social actor who remains undefined in this article. 
[cuerpo] Fernández reiteró que el destino de los fondos será la seguridad social (en 
un 30%) y un fondo fiduciario (el 70% restante), y descartó – salvo que haya una 
modificación de la ley – que pueda destinarse a gastos corrientes o cubrir las 
necesidades de financiamiento. (La Nación, 1998, 5 November) 
[body] Fernández repeated that the funds will go to social security (30%) and a trust 
fund (the remaining 70%) and dismissed – unless there is a change in legislation – the 
possibility that the funds could be used to cover current expenditure or financing 
needs. 
The Argentine government and the YPF management finally reached a compromise on 
how the shares would be sold: the memorandum of association would not be amended if 
14.9% of the state’s shares could be sold in one package to the highest bidder. In January 
1999, Repsol emerged as the sole bidder for this package and the government raked in 
$2.01 billion in one day. After the sale of the 14.9% package, a new phase in the 
acquisition process began. Repsol had to abide by the compromise reached by YPF and 
the government to leave the articles of association as they were. However, the Spanish 
company did not give up on trying to gain full control of YPF. At the end of April, Repsol 
did what many had feared, but few had expected, when it launched a surprise all-cash 
offer for the remaining 85.1% of the Argentine company. In this second phase, the 





The most important critique after Repsol’s acquisition of YPF was the new company’s 
dominant position in the Argentine energy market. This problem was already 
considered in 1998, well before the sale of the 14.9% package. In November 1998, the 
Argentine government was already found reacting to this critique. The minister of 
Economic Affairs tried to relegitimate its controversial decision to privatize YPF by 
stating that the government would take all necessary precautions to prevent that any 
company would eventually take a dominant position in Argentina. 
[cuerpo] El Gobierno tomará todos los recaudos para evitar que la venta de las 
acciones de YPF en poder del Estado “habilite prácticas monopólicas”, [...] dijo ayer 
el ministro de Economía, Roque Fernández. (La Nación, 1998, 5 November) 
[body] The government will take all necessary precautions to prevent that the sale 
of YPF’s hares currently owned by the state “would facilitate monopolistic 
practices”, […] said the Minister of Economic Affairs, Roque Fernández yesterday. 
The critique about the dominant position surfaced again after Repsol launched its 
surprise all-cash offer to take full control of YPF at the end of April 1999. The Argentine 
government’s discursive strategizing was somewhat ambiguous on this topic because 
there were a number of dissident voices within the governing Justicialist Party which 
also presented the delegitimating nationalistic Competition argument topic. One of the 
dissident voices that was identified most frequently in the newspaper corpus was that of 
Alieto Guadagni, the Secretary of Industry, Trade and Mining. In the following fragment, 
he is found stating that, even though he is not hostile to Repsol’s bid, the government 
must protect freedom of competition and that he therefore asked the National Antitrust 
Commission to investigate the deal. 
[cuerpo] El secretario de Industria, Comercio y Minería, Alieto Guadagni, advirtió que 
pese a que daba la bienvenida a la oferta española, el Gobierno debe defender la 
libre competencia y ordenó una investigación a la Comisión Nacional de Defensa 
de la Competencia (CNDC) sobre los efectos de la fusión de YPF con los activos que 
Repsol tiene en el país (Astra, la cadena de estaciones de servicio EG3 y Repsol Gas, 
entre otros). (La Nación, 1999, 7 May) 
[body] The Secretary of Industry, Trade and Mining, Alieto Guadagni, warned that 
although he welcomed the Spanish bid, the government has a duty to defend free 
competition and ordered an investigation by the National Antitrust Commission 
(CNDC) about the effects of the merger between YPF and the assets Repsol has in 
Argentina (Astra, the chain of petrol stations EG3 and Repsol Gas, among others). 
The government again felt forced to react to these pressures and tried to relegitimate 
the deal by minimizing the discussion about this dominant position. In the following 
fragment, the government states that a dominant position can be perfectly legal if a 
company does not abuse its power. 
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[cuerpo] Desde el Gobierno acercan explicaciones. Dicen que una cosa es dominar 
mercado y otra abusar de ese poder. (Clarín, 1999, 9 May[a]) 
[body]The government provides explanations. They say that it is one thing to 
dominate the market and another to abuse that power. 
In the end, the government did succumb to the pressure. In June 1999, the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs issued an official statement demanding the Spanish company to make 
reasonable efforts to reduce its dominant position, mainly by divesting substantial parts 
of the companies it already controlled in the Argentine energy market (Astra, EG3, 
Pluspetrol, Repsol Gas). 
[cuerpo] El Ministerio de Economía informó, mediante un comunicado, sobre el plan de 
ventas necesario para achicar el poder de mercado que heredará la española 
Repsol si compra YPF. En la lista de desinversiones entran estaciones de servicio, 
ventas de gas natural, garrafas y refinación de crudo. (Clarín, 1999, 18 June) 
[body] The Ministry of Economic Affairs informed, by way of a release, about the necessary 
sales plan to reduce the market power inherited by the Spanish company Repsol if it 
were to buy YPF. The list of divestitures contained petrol stations, natural gas and 
gas bottle sales and crude oil refining. 
 
[cuerpo] Las desinversiones se deberán centrar en la actividad de refino, 
distribución de productos petrolíferos, de gas natural y de gas licuado de petróleo 
(GLP), según la notificación enviada por el Gobierno de Carlos Menem al grupo español. 
El Ejecutivo argentino ha considerado que el peso de Repsol, que también tiene el 
66% de Astra y el 45% de Pluspetrol, en diversas áreas energéticas iba a ser muy 
elevado, y no considera oportuno esperar a que pudiera producirse un posible 
“abuso de la posición dominante”. (Cinco Días, 1999, 18 June) 
[body] Divestitures should focus on refinery and distribution of petroleum products, 
natural gas and liquid petroleum gas (LPG), according to the notification issued by the 
government of Carlos Menem to the Spanish group. The Argentine government has 
considered that Repsol’s weight, which also owns 66% of Astra and 45% of Pluspetrol 
would be very large in different fields of the energy sector, and that it would not be 
appropriate to wait for potential “abuse of a dominant position” to take place. 
In June 1999, Repsol formally accepted the measures imposed by the Argentine Ministry 
of Economic Affairs. 
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4.3.3 Legitimating perspective: The Spanish acquiring company Repsol 
The Spanish acquiring company Repsol had big global ambitions at the end of the 20th 
century and it saw the acquisition of a controlling stake in the Argentine company YPF 
as an opportunity to work its way up the rankings of the international oil industry. The 
results of the analysis of Repsol’s discursive strategizing are similar to the findings of 
other studies in that the acquiring company is indeed found to be mobilizing a mix of 
both rationalistic and nationalistic discourse in order to gain acceptance for its decision 
to engage in this high-profile M&A-process. 
Table 17 The Spanish acquiring company Repsol’s discursive strategizing in the 1998-1999 
Repsol-YPF case 
























Inevitability (of global restructuring) 0 
Complementarity and Synergy 18 
Efficiency and Costs 6 
Size 20 
Growth 7 
Strategic decision 1 
Timing 0 
Price bid for the acquisition 4 
























Contribution to the Argentine State Treasury 0 
Confidence in Argentina 6 








The acquiring company Repsol is found presenting argument topics in 30% of the texts 
in the 1998-1999 corpus (99/330). The numbers in Table 17 show that Repsol’s discursive 
strategizing consisted of a mix of both rationalistic and nationalistic argument topics. 
The company not only emphasized the advantages the acquisition would bring to the 
company and its (financial) stakeholders (particularly Size (20/99; 20%) and 
Complementarity and Synergy (18/99; 18%)). Repsol is also found presenting a lot of 
nationalistic argument topics, in particular Competition (42/99; 42.5%), Ownership (38/99; 
38.5%) and Employment (17/99; 17%). 
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The argument topics that are found to be attributed to the acquiring company Repsol 
in the 1998-1999 newspaper accounts are very much in line with the findings of my 
earlier analysis of the M&A-related press releases Repsol issued during the acquisition 
process of YPF in 1999 (Vandenberghe, 2011). The analysis of the discourses mobilized 
through this particular corporate communication channel also revealed that the 
acquiring company presented a mix of both rationalistic and nationalistic argument 
topics to defend its decision to acquire YPF for its wide and diverse public of 
stakeholders. On the one hand, the company presented a number of rationalistic 
argument topics in order to present itself as a (financially) responsible company. These 
are most probably aimed at Repsol’s business oriented stakeholders (shareholders, 
future investors, financial analysts, etc.). On the other hand, the company also 
addressed the stakeholders in the target company’s (local/national) environment 
(future employees, politicians and the Argentine public opinion in general). The analysis 
revealed how Repsol, from the beginning, worked to avoid the image of a hostile 
takeover by making several symbolic concessions to try to assuage the (predictable and 
inevitable) hurt feelings of the target company’s stakeholders. 
 
Companies, naturally, have every interest in presenting themselves as favourably as 
possible in the information that they distribute through their corporate communication 
channels. However, there are also other influential actors, such as the media, which may 
suggest interpretations that are different from the corporate point of view, especially in 
contexts where (societal/national) feelings are likely to get hurt72. The analysis of 
Repsol’s press releases also reports evidence that, even though the acquiring company 
clearly was aware of the societal implications of the process, it may have 
underestimated the hurt (nationalistic) feelings of many Argentines as a result of its 
acquisition of YPF. At times, Repsol used its press releases to react to certain 
interpretations of its actions it deemed unfounded, particularly in relation to the 
dominant position it would achieve in the Argentine energy market. In the following 
fragment, taken from the final paragraph of a release issued on 18 June 1999, Repsol is 
found explicitly identifying the Argentine authorities and the Argentine public opinion 
as the sources of the perceived external pressures (i.c. the delegitimating nationalistic 
Competition argument topic). 
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 Several scholars have looked into the “genre chains” (Swales, 2004) constituted by news reports and the 
press releases on which they are based (see, for instance, Catenaccio, 2006; Erjavec, 2004, 2005; McLaren-
Hankin, 2007; Pander Maat, 2007; Van Hout, Pander Maat, & De Preter, 2011). 
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[nota de prensa] Repsol ha mantenido en todo momento ante las autoridades y la 
opinión pública argentina su disposición a no ejercer posiciones que se consideren 
indeseadas de dominio de mercado. (Repsol, 1999, 18 June; cited in Vandenberghe, 
2011, p. 385) 
[press release] Repsol maintained, at all times, to both the authorities and the 
Argentine public opinion, its disposition not to establish market positions that could 
be considered undesirable. 
In the following, Repsol’s discursive strategizing, as reconstructed from the newspaper 
texts, will be discussed in detail. The analysis will show that the company presented the 
rationalistic Size and Complementarity and Synergy argument topics to legitimate the deal. 
The analysis will also reveal how Repsol often mixed rationalistic argument topics with 
nationalistic argument topics. The company presented a number of symbolic 
concessions which are grouped together for the presentation of the findings under the 
legitimating Ownership argument topic. With these concessions, Repsol probably sought 
to appease the hurt feelings of the target company’s stakeholders. The analysis will also 
show how the Spanish company at times felt forced to react to other nationalistic 
pressures coming from the Argentine society. Repsol was particularly found mobilizing 
relegitimating discourse to counter the delegitimating nationalistic Competition and 
Employment argument topics. 
 
Legitimation: Size and Complementarity and Synergy 
The rationalistic Size argument topic is one of the dominant topics in the Spanish 
company’s discursive strategizing to legitimate the deal at the end of January 1999, 
when Repsol purchased the 14.9% package from the Argentine government73. 
[cuerpo] “En conjunto, las dos compañías podrían constituir la novena petrolera 
del mundo y alcanzar un tamaño similar al de la norteamericana Chevron”, explicó 
García-Perrote. (La Nación, 1999, 27 January) 
[body] “Together, the two companies could make up the ninth biggest oil company 
in the world and reach a size that is similar to the North American company 
Chevron”, stated García-Perrote [spokesperson for Repsol]. 
 
[cuerpo] Durante una visita relámpago a Buenos Aires, el presidente de Repsol, 
Alfonso Cortina, dejó bien claro que la compañía quiere apresurar los plazos para 
concretar su meta de integrar a YPF y crear la sexta petrolera del mundo. (El País, 
1999, 7 February) 
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 As the examples will show, most fragments contain a number of legitimating rationalistic argument topics. 
They are rarely found to be presented in isolation. 
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[body] During a lightning visit to Buenos Aires, Repsol’s President Alfonso Cortina left 
no doubts about the company’s intentions to speed up the process in order to obtain 
its goal of taking over YPF and creating the sixth largest oil company in the world. 
The Size argument topic was also one of the main elements in Repsol’s discursive 
strategizing to legitimate its decision to gain full control of the Argentine company at 
the end of April 1999. 
[cuerpo] Según Repsol con la absorción de YPF quedarán octavos entre las grandes 
petroleras del mundo. (Clarín, 1999, 30 April) 
[body] According to Repsol, after acquiring YPF they will be the eighth biggest oil 
company in the world. 
 
[cuerpo] Para Repsol, según su presidente, Alfonso Cortina, se trata de un momento 
histórico en el que se constituye una compañía que accede al club de los líderes 
mundiales del petróleo. (Cinco Días, 1999, 25 June[a]) 
[body] According to its President Alfonso Cortina, for Repsol this is a historic moment 
in which the company gains access to the select group of world leaders in the oil 
industry. 
Another recurring argument topic in the discursive strategizing of acquiring companies 
in many mergers and acquisitions is that the acquiring company stresses the 
complementarity or the strategic fit between the companies involved (see, for instance, 
Vaara et al., 2004, p. 14). In the following fragment, the acquiring company Repsol 
highlights the excellence of the partner by emphasizing that both companies have their 
own strengths. 
[cuerpo] YPF tiene un enorme peso en términos de exploración y producción de 
hidrocarburos, y Repsol, que quiere crecer en ese campo, es muy fuerte en 
refinación y comercialización –agregó [García-Perrote]. (La Nación, 1999, 27 January) 
[body] [García-Perrote] added: “YPF carries enormous weight in terms of exploration 
and production of hydrocarbons and Repsol, who wants to grow in that area, is very 
strong in the fields of refining and commercialization”. 
In July 1999, a few months after the YPF management had accepted Repsol’s bid, CEO 
Alfonso Cortina again talked about the complementarity of the two companies and 
praised the excellence of its partner YPF. 
[cuerpo] “La complementariedad entre ambas compañías es perfecta –dijo [Alfonso 
Cortina] el último martes, en una conferencia de prensa que dio en Buenos Aires-. 
Repsol no podía encontrar un mejor socio que YPF, e YPF no podía encontrar 
mejor socio que Repsol”. (La Nación, 1999, 18 July) 
[body] “The two companies are perfectly complementary”, [Alfonso Cortina] said last 
Tuesday during a press conference held in Buenos Aires. “Repsol could not have 
found a better partner than YPF and YPF could not have found a better partner than 
Repsol”. 
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According to the strategic management literature, strategic fit is crucial because it 
provides opportunities for greater synergies that enable companies to operate more 
efficiently (see, for instance, Chatterjee, 1986). This idea can also be observed in Repsol’s 
discursive strategizing. The company often explicitly links the complementarity of the 
two companies to the potential to reduce costs because that would make the company 
stronger and more productive. Before the integration of the two companies, these 
argument topics were presented in the form of “forward-looking statements” (Bhatia, 
2004). 
[cuerpo] En caso de alcanzar su objetivo, planearía integrar las operaciones de las 
respectivas empresas con vistas a lograr sinergias operativas [Complementarity and 
Synergy] y ahorros de costs [Efficiency and Costs]. (Cinco Días, 1999, 3 February) 
[body] If it reaches its goal, the company plans to integrate the operations of both 
companies in order to achieve operational synergies [Complementarity and Synergy] 
and cost savings [Efficiency and Costs]. 
 
[cuerpo] Para su presidente, Alfonso Cortina, “el alto nivel complementariedad de las 
compañías permitirá crear un grupo energético líder mundial [Size], con un 
balance más equilibrado entre los negocios de exploración y producción 
(upstream) y los de refino y comercialización (downstream) [Complementarity and 
Synergy]. (Cinco Días, 1999, 12 May) 
[body] According to its President Alfonso Cortina: “the high level of complementarity of 
the companies will allow us to create a global leading energy group [Size] that is 
more balanced between the business units of exploration and production (upstream) 
and those of refinery and commercialization (downstream) [Complementarity and 
Synergy]. 
After the successful completion of the takeover bid, these argument topics were 
repeated in the form of backward-looking statements, through which the company 
stated that it had become a larger company with a better balanced structure74. As such, 
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 These forward-looking and backward-looking statements were also identified in Repsol’s M&A-related press 
releases (Vandenberghe, 2011, pp. 380-381). Consider the following fragments taken from press releases issued 
on 29 April 1999 and 21 December 1999. 
[nota de prensa] La combinación de ambas empresas creará una compañía energética líder mundial [Size]. 
(Repsol, 1999, 29 April) 
[press release] Combining both companies will create a world leading energy company [Size] 
[nota de prensa] […] la complementariedad de ambas empresas [Complementarity and Synergy] y la estrategia 
seguida para su integración han dado como resultado una empresa multinacional situada entre las diez 
mayores petroleras del mundo [Size] y con amplias perspectivas de expansión en el futuro [Growth]. (Repsol, 
1999, 21 December) 
[press release] […] the complementarity of both companies [Complementarity and Synergy] and the strategy 
developed for the integration have resulted in a multinational company situated among the ten largest oil 
companies in the world [Size] and with broad prospects for future expansion [Growth]. 
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Repsol presented itself as a force to be reckoned with amongst its competitors. In the 
following fragment, Cortina presents three legitimating rationalistic argument topics: 
Size, Complementarity and Synergy, and Growth. 
[cuerpo] “Como resultado de la adquisición de YPF, Repsol ha dado un paso 
gigantesco para convertirse en una compañía mucho más grande [Size], más 
balanceada [Complementarity and Synergy] y con más capacidad de crecimiento 
[Growth]”, dijo el presidente de la petrolera con sede en Madrid, Alfonso Cortina. (La 
Nación, 1999, 25 June) 
 
[body] “As a result of the acquisition of YPF, Repsol has taken a giant step toward 
becoming a much larger [Size], more balanced company [Complementarity and 
Synergy] with more potential for growth [Growth]”, said the president of the Madrid-
based oil company, Alfonso Cortina. 
 
Legitimation: Ownership 
The fragments included under this label show how the acquiring company mobilized a 
mix of rationalistic and nationalistic discourse in order to try to gain acceptance for its 
decision to launch a bid for YPF (14.9% in January 1999, 100% in April 1999). In cross-
border mergers and acquisitions, acquiring companies are often found to make symbolic 
concessions in order to appease the (expected) hurt feelings over the loss of ownership 
in the target company’s environment. These symbolic concessions are made in an 
attempt to start forging a common corporate identity (see, for instance, Hitt & Pisano, 
2004; Søderberg, 2012). They may include the use of corporate names, the appointment 
of key managers and the location of the company headquarters. These issues are often 
highly sensitive because they define the perceived nationality of a corporate identity 
(Olie, 2005). In the media corpus, Repsol representatives are mainly found mentioning 
the key managers (especially YPF’s CEO Roberto Monti) and the location of the company 
headquarters (Madrid ánd Buenos Aires). 
 
First up is the importance of the key managers of YPF in Repsol’s attempt to appease 
the target company’s stakeholders75. During the acquisition process, Alfonso Cortina, 
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 This symbolic concession was also discussed in the analysis of Repsol’s M&A-related press releases 
(Vandenberghe, 2011, pp. 382-383). In the press release issued on 29 July, for instance, Repsol stated that it had 
chosen the most suitable people on the basis of objective criteria and added specifically that it did not only 
give these jobs to former Repsol managers. 
[nota de prensa] Uno de los objetivos prioritarios en el diseño de la nueva organización ha sido identificar a las 
personas que, por su experiencia professional y capacidad técnica, presentan el perfil más apropiado para […] 
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Repsol’s CEO, explicitly mentioned on several occasions that he wanted to keep Roberto 
Monti, YPF’s CEO, on board. For Repsol, or indeed any acquiring company, it was 
important to keep the Argentine on board because it could be seen as a powerful signal 
of cooperation. Repsol’s management had every interest in avoiding the image of a 
Spanish invasion at the top of Argentina’s most emblematic company. 
[cuerpo] También se habla de la voluntad de Cortina de convertirse en presidente de 
la nueva compañía, y de mantener a Roberto Monti, actual presidente de YPF, 
como su vicepresidente. (La Nación, 1999, 3 February) 
[body] Cortina’s intentions to become President of the new company and to keep 
Roberto Monti, the current President of YPF, on as his Vice-President, are also being 
rumoured. 
 
[cuerpo] Cuando se le preguntó qué pasará con la conducción actual de YPF, que 
resistió duramente el ingreso de Repsol, Cortina dijo: Espero que Monti (Roberto, 
actual titular) se quede en YPF, ha hecho una gran labor, pero se negó a responder 
si ofrecieron un puesto. (Clarín, 1999, 6 June) 
[body] When he was asked what would happen with YPF’s current management, 
who fiercely resisted Repsol’s entry, Cortina said: “I hope that Monti (Roberto, the 
current President) stays at YPF, he has done a great job”, but he refused to respond 
whether they had offered him a position. 
Repsol also repeatedly stated that it would prefer to continue to work with the current 
YPF management and that it would not bring in a shipload of Spanish managers. Of 
course, the Spanish company would have been primarily interested in the Argentine 
managers’ experience and knowhow of the Argentine energy sector and their network 
of contacts in the Argentine political and business circles. Repsol was particularly strong 
in the downstream segment of the oil and gas industry (the refining and marketing of oil 
products to end users and consumers) and was very keen on YPF’s experience in the 
upstream segment (the exploration and production of crude oil and natural gas). 
[cuerpo] García Perrote comentó además que la idea de Repsol es traer poca gente de 
España y mantener el management local. “Lo hicimos con Astra. Tenemos un gran 
respeto profesional por la gente de YPF, aquel que quiera permanecer en la 
compañía, y tenga algo para ofrecer, podrá hacerlo.” (La Nación, 1999, 2 May[a]) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
[…] ocupar puestos de responsabilidad en la gestión de cada uno de los negocios. Las personas designadas 
proceden tanto de YPF como de Repsol S.A. (Repsol, 1999, 29 June) 
[press release] One of the priorities in the implementation of the new organizational structure has been to identify 
those people who, thanks to their professional experience and technical abilities, have the appropriate profile to 
hold a responsible position in the management teams of each entity. The designated people come from both YPF 
and Repsol. 
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[body] García Perrote also mentioned that Repsol’s plan is to bring few people from 
Spain and to maintain local management. “We did so with Astra. We have a lot of 
professional respect for the people at YPF. The people who want to stay at the 
company and who have something to offer will be able to stay”. 
 
[cuerpo] Como adelantó La Nación, los españoles optaron por una transición sin 
traumas y decidieron mantener a Monti, hasta ayer CEO de YPF, al frente del 
negocio local. La idea es que también permanezcan en sus puestos los principales 
gerentes de la petrolera, por lo menos en el corto plazo. (La Nación, 1999, 2 July) 
[body] As anticipated by La Nación, the Spanish opted for a transition without 
trauma and decided to keep Monti, who was the CEO of YPF until yesterday, at the 
front of the local business. The idea is also to keep the main managers of the oil 
company on board, at least for the short term. 
The second symbolic concession that was frequently identified in Repsol’s discursive 
strategizing in the newspaper articles, revolved around the location of the company 
headquarters. Repsol recognized the importance of Buenos Aires for the newly 
integrated company. 
[cuerpo] Los españoles aseguraron que, si logran quedarse con el control de la 
compañía más grande del país, no cambiarán su domicilio fiscal ni retirarán su 
cotización de la Bolsa de Comercio local. (La Nación, 1999, 2 May[a]) 
[body] The Spaniards assured that, if they obtain control of the country’s largest 
company, they will not change its tax domicile nor will they withdraw its quotation 
from the local Stock Exchange. 
 
[cuerpo] Cortina ratificó que todas las empresas y activos que Repsol tiene en 
Latinoamérica serán integrados dentro de YPF, que seguirá teniendo su sede social 
en Buenos Aires y extenderá su marca y su bandera por toda la región. (Clarín, 
1999, 7 May[b]) 
[body] Cortina reconfirmed that all companies and assets owned by Repsol in Latin 
America will be integrated into YPF, which will continue to hold headquarters in 
Buenos Aires and will expand its brand and raise its flag throughout the region. 
 
Relegitimation: Competition and Employment 
The analysis of Repsol’s discursive strategizing not only reveals how the acquiring 
company mobilized a mix of both rationalistic and nationalistic discourse. The findings 
also show how Repsol felt compelled to react to some intense (societal/nationalistic) 
pressures coming from the Argentine society. The Spanish company was particularly 
found mobilizing relegitimating discourse to counter the delegitimating nationalistic 
Competition and Employment argument topics. 
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First, the Competition argument topic. The Argentine concern with the dominant 
position Repsol would achieve in the Argentine energy market is one of the major 
themes in the newspaper articles (particularly in the Argentine subcorpus). The Spanish 
company was found reacting to this external pressure after it had launched the all-cash 
offer at the end of April 1999. From that moment, Repsol incorporated relegitimating 
discourse in its discursive strategizing in order to refute the criticism of its alleged 
dominant position. This relegitimation is also a dominant issue in the press releases 
Repsol issued during the acquisition process. In the analysis of the acquiring company’s 
M&A-related press releases, this was labelled Repsol’s “appeasing antitrust narrative” 
(Vandenberghe, 2011). 
 
In the following fragments, Repsol tries to relegitimate its decision by stressing that 
it never had the intention to achieve a dominant position in the Argentine energy 
market and that it would divest some of its Argentine assets to keep the playing field 
level. Interestingly, the authors of these texts explicitly describe the Spanish company 
as reacting to these external pressures: se defendió de las críticas (in defence against 
criticism), por las dudas (just to make sure), ante las críticas (in response to criticism). 
[cuerpo] Desde Madrid, Cortina se defendió de las críticas por el poder que tendrán 
los españoles en el mercado tras la absorción de YPF. Aseguró que el propósito de 
Repsol no es alcanzar posiciones de dominio en la Argentina. (Clarín, 1999, 8 May) 
[body] From Madrid, Cortina spoke out in defence against criticism regarding the 
power the Spanish will have in the market after acquiring YPF. He ensured that it is 
not Repsol’s goal to dominate in Argentina. 
 
[cuerpo] Por las dudas, Alfonso Cortina ya le aseguró por escrito al ministro Roque 
Fernández que si Repsol concreta la adquisición de YPF, venderá una refinería y 
800 puestos de gasolina justamente para “no alcanzar posiciones de dominio” en 
el mercado argentino. (Cinco Días, 1999, 10 May) 
[body] Just to make sure, Alfonso Cortina confirmed in writing to Minister Roque 
Fernández that, if Repsol acquires YPF, it will sell a refinery and 800 petrol stations 
in order to “avoid “dominating” the Argentine market. 
 
[cuerpo] Poco después del anuncio de su oferta de US$ 13.439 millones por el 
85,01% de YPF, y ante las críticas por la posición dominante que tendría en el 
mercado, Repsol dijo que vendería activos para cumplir con la legislación 
argentina. (La Nación, 1999, 12 May[a]) 
[body] Shortly after announcing its bid for USD 13.439 billion to acquire 85.01% of 
YPF and in response to criticism regarding the dominant position it would obtain in 
the market, Repsol announced that it would sell assets in order to comply with 
Argentine legislation. 
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[cuerpo] “El propósito de Repsol no es alcanzar posiciones de dominio en el 
mercado argentino”, dijo hace unos días el presidente de la petrolera, Alfonso Cortina, 
en una carta que envió al ministro de Economía, Roque Fernández. Ante las críticas 
de empresarios y economistas por la anunciada integración de YPF con Astra y 
Pluspetrol, el ejecutivo aseguró que la compañía vendería o intercambiaría activos 
equivalentes a los de la petrolera que pertenecía a los Grüneisen [Astra]. (La 
Nación, 14 May) 
[body] “It is not Repsol’s goal to dominate the Argentine market”, said the President of 
the oil company, Alfonso Cortina a couple of days ago in a letter he sent to the Minister 
of Economic Affairs, Roque Fernández. In response to criticism from businessmen and 
economists regarding the merger of YPF with Astra and Pluspetrol, the executive 
assured that the company would sell or exchange assets equivalent to the 
Grüneisen’s oil company [Astra]. 
In the following fragment, taken from a lengthy article based on an interview, Alfonso 
Cortina explicitly rejects the criticism of the company’s alleged monopoly position. In 
the fragment, he points out that Repsol is well aware of the fact that monopolies are no 
longer sustainable and that the company considers it self-evident that an agreement 
should be reached with the Argentine government. He also indicates that the company 
is in negotiations with the government to settle the issue. The title of the article is a 
quote taken from the interview. The quote nicely sums up the relegitimating 
component of Repsol’s discursive strategizing: YPF no es ni será un monopolio (YPF does 
not have a monopoly and it never will). 
[cuerpo] -Es que nosotros nunca hemos pensado esta operación (la compra del 
100% de YPF) como un sistema para alcanzar posiciones monopolísticas. Creo que 
el crecer yendo a posiciones monopolísticas está fuera de contexto, porque hoy en 
día nadie puede pensar en ejercer esas posiciones monopolísticas. Nosotros ya 
estamos en conversaciones con el Gobierno para limitar nuestra presencia en las 
áreas más conflictivas en relación a que puedan constituirse posiciones 
dominantes de mercado. (Clarín, 1999, 13 June[e]) 
[body] We have never considered this operation (the acquisition of 100% of YPF) as a 
system to obtain a monopolistic position. I think that growing towards monopolistic 
positions is taken out of context, as nowadays nobody can think about exercising 
monopolistic positions. We are already having talks with the government to limit 
our presence in those areas that are most conflictive because dominant market 
positions can be obtained. 
Eventually, on 18 June 1999, Repsol officially declared that it would comply with the 
Argentine government’s demands to divest some of its Argentine assets. The 
communication was spread through several channels, including a press release entitled 
Repsol acepta las peticiones del Ministerio de Economía argentine en materia de defensa de la 
competencia (Repsol accepts the Argentine Ministry of Economic Affair’s requests 
regarding antitrust) (see also Vandenberghe, 2011). 
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[cuerpo] La petrolera Repsol informó ayer a la Comisión Nacional del Mercado de 
Valores de España que aceptó desprenderse de algunos activos, como le solicitó el 
gobierno argentino, para evitar la conformación de una posición dominante en el 
mercado local de hidrocarburos, tras la compra de YPF. (La Nación, 1999, 19 
June[a]) 
[body] Yesterday the oil company Repsol informed the Spanish National Stock Exchange 
Commission that it would accept to sell off some of its assets, as requested by the 
Argentine government, in order to avoid obtaining a dominant position on the local 
hydrocarbon market after acquiring YPF. 
 
[cuerpo] El grupo petrolero Repsol ha aceptado las peticiones del Ministerio de 
Economía de Argentina en materia de Defensa de la Competencia a raíz de la 
próxima toma de control de hasta el 100% del capital de YPF a través de una OPA. 
(Cinco Días, 1999, 21 June) 
[body] The oil group Repsol has accepted the requests from the Argentine 
Ministry of Economic Affairs regarding antitrust as a result of the upcoming 
acquisition of up to 100% of YPF’s capital through a takeover bid. 
The second delegitimating nationalistic argument topic that Repsol felt compelled to 
react to was the Employment argument topic. The relegitimating discourse regarding the 
loss of YPF jobs is also found mainly after Repsol’s all-cash offer. It is common 
knowledge that mergers and acquisitions often lead to drastic changes in organizational 
structures and processes. Employees often fear that the new management will announce 
massive layoffs, particularly at the newly acquired company (see, for instance, Vakola, 
Armenakis, & Oreg, 2013). 
 
In the following two fragments, the journalist authors refer to a public statement 
made by Alfonso Cortina with which he attempted to appease the YPF stakeholders (the 
employees in particular, but also the general public opinion). The CEO of Repsol had 
declared that the company would continue to need all of YPF’s managerial and technical 
abilities in the future. In the first fragment, the Clarín journalist explicitly describes 
Cortina’s intervention as a reaction to the presentation of the delegitimating 
nationalistic Employment argument topic discursive strategizing by adding that he made 
this statement “in order to allay fears of layoffs as a result of YPF’s absorption”. In the 
second fragment, the La Nación journalist introduces a contrast (si bien; although) 
between Cortina’s relegitimating statement and the way it was interpreted by the 
people at YPF. 
[cuerpo] Para espantar temores de despidos por la absorción de YPF, Cortina dijo 
ayer que necesitará de todas las capacidades técnicas y gerenciales. (Clarín, 1999, 
25 June[b]) 
[body] In order to allay fears of layoffs as a result of YPF’s absorption, Cortina said 
yesterday that he will need all technical and managerial capabilities. 
  203 
 
[cuerpo] Si bien el presidente de Repsol, Alfonso Cortina, dijo que “la empresa va a 
necesitar todas las capacidades gerenciales y técnicas que existen en las actuales 
companies”, la anunciada integración de las operaciones de YPF con las de Astra y 
EG3 provocará una superposición de funciones que, dicen en los pasillos del edificio de 
Diagonal Norte, llevará a un inevitable ajuste. (La Nación, 1999, 28 June) 
[body] Although the President of Repsol, Alfonso Cortina, has said that “the company will 
need all current technical and managerial capabilities in the existing companies”, 
the integration that has been announced between YPF’s, Astra’s and EG3’s 
operations will cause an overlapping of positions. According to rumours in the building 
on Diagonal Norte [YPF headquarters], this will inevitably lead to staff reductions. 
It is nevertheless important to stress that, contrary to expectations and even though 
Repsol was indeed found reacting to the delegitimating nationalistic Employment 
argument topic, the public discussion of the potential layoffs at YPF was definitely given 
less attention in the newspaper articles than the delegitimating nationalistic Competition 
argument topic and the space Repsol was given in the newspapers to react to these 
antitrust criticisms. In any case, the voice of the YPF employees was mostly left out of 
the media discussion (see also section 4.4.3.3). This finding can be taken as proof of the 
point made by several studies that non-elite social actors find it more difficult to get 
access to the media and get their voices heard loudly (see, for instance, Davis, 2000; 
Manning, 2001). 
4.3.4 Delegitimating perspective: The Argentine target company YPF 
When the Argentine state decided to sell its remaining shares in YPF in 1998, the state 
still owned 20.3% of the company. It also held the so-called golden share, giving it the 
power to outvote all other shares in certain specific circumstances (such as hostile 
takeover bids). The largest local shareholder of YPF was the Argentine energy 
conglomerate Perez Companc, holding 2.5% of the company76. The average shareholders 
are typically not directly involved in the day-to-day operations of the company. At the 
time of the privatization plans and Repsol’s subsequent acquisition of YPF, Roberto 
Monti was the Argentine company’s CEO and, as such, in charge of the overall 
management. 
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 As a result of earlier privatizations, the YPF shares were held by over 140,000 different shareholders. About 
50% of the shares were held by 80 different North-American investment funds. Some of these funds were 
among the largest shareholders of YPF (Brandes Investment Partners, Templeton, Franklin Resources, Merril 
Lynch and Scudder Kemper) (Clarín, 1999, 17 January). 
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Table 18 The target company YPF’s discursive strategizing in the 1998-1999 Repsol-YPF 
case 
























Inevitability (of global restructuring) 1 
Complementarity and Synergy 0 
Efficiency and Costs 0 
Size 2 
Growth 0 
Strategic decision 0 
Timing 1 
Price bid for the acquisition 10 
























Contribution to the Argentine State Treasury 0 
Confidence in Argentina 0 








The target company YPF, one of the most prominent opponents of the deal, is found 
presenting argument topics in 15% of the texts in the 1998-1999 corpus (50/330). Table 
18 reveals that YPF mainly mobilized nationalistic discourse in its attempts to, first, 
delegitimate the government’s decision to sell its remaining shares and, later, to 
delegitimate Repsol’s surprise all-cash offer for the entire company. This finding is in 
line with the results of earlier studies looking into the discursive strategizing of 
opponents in cross-border M&A-processes. YPF representatives were mainly found 
presenting the Ownership argument topic (41/50; 82%). 
 
The following sections will provide a detailed analysis of YPF’s discursive 
strategizing. The analysis will show that the target company took a drastic and sudden 
turn in its delegitimating strategy when, after months of stern opposition, the YPF 
management realized that it could no longer withstand the pressure. 
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Delegitimation: Ownership 
The analysis reveals that, from the beginning, the target company’s discursive 
strategizing mainly revolved around one delegitimating nationalistic argument topic: 
Ownership. Indeed, the Argentine company firmly opposed the Argentine government’s 
decision to sell its remaining shares. Both the YPF management and the company’s 
largest shareholders were afraid that the sale would significantly and irrevocably alter 
the existing power balance. 
[título] Directivos e inversores de la mayor compañía argentina se unen para evitar que 
la empresa española compre el 14,9% de los títulos. (El País, 1998, 15 November) 
[headline] Directors and investors at the biggest Argentine company join forces to prevent 
the Spanish company from buying 14.9% of the shares. 
Changing the power balance within the company may not only have consequences for 
the shareholders who may be mostly interested in a high return on investment. The YPF 
management also presented a much more specifically (societal-)nationalistic 
argumentation to delegitimate this potential organizational change. On several 
occasions, the YPF management warned against the possibility that, as a result of the 
privatization, the Argentine company’s most powerful shareholder could well be a 
foreign company. This could potentially have important consequences, as the new owner 
of the controlling majority could in theory decide to move the company headquarters to 
another country. This would mean that YPF would no longer pay taxes in Argentina. 
[cuerpo] El directorio (consejo de administración) y el presidente Roberto Monti se han 
mostrado hostiles a esta colocación y especialmente si el ganador podía ser una 
empresa extranjera. (Cinco Días, 20 January) 
[body] The Board of Directors and the President Roberto Monti have shown hostility 
towards this tender and particularly if the winner could be a foreign company. 
 
[cuerpo] Y en los últimos días [Roberto Monti] disparó contra la posibilidad de que, al 
pasar a manos de una multinacional, YPF cambiara de domicilio fiscal y dejara de 
aportar al fisco. (La Nación, 1999, 21 January[b]) 
[body] And over the last days, [Roberto Monti] warned about the possibility of YPF 
changing its tax domicile upon being absorbed by a multinational, as a result of 
which the company would stop paying taxes in Argentina. 
After Repsol’s all-cash offer for the remaining 85.1% of the shares at the end of April 
1999, it became increasingly difficult for Roberto Monti to continue to generate enough 
shareholder support for maintaining the hard line against the Spanish company. Repsol 
was willing to pay $44.78 per share, a price well above YPF’s all-time high stock price. 
Given the international crisis in the oil sector, with world oil prices dropping sharply 
again, the shareholders preferred to play it safe and became increasingly tempted to 
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accept Repsol’s offer. One of the journalists writing for the Spanish newspaper Cinco 
Días describes it like this: 
[cuerpo] Hasta hoy [Roberto Monti] ha evitado las intenciones de la firma española, 
pero tiene muy difícil convencer al consejo que declare hostil y recomiende a los 
accionistas no acudir a la generosa oferta. (Cinco Días, 1999, 3 May[d]) 
[body] So far, [Roberto Monti] has been able to avoid the intentions of the Spanish 
company, but it is becoming increasingly difficult for him to convince the Board to 
declare the takeover attempt hostile and recommend shareholders to reject the 
generous offer. 
 
Legitimation: Price bid, Size, Inevitability 
After one final delaying tactic (hiring Credit Suisse First Boston to provide a fairness 
opinion about Repsol’s offer77) the YPF management’s discursive strategizing took a 
sudden turn. Monti had to accept that he had lost his battle with Repsol. After months 
of mobilizing delegitimating discourse to prevent the Spanish company, or indeed any 
other foreign company, from purchasing YPF, he could only announce that Repsol’s 
offer was a reasonable one under the market conditions of that time (legitimating 
rationalistic Price bid for the acquisition argument topic). According to the Spanish 
newspaper Cinco Días, he even assured that he would not hinder the operation. 
[cuerpo] Roberto Monti, presidente de YPF, ha asegurado que la OPA anunciada por 
Repsol por el 85,01% de la petrolera argentina “no puede mejorarse”. En sus 
declaraciones, el directivo argentino daba por hecho que la empresa española 
podrá tomar el control de YPF, y aseguró, asimismo, que no iba a obstaculizar la 
operación. (Cinco Días, 1999, 6 May) 
[body] The President of YPF, Roberto Monti, has assured that the takeover bid presented 
by Repsol for 85.01% of the oil company “cannot be improved”. In its declarations, 
the Argentine Board confirmed that the Spanish company can take control of YPF 
and he even assured that he would not obstruct the operation. 
Around that time, Roberto Monti also made a brief statement which was picked up by 
three of the four newspapers in the 1998-1999 corpus. The statement containes a 
peculiar mix of nationalistic and rationalistic discourse. On the one hand, the CEO of 
YPF laments the loss of YPF’s independence which “saddens us all” (delegitimating 
nationalistic Ownership argument topic). On the other hand, Roberto Monti also states 
that everybody should “be happy” because Repsol’s offer can also be seen as a 
 
                                                     
77
 A fairness opinion is “a professional opinion provided by a third party, typically an investment bank, on 
whether the price offered in an acquisition, merget, etc. is fair” (OED Online, 2014). 
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recognition of the importance of YPF. He also recognizes that the two companies 
together will come to form one of the largest oil companies in the world (legitimating 
rationalistic Size argument topic). Moreover, in the Clarín fragment, the CEO is also 
found recognizing the consequences of doing business in a global economy, saying that 
the company accepts not only the advantages, but also the consequences of the 
company’s expansion into an international market (legitimating rationalistic 
Inevitability (of global restructuring) argument topic). 
[cuerpo] Monti apuntó un dato sobre el porvenir de la petrolera con sede en la 
Argentina. YPF perderá su independencia. Eso nos pone tristes, sostuvo muy cauto 
en cada una de sus expresiones. Como actuamos en un mercado abierto e 
internacionalizado, aceptamos sus ventajas y también las consecuencias de esa 
inserción, dijo sobre la oferta de toma de control. (Clarín, 1999, 5 May[b]) 
[body] Monti highlighted one item about the future of the oil company that is 
headquartered in Argentina. YPF will lose its independence. “This saddens us all”, he 
said very cautiously in all of his declarations. Considering ours is an open and 
internationalized market, we accept the advantages and the consequences of that 
insertion, he said about the takeover bid. 
 
[cuerpo] Roberto Monti, uno de los “duros” del mercado petrolero local, se permitió 
un momento de melancolía. “Nos sentimos muy contentos y muy tristes. Contentos 
porque hemos logrado la inserción internacional de YPF y su reputación como la 
mejor petrolera de América Latina –dijo el presidente de la compañía-. Y tristes 
porque, sin tener nada contra Repsol, vamos a extrañar la independencia de YPF”. 
(La Nación, 1999, 5 May[a]) 
[body] Roberto Monti, one of the “hardliners” on the local oil market, allowed himself a 
moment of melancholy: “We feel both very happy and very sad. Happy because we’ve 
achieved the international insertion of YPF and its reputation as the best oil 
company in Latin America”, said the company’s President. “And sad because, 
although we have nothing against Repsol, we will miss YPF’s independence”. 
 
[cuerpo] “Estamos contentos y tristes al mismo tiempo”, añadió [Roberto Monti]. La 
alegría de Monti se basa en el reconocimiento de la importancia de YPF, contenido 
en la oferta de Repsol. Por el contrario, la tristeza se debe a la pérdida de la 
independencia. (Cinco Días, 1999, 6 May) 
[body] [Roberto Monti] added: “We are happy and sad at the same time”. Monti’s joy is 
based on the acknowledgment of YPF’s importance, contained by Repsol’s bid. On 
the other hand, his sadness is due to the loss of independence. 
The way in which Roberto Monti mobilizes a mix of both rationalistic and nationalistic 
discourse when he finally announced that he would no longer resist Repsol’s attempts 
to acquire the Argentine company nicely illustrates the difficult balancing act of 
combining global vision with local pressures (see also Levy & Newell, 2006; Meyer, 
Mudambi, & Narula, 2011; Prahalad & Doz, 1987). 
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4.3.5 Delegitimating perspective: The Argentine political opposition 
The Argentine government’s decision to sell its remaining shares was met with fierce 
opposition from its political rivals. At the time, the main opposition party in Argentina 
was the Alianza party78, a centre-left electoral coalition formed in 1997 between the 
UCR79 and the FrePaSo80 to break the hegemony of President Menem’s Partido Justicialista 
(Justicialist Party). 
Table 19 The Argentine political opposition’s discursive strategizing in the 1998-1999 
Repsol-YPF case 

























Inevitability (of global restructuring) 0 
Complementarity and Synergy 0 
Efficiency and Costs 0 
Size 0 
Growth 0 
Strategic decision 0 
Timing 4 
Price bid for the acquisition 0 























Contribution to the Argentine State 
Treasury 
2 
Confidence in Argentina 0 








The Argentine political opposition is found presenting argument topics in 9% of the 
texts in the 1998-1999 corpus (30/330). The numbers in Table 19 show that the 
Argentine political opposition’s discursive strategizing mainly revolved around the 
nationalistic Competition (18/30; 60%) and Ownership (17/30; 56.5%) argument topics. 
 
                                                     
78
 Alianza para el Trabajo, la Justicia y la Educación (Alliance for Work, Justice and Education). 
79
 Unión Cívica Radical (Radical Civic Union). 
80
 Frente por un País Solidario (Front for a Country in Solidarity). 
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Again, this is in line with the findings of earlier studies into the discursive strategizing 
of opponents of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. 
 
In the following, the discursive strategizing deployed by the Argentine political 
opposition will be discussed in detail. The analysis will reveal that, as was expected, the 
two dominant nationalistic argument topics Competition and Ownership were presented 
to delegitimate the privatization and acquisition of YPF. The Argentine political 
opposition’s discursive strategizing was in fact exclusively delegitimating. 
 
Delegitimation: Ownership 
A close reading of the fragments coded as nationalistic Ownership argument topic reveals 
that the Argentine political opposition was most concerned about the shares of 
Argentina’s most important company ending up in the hands of a foreign company. In 
November 1998, for instance, Jorge Rivas (FrePaSo) introduced a draft bill to put the sale 
on hold. The document was signed by representatives of both the FrePaSo and the UCR 
party, and by one representative of the Justicialist Party (Sergio Acevedo) (La Nación, 
1998, 20 November). The following fragment contains three (societal-)nationalistic 
concerns that were raised in the document and commented upon by Jorge Rivas. These 
three issues are grouped under the nationalistic Ownership argument topic. First, 
petroleum is too important as a strategic commodity for any nation to just hand it over 
to a foreign company. Second, a foreign company could easily move the company 
headquarters to another country. And third, when contemplating making large 
investments, a foreign multinational company would place its own multi-national 
strategy above the national interests of one particular nation. 
[cuerpo] “En la economía mundial sigue siendo muy importante el control por 
parte del Estado Nacional, aunque sea relativo, de las grandes empresas 
extractivas, sobre todo las vinculadas al petróleo”, puede leerse en el documento. 
El diputado también manifestó su preocupación por el traspaso del control de YPF a 
una compañía extranjera, ya que permitiría, por ejemplo, el traslado del domicilio 
de la petrolera a otro país. 
“No es lo mismo que las grandes decisiones de inversión de la empresa sean 
tomadas por una multinacional, que subordinará los intereses del país a los de su 
estrategia a nivel internacional”, explicó a La Nación [...]. (La Nación, 1998, 20 
November) 
[body] “Albeit relative, State control of the big extractive companies, especially 
those linked to oil, is still very important in the global economy”, said the document. 
The congressman also expressed his concern about handing over the control of YPF to a 
foreign company as it would allow, for example, the domicile to be moved to 
another country. 
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“It’s different when the big investment decisions of a company are taken by a 
multinational, which will subordinate the interests of the country to those of its 
international strategy”, he explained to La Nación [...]. 
The opposition described the sale of the state’s remaining shares as the (total) 
denationalization of a good running semi-privatized company. The main concern was that 
the sale would mean that YPF would become nothing more than a subsidiary of a 
foreign holding company which would follow the national strategy of another nation. 
[cuerpo] De paso [Daniel Montamat (UCR)] sospechó de […] la insistencia en ofrecer el 
control de YPF a una petrolera extranjera. Hablamos de desnacionalización 
porque, así, YPF será sólo un apéndice de un holding que seguirá la estrategia de 
otro país. (Clarín, 1998, 5 December) 
[body] [Daniel Montamat (UCR)] was also suspicious of the insistence in handing over 
the control of YPF to a foreign oil company. We speak of denationalization because 
YPF would become just an appendix to a holding that will follow the strategy of 
another country. 
 
[cuerpo] Para el candidato presidencial de la oposición, Fernando de la Rúa, se pretende 
la desnacionalización total de la compañía, según dijo ayer en un acto de campaña. 
(Clarín, 1999, 2 May[c]) 
[body] During a campaign act yesterday, the opposition’s presidential candidate, 
Fernando de la Rúa, said that the goal is to completely denationalize the company. 
 
[cuerpo] Consultado sobre la futura venta del 5,4% de las acciones de YPF que 
todavía están en manos del Estado, [Fernando de la Rúa] dijo que “es toda una 
orientación política que lleva a la desnacionalización de una empresa que andaba 
bien y que daba ganancias, aún privatizada”. (La Nación, 1999, 4 May[a]) 
[body] When asked about the future sale of 5.4% of the YPF shares that are still in 
hands of the state, [Fernando de la Rúa] said that “there are politics at play here that 
lead to the denationalization of a company that was doing well and turning a profit, 
even though it was privatized”. 
Again, what was particularly important for the opposition were the national strategic 
interests. It was crucial for the opposition that the Argentine state would retain the so-
called golden share so that the government would have the power to veto any crucial 
decision that would go against the nation’s general interests. 
[cuerpo] “Creo que el Gobierno debe aclarar muy bien que no va a vender la acción 
de oro, que garantiza que YPF siga teniendo el nombre y el domicilio acá”, agregó 
[Fernando de la Rúa]. (La Nación, 1999, 4 May[a]) 
[body] “I think the government should clarify that it will not sell the golden share, 
which guarantees that YPF will continue to keep its name and domicile here”, 
[Fernando de la Rúa] added. 
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The nationalistic Ownership argument topic is also where the typically Argentine deep 
emotional connection to the oil company surfaces in the Argentine opposition’s 
discursive strategizing as reconstructed from the 1998-1999 newspaper articles. In the 
following fragment, Jorge Lapeña (UCR), one of the Alianza party’s energy specialists, 
states that even retaining the golden share would not make up for the loss of national 
control over a company that had meant so much to so many people over the years (see 
also section 2.2.2). He even describes YPF’s oil extracting activities as the symbol of the 
progress Argentina had made. 
[cuerpo] El Estado sólo se queda con lo que se llama la acción de oro. […] Permite 
sólo que la empresa no cambie de país y pague impuestos en otro. O que no cambie 
de nombre. Y también para autorizar o no la compra de la mitad más uno de las 
acciones por parte de un solo propietario. No parece mucho control sobre una 
empresa que cobijó a más de sesenta mil familias y para una actividad que fue 
símbolo del progreso en la Argentina. [Jorge Lapeña, UCR] (Clarín, 1999, 9 May[b]) 
[body] The state will only keep the so-called golden share. [...] This only stops the 
country from moving to another country and paying taxes there. Or changing its 
name. And also to authorize or forbid the sale of half plus one of the shares by a sole 
proprietor. That does not seem to be much control over a company that has 
harboured more than sixty thousand families, and over an activity that has been the 
symbol of progress in Argentina. [Jorge Lapeña, UCR] 
 
Delegitimation: Competition 
The second issue that was considered highly problematic by the Argentine political 
opposition was the effect the sale of the state’s shares would have on the Argentine 
energy market. The delegitimating nationalistic Competition argument topic is found in 
the opposition’s discursive strategizing from the very beginning of the acquisition 
process (that is, even before the sale of the 14.9% package). 
[cuerpo] Para Jorge Lapeña de la UCR, [...] la concentración será fabulosa. (Clarín, 
1998, 21 December) 
[body] According to Jorge Lapeña of the UCR, [...] the concentration will be tremendous. 
 
[cuerpo] Jorge Lapeña, uno de los referentes energéticos de la Alianza, advirtió sobre los 
peligros de que una multinacional pase a controlar a la principal compañía del 
sector energético local, que domina tanto en la exploración y explotación de 
hidrocarburos como en la refinación y comercialización de combustibles. (La 
Nación, 1999, 7 January) 
[body] Jorge Lapeña, one of the energy experts of la Alianza, warned about the dangers of 
having a multinational control the main company in the local energy sector, 
especially when that company dominates exploration and exploitation of 
hydrocarbons as well as refinery and commercialization of fuels. 
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Before the sale of the 14.9% package, the Argentine opposition already denounced that 
the Argentine legislation was not prepared for the arrival of an important international 
player in the Argentine energy market. Jorge Lapeña, for instance, emphasized that the 
existing antitrust law should be rewritten and strengthened. 
[cuerpo] “Se va a introducir en el mercado a un gran jugador internacional sin una 
nueva ley de hidrocarburos y con una ley de defensa de la competencia 
absolutamente inoperante. Me parece una irresponsabilidad absoluta.” [Jorge 
Lapeña, UCR] (La Nación, 1999, 7 January) 
[body] “A big international player will be introduced into the market without 
creating a new hydrocarbon law and with a totally ineffective antitrust law in place. 
To me, that is completely irresponsible”. [Jorge Lapeña, UCR] 
After Repsol’s all-cash offer, this problem became increasingly apparent. On several 
occasions, the Argentine opposition is found stating that the privatization of YPF was 
badly executed and that it could pave the way for an oligopolistic or monopolistic 
Argentine energy market. 
[cuerpo] En tanto, Rafael Flores (Frepaso-Santa Cruz) sostuvo que “el Congreso ya no 
puede hacer nada, porque el justicialismo ya privatizó y mal a la empresa YPF”. 
Dijo que el traspaso de la empresa estatal a manos privadas se hizo “por paquetes y 
ello dejó abierta la posibilidad para la conformación de lo que hoy asistimos: un 
oligopolio”. (La Nación, 1999, 3 May[b]) 
[body] Meanwhile, Rafael Flores (Frepaso-Santa Cruz) sustained that “It is too late for 
Congress to do anything about it, as the Justicialist Party has already privatized YPF, 
and it has not done a good job”. He said that the transfer of the state company into 
private hands was done “in packages which leaves open the door to the formation of 
what we are seeing today: an oligopoly”. 
 
[cuerpo] “Está bien que Repsol traiga capitales –aseguró León [Luis León, UCR]-, pero 
no podemos permitir que quieran hacer un nítido monopolio.” (La Nación, 1999, 
24 June[b]) 
[body] “It’s all good and well that Repsol will bring capital – said León [Luis León, 
UCR]– but we cannot allow them to create a clear monopoly.” 
Eventually, the opposition found support to modify the existing law with some dissident 
members of the governing Justicialist Party (see also section 4.3.2). 
[cuerpo] Diputados de la Alianza y del PJ reclamaron la sanción de una ley 
antimonopolio para evitar la concentración del mercado petrolero en una sola 
mano. (La Nación, 1999, 3 May[b]) 
[body] Representatives of la Alianza and the Justicialist Party demanded the creation of an 
antitrust law to avoid the concentration of the oil market in a single hand. 
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[cuerpo] El diputado de la Alianza, Pablo Baylac, dijo, en tanto, que había consenso 
entre los diferentes partidos para aprobar la iniciativa, puesto que “las inversiones 
como las de Repsol requieren una ley antimonopolio moderna y adecuada a estos 
tiempos de fusiones”. (La Nación, 1999, 7 May) 
[body] Meanwhile, Pablo Baylac, representative of la Alianza said that there was a 
consensus between the parties to approve the initiative, as “investments like that of 
Repsol require a modern antitrust law, adapted to these times of mergers”. 
At the end of June 1999, the bill that would reform Argentina’s Antitrust law was 
unanimously approved by the Argentine Senate. On 16 September 1999 the new 
antitrust law was enacted (25.156: Ley de Defensa de la Competencia81). 
4.3.6 Conclusion 
The analysis of the discursive strategizing of the four most prominent social actors in 
the 1998-1999 corpus further develops and extends the findings of earlier studies 
investigating discursive strategizing in the context of cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions (see particularly Hellgren et al., 2002; Tienari et al., 2003). First, the findings 
clearly show that (i) the opponents mainly mobilized nationalistic discourse to 
delegitimate the deal and (ii) that one of the proponents also mobilized a mix of both 
discourses to legitimate the deal (i.c. Repsol). Second, the analysis also extends the 
findings of earlier studies because it was found that the special role of the Argentine 
government as the front runner in this acquisition after privatization was also reflected 
in its discursive strategizing. As one of the main proponents of the deal, the Argentine 
government did not present a mix of both discourses. Instead, the government drew 
mainly on nationalistic discourse to legitimate the deal. Third, the analysis also shed 
more light on the ways in which the proponents of the deal mobilized relegitimating 
discourse in their attempts to counter the delegitimating argument topics presented by 
the opponents. In the following, the findings of the analysis will be presented by 
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 See http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/60000-64999/60016/texact.htm [accessed on 16 
May 2014]. 
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RQ1: How do social actors deploy discursive strategizing to legitimate or delegitimate 
this cross-border acquisition after privatization? 
The discursive strategizing of the opponents of the deal are most stable in that the 
analysis revealed that these social actors almost exclusively mobilized delegitimating 
nationalistic discourse. The YPF management mainly presented the delegitimating 
nationalistic Ownership argument topic, whereas the Argentine political opposition 
mainly presented the delegetimating nationalistic Ownership and Competition argument 
topics. However, when the CEO of YPF finally declared that the management would no 
longer resist the acquisition, he tried to legitimate this decision by presenting a peculiar 
mix of both rationalistic and nationalistic discourse. In one and the same statement, he 
was found presenting the nationalistic Ownership argument topic together with the 
rationalistic argument topics Size and Inevitability. 
 
The discursive strategizing of the proponents of the deal was found to be much more 
complex. Moreover, the analysis also revealed that there are significant differences 
between the discursive strategizing of the acquiring company Repsol and the Argentine 
government. First, the analysis of the Argentine government’s discursive strategizing 
proved that this social actor plays a special role in acquisitions after privatization. 
Whereas earlier studies have found that proponents often mobilize a mix of rationalistic 
and nationalistic discourse, this study found that the Argentine government mainly 
presented the legitimating nationalistic Contribution to the Argentine State Treasury 
argument topic. The government sought to maximize the revenue from the 
privatization and tried to legitimate this decision by pointing out that Argentina and its 
people would benefit from it. Second, the findings also show that Repsol’s discursive 
strategizing unfolded along the lines of the findings of earlier studies in that the 
analysis clearly showed how the Spanish company presented a mix of both rationalistic 
and nationalistic discourse in order to gain acceptance for its decision. The Spanish 
company predominantly presented the legitimating rationalistic Size and 
Complementarity and Synergy argument topics alongside a number of symbolic 
concessions that were coded under the label of the legitimating nationalistic Ownership 
argument topic. These symbolic concessions mainly addressed the issues of key 
management positions and the location of the company headquarters. 
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RQ2: How do social actors respond to the discursive attacks launched by other social 
actors (relegitimation)? 
This is a second aspect with which the analysis sought to extend the findings of earlier 
studies looking into the discursive strategizing in the context of cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions. The analysis also paid attention to the relegitimating efforts of the two 
prominent proponents in response to the delegitimating discursive strategizing 
deployed by the opponents of the deal. This extension allows for a deeper and more 
detailed understanding of the discursive strategizing in cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions. In this case study, the two proponents that were singled out for the 
analysis were found reacting to delegitimating argument topics presented by their 
opponents. 
 
The analysis revealed that the Argentine government reacted to the delegitimating 
nationalistic argument topics Contribution to the Argentine State Treasury and Competition. 
The government was found reacting to the first delegitimating argument topic by 
denying that the money would be used to ease the Argentine budget crisis. The second 
delegitimating argument topic was countered, first, by stating that the government 
would take precautions to prevent that any company would take a dominant position in 
Argentina and, later, by officially demanding Repsol to make reasonable efforts to 
reduce its dominant position in the Argentine energy market. 
 
The analysis also showed that the Spanish acquiring company felt forced to react to 
some intense (societal/nationalistic) pressures coming from the Argentine society. 
Repsol particularly responded to the delegitimating nationalistic argument topics 
Competition and Employment. The company was found countering the first delegitimating 
argument topic by stating that it never had the intention to achieve a dominant position 
and that it was prepared to divest some of its Argentine assets. With regard to the 
second delegitimating argument topic, the company did not deny that the acquisition 
could lead to layoffs. However, the company did react to the employment concerns 
emanating from the Argentine society by specifying that the company would continue 
to need all of YPF’s managerial and technical abilities. In the newspaper articles, the 
journalist authors often made it very clear that the company was reacting to external 
pressures by introducing these relegitimating statements into their texts with 
constructions such as ante las críticas (in defence against criticism) or para espantar 
temores (in order to allay fears). 
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RQ3: What do these findings tell us about discursive strategizing in cross-border 
acquisitions in general, and cross-border acquisitions after privatization in particular? 
First, the analysis showed that the discursive strategizing deployed to gain legitimacy 
for a particular cross-border merger or acquisition is more complex than the discursive 
strategizing deployed to delegitimate such a decision. The acquiring company, for 
instance, will need to defend its decision to pursue a cross-border M&A for a wide and 
diverse public of stakeholders. It is of course difficult to decipher from the analysis 
which stakeholders an acquiring has in mind when presenting specific argument topics. 
However, it seems reasonable to assume that rationalistic discourse is mobilized for the 
global financial community, whereas nationalistic discourse is mobilized for the local 
stakeholders in the target company’s environment (see also Tienari et al., 2003, p. 385). 
 
In this respect, it is again revealing to consider the atypical discursive strategizing 
deployed by the Argentine government in this acquisition after privatization. As the 
analysis showed, this proponent did not mobilize a mix of both discourses. The 
Argentine government mainly presented legitimating nationalistic argument topics. 
The in-depth analysis revealed that the government stated that it wanted to make as 
much money as possible from the privatization for the benefit of Argentina and its 
people. In other words, the government adapted the rationalistic discourse of global 
capitalism to be used at the local level. Therefore, it is perhaps more suitable to describe 
the legitimating nationalistic discourse mobilized by the Argentine government as a 
discourse of local capitalism (see also Erkama, 2010a, 2010b). 
 
Second, the special attention that was given to relegitimation in this analysis 
provides a deeper understanding of the social actors’ responses to discursive attacks 
launched by other social actors. The findings obtained from the analysis clearly indicate 
that relegitimation is an essential part of the discursive strategizing of the proponents 
of this particular cross-border acquisition after privatization. It is also safe to assume 
that this would be the case for any cross-border acquisition after privatization, or 
indeed for any merger or acquisition. The fact that the two proponents of the 
privatization and acquisition of YPF found it important to engage in a discursive 
struggle over the legitimacy of the deal by mobilizing relegitimating discourse in 
response to the mobilization of delegitimating discourse by the opponents of the deal 
shows that the proponents took into account how different social actors perceived and 
responded to the privatization and acquisition of YPF. 
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4.4 Discursive (re)constructions of the 1998-1999 Repsol-YPF 
case in the Argentine and Spanish newspapers 
4.4.1 Introduction 
In the second empirical section of this chapter, the same data will be analysed from a 
different perspective. The analysis will explore how the (written) media in the two news 
environments that are directly involved in the M&A-process promote particular 
versions of reality while marginalizing and excluding others. As such, the aim of the 
comparative cross-textual analysis of the Argentine and Spanish 1998-1999 newspaper 
articles is to provide insights into the different beliefs, feelings and conceptions about 
the Repsol-YPF case that (explicitly or implicitly) shine through the texts produced in 
the two news environments. It is assumed from the outset that the (written) media in 
both news environments drew on different means when discursively (re)presenting and 
(re)constructing the privatization and acquisition of YPF for their respective audiences. 
 
This section seeks to further develop and extend the findings of earlier studies that 
looked into the discursive (re)presentation and (re)construction of cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions in the (written) media (see particularly Hellgren et al., 2002; 
Kuronen et al., 2005; Risberg et al., 2003). These studies already described how the 
(written) media in countries that are directly involved in high-profile cross-border 
M&As report differently on the same business manoeuvre. They found that the media 
on the winning side (the acquiring company’s news environment) tend to draw more on 
rationalistic discourse, whereas the media on the losing side (the target company’s news 
environment) are usually more inclined to include nationalistic discourse as well. 
 
This analysis will also extend the findings of these earlier studies because of the 
methodological refinement that was added to the discourse analytic model. The 
refinement was added on three levels. First, the guidelines provided by Appraisal 
Theory (Martin & White, 2005; Thomson et al., 2008) were used to make an informed 
decision about evaluation in the texts (see also section 4.2.2.2). This allowed for a more 
detailed analysis of the newspaper articles. Second, the analysis also benefits from the 
incorporation of quantitative elements. After the relevant fragments were identified 
(necessarily a qualitative endeavour), the codes were quantified in order to reveal 
patterns in the way the discourses/argument topics were introduced into the 
newspaper discourse (Miles & Huberman, 1994) (see also section 4.2.2.2). Third, the 
analysis will provide more insights into the ways in which the (written) media 
discursively (re)present and (re)construct these major corporate events for their 
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respective audiences because of the incorporation of recent advances in the study of 
journalistic stance (Vertommen et al., 2012; White, 2012) (see also section 4.2.1.4). 
Following these studies, the analysis will not only focus on the use of explicit evaluative 
markers in the news reports, but also, for instance, on whether certain argument topics 
are more prominent in the coverage in one subcorpus compared to the other, and on 
whether certain argument topics are attributed to social actors or, conversely, are 
introduced into the newspaper texts as general truths82. 
 
The newspaper articles in the corpus were grouped into two categories: editorials 
and news reports83. Since editorials are characterized by a more argumentative writing 
style (Breeze, 2013; Martin & White, 2005; Thomson et al., 2008), the writers of these 
texts are less bound by the professional journalistic desire to remain neutral and 
impartial. On the contrary, the editorial is an opinion piece which usually reflects the 
newspaper’s general editorial line (Alonso Belmonte, 2007). Therefore, it is assumed that 
these texts will be most explicit in the way they position themselves vis-à-vis the 
legitimacy of the privatization and acquisition of YPF. The analysis of the editorials in 
the 1998-1999 corpus (4 Argentine and 3 Spanish texts) will be presented in section 4.4.2. 
The findings about the different perspectives on the Repsol-YPF case obtained from this 
comparative analysis will then be further substantiated with the findings from the 
analysis of the news reports in section 4.4.3. 
 
If uncovering the editorial line in the commentator voice texts is perhaps rather 
straightforward in that the authors are expected to position themselves unequivocally 
vis-à-vis the legitimacy of the deal, unveiling different lines of vision in the news 
reports is certainly more challenging. News reports are generally characterized by a 
journalistic professional desire to strike a balance. Indeed, journalists frequently include 
various sources with different (often both legitimating and delegitimating) points of 
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 In the Appraisal framework, these are called “bare assertions” (see Martin & White, 2005, pp. 98-102). 
83
 Martin and White (2005, pp. 164-184) described three different categories, depending on the evaluative role 
of the journalist author of the text. They distinguish between reporter voice (used in hard news reports), 
correspondent voice (used in investigative news reports) and commentator voice (used in opinion pieces). For the 
analysis presented in this chapter, a distinction will be made between two categories of newspaper texts: 
editorials and news reports. The commentator voice texts, the editorials, will be discussed separately in section 
4.4.2. For the analysis of the news reports in section 4.4.3, reporter and correspondent voice texts will be grouped 
together. The vast majority of the newspaper articles in the corpus can be considered reporter voice texts, 
whereas 9 of the articles can be considered correspondent voice texts. In these more investigative reports, a 
journalist (or a group of journalists) provides a more thorough analysis of the news event. These reports are 
also longer than the news reports. All 9 correspondent voice texts in the corpus were published by Argentine 
newspapers. 
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view in order to try to report objectively on the existing ideas and representations of a 
particular news event (McQuail, 1992, pp. 224-232). Thus, the evaluative role of the 
quoted sources is foregrounded while, at the same time, the journalists’ own evaluative 
role is backgrounded. Still, as White (2012, p. 62) stresses, “the journalist author is 
entirely responsible for introducing the attributed material into the text and 
accordingly for putting this particular proposition into play”. Therefore, following 
Vertommen et al. (2012), it is also deemed relevant to compare the ways in which the 
main social actors are quoted presenting argument topics in the newspaper articles 
produced in both news environments. Several studies looking into the journalistic use of 
quotations have already shown how the foregrounding of certain value positions 
attributed to particular sources, and the backgrounding of others, can be used to 
support the journalist’s own point of view (or, by extension, the general editorial line of 
the newspaper s/he writes for) (see, for instance, Jullian, 2011; Smirnova, 2009). 
 
First, the findings of the analysis of the editorials will be presented in section 4.4.2. 
The analysis of the editorials is rather straightforward because of the small number of 
editorials (7). The presentation of the findings will start with an overview of the 
discourses/argument topics that are foregrounded/backgrounded in the 
Argentine/Spanish editorials. Because of the small number of texts in this section, the 
main focus will be on the positioning of the editorialists vis-à-vis the 
discourses/argument topics identified in the texts. The analysis of the editorials is 
guided by the following research question: 
RQ1: How did the Argentine and Spanish editorialists position themselves vis-à-vis 
the discourses/argument topics surrounding the 1998-1999 Repsol-YPF case? 
The findings from the analysis of the editorials will already give an insight into the 
differences between the two news environments in terms of their positioning vis-à-vis 
the Repsol-YPF case. In section 4.4.3, these findings will be further substantiated with 
the findings from the analysis of the news reports. The analysis in this section will be 
guided by the following two research questions: 
RQ2: What discourses/argument topics surrounding the 1998-1999 Repsol-YPF 
case are foregrounded/backgrounded in the Argentine and Spanish news reports? 
 
RQ3: How did the writers of the Argentine and Spanish news reports position 
themselves vis-à-vis the discourses/argument topics surrounding the 1998-1999 
Repsol-YPF case? 
In order to facilitate the description of the findings, the presentation of the analysis of 
the news reports will be subdivided into three sections. Each section will provide a 
detailed analysis of a remarkably different pattern unveiled by the comparative 
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analysis. Section 4.4.3.1 will look into the ways in which the four prominent social actors 
were introduced in the Argentine and Spanish news reports. In section 4.4.3.2 the 
analysis will zoom in on the use of expert opinion in the two subcorpora. Section 4.4.3.3 
will closely analyse the foregrounding/backgrounding of the specific nationalistic 
argument topics Ownership, Employment and Competition. Each section will start with an 
overview of the significant patterns uncovered by the analysis of the Argentine and 
Spanish news reports (RQ2). Then, a more finegrained analysis will be presented to shed 
light on the different ways in which the discourses/argument topics were introduced 
into the texts in both subcorpora (RQ3). 
4.4.2 Comparative analysis of the Argentine and Spanish editorials in 
the 1998-1999 corpus 
This section focuses on the editorials in the corpus of Argentine and Spanish newspaper 
articles on the 1998-1999 privatization and acquisition of YPF. The Argentine subcorpus 
contains four editorials84, the Spanish subcorpus three (see Table 20). 
Table 20 Argentine and Spanish editorials in the 1998-1999 corpus 
Argentine editorials Spanish editorials 
La Nación (1998, 24 November[b]) 
La Nación (1999, 1 February) 
La Nación (1999, 6 May[c]) 
Clarín (1999, 12 May) 
El País (1999, 1 May) 
Cinco Días (1999, 3 May[a]) 
Cinco Días (1999, 6 October[a]) 
Four of the editorials were published in May after Repsol had made its all-cash offer to 
acquire the whole company. The Argentine newspaper La Nación also published an 
editorial on two other crucial moments in the process: in November 1998, when the 
Argentine government was about to decide how the remaining shares would be sold and 
in February 1999, after Repsol had won the public bid for the 14.9% package. 
 
Table 21 offers a first insight into the different beliefs, feelings and conceptions about 
this case that shine through the editorials produced in the Argentine and Spanish news 
environments. The numbers in this table already indicate that the editorial positions are 
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 In fact, there is a fifth editorial in the Argentine subcorpus (La Nación, 27 June[b]). This text was not taken 
up for the analysis presented here because it does not have the Repsol-YPF case as its main focus. Instead, this 
editorial focuses on the new Argentine antitrust law. 
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indeed markedly different. The Argentine editorialists drew exclusively on nationalistic 
discourse, whereas the Spanish editorialists drew exclusively on rationalistic discourse. 
Table 21 Editorials in the 1998-1999 corpus: Legitimating and delegitimating rationalistic 





RATIONALISTIC DISCOURSE 0/4 3/3 
Legitimating rationalistic argument topics 0/4 3/3 
Delegitimating rationalistic argument topics 0/4 2/3 
NATIONALISTIC DISCOURSE 4/4 0/3 
Legitimating nationalistic argument topics 1/4 0/3 
Delegitimating nationalistic argument topics 4/4 0/3 
These numbers are used as the starting point for a more finegrained analysis of the 
Argentine and Spanish editorials. The occurrence of both legitimating and 
delegitimating discourse in these commentator voice texts certainly deserves to be taken 
a closer look at, particularly in the Spanish editorials. In the following, these findings 
will be discussed in detail with a number of illustrative examples from the corpus. 
4.4.2.1 The Argentine editorials in the 1998-1999 corpus 
The numbers in Table 21 indicate that the Argentine editorials are firmly based on 
delegitimating nationalistic discourse. But how did these editorialists position 
themselves vis-à-vis the privatization plans of the Argentine government? Did they 
emphatically reject any form of privatization? Or did they present a more moderate 
point of view regarding the liberalization of the Argentine energy sector? The analysis 
will reveal that the Argentine editorialists were in fact not against the privatization of 
YPF per se, but also that they strongly opposed the government’s strategy to sell its 
remaining shares in one package to a (foreign) competitor of YPF. 
 
The three editorials published by the Argentine newspaper La Nación are firmly 
based on the delegitimating nationalistic Ownership argument topic. In these texts, the 
editorialists explain why YPF should stay in local hands. However, this does not mean 
that they emphatically reject the idea of a privatized YPF. On the contrary. The 
editorialists carefully explain the advantages of the model chosen for the first phase of 
the privatization of YPF in the early 1990s, when the shares were sold to private 
investors on the international markets. This procedure ensured that no dominant party 
could acquire a controlling stake in the Argentine oil company. In all three La Nación 
editorials, the commentators state that this model had been used to great effect for the 
privatization of large state-controlled enterprises in a number of European countries. 
Great Britain, which is often seen as a country with one of the most neoliberal 
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economies in the world, is identified twice in this context. The editorialists clearly 
approve of this method because the management can be kept in local hands, even 
though the shares may have been sold to (both individual and institutional) investors all 
over the world. 
[cuerpo] El procedimiento de privatizar abriendo el capital y colocándolo en los 
mercados fue el utilizado en Gran Bretaña y otros países para sus grandes empresas 
industriales y de servicios públicos. Además de su conveniencia, esta modalidad 
tiene otra ventaja: la de mantener la independencia y el carácter básicamente 
local de la compañía, aunque la propiedad accionaria pueda estar 
mayoritariamente en manos de fondos y personas del exterior. (La Nación, 1998, 
24 November[b]) 
[body] The privatization procedure of opening up the capital and placing it on the 
markets was used in Great Britain and other countries for large industrial and public 
service companies. Besides being convenient, this course of action has another 
advantage: it maintains the independent and basically local character of the 
company, although the ownership of the shares may be in hands of funds and 
persons abroad. 
 
[cuerpo] En efecto, el proceso aplicado a esta empresa, la más grande del país, 
siguió la secuencia de los casos más ponderados en el mundo, particularmente los 
de las grandes empresas estatales británicas y de otros países europeos. (La Nación, 
1999, 1 February) 
[body] Effectively, the process that was applied to this company, the biggest in the 
country, followed the procedure of some of the most carefully executed cases in the 
world, particularly the great British state-owned corporations and those of other 
European countries. 
In the following fragment, the editorialist writes openly about the advantages of el 
capitalism bien practicado (well-practiced capitalism). According to La Nación, the first 
privatization of YPF can be seen as an example of this because YPF was converted into 
an efficiently run competitive oil company. Again, there is a reference to Europe as the 
cradle of such well-thought-out privatizations. 
[cuerpo] La de YPF fue la única privatización realizada como lo fueron las más 
importantes ocurridas en Europa. Se alcanzó el objetivo de democratizar el capital 
introduciendo todos los incentivos y controles característicos de la actividad 
privada, en la empresa más importante de la Argentina. Esto, más la competencia 
dentro del país y frente al mundo, está en la esencia del capitalismo bien 
practicado. La privatización fue exitosa e YPF pasó su examen alcanzando niveles 
de eficiencia comparables a los de las mejores empresas internacionales. (La 
Nación, 1999, 6 May[c]) 
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[body] YPF’s was the only privatization done in the same way as the most important 
cases in Europe. The goal of democratizing the capital by introducing all the 
incentives and controls that are characteristic of private enterprise, was achieved 
for the most important company in Argentina. This, plus the competition within the 
country and in the rest of the world, is in the essence of well-practiced capitalism. 
The privatization was a success and YPF passed the test, achieving efficiency levels 
comparable to those of the best international companies. 
The successful transformation of YPF into an internationally competitive oil company as 
a result of the first privatization in the early 1990s is clearly a source of great national 
pride in Argentina. The editorialists, unmistakably drawing on nationalistic discourse, 
also link the Argentine pride in YPF to the hurt feelings that would come with the loss of 
ownership over the oil company. In the following fragments, the writers explain how 
Argentina, as a nation, felt proud of the way YPF had adapted to the pressures of an 
increasingly globalized economy. The fact that the company had weathered this storm 
under the leadership of a highly qualified local management only contributed to the 
mythical status of the company. Therefore, as the writers explain, it should not come as 
a surprise that the people of Argentina rejected the idea of a foreign company taking 
control of this national symbol. 
[cuerpo] Los argentinos valoran sus triunfos deportivos, están orgullosos de sus 
logros científicos o literarios, o de sus bellezas naturales. También satisface a los 
argentinos el éxito en la transformación de YPF, y que pueda ser expuesto como 
un logro propio. Por lo mismo debe aceptarse como una realidad que la 
transferencia del control de YPF a una firma petrolera de otro país no sería 
neutral en el sentimiento general. (La Nación, 1998, 24 November[b]) 
[body] Argentines value their sports triumphs, they are proud of their scientific or 
literary achievements, or of their natural wonders. The success of the 
transformation of YPF also satisfies the Argentines, especially the fact that it can be 
understood as an achievement of their own. For the same reason, it should be 
accepted as a reality that the transfer of control over YPF to a foreign oil company 
would not be felt as neutral by the public opinion. 
 
[cuerpo] Sin ningún tipo de apelación chauvinista, podría decirse que YPF ha sido 
un motivo de orgullo para los argentinos, que encontraron que es posible jugar un 
papel empresarial activo e importante en el campo internacional. Desde ya que 
YPF no desaparecerá ni dejará de operar sus actividades ni de ocupar su personal 
debido a su venta, pero tal vez no será lo mismo, desde la percepción que el 
imaginario colectivo tiene de esa empresa. (La Nación, 1999, 6 May[c]) 
[body] Without resorting to chauvinism, it can be said that YPF has been a source of 
pride for the Argentines, who found that it is possible for them to play an active and 
important role in the international field of business. Of course, YPF will not 
disappear nor will it cease to operate its activities or occupy its personnel as a result 
of being sold. However, it may no longer be the same, from the perception that the 
collective imagination has of the company. 
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As such, the La Nación editorialists do not write against the privatization of the 
Argentine oil company, but they do strongly oppose the privatization strategy pursued 
by the Argentine government. In the following fragments, it can be observed that these 
writers use unambiguous terms to denounce the government’s decision. In the 
Appraisal framework, these realizations are described as instances of unmediated 
inscribed negative judgement (social sanction – impropriety [unethical behaviour]). On 
the news pages, these realizations are typically only found in the stylistic regime of 
commentator voice (commentary, opinion, editorial) because these are the only texts in 
which journalistic writers are free to employ the language’s full attitudinal potential on 
their own behalf (Martin & White, 2005, pp. 52-56; 164-184). 
[cuerpo] Esta empresa fue bien privatizada, con éxito y con transparencia. No es la 
hora de cometer torpezas. (La Nación, 1998, 24 November[b]) 
[body] This company was privatized well, successfully and transparently. This is not 
the time for clumsiness. 
 
[cuerpo] En cuanto a la privatización de YPF, el camino elegido no ha sido el 
mejor. (La Nación, 1999, 1 February) 
[body] With regards to the privatization of YPF, the chosen path has not been the 
best. 
The Argentine newspaper La Nación accused the Argentine government of betraying 
the nation for two reasons. First, the government seemed to be only interested in 
pushing up the price for its remaining shares in YPF (delegitimating nationalistic 
Contribution to the Argentine State Treasury argument topic). And second, its decision to 
sell the shares in one package paved the way for a foreign company to take control of 
the company which had access to the country’s most valuable strategic assets 
(delegitimating nationalistic Ownership argument topic). 
[cuerpo] Un fino sentido político debería indicar que la diferencia en el monto 
obtenido de la venta de las acciones residuales puede no tener más valor relativo que el de 
un plato de lentejas, si por tomar la decisión de vender el control de YPF se pone en 
riesgo la voluntad de continuar o sostener lo ya hecho en esa empresa y en otras 
privatizaciones. (La Nación, 1998, 24 November[b]) 
[body] An acute understanding of politics should indicate that the relative value of the 
amount obtained from the sale of the residual shares could be no more than that of a plate of 
Argentine lentil stew if, as a result of the decision to sell control of YPF, the will to 
continue or sustain what has already been done in this company and other 
privatizations is put at risk. 
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[cuerpo] La objeción de este diario no se apoyaba en los resultados monetarios 
probables de la venta, sino en la desvirtuación de la correcta línea de pensamiento 
que guió la exitosa privatización de YPF. (La Nación, 1999, 1 February) 
[body] The objection of this newspaper was not based on the probable monetary results 
of the sale, but on the distortion of the correct line of thinking that guided the 
successful privatization of YPF. 
In the following fragment, the La Nación editorialist links the privatization of YPF to the 
bigger picture of the neoliberal reforms undertaken by the government of Carlos 
Menem in the 1990s. One of the major elements of these reforms was the privatization 
of a number of state-controlled companies. In the excerpt, the so-called extranjerización 
(denationalization) is explicitly evaluated negatively as it is stated that, in retrospect, 
the loss of national ownership (together with the lack of competition and transparency) 
will seguramente (surely) be evaluated negatively. 
[cuerpo] Seguramente en un futuro, a la hora de evaluar las privatizaciones, la 
extranjerización -así como la concentración y la falta de transparencia- se 
esgrimirán como un costo negativo de muchas privatizaciones. (La Nación, 1998, 
24 November[b]) 
[body] Surely in the future, when evaluating the privatizations, the 
denationalization -as well as the concentration and lack of transparency- will be 
considered as a negative cost for many privatizations. 
The Argentine newspaper Clarín also published an editorial on the topic of Repsol’s 
acquisition of YPF. It was published under the headline Objections to the acquisition after 
Repsol had made its final move. The headline already indicates that this newspaper also 
took a clearly delegitimating societal/nationalistic perspective. However, the focus is on 
different argument topics. The central focus of this text is not the Ownership argument 
topic but on the delegitimating nationalistic Competition and Contribution to the Argentine 
State Treasury argument topics. Clarín stated that it was concerned about the 
consequences of the deal for the Argentine energy consumers and about what the 
government was going to do with the money obtained from the privatization. 
[cuerpo] La proyectada venta de YPF a la española Repsol da origen a dos 
cuestionamientos de enorme importancia: el primero es que puede incrementar la 
desprotección de los consumidores ante la oferta de combustibles y el segundo es 
que todo permite presumir que el Gobierno, firme partidario de la venta de la 
empresa nacional, destinará lo obtenido a cubrir un desbalance fiscal coyuntural. 
De este modo puede resultar que los consumidores deberán pagar por los defectos 
de la política fiscal oficial. (Clarín, 1999, 12 May) 
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[body] The projected sale of YPF to Spanish Repsol brings two enormously 
important questions to the table: first is the possibility that the supply of fuel will 
lead to an increase in consumer vulnerability and second is that everything 
indicates that the government, a firm supporter of the sale of the national company, 
will use the proceeds to cover the current fiscal imbalance. This way, consumers 
may end up paying the price for the defects of the government’s fiscal policy. 
The analysis of the Argentine government’s discursive strategizing already showed that 
the government felt forced to respond to precisely these two delegitimating 
nationalistic argument topics by mobilizing relegitimating discourse85. 
 
Table 21 also showed that one editorialist drew on legitimating nationalistic 
discourse. This observation warrants a closer look at this specific fragment. The 
legitimating perspective was found in one of the editorials La Nación published in May 
1999, after Repsol had made its all-cash offer. 
[cuerpo] El precio más alto obtenido por la venta sin duda será bienvenido en un momento 
difícil de las cuentas públicas. Tanto el gobierno nacional como algunas provincias 
aún retienen acciones de YPF que venderán a buen precio. Los inversores 
privados, al igual que las AFJP, también se beneficiarán con ganancias que 
revertirán al mercado. De hecho, el ofrecimiento de Repsol produjo un incremento 
en las cotizaciones y en los volúmenes transados en la Bolsa local. Pero estos 
beneficios son por una única vez y pierden dimensión relativa cuando se los 
incorpora al contexto de las cifras globales de la macroeconomía y del sector 
público, en espacios mayores de tiempo. (La Nación, 1999, 6 May[c]) 
[body] The higher price obtained from the sale will no doubt be welcome in these difficult 
times for public accounts. The national government as well as some of the provinces 
still own YPF shares which they will sell at a good price. Private investors, as well as 
the AFJPs [pension fund administrators], will also benefit from the gains that are 
injected into the market. Repsol’s bid even caused a raise in stock values and 
number of transactions on the local stock market. However, these benefits apply one 
time only and lose relative dimension when incorporated into the context of global 
macro-economic and public sector figures in larger periods of time. 
In the first part of the fragment, the editorialist shows understanding for the 
government’s strategy to push up the price for the sale. However, this legitimating 
fragment does not change the general delegitimating tone of the editorial. In the final 
sentence of this fragment, this initial understanding for the government’s strategy is 
ruthlessly swept aside when the writer states that, in retrospect, the denationalization 
and the lack of competition and transparency will undoubtedly be evaluated negatively. 
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 The analysis of the Argentine government’s discursive strategizing was presented in section 4.3.2. 
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4.4.2.2 The Spanish editorials in the 1998-1999 corpus 
The Spanish editorialists of Cinco Días and El País present a notably different 
perspective on the cross-border acquisition after privatization (see Table 21 on p. 221). 
A finegrained analysis of the Spanish editorials reveals that these argumentative texts 
are firmly based on legitimating rationalistic discourse. In the following fragments, 
Repsol’s move beyond the Spanish borders is evaluated positively as an important 
Strategic decision (see de forma inteligente (intelligently) and intento lógico (logical attempt) 
in the first fragment). Moreover, the move abroad is presented as Inevitable if the 
company wanted to survive in the challenging and increasingly competitive 
international energy market (see estaba poco menos que obligada a responder 
estratégicamente (had not other choice than to strategically respond) and la imparable 
reordenación del sector petrolero internacional (the unstoppable reshuffle of the 
international oil sector) in the second and third fragment). 
[cuerpo] En la disyuntiva de aceptar el riesgo del mercado y crecer comprando 
empresas, o recluirse en el mercado español y ser objeto probable de una OPA 
similar de otra petrolera mayor, Repsol ha optado de forma inteligente por la 
primera opción. […] 
Hay que valorar la decisión de Repsol como lo que es, el intento lógico de 
encontrar una línea de crecimiento que no aumente la concentración de mercado 
en España. (El País, 1999, 1 May) 
[body] Presented with the choice of accepting market risk and growing by 
acquisition, or secluding itself on the Spanish market and most likely becoming the 
object of a similar takeover bid by a larger oil company, Repsol has intelligently 
chosen the first option. [...] 
Repsol’s decision should be valued for what it is: a logical attempt of finding growth 
without increasing concentration on the Spanish market. 
 
[cuerpo] Sin duda, Repsol estaba poco menos que obligada a responder 
estratégicamente a una tendencia sectorial de concentración, que ha impulsado 
diversas fusiones y adquisiciones en los últimos meses. (Cinco Días, 1999, 3 May[a]) 
[body] It is clear that Repsol had no other choice than to strategically respond to a 
tendency towards concentration in the sector, which has generated several mergers 
and acquisitions over the last months. However, the resulting landscape cannot be 
considered definitive. 
 
[cuerpo] Este conjunto de actuaciones pueden convertir a Repsol en actor 
importante de la imparable reordenación del sector petrolero internacional. De 
hecho, la compañía española está demostrando más agilidad que competidores 
mayores, como el ENI italiano, y su presencia e influencia en el mercado 
latinoamericano le otorgan indudable atractivo en el juego de las alianzas 
europeas. (Cinco Días, 1999, 6 October[a]) 
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[body] This series of events can make Repsol an important player in the unstoppable 
reshuffle of the international oil sector. The Spanish company is even showing 
greater agility than its main competitors, like Italian ENI, and its presence and 
influence on the Latin American market make it undoubtedly attractive during the 
formation of alliances in Europe. 
In the following fragment, the El País editorialist zooms out to take a look at the bigger 
picture of the Spanish investments in Latin America. S/he states that the behaviour of 
Spanish companies in Latin America is not to be taken lightly because they represent 
the quality of the Spanish business community. The editorialist subtly refers to other 
cases which had not been successful and which had damaged the image of the Spanish 
investors (see las actitudes prepotentes y chapuceras (arrogant and amateurish attitudes) in 
italics). However, the writer contrasts these negative experiences with the Repsol-YPF 
case which should be seen as a good example. According to the writer of this text, one of 
the reasons why this particular acquisition is to be regarded as legitimate is because of 
the approval of the Argentine government. As such, the positive evaluation of the 
Argentine government’s support seems to indicate that the Spanish editorialist is 
writing from the perspective of the Spanish company. In any case, the analysis of the 
Argentine editorials clearly revealed a totally different evaluation of the role of the 
Argentine government in this acquisition after privatization. 
[cuerpo] El comportamiento de empresas como Repsol, ENDESA o Telefónica en 
América Latina no es irrelevante. Su actitud se toma como ejemplo de la calidad 
del empresariado español; y si un comportamiento respetuoso con el entorno 
empresarial y legal de cada país beneficia al conjunto de las empresas españolas, 
las actitudes prepotentes y chapuceras causan el efecto contrario. Como la operación de 
Repsol cuenta con el apoyo del Gobierno argentino y ha respetado los trámites y 
las normas no escritas del mercado argentino, habrá que convenir que es correcta. 
(El País, 1999, 1 May) 
[body] The behaviour of companies such as Repsol, ENDESA or Telefónica in Latin 
America is not irrelevant. Their attitude is taken as an example of the quality of the 
Spanish business community. While respectful behaviour towards the business and 
legal community of each country benefits all Spanish companies, arrogant and 
amateurish attitudes have the opposite effect. As Repsol’s operation has the backing of 
the Argentine government and has respected the unwritten rules and regulations of 
the Argentine market, it can only be concluded that it is correct. 
The writer of this El País editorial also refers to the opposition to Repsol’s acquisition of 
YPF in Argentina. The Argentine hurt feelings are not only described as predictable and 
instinctive but also as unmotivated. 
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[cuerpo] El paso de Repsol en Argentina es arriesgado, por las condiciones 
económicas latinoamericanas, por la cuantía de la apuesta y por el previsible 
rechazo, visceral e inmotivado, de los grupos de presión locales. (El País, 1999, 1 
May) 
[body] Repsol’s move in Argentina is risky because of the economic conditions in 
Latin America, the amount of the offer and the predictable, instinctive and 
unmotivated rejection of local pressure groups. 
However, as the numbers in Table 21 (on p. 221) already indicated, the Spanish 
editorialists also draw on delegitimating rationalistic discourse in two of the three 
commentator voice texts. A close reading of the texts reveals that, even though the 
Spanish editorialists focused mostly on the positive aspects of the deal, two of them also 
referred to a potentially dangerous aspect: Repsol’s increased debt levels (viz. 
delegitimating rationalistic Repsol’s acquired debt argument topic). In the following 
fragment, the editorialist indeed shows concern for this aspect, especially because, as 
this writer states, Repsol still needed to develop a strategy to solve this potential 
danger. 
[cuerpo] Estamos, en todo caso, ante una operación de enorme envergadura 
financiera: del orden de 2 billones de pesetas. Da idea de su dimensión no solo que 
sea una de las más abultadas a pagar en efectivo -sin intercambio de títulos- sino 
que su monto equivalga al total de las inversiones españolas en América Latina en 
1998. Requerirá, como es lógico, un enorme esfuerzo de recomposición de la 
estructura financiera de Repsol –deuda y recursos propios-, pendiente todavía de 
diseñar. (Cinco Días, 1999, 3 May[a]) 
[body] We are looking, in any case, at an enormous financial operation: 
approximately 2 trillion pesetas. Not only is it one of the largest cash transactions -
no exchange of shares- but its total value equals all Spanish investments in Latin 
America during 1998. As can be expected, it will require an enormous recomposition 
effort of Repsol’s financial structure -debt and assets- which is still to be developed. 
The overall tone of this Cinco Días editorial does remain positive as the editorialist 
concludes the text with a reference to the positive evaluation of the deal by a number of 
experts86 (investors, financial analysts, and the Spanish banks that are the majority 
shareholders of Repsol).  
  
 
                                                     
86
 The analysis of the news reports in section 4.4.3 will reveal that the Argentine and Spanish news reports are 
markedly different in the way expert opinion is introduced in these texts. 
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[cuerpo] Por lo pronto, los inversores han acogido favorablemente la iniciativa de 
Repsol: sus acciones subieron en Bolsa casi un 5% el pasado viernes. También los 
analistas han valorado positivamente el movimiento estratégico de la compañía. Y 
está claro el apoyo institucional de las entidades financieras que integran el 
núcleo duro accionarial de la empresa: tanto La Caixa como el BBV han prestado 
su soporte financiero para garantizar el buen fin de la OPA y manifestando su 
intención de no diluir sus participaciones, acudiendo en la medida necesaria a la 
proyectada ampliación de capital. (Cinco Días, 1999, 3 May[a]) 
[body] For the moment, investors have received Repsol’s initiative favourably: its 
shares went up almost 5% last Friday. Analysts have also received the company’s 
strategic move positively. Furthermore, the institutional support from the financial 
entities that make up the core of the company’s shareholders is also clear: both La 
Caixa and BBV have pledged their financial support to guarantee a positive 
conclusion of the takeover bid and have expressed their intentions of not reducing 
their stakes and helping to secure the projected capital increase. 
In conclusion, the comparative analysis of the Argentine and Spanish editorials in the 
1998-1999 corpus revealed that the editorial line of the newspapers in the two directly 
involved news environments was notably different. The Argentine newspapers 
emphasized the hurt feelings associated with the loss of YPF to a foreign company (viz. 
delegitimating nationalistic discourse), whereas the Spanish editorialists showed 
explicit support for Repsol’s internationalization strategy (viz. legitimating rationalistic 
discourse). These findings are consistent with earlier studies which also described how 
the media on the winning and the losing side adopted different perspectives on the same 
M&A-process (Hellgren et al., 2002; Kuronen et al., 2005; Risberg et al., 2003). In the next 
section, the comparative analysis will focus on the news reports in the corpus of 
newspaper accounts of the Repsol-YPF case in order to reveal whether these different 
editorial lines can also be identified in news texts that are generally seen as more 
factual, balanced and neutral. 
4.4.3 Comparative analysis of the Argentine and Spanish news reports 
in the 1998-1999 corpus 
The analysis of the editorials in the previous section clearly revealed that the 
editorialists in both news environments under study explicitly positioned themselves 
vis-à-vis the legitimacy of the privatization and acquisition of YPF. The explicitly 
argumentative writing style typical of editorials is, however, substantially less common 
in news reports. These texts are characterized by strategic impersonalization by which 
the author’s evaluative role is backgrounded (Martin & White, 2005). Therefore, the 
analysis will focus on the ways in which the journalists in the two news environments 
foreground/background certain argument topics in their news reports on the 
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privatization and acquisition of YPF. This approach will provide further insight into the 
ways in which writers of (hard) news reports discursively (re)present and (re)construct 
the same news event differently, depending on whether they belong to the winning (i.c. 
Spain) or the losing side (i.c. Argentina) (Hellgren et al., 2002; Kuronen et al., 2005; 
Risberg et al., 2003) 
 
Table 22 shows the distribution of rationalistic and nationalistic discourse in both 
subcorpora. A news report was counted as containing rationalistic/ nationalistic 
discourse if at least one rationalistic/ nationalistic argument topic was identified in the 
text. The table also shows in how many texts rationalistic/nationalistic discourse was 
mobilized to either legitimate or delegitimate the deal87. 
Table 22 News reports in the 1998-1999 corpus: Legitimating and delegitimating 





























The numbers in Table 22 indicate that nationalistic discourse is unquestionably the 
more dominant discourse in the Argentine subcorpus. Moreover, the table also indicates 
that the Argentine news reports adopted a more delegitimating perspective. The picture 
is, however, not so clear for the Spanish news reports. The table seems to suggest that 
the Spanish journalists were more committed to the ideal of professional detachment by 
reporting on both legitimating and delegitimating points of view. The following sections 
will present a finegrained analysis of the news reports. The comparative analysis will 
 
                                                     
87
 I also calculated the p-values for these categories. For each category, the p-value is less than 0.05, indicating 
that the differences between the two sets of data are statistically significant. 
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zoom in on three aspects that are found to be markedly different in the news reports 
produced in these two directly involved news environments. 
 
In section 4.4.3.1, the analysis will look into the differences between the two 
subcorpora in terms of the argument topics that were attributed to the four most 
prominent social actors88. Indeed, in the stylistic regime of news reports, evaluative 
statements are often attributed to external sources. However, the journalist is still 
responsible for introducing the attributed material into the text (Vertommen et al., 
2012; White, 2012). In other words, it is assumed that it is possible to unveil different 
perspectives by cross-textually comparing the journalistic use of quotations in the two 
subcorpora. 
 
The analysis presented in section 4.4.3.2 will look into a different category of social 
actors: the experts. Journalist authors in both news environments at times attributed 
statements to experts, such as financial analysts and economists, who try to explain the 
dynamics of the case from their respective areas of expertise. The analysis will show 
that journalists often draw on expert opinion which fits into the general editorial line of 
the newspaper they write for. 
 
Finally, section 4.4.3.3 will go deeper into the ways in which three specific 
nationalistic argument topics were presented in both subcorpora: Ownership, Employment 
and Competition. Not only are the two subcorpora significantly different in terms of the 
frequency with which these argument topics are identified, the analysis will also reveal 
that the journalists in the two news environments wrote differently about these 
argument topics. 
4.4.3.1 Comparative analysis of the positioning vis-à-vis the discursive 
strategizing of the four prominent social actors in the Argentine and 
Spanish news reports 
The quantitative comparative analysis of the news reports on the Repsol-YPF case 
presented in Table 22 (on p. 231) already pointed towards different perspectives in the 
two news environments. For instance, the Argentine newspapers drew more on 
delegitimating nationalistic discourse whereas the Spanish newspapers seem to be more 
balanced in their reporting of the case. In this first section of the more finegrained 
 
                                                     
88
 An extensive analysis of the discursive strategizing of the four most prominent social actors was already 
presented in section 4.3. In section 4.4.3.1, the focus will be on the differences between the Argentine and 
Spanish news reports. 
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analysis of the Argentine and Spanish news reports, the focus moves towards 
comparative analysis of the argument topics that were attributed in the two subcorpora 
to the four prominent social actors in this acquisition after privatization process. The 
analysis will further explore the frequency with which the four prominent social actors 
were quoted when presenting different argument topics in the news reports in the 
1998-1999 corpus. Special attention will be paid to the ways in which the journalists 
reported differently on the argument topics put forward by these social actors. 
 
Let us first explore in how many news reports the four prominent social actors were 
quoted presenting argument topics. The numbers in Table 23 show that the two 
subcorpora are in fact not that different in terms of giving voice to these prominent 
social actors, except for the attention paid to the Argentine government. Of course, it 
should not come as a surprise that the generic Argentine government category was 
identified significantly more often in the Argentine subcorpus. 






















Of course, these numbers do not provide insight into the ways in which the journalists 
used these quotes in their news reports. In the following, the comparative analysis will 
focus on the ways in which the newspapers in the two new environments reported on 
the discursive strategizing deployed by the four prominent social actors. 
 
The Argentine political opposition 
The Argentine political opposition was one of the main opponents of the deal. As the 
numbers in Table 23 show, there is no significant difference between the two 
subcorpora for the quotes attributed to the Argentine political opposition. A close 
reading of the fragments further reveals that in both subcorpora, the opposition was 
only found presenting delegitimating nationalistic argument topics (see also section 
4.3.5). The fact that these statements were also taken up by the Spanish newspapers 
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partly explains the presence of delegitimating nationalistic discourse in the Spanish 
news reports (see Table 22 on p. 231). On 3 May 1999, for instance, both the Argentine 
newspaper La Nación and the Spanish newspaper Cinco Días published an article which 
primarily focused on the Argentine political opposition’s delegitimating perspective on 
Repsol’s acquisition of YPF. 
[título] Lamentos en el Parlamento (La Nación, 1999, 3 May[b]) 
 [headline] Lament in Parliament 
 
[título] La oposición se lamenta (Cinco Días, 1999, 3 May[d]) 
 [headline] The opposition complains 
 
The Argentine target company YPF 
The Argentine target company YPF was the other main opponent of the deal. Table 23 
also shows that there is no significant difference between the two subcorpora in terms 
of the number of articles in which argument topics were found to be attributed to this 
opponent. YPF and its representatives were predominantly quoted presenting 
delegitimating nationalistic argument topics. The only exceptions are found when, in 
the end, YPF finally accepted Repsol’s offer and Roberto Monti was quoted mobilizing a 
mix of delegitimating nationalistic and legitimating rationalistic discourse (see section 
4.3.4). Again, these quotes partly explain the presence of delegitimating nationalistic 
discourse in the news reports published by the two Spanish newspapers (see Table 22 on 
p. 231). 
 
The Argentine government 
The comparative analysis does reveal a significant difference when the quotes 
attributed to the Argentine government are closely analysed. Table 23 (on p. 233) 
already revealed that the Argentine newspapers paid more attention to the (generic) 
Argentine government category than the Spanish newspapers. However, these numbers do 
not reveal much about the ways in which these quotes were introduced into the news 
reports. 
 
The analysis of the Argentine government’s discursive strategizing in 4.3.2 already 
showed how the government felt forced to mobilize relegitimating discourse in 
response to the presentation of the delegitimating nationalistic argument topics 
Contribution to the Argentine State Treasury and Competition. The comparative analysis of 
the news reports in the corpus reveals that these relegitimating efforts were mainly 
taken up by the two Argentine newspapers. 
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The Spanish newspapers, on the other hand, hardly paid any attention to the 
legitimating and relegitimating discourse mobilized by the Argentine government. In 
fact, there is only one Spanish news report in which the government was found 
(indirectly) presenting a legitimating argument topic (i.c. Confidence in Argentina). 
[cuerpo] Aparte de agitar el lema de que es otra muestra de la “confiabilidad” del 
país, el Gobierno de Menem también embolsará unos 830 millones de dolares […]. 
(Cinco Días, 1999, 3 May[d]) 
[body] Apart from using the slogan that it is another show of the country’s 
“reliability”, Menem’s government will also stand to win some 830 million dollars 
[...]. 
In the other articles, the Spanish journalists wrote about the critical stance adopted by 
some of the (dissident) members of the governing Justicialist Party and, later, about the 
official statement demanding Repsol to reduce its dominant position in the Argentine 
energy market (delegitimating nationalistic discourse; see also 4.3.2). On two occasions, 
the Spanish newspaper Cinco Días reported in a rather critical tone about the ambiguity 
in the Justicialist Party’s support for Repsol’s acquisition of YPF. In the following 
fragments, the Cinco Días journalists point out that the delegitimating argument topics 
presented by these dissident voices are in stark contrast with the governing party’s 
generally firm support for the deal. 
[cuerpo] Esa posición [de “algunos diputados de ese partido [Partido Justicialista], 
así como el secretario de Industria y Minería, Alieto Guadagni] contrasta con el 
apoyo decidido dado por el Gobierno de Carlos Menem (de ese mismo partido) a la 
operación a lo largo de los últimos meses. (Cinco Días, 1999, 21 May[d]) 
[body] That position [of “some representatives of that party [Justicialist Party], as 
well as the Secretary of Industry and Mining, Alieto Guadagni] stand in sharp 
contrast to the strong support given by Carlos Menem’s government (of that same 
party) to the operation over the last two months. 
 
[cuerpo] Pese al apoyo decidido del Gobierno de Carlos Menem […], algunos 
diputados del Partico Justicialista han mantenido una posición similar a la de la 
oposición […]. (Cinco Días, 4 June) 
[body] In spite of the strong support provided by Carlos Menem’s government [...], 
some representatives of the Justicialist Party have kept a similar position to that of 
the opposition [...]. 
 
The Spanish acquiring company Repsol 
The numbers in Table 23 (on p. 233) indicate that there is no significant difference 
between the two subcorpora in terms of the number of articles in which the Spanish 
acquiring company Repsol was identified presenting (re)legitimating argument topics. 
However, the more finegrained analysis of these fragments does reveal some differences 
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in the ways in which the newspapers in the two news environments reported on the 
Spanish acquiring company’s discursive strategizing. 
 
As was the case with the statements attributed to the Argentine government, the 
analysis found that the Argentine newspapers wrote more extensively on Repsol’s 
relegitimating discourse than the Spanish newspapers. In the Argentine newspapers, 
the Spanish company is often found reacting to the delegitimating nationalistic 
Competition argument topic. The fact that the Argentine journalists paid quite a lot of 
attention to Repsol’s relegitimating discourse can be interpreted as a sign of their 
general concern about what would happen to YPF after Repsol had seized control. The 
Spanish journalists did not extensively cover this relegitimating discourse, but that does 
not mean that it was entirely absent in the Spanish newspapers (some of these 
fragments were already discussed in section 4.3.3). 
 
The most revealing difference is found, however, in the ways in which the journalists 
in both news environments reported on the legitimating rationalistic argument topics 
presented by the acquiring company Repsol. The analysis of Repsol’s discursive 
strategizing already revealed that the company often presented legitimating 
rationalistic argument topics to gain acceptance for its decision to buy into the 
Argentine company (see section 4.3.3; see also Vandenberghe, 2011). 
 
In the Argentine subcorpus, legitimating rationalistic argument topics were often 
attributed to Repsol, as can be observed in the following fragments. In the excerpts from 
Clarín, the company presents the legitimating rationalistic argument topics Strategic 
decision, Complementarity and Synergy and Size. In the fragment taken from La Nación, 
Repsol’s CEO is quoted presenting three legitimating rationalistic argument topics: Size, 
Complementarity and synergy and Growth. 
[cuerpo] Para Repsol, el control de YPF representa un gran valor estratégico 
debido a la marcada complementariedad que tienen las dos compañías. (Clarín, 
1999, 22 January) 
[body] For Repsol, control of YPF represents a big strategic value due to the clear 
complementarity of the two companies. 
 
[cuerpo] Según Repsol con la absorción de YPF quedarán octavos entre las grandes 
petroleras del mundo. (Clarín, 1999, 30 April) 
[body] According to Repsol, after acquiring YPF they will be the eighth biggest oil 
company in the world. 
 
[cuerpo] “Como resultado de la adquisición de YPF, Repsol ha dado un paso 
gigantesco para convertirse en una compañía mucho más grande, más balanceada 
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y con más capacidad de crecimiento”, dijo el presidente de la petrolera con sede 
en Madrid, Alfonso Cortina. (La Nación, 1999, 25 June) 
[body] “As a result of the acquisition of YPF, Repsol has made huge steps towards 
converting itself into a company that is much bigger, more balanced and with a 
higher capacity for growth”, said Alfonso Cortina, the President of the oil company 
that is headquartered in Madrid. 
In the Spanish subcorpus, Repsol is also found presenting these argument topics. 
However, what is interesting in the Spanish news reports is that the Spanish journalists 
seem to have taken over the legitimating rationalistic perspective of the Spanish 
acquiring company. The analysis clearly reveals that, whereas the Argentine journalists 
attributed Repsol’s legitimating rationalistic discourse to company representatives, the 
Spanish journalists seemed to have internalized the Spanish company’s legitimating 
rationalistic perspective. This is particularly the case for the argument topic Size which 
was found several times in the headline of Spanish news reports (especially in El País). 
As such, the following headlines could be read as expressions of the Spanish pride in the 
internationalization of their company. 
[título] Repsol es la décima petrolera del mundo tras comprar YPF (El País, 1999, 
22 January) 
[headline] Repsol is the tenth largest oil company in the world after buying YPF 
 
[título] Repsol + YPF, quinta en reservas de gas (Cinco Días, 1999, 2 February) 
 [headline] Repsol + YPF, fifth in gas reserves 
 
[título] OPA de Repsol para situarse entre las grandes petroleras (El País, 1999, 30 
April[a]) 
 [headline] Takeover bid by Repsol to take its place among biggest oil companies 
 
[título] La petrolera española se convertirá tras la operación en una de las 10 
mayores del mundo (El País, 1999, 30 April[b]) 
[headline] After the operation, the Spanish oil company will become one of the 10 
biggest in the world 
 
[título] La petrolera española se incorpora al club de las grandes (El País, 1999, 16 
May[b]) 
 [headline] The Spanish oil company joins the big league 
Moreover, the close reading of the fragments from the Spanish subcorpus also reveals 
that these argument topics were often presented in rather neutral and matter-of-fact-
like sentences (bare assertions in the Appraisal framework (Martin & White, 2005, pp. 98-
102). Contrary to the Argentine journalists, the writers of these Spanish news reports 
did not always attribute these legitimating rationalistic argument topics to the Spanish 
company Repsol. Instead, the acquiring company’s discourse was often taken over and 
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presented as if there were no alternative positions. In the following fragments, this is 
done by using a combination of the present and/or future tense and the intensifying 
connector además (furthermore). 
[cuerpo] La integración con YPF, que además es una compañía complementaria 
con Repsol, permitirá al grupo entrar en el selecto club de las diez petroleras 
mundiales más grandes. (Cinco Días, 1999, 25 March) 
[body] The integration with YPF, which is, furthermore, a complementary company 
to Repsol, will allow the group to join the elite club of the world’s ten largest oil 
companies. 
 
[cuerpo] Además, permitirá concentrar las operaciones del grupo realizando 
ahorros de costes significativos y desinversiones sin mermar el crecimiento, y 
optar al liderazgo del mercado de gas natural del Cono Sur, cuyo crecimiento se 
estima en el 10% anual para los próximos años. (El País, 1999, 9 May) 
[body] Furthermore, it will allow the group to concentrate its operations by making 
significant cost savings and divestitures without diminishing growth and to opt for 
leadership on the natural gas market in the South Cone, whose growth is estimated 
at 10% yearly for the next years. 
In the following fragments, the legitimating rationalistic argument topics which are 
typical of Repsol’s discursive strategizing are also presented as facts. Moreover, the 
writer of this particular fragment introduced them with an explicitly positive 
evaluation of the deal: El salto será espectacular (the jump will be spectacular). 
[cuerpo] El salto será espectacular. El grupo resultante de la incorporación de la 
argentina YPF y Repsol se convertirá en la octava petrolera privada del mundo por 
reservas de hidrocarburos y tendrá una estructura más equilibrada que la 
compañía española y argentina por separado. (Cinco Días, 1999, 3 May[b]) 
[body] The jump will be spectacular. The group that was created as a result of Repsol 
acquiring YPF will become the eighth private oil company in the world by 
hydrocarbon reserves and will have a more balanced structure that the Spanish and 
Argentine companies separately. 
As such, the analysis reveals how these Spanish news reports followed the editorial line 
of the Spanish editorials in that they also adopted a more legitimating rationalistic 
perspective. The Spanish journalists seem to be writing from the perspective of the 
Spanish company Repsol. The next fragments further illustrate this perspective. 
However, before looking more closely at the fragments, some contextualization is in 
order (see also section 2.2.3). 
 
After Repsol had offered to buy a large package of shares, the government tried to 
convince the YPF management to change the Argentine company’s memorandum of 
association. The memorandum stated that any company that wanted to buy more than 
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14.9% of YPF shares was obliged to make an all-cash offer for the full 100% of the 
company. After Repsol had acquired the 14.9% package in January 1999, Repsol once 
more tried to convince the YPF management to change the memorandum so that it 
would be possible to take full control of the company through a stock swap instead of a 
cash offer. The YPF management, however, would not budge. In the end, Repsol did 
what few had expected. At the end of April, the Spanish company launched an all-cash 
offer for the remaining 85.1% of YPF. The following excerpts are taken from the Spanish 
newspapers’ coverage of this power game between the Argentine government, and the 
managements of YPF and Repsol. These fragments clearly illustrate how the authors of 
the Spanish news reports described the showdown from the perspective of the Spanish 
company Repsol. The concerns regarding the company’s dominant position in the 
Argentine energy market, for instance, were described as problemas (problems) and un 
obstáculo (obstacle) in the first and third fragment, and as worrying messages that can 
have dangerous consequences in the second excerpt. 
[cuerpo] Cuando el Gobierno argentino da los últimos pasos para la privatización 
del 20,5% del líder energético de su país, YPF, aparecen con fuerza nuevos 
obstáculos en esta operación, que tendrá un montante global de unos 2.700 
millones de dólares (390.000 millones de pesetas). Los problemas han surgido 
tanto en el Parlamento, desde la oposición política, como en la dirección de la 
compañía. (Cinco Días, 1998, 25 November) 
[body] While the Argentine government is making the last steps to privatize 20.5% 
of its country’s leading energy company YPF, new obstacles to the 2.7 billion dollar 
(390 billion peseta) operation appear in full force. Problems have arisen both from 
Parliament and from the company’s board. 
 
[cuerpo] Los directivos de la petrolera argentina, que representan a los fondos de 
inversión estadounidenses, transmitieron dos mensajes preocupantes para Repsol. 
El primero es que YPF no tiene cartel de remate y los directores deben defender a 
los accionistas. El segundo es la peligrosa consecuencia del primero: no descartan 
una alianza con otra petrolera. (El País, 1999, 7 February) 
[body] The executives of the Argentine oil company, who represent U.S. investment 
funds, transmitted two worrying messages to Repsol. The first message is that YPF 
does not have a ‘for sale’ sign and that the executives must defend the shareholders. 
The second message is the dangerous consequence of the first one: they do not 
dismiss the possibility of an alliance with another oil company. 
 
[cuerpo] Repsol ha eliminado de nuevo un obstáculo en su camino para lograr la 
integración con la empresa argentina YPF, líder en el sector petrolero en su país. 
(Cinco Días, 1999, 3 March) 
[body] Repsol has eliminated yet another obstacle in its way to achieving integration 
with the Argentine company YPF, the leader in that country’s oil sector. 
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[cuerpo] Con la decisión del directorio de YPF de apoyar por unanimidad la OPA de 
Repsol por el 85,01% de su capital, el grupo petrolero ha salvado el último 
obstáculo para su oferta que ya se ha puesto en marcha. (Cinco Días, 1999, 12 May) 
[body] With the decision of YPF’s board to unanimously support Repsol’s takeover 
bid for 85.01% of its capital, the oil group has overcome the last obstacle for its bid 
which has already been set into motion. 
To summarize, this section closely analysed the ways in which the newspapers in these 
two news environments reported on the discursive strategizing of the four prominent 
social actors. The analysis revealed no significant differences between the two news 
environments when the discursive strategizing of the opponents of the deal was 
included into the news reports. However, the picture is different for the discursive 
strategizing of the proponents of the deal. First, the analysis showed that the Argentine 
journalists often included statements attributed to the proponents in which they 
mobilized relegitimating discourse to counter the discursive attacks of the opponents of 
the deal. Second, the analysis of the Spanish news reports revealed that the Spanish 
journalists often presented legitimating rationalistic argument topics in neutral, 
matter-of-fact terms, leaving no room for alternative positions. This representation was 
uncovered thanks to the comparative approach: often, the same argument topics which 
were presented as facts in the Spanish news reports were attributed to the Spanish 
acquiring company Repsol in the Argentine subcorpus. 
4.4.3.2 Comparative analysis of the use of expert opinion in the Argentine and 
Spanish news reports 
This section will zoom in on a different category of social actors which has not been 
mentioned until now: the experts. This category was found to be significantly different 
after the argument topics identified in the newspaper corpus were linked to the 
categories of social actors by using NVivo’s coding matrix tool (see also section 4.2.2.2). 
This tool was not only used to analyse the discursive strategizing of the four prominent 
social actors89, but also to look into the argument topics that were presented by other 
social actors in the Argentine and Spanish subcorpora. This focus revealed that, in fact, 
the newspapers’ different perspectives also become clear when looking into the ways in 




                                                     
89
 The findings of the analysis of the discursive strategizing deployed by the four most prominent social actors 
were described in section 4.3. 
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Influenced by the professional desire for objectivity, modern mainstream journalists 
often write their news stories from a “facts-as-contextualized-through-experts-
orientation” (St. John, 2010, p. 4). Several studies have shown, however, that this expert 
opinion is often used to support the article’s general point of view (or, indeed, the 
general editorial line of the newspaper). Kepplinger, Brosius, and Staab (1991) 
introduced the concept of “instrumental actualization” by which they refer to the 
selection of precisely those opinions which support the writer’s general perspective on 
a particular case. Hagen (1993, p. 329) described these sources as “opportune witnesses” 
because they testify to “a specific view in a conflict on how to interpret reality”. Indeed, 
the selection of sources that put forward a particular evaluation of the news event can 
give the impression that the general view of the journalist (or the newspaper) is shared 
by these influential experts (see also Albæk, 2011; Berkowitz, 2009; Boyce, 2006). More 
recently, Manning (2013) looked into the way financial journalists used expert sources 
in the years preceding the global financial meltdown of 2007-2009 in an attempt to 
explain why they failed to report on the emerging evidence of the growing possibility of 
collapse. He rejects the conspiracy theory advanced by some critics. Instead, he claims 
that “[m]any financial journalists embraced the received wisdom on financial markets 
and low interest rates so that they did not pursue holistic questions via their exchange 
relationships with sources” (Manning, 2013, p. 187). 
 
In both the Argentine and Spanish news reports on the Repsol-YPF case, the 
journalist authors at times turned to financial analysts and economists in order to 
better understand and explain the case to their reader. The numbers in Table 24 
indicate that around 20% of both Argentine (39/216) and Spanish news reports (24/107) 
contain fragments in which experts are quoted presenting argument topics. In other 
words, there is no significant difference between the subcorpora in terms of the 
frequency with which experts are introduced into the 1998-1999 news reports. 









Table 25 gives an overview of the legitimating and delegitimating rationalistic and 
nationalistic argument topics identified in the quotes attributed to expert sources in the 
Argentine and Spanish news reports in the 1998-1999 corpus. These numbers clearly 
show that the Spanish journalists quoted significantly more experts presenting 
legitimating rationalistic argument topics than the Argentine journalists. This again 
points to a generally more legitimating perspective on the Repsol-YPF case on the part 
of the Spanish journalists. The numbers in Table 25 also indicate that, compared to the 
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Spanish journalists, the Argentine journalists quoted significantly more experts 
presenting delegitimating nationalistic argument topics. It must be added, however, 
that the fragments in the Argentine subcorpus are more or less evenly spread out over 
the four categories (legitimating/delegitimating rationalistic/nationalistic argument 
topics). 
Table 25 Argument topics in quotes attributed to expert sources in the 1998-1999 corpus: 





























In the following, these findings will be discussed in greater detail with a selection of 
illustrative examples from the Argentine and Spanish news reports. The more 
finegrained analysis of the fragments will, for instance, reveal that the Argentine 
journalists only included experts who presented legitimating argument topics after 
Repsol had made its all-cash offer for the Argentine company. 
 
Expert opinion in the Spanish news reports 
The writers of the Spanish news reports often quoted experts who presented a 
legitimating rationalistic perspective on the Repsol-YPF deal. The experts in the Spanish 
subcorpus were particularly found presenting the argument topics Growth (9/17; 53%), 
Complementarity and Synergy (7/17; 41%) and Strategic decision (7/17; 41%)90. Interestingly, 
the Spanish journalists often introduced this expert opinion by generically referring to 
the (sector) experts, as in the following two examples. In the first fragment, the sector 
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 In the Argentine subcorpus, not one expert was found presenting one of these three legitimating 
rationalistic argument topics. 
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experts are generically described as “applauding” not only the Strategic decision but also 
the increased Efficiency and Costs and Growth. In the second excerpt, the journalist refers 
to a generic category of analysts who are described as “indicating” that there is a 
definite potential for Growth. 
[cuerpo] Ayer, los expertos del sector aplaudieron esta decisión estratégica de la 
compañía española y recalcaron que le supondrá un importante ahorro de costes e 
incrementará sus beneficios operativos y por acción. (El País, 1999, 22 January) 
[body] Yesterday, the sector experts applauded the Spanish company’s strategic 
decision and pointed out that it would entail important cost savings and would 
increase operational benefits as well as benefits per share. 
 
[cuerpo] Los analistas señalan que los resultados operativos del grupo estarán 
cercanos a los 3.000 millones de dólares (unos 455.000 millones de pesetas) en el 
primer ejercicio después de la integración, lo que supone un incremento del 55% 
respecto a los logrados en el último ejercicio por la petrolera española. (Cinco 
Días, 1999, 3 May[b]) 
[body] Analysts indicate that the operational results of the group will be close to 3 
billion dollars (some 455 billion pesetas) in the first fiscal year after the integration, 
which assumes a 55% increase from the Spanish oil company’s results in its last 
fiscal year. 
Moreover, in two news reports published a few days after Repsol’s all-cash offer to 
acquire all remaining YPF shares at the end of April, the journalists of the Spanish 
newspaper Cinco Días wrote about the positive evaluation of the offer formulated by, 
again, a generic category of market analysts. Usually, generic references do allow for 
exceptions. As such, the generic reference to los analistas should be understood as a 
generalization about a substantial proportion of analysts, but by no means about all 
analysts (see Radden, 2009, p. 207). However, in these fragments, the journalists leave 
little room for alternative positions because it is emphasized that the analysts were 
unanimous in their positive evaluation of the deal: sin excepciones (without exception) 
and al unisono (in unison). 
[cuerpo] Al aplauso del mercado se unió el de los analistas, que alabaron al unisono 
la operación. (Cinco Días, 1999, 3 May[c]) 
[body] The market’s applause was joined by that of the analysts, who praised the 
operation in unison. 
 
[cuerpo] Bolsas y analistas han aplaudido, sin excepciones, la OPA de Repsol sobre 
la argentina YPF. (Cinco Días, 1999, 4 May[c]) 
[body] Without exception, stock markets and analysts have applauded Repsol’s 
takeover bid for the Argentine YPF. 
However, as the numbers in Table 25 (on p. 242) also show, the Spanish newspapers not 
only introduced expert sources mobilizing legitimating rationalistic discourse. The 
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analysis also shows that the Spanish writers quoted expert sources who presented 
delegitimating argument topics as well. In the Spanish subcorpus, the experts were 
found presenting the delegitimating rationalistic Repsol’s acquired debt (9/11; 82%) and 
the delegitimating nationalistic Competition (1/1; 100%) argument topics. It is 
particularly revealing to take a closer look at the ways in which the Spanish journalists 
introduced this expert opinion into their news reports. In the Spanish subcorpus, the 
critical expert opinion usually appeared in one sentence in articles which otherwise 
reported positively about the Repsol-YPF case. Moreover, these critical statements are 
often immediately downplayed by either the analysts themselves, or the journalists who 
chose to include the statement. 
 
The first fragment which illustrates this is taken from an article about the positive 
impact of Repsol’s all-cash offer on the Spanish company’s share price on the 
international stock markets. In the article, the journalist used generic referencing (los 
analistas) to summarize the opinion of various experts. In this Cinco Días news report, 
the analysts are quoted presenting legitimating rationalistic argument topics such as 
Size, Price bid for the acquisition and Strategic decision (not reproduced here). After this 
positive evaluation of the deal, presented through expert opinion, the journalist author 
of this text also refers to the delegitimating rationalistic Repsol’s acquired debt argument 
topic which is also attributed to the generic category of the analysts. However, even 
though the analysts are quoted presenting an important concern in this article, the risk 
for the Spanish company is immediately downplayed by including the analysts’ 
assertion that they foresee the situation of increased debt levels to last for a period of 
merely six months. 
[cuerpo] Los analistas afirman, sin embargo, que el nivel de riesgo asumido por la 
petrolera española es alto al suponer un elevado endeudamiento, aunque prevén 
que sea tan solo por un periodo de seis meses. (Cinco Días, 1999, 4 May[c]) 
[body] Analysts say, however, that the level of risk assumed by the Spanish oil 
company is considerable due to high indebtedness, although they foresee that this 
will only be the case for a period of six months. 
In another Cinco Días article, published right after Repsol had bought the 14.9% 
package, there is a fragment in which the experts of the Madrid based company Benito 
Monjardín are quoted presenting a different concern about the deal: the delegitimating 
nationalistic Competition argument topic. However, a close reading of the entire article 
reveals that this delegitimating argument topic almost disappears between the other 
legitimating rationalistic argument topics which are also attributed to expert sources. In 
the text, argument topics such as Complementarity and Synergy, Growth, Size, and Strategic 
decision are attributed to both generic – los analistas and los expertos – and more specific 
referents such as según Ibersecurities y Bestinver (according to Ibersecurities and 
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Bestinver), Vicente Santillana, de Urquijo Bolsa (Vicente Santillana, from Urquijo Bolsa) and 
Natalia Aguirre, de Renta 4 (Natalia Aguirre, from Renta 4) (not reproduced here). At the 
very end of the section of the news report in which the expert opinion on the deal is 
identified, the delegitimating nationalistic Competition argument topic is presented in a 
quote attributed to the analysts of Benito Monjardín. In this particular fragment, 
reproduced below, this delegitimating nationalistic argument topic is immediately 
downplayed by the journalist when s/he wrties that, for the moment, there is no reason 
to believe that his dominant position would even become a problem. 
[cuerpo] También habrá que estar atentos a las posiciones de dominio de Repsol, 
que ya posee el 66% de la argentina Astra, además de su 45% en Gas Natural 
(presente en el cono sur), advierten desde Benito Monjardín. Hasta entonces parece 
que reinará el optimismo. (Cinco Días, 1999, January 22[b]) 
[body] Benito & Monjardín warnes that “we will also have to pay attention to Repsol’s 
dominance, as it already owns 66% of the Argentine company Astra and 45% of Gas 
Natural (present in the South Cone). Until that time, it looks like the mood is 
optimistic. 
 
Expert opinion in the Argentine news reports 
The numbers in Table 25 (on p. 242) indicate that the Argentine journalists quoted 
experts presenting all four categories in more or less the same amount of news reports: 
legitimating and delegitimating rationalistic and nationalistic argument topics. When 
the experts are found mobilizing delegitimating discourse in the Argentine news 
reports, they mainly present the rationalistic Timing argument topic (6/10; 60%) and the 
nationalistic Competition argument topic (8/11; 72.5%)91. When they are found mobilizing 
legitimating discourse, they mainly present the rationalistic Price bid for the acquisition 
argument topic (6/11; 54.5%) and the nationalistic Reinvestments in Argentina argument 
topic (10/11; 91%). 
 
In most Argentine news reports in which experts are found presenting the 
delegitimating nationalistic Competition argument topic, the text does not present an 
exclusively negative evaluation of the deal. Most of these reports contain at least one 
legitimating argument topic as well (attributed to expert or other sources). The 
following fragment, on the other hand, is taken from an Argentine tekst which presents 
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 The analysis of expert opinion in the Spanish news reports already showed that delegitimating nationalistic 
discourse was only identified once: the Dominant position argument topic was mentioned by the analysts of 
Benito Monjardín (Cinco Días, 1999, January 22[b]). 
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an exclusively negative evaluation of the deal. In other words, no legitimating argument 
topic was identified in this news report. 
[cuerpo] La posición dominante que tendrá Repsol en el negocio local de la energía 
-con la integración de las operaciones de YPF, Astra y Pluspetrol- preocupa a los 
empresarios y especialistas del sector. (La Nación, 1999, 12 May[a]) 
[body] Repsol’s dominant position on the local energy market -with the integration 
of YPF’s, Astra’s and Pluspetrol’s operations- worries businessmen and sector experts 
alike. 
The second delegitimating argument topic that was found in the fragments attributed to 
experts in the Argentine subcorpus is the rationalistic Timing argument topic. This 
argument topic is only found in the phase where the Argentine government was looking 
for an interested buyer for the 14.9% package that was on offer. It disappears again from 
the newspaper discourse when the controlling stake in YPF was sold to Repsol in 
January 1999. This category contains fragments in which analysts state that the 
government should postpone the sale of its remaining shares because of the 
unfavourable market conditions. The first fragment is taken from an article which 
presents an overall negative evaluation of the government’s idea to sell its remaining 
shares. The writer of this article introduces a paraphrase to illustrate how the 
argumentation in the article is backed by (generic) expert opinion. This rhetorical 
technique makes it possible to introduce strong words such as desprenderse de (get rid 
off) and rápido y mal (rapidly and badly). The emotionally laden metaphor joya de la 
abuela (grandmother’s jewel) is used to powerfully conclude the journalist’s negative 
evaluation of the government’s actions (see also section 3.4.3.1 for a discussion of this 
metaphorical construction). 
[cuerpo] De acuerdo a los analistas, el gobierno argentino no necesita por ahora 
desprenderse rápido y mal de esa joya de la abuela. (Clarín, 1998, 14 August) 
[body] According to analysts, for now the Argentine government does not need to 
get rid of “grandmother’s jewel” this quickly and badly. 
In the second fragment, the author of the news report refers to the negative reactions of 
both the Argentine political opposition and a generic category of stock market analysts. 
These experts are explicitly described as assuring that this is not a good time to sell the 
shares. 
[cuerpo] La decisión presidencial de obtener nuevos recursos por esta vía no solo 
mereció el rechazo de los legisladores de la oposición. Los analistas bursátiles 
coinciden con éstos al aseverar que es un mal momento para que el Estado 
desprenda de sus tenencias. (La Nación, 1998, 24 November[a]) 
[body] The presidential decision to obtain new resources this way was met with 
rejection, not only from the opposition’s legislators. Stock market analysts agree and 
say that this is a bad time for the state to let go of its assets. 
  247 
The numbers in Table 25 (on p. 242) show, however, that the Argentine journalists also 
quoted experts presenting legitimating argument topics. Interestingly, almost all 
legitimating argument topics are found in news reports published after Repsol had 
launched its all-cash offer to acquire all remaining YPF shares at the end of April 199992. 
In the Argentine subcorpus, experts are particularly found presenting the legitimating 
rationalistic Price bid for the acquisition and the legitimating nationalistic Reinvestments in 
Argentina argument topics. It would appear that the Argentine journalists did not 
include more positive expert opinion until Repsol had formally announced its all-cash 
offer. 
 
When the legitimating rationalistic Price bid for the acquisition is identified in quotes 
attributed to experts in the Argentine subcorpus, Repsol’s offer is described as an 
irresistible one. This expert opinion is introduced into the text by means of both generic 
and specific references, as can be observed in the following examples. 
[cuerpo] Según los analistas del sector petrolero, el irresistible precio que los 
españoles pusieron a su apuesta (US$ 44,78 por acción) finalmente no dejará 
espacio al management de YPF para seguir resistiendo la operación. (La Nación, 
1999, 4 May[a]) 
[body] According to analysts from the oil sector, the irresistible price the Spanish 
offered as part of their bid (USD 44.78 per share) will leave YPF management 
without room to continue resisting the operation. 
 
[cuerpo] “La oferta de Repsol es muy atractiva, y la expectativa es que la mayoría 
de los accionistas la accepte en forma masiva en los primeros días”, coincidió 
Luciano Rolón, jefe de Research de Allaria Ledesma & Cía, Sociedad de Bolsa. (La Nación, 
1999, 24 May) 
[body] Luciano Rolón, Head of Research at Allaria Ledesma & Cía, stockbroker firm, 
agrees: “Repsol’s offer is very attractive, and the expectation is that the majority of 
the shareholders will accept it massively in the first few days”. 
After Repsol’s final move, the Argentine journalists also quoted a number of experts 
presenting the legitimating nationalistic Reinvestments in Argentina argument topic. In 
these fragments, the experts are quoted explaining how the acquisition could also have 
a positive effect on the local financial markets. In these fragments, the experts show 
that they believe that the Argentine shareholders of YPF who would sell their shares to 
Repsol would use that money to invest in other local companies. Thus, these quotes 
illustrate the experts’ belief in the positive impact of foreign direct investment on local 
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 In the Argentine subcorpus, there are 22 different news reports in which experts are quoted presenting 
legitimating argument topics. Only 4 of these texts (18%) were published before May 1999. 
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development (see, for instance, Moran, Graham, & Blomström, 2005). The discourse 
mobilized in these post-acquisition expert quotes is similar to the discourse mobilized 
by the Argentine government and can, as such, also be characterized as being infused by 
a discourse of local capitalism (see also Erkama, 2010a, 2010b). In the following two 
fragments, the expert quotes containing the legitimating nationalistic Reinvestments in 
Argentina argument topic are again introduced with both generic and specific 
references. 
[cuerpo] Otro operador, Alejandro Milito (de la firma Rabello y Cía), señaló que el 
efecto inmediato de YPF es más liquidez en el mercado. El que tiene asignado 
determinado monto de dinero para activos argentinos seguramente pondrá lo que 
cobre de YPF en otras acciones locales. (Clarín, 1999, 2 May[d]) 
[body] Another operator, Alejandro Milito (of Rabello & Cía), stated that the immediate 
effect of YPF is more liquidity on the market. Those who have assigned a certain 
amount of money to Argentine assets most likely will reinvest the proceeds of YPF 
into other local shares. 
 
[cuerpo] Los analistas coinciden en que el resto de los tenedores locales (fondos 
communes de inversión e inversores particulares) también destinarían gran parte 
de lo obtenido a la compra de otras acciones locales, dada la tendencia de los 
inversores a colocar sus ahorros en su propio mercado. (La Nación, 1999, 9 May[a]) 
[body] Analysts agree that the rest of local shareholders (common investment funds 
and individual investors) will also use a large part of their winnings to the purchase 
of other local shares, in line with the tendency of investors to place their savings in 
their own market. 
To summarize, the comparative analysis of expert opinion in the news reports revealed 
a significant difference between the two subcorpora. The findings suggest that, more 
often than not, the journalists drew on experts that presented ideas that were in line 
with the general editorial line of the newspapers. The experts in the Spanish news 
reports were primarily found presenting legitimating rationalistic argument topics. 
Moreover, when the Spanish journalists did include an expert with a different point of 
view, this delegitimating perspective was downplayed in the text. On the other hand, 
the experts in the Argentine news reports were initially primarily found mobilizing 
delegitimating discourse: the delegitimating rationalistic Timing and the delegitimating 
nationalistic Competition argument topics. It was only after Repsol’s all-cash offer that 
the Argentine journalists began to include experts who also mobilized legitimating 
discourse: the rationalistic Price bid for the acquisition and the nationalistic Reinvestments 
in Argentina argument topics. As such, these findings provide further evidence for the 
contention that journalists often introduce experts who support the general perspective 
of their news report or indeed of their newspaper’s perspective on a particular event 
(see also Albæk, 2011; Berkowitz, 2009; Boyce, 2006; Hagen, 1993). 
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4.4.3.3 Comparative analysis of the use of three nationalistic argument topics in 
the Argentine and Spanish news reports 
The final section in this chapter will look deeper into the ways in which three specific 
argument topics were presented in the two news environments: the nationalistic 
Ownership, Employment and Competition argument topics. These were used to delegitimate 
the deal and, as the analysis of the discursive strategizing of the main social actors 
already showed, the Argentine government and the Spanish company Repsol, the main 
proponents of the deal, were also found to react to these pressures by mobilizing 
relegitimating discourse (see sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3). The numbers in Table 26 reveal 
that the two subcorpora are significantly different in terms of the frequency with which 
the Employment and Competition argument topics were introduced into the news reports. 
There is no significant difference for the Ownership argument topic in terms of 
frequency, but a close reading of the fragments does reveal that these three 
nationalistic argument topics deserve to be discussed in more detail. 
























Again, this table does not show how these argument topics were presented in the 
Argentine and Spanish news reports. In the following, the more finegrained analysis of 
these fragments will reveal that the newspapers’ different perspectives on the case can 
indeed be unveiled by closely analysing the ways in which the journalists in the two 
news environments introduced these argument topics into their news reports. 
 
Ownership in the Argentine news reports 
The numbers in Table 26 clearly illustrate that the loss of ownership over the Argentine 
former state-controlled company was one of the major issues for the Argentine 
newspapers. This should not come as a surprise, given that over the years YPF had 
become a national symbol of local development and Argentine sovereignty (see also 
section 2.2.2). The status of YPF in the Argentine national consciousness is perhaps best 
illustrated with the following fragment, taken from an investigative newspaper article 
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entitled Ascenso, apogeo y caída de YPF (Rise, greatness and fall of YPF). The first lines of 
this text describe how, in 1907, a water drilling crew led by two technicians called 
Beghin and Fuchs accidentally struck oil in the region of Comodoro Rivadavia, in the 
south of Argentina. In the excerpt, the journalist goes on to explain how la legendaria YPF 
(the legendary YPF) became so closely associated with the Argentine national identity 
and concludes the introduction with an open accusation against the Argentine 
government for handing over control of YPF to the Spanish company Repsol and, as 
such, for throwing the concept of strategic asset out the door. 
[cuerpo] Era petróleo. Y aquello que la tierra vomitaba toda mezclada con globitos, 
iniciaba una larga y tormentosa relación entre la Argentina, una de sus riquezas y 
la empresa creada para administrarla: Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales, la 
legendaria YPF. Casi un siglo de vínculos tempestuosos que desató pasiones, 
provocó golpes de Estado, puso en crisis la noción de patria y corrió como una 
ráfaga helada por ese concepto indescifrable que suele llamarse identidad 
nacional, terminó en una ruptura impiadosa de amantes despechados decididos a 
no reconciliarse jamás. A noventa y un años de aquella mañana del telegrama de 
urgencia de Beghin y Fuchs, el Estado nacional está a punto de entregar a manos 
de la empresa española Repsol el control total de YPF; ha renunciado hace tiempo 
a la exploración afanosa de petróleo en el país; arriesga sus reservas, que se 
calculan que alcanzarán a hacer marchar los engranajes argentinos por sólo diez 
años y echó al canasto el concepto de bien estratégico. (Clarín, 1999, 9 May[b]) 
[body] It was oil. And that bubbly stuff being thrown up by the earth started a long 
and stormy relationship between Argentina, one of its riches and the company that 
was created to administer it: Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales, the legendary YPF. 
Nearly a century of tempestuous links that unleashed passion, caused coups d’état, 
put the concept of fatherland in question and ran like a cold wind through this 
indecipherable concept called national identity, ended in a merciless breakup of 
angry lovers, determined to never reconcile. Ninety-one years after that morning 
and the urgent telegram from Beghin and Fuchs, the state is about to hand over 
total control of YPF to the Spanish company Repsol. The state has renounced oil 
exploration in Argentina a long time ago, putting its reserves at risk, which are 
estimated to keep Argentina in gear for just ten more years and threw the concept 
of strategic asset out the door. 
The symbolic value of YPF for Argentina and the distress caused by the prospect of 
losing ownership of the company are evidenced in the descriptions that are used to 
refer to the Argentine oil company. In the Argentine news reports, YPF is usually 
described as the nation’s largest and most important company. This representation 
infused with national pride becomes extra meaningful when combined with the 
delegitimating nationalistic Ownership argument topic. In the first fragment below, 
taken from the subtitle of an article published a few months before the sale of the 14.9% 
package, the delegitimation is explicit but it is also attributed to the competitors of YPF 
in the Argentine energy market. The second fragment is the headline from an article 
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published after Repsol’s all-cash offer to gain full control of the Argentine company. 
Here, the negative evaluation of the deal is more implicit yet powerful because of the 
use of the inhabitants metonym to refer to the Spanish company Repsol (see also 
3.4.2.1). 
[subtítulo] Compañías locales del sector energético no ven con buenos ojos que la 
mayor empresa del país pase a ser controlada por un solo grupo. (La Nación, 1998, 30 
October) 
[subtitle] Local energy companies do not look kindly upon the country’s biggest 
company being controlled by a single group. 
 
[título] La compañía más grande del país ya es de los españoles (La Nación, 1999, 25 
June) 
 [headline] The country’s biggest company is now owned by the Spaniards 
In a number of Argentine news reports, Repsol’s acquisition of YPF is placed in the 
broader context of the increasing denationalization of the Argentine economy, as in the 
Clarín article published with the headline El 40% de las ventas está concentrado en 500 
empresas (40% of sales concentrated in 500 companies) and the subtitle Crece el proceso de 
extranjerización (Increasing denationalization) (Clarín, 1999, 2 September[c]). 
Interestingly, after Repsol had made its final move on the Argentine company, the 
Argentine newspaper Clarín published a series of articles in which the increasing 
denationalization of the Argentine economy was linked to the sudden appearance and 
subsequent dominance of Spanish investors in the country. The next fragment is taken 
from the first article in which this issue is discussed in the Argentine newspaper. In the 
text, the Clarín journalist wrote about Repsol’s all-cash offer which was launched the 
night before. In the excerpt, the journalist sums up a long (incomplete) list of Argentine 
companies in which both state and private enterprises from Spain had recently 
invested. 
[cuerpo] La oferta, de concretarse en su totalidad, superaría como inversión a la 
suma de todas las realizadas hasta ahora por los españoles en la Argentina desde 
que se iniciaron las privatizaciones. Empresas estatales y privadas españolas están 
en Aerolíneas, Telefónica, Aguas Argentinas, Edenor, Edesur, Gas Natural BAN, 
YPF, Banco Francés, Banco Río, Banco Tornquist, EG3, Astra, Orígenes, Consolidar 
y Signa, entre otras. (Clarín, 1999, 30 April) 
[body] The bid, if it were to be fully executed, as an investment would exceed the 
sum of all Spanish investments in Argentina since the start of privatizations. 
Spanish state-controlled and private companies have participations in Aerolíneas, 
Telefónica, Aguas Argentinas, Edenor, Edesur, Gas Natural BAN, YPF, Banco Francés, 
Banco Río, Banco Tornquist, EG3, Astra, Orígenes, Consolidar and Signa, among 
others. 
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After the dominance of Spanish investors in Argentina was mentioned briefly in this 
news report, Clarín published more articles on this issue. At times, the Argentine 
journalists tapped into socio-cultural background knowledge about the history that 
binds the two countries93. This is particularly the case in the Clarín article titled Cómo se 
despliega la reconquista española? (How does the Spanish reconquest unfold?) (Clarín, 1999, 
30 May[a]) because this text is built entirely upon colonial metaphor scenarios. In the 
second excerpt, the journalist describes how the Spanish investors see Argentina (and 
by extension the whole continent) as a new Eldorado of profitability. 
[título] ¿Cómo se despliega la reconquista española? (Clarín, 1999, 30 May[a]) 
 [headline] How does the Spanish reconquest unfold? 
 
[cuerpo] En España, el BBV tiene participaciones clave en la eléctirca Iberdrola 
(7,5%), en la propia Repsol (9,9%) y en Iberia (7%), todas compañías que ven en 
nuestro país o el resto de Latinoamérica la nueva Eldorado de la rentabilidad. 
(Clarín, 1999, 13 June[c]) 
[body] In Spain, BBV owns key participations in electrical company Iberdrola (7.5%), 
in Repsol (9.9%) and in Iberia (7%), all companies that see our country and the rest of 
Latin America as the new Eldorado of profitability. 
In another news report, Clarín reported on a particular percentage of the Argentine 
economy which was said to be controlled by Spanish companies: El 7% de la economía, en 
manos españolas (7% of the economy in Spanish hands) (Clarín, 1999, 9 May[e]). In the 
text, the journalist traces the Spanish investment spree back to 1990, when Telefónica 
was the first Spanish company to buy a stake in an Argentine company. In the second 
part of the excerpt, there are two elements that point towards a negative evaluation of 
this process. First, the journalist writes about how this process can be linked to the 
Spanish conquest of the Americas fivehundred years earlier. However, this statement is 
attributed to the rather fuzzy referent algunos (some). The second element is the subtle 
selection of words used to describe how this marked the beginning of the Spanish 
invasion. The representation of Spanish capital starting to infiltrate all segments of the 
local economy certainly has the potential to trigger a negative evaluation in the 
(Argentine) reader of the article. 
  
 
                                                     
93
 The analysis of the use of Spain’s colonial past in the context of Repsol’s acquisition of YPF was presented in 
section 3.4.3.1. 
  253 
[cuerpo] Las empresas con capital español ya facturan más de 20.000 millones. Eso 
es el equivalente a un 7% del PBI de la Argentina. El proceso que llevó a esa 
situación arrancó en 1990, cuando Telefónica de España se alzó con la porción sur 
de la ex ENTEL. Algunos llamaron a lo que vino después la reconquista de América. 
Y fue el proceso en que capitales españoles empezaron a infiltrarse en todos los 
segmentos de la economía local. (Clarín, 1999, 9 May[e]) 
[body] Companies with Spanish capital already bill over 20 billion pesos. This is the 
equivalent of 7% of Argentina’s GDP. The process that lead to this situation started 
in 1990, when Spanish Telefónica took control of the southern portion of former 
ENTEL. Some labeled what came next the reconquest of America. And it was the 
process of Spanish capitals starting to infiltrate into all segments of the local economy. 
The concluding sentence of the article also has the potential to trigger this negative 
evaluation of the Spanish presence in the Argentine economy. Again, there are no 
explicit forms of evaluation, but the following excerpt can certainly be interpreted as 
the journalist’s subtle indication of the potentially dangerous political consequences 
when the data that these two Spanish companies have access to falls into the wrong 
hands. 
[cuerpo] […] como un signo de la inserción de las companies españolas en el país, 
es también española una de las empresas encargadas de confeccionar los DNI de 
todos los argentinos y también fue la que procesó los resultados de las últimas 
elecciones a nivel nacional. (Clarín, 1999, 9 May[e]) 
[body] [...] as a sign of insertion of the Spanish companies in the country, one of the 
companies in charge of manufacturing ID cards for all Argentines is also Spanish, as 
well as the company that processed the results of the latest national elections. 
 
Ownership in the Spanish news reports 
The comparative approach provides interesting insights into the differences between 
the two subcorpora in terms of the use of the Ownership argument topic. The link 
between the Repsol-YPF case and the bigger picture of the Spanish investments in 
Argentina was already mentioned in the discussion of the Ownership argument topic in 
the Argentine news reports (see the discussion of the 9 May[e] Clarín article above). 
Interestingly, the percentage of the Argentine economy that was in Spanish hands was 
also discussed in the Spanish newspaper Cinco Días (1999, 3 May[b]). However, the 
representation of this issue could not have been more different. 
 
In fact, the percentage was discussed by the Spanish newspaper first and was later 
taken up by the Argentine newspaper. Unlike the Argentine report, the Spanish article 
did not have the 7% as the main focus of its article. The Spanish journalist included the 
percentage into his/her text as an interesting digression. The main argument topics in 
the Spanish news report are the legitimating rationalistic Complementarity and Synergy, 
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Efficiency, Growth and Size argument topics (not reproduced here). Furthermore, the 
Spanish journalist evaluated the privatization plans of the Argentine government 
favourably. In the following fragment, they are described as “ambitious” and as “one of 
the attractions of this project”. In the last sentence of this excerpt, Spain is described 
positively as el líder de las inversions extranjeras en el país (the leader in foreign investment 
in the country). 
[cuerpo] En el caso de Argentina, su carácter de plataforma de acceso al Mercosur, 
con un mercado potencial de 250 millones de habitantes, y el ambicioso plan de 
privatizaciones emprendido han sido algunos de los atractivos que han permitido 
multiplicar por 25 las inversiones de las empresas españolas en el último 
quinquenio. Además, los proyectos ya comprometidos hasta el año 2000, por un 
importe global de 3.677,52 millones de dólares (más de 551.000 millones de 
pesetas), convierten a España en el líder de las inversiones extranjeras en el país. 
(Cinco Días, 1999, 3 May[b]) 
[body] In the case of Argentina, it is considered a platform for access to Mercosur, a 
potential market of 250 million inhabitants. This, and the ambitious privatizations 
plan have been some of the attractions that have multiplied the investments by 
Spanish companies by 25 during the last five years. Furthermore, confirmed projects 
up until the year 2000, for a total amount of 3.677 billion dollars (more than 551 
billion pesetas), will make Spain the leader in foreign investment in the country. 
Then, in the second part of the report, the journalist reports on the percentage of the 
total GDP of Argentina that was generated by companies in which Spanish investors had 
invested over the last couple of years. This elaboration is introduced with the following 
subtitle. 
[subtítulo] Las empresas de capital español generan hoy más del 7% del PIB de 
Argentina (Cinco Días, 1999, 3 May[b]) 
[subtitle] Companies with Spanish capital nowadays generate more than 7% of 
Argentina’s GDP 
Indeed, as the following fragment illustrates, the comparative analysis of these news 
reports shows that a completely different interpretation of this percentage can be 
given, depending on the general perception of the Spanish investments in the news 
environment. In the Spanish news report, Spain is proudly described as uno de los grandes 
protagonistas del proceso de reformas económicas de este país (one of the great protagonists in 
the process of economic reforms in the country). The Spanish companies are explicitly 
linked to the creation of economic growth and to the modernization of the country’s 
public services and its industry thanks to the technological support they offer. It is also 
striking to find the nation metonym España (Spain) to be used to refer to the Spanish 
investors. As such, this fragment can be seen as another indication of the Spanish pride 
in the economic internationalization of the Spanish economy at the end of the 20th 
century. 
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[cuerpo] En la actualidad las empresas con capital español generan en torno al 7% 
del PIB argentino, lo que unido al aporte tecnológico para la modernización de los 
servicios públicos y de la industria han convertido a España en uno de los grandes 
protagonistas del proceso de reformas económicas de este país. (Cinco Días, 1999, 
3 May[b]) 
[body] Currently, Spanish companies generate approximately 7% of the Argentine 
GDP. This, together with the technological contribution towards the modernization 
of public services and the industry, have turned Spain into one of the main 
protagonists of the economic reform process of this country. 
In this Spanish news report, there is no mention of any of the alternative, more critical 
positions on the Repsol-YPF case as both the rationalistic argument topics and the 
positive evaluation of the Spanish investments in Argentina are presented in a neutral, 
matter-of-fact way94. 
 
That does not mean, however, that these critical voices are completely absent from 
the Spanish subcorpus. The Spanish newspapers certainly did not hide for their reader 
that there were a number of Argentine social actors who strongly opposed Repsol’s 
plans to acquire YPF. A close reading of the fragments reveals that the Spanish 
journalists mostly attributed delegitimating nationalistic Ownership argument topics to 
YPF representatives and to members of the Argentine political opposition (see also 
sections 4.3.4 and 4.3.5). 
 
In some of the Spanish news reports, the journalists also refer to a more general 
feeling of discontent in the Argentine society as a whole. In the first fragment, the 
Buenos Aires-based Cinco Días correspondent refers to the at times condescending 
descriptions of Repsol that circulated in Argentina: una petrolera de un país sin petróleo (an 
oil company of a country with no oil) and la peor petrolera del mundo (the worst oil 
company in the world). In the second fragment, another Cinco Días journalist describes 
the opposition to Repsol’s move on YPF as la aparente reacción nacionalista (the apparent 
nationalist reaction). 
[cuerpo] El error de unos y de otros fue quizás el exceso de confianza y también 
una cierta subestimación de la capacidad de Repsol, sobre la que en los últimos 
meses cayeron acá calificativos tales como el de ser “una petrolera de un país sin 
petróleo”, o también “la peor petrolera del mundo”. (Cinco Días, 1999, 3 May[d]) 
 
                                                     
94
 The analysis presented in section 4.4.3.1 already revealed that legitimating rationalistic argument topics 
were often presented as facts in the Spanish news reports, whereas the Argentine journalists attributed these 
topics more often attributed to the Spanish acquiring company Repsol. 
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[body] The error of some people may have been overconfidence and also 
underestimating the capacity of Repsol which, over the last few months, has been 
qualified down here as “the oil company of a country without oil”, and also “the 
worst oil company in the world”. 
 
[cuerpo] Ante la aparente reacción nacionalista que ha provocado la avanzada de 
Repsol sobre YPF, los españoles parecen haber cerrado filas para emitir al unisono 
el mensaje de que sus inversiones convienen al país porque no son especulativas y 
ofrecen una apuesta por la estabilidad. (Cinco Días, 1999, 17 May) 
[body] After the apparent nationalist reactions that Repsol’s bid for YPF has caused, 
the Spanish have united behind the message that their investments are beneficial to 
the country as they are not speculative and present a future of stability. 
The Spanish newspaper El País also published an article on the Argentine reaction to the 
deal. This report, introduced by the telling headline Orgullo herido (Wounded pride) has 
the Argentine hurt feelings as its only focus. In the following fragment, the journalist is 
found explaining why Argentina’s reaction to Repsol’s acquisition of YPF was so 
emotional at times. In this excerpt, the journalist also emphasizes that the previous 
(partial) privatization of YPF was thought highly of because the process was not 
accompanied by a total loss of control over the company. On the other hand there is no 
reference in this article to the Argentine negative reactions towards the Spanish 
investors. 
[título] Orgullo herido 
[cuerpo] La compra de la petrolera YPF por parte de la compañía española ha 
herido el orgullo nacional argentino. La empresa argentina era el último símbolo, 
el emblema casi, de que una compañía de gran tamaño podía ser privatizada, como 
lo fue, quedando en manos argentinas y funcionando eficientemente. La entrada de 
Repsol con una oferta pública de adquisición (OPA) millonaria ha roto de cuajo 
esta oculta esperanza de muchos ciudadanos. (El País, 1999, 16 May[a]) 
[headline] Wounded pride 
[body] The takeover of oil company YPF by the Spanish company has hurt the 
Argentine national pride. The Argentine company was the last symbol, almost the 
emblem, of the idea that a big company could be privatized, as it was, while remaining 
in Argentine hands and functioning efficiently. Repsol’s entry with a multi-million dollar 
takeover bid has shattered many citizens’ hidden hopes. 
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Employment in the Argentine and Spanish news reports 
Employees are often very suspicious of an acquiring company’s search for synergistic 
benefits and cost efficiency because they often lead to a series of layoffs. When 
employment concerns come to the fore in public discussions of cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions, union representatives sometimes appear in the public forum (see, for 
instance, Tienari et al., 2003; Vaara & Tienari, 2002). This does not seem to be the case, 
however, in the Argentine and Spanish media representation of the privatization and 
acquisition of YPF. Table 26 (on p. 249) shows a significant difference between the two 
news environments for the nationalistic Employment argument topic. The most 
surprising finding concerning this argument topic is its relative absence from the 
newspaper discourse on the Repsol-YPF case. The potential for layoffs was clearly not an 
issue at all for the Spanish newspapers as this argument topic was not identified once in 
the Spanish subcorpus. The Argentine newspapers did seem to be more concerned about 
the consequences of the deal for the employees of YPF (10%). Still, the numbers in Table 
26 also indicate that the Argentine newspapers devoted considerably more attention to 
the issues of the loss of ownership over YPF and the new company’s dominant position 
in the Argentine energy market. 
 
In the Spanish subcorpus, the (societal-)nationalistic Employment argument topic was 
not identified because, as the analysis already revealed, the Spanish newspapers 
adopted Repsol’s rationalistic perspective on the case. In the Spanish subcorpus, staff 
reduction is described in factual, rationalistic terms as a means to increase efficiency 
and/or reduce costs (legitimating rationalistic Efficiency and Costs argument topic). In the 
following fragment, the issue appears in a list of rationalistic argument topics 
(Complementarity and Synergy, Efficiency and Costs, Growth and Size) attributed to the 
analysts of Santander Investment who are (implicitly) quoted saying that these 
argument topics are to be seen as ventajas de la fusión (advantages of the merger). The 
fact that staff reduction is mentioned in parentheses further illustrates how the Spanish 
journalists do not see this as essential information. 
[cuerpo] Entre las ventajas de la fusión, [Santander Investment] resaltaba las 
siguientes: Repsy [Repsol-YPF] sería una compañía más equilibrada por actividades 
y mejor integrada verticalmente; ambas complementarían las carencias que cada 
una tiene por separado; permitiría una fuerte reducción de costes (y una 
disminución de plantilla de hasta 6.300 empleados); convertiría a la resultante en 
uno de los grandes valores petroleros; le daría mayor fuerza negociadora, y 
permitiría un mayor crecimiento en Latinoamérica. (Cinco Días, 1999, 3 May[c]) 
[body] Among the advantages of the fusion, [Santander Investment] highlighted the 
following: Repsy [Repsol-YPF] would be more balanced by activity and better 
integrated vertically. Both companies would complement the shortages each of 
them has separately; it would allow for strong cost reduction (and a reduction of up 
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to 6.300 employees from the payroll). Furthermore, the resulting company would 
become one of the biggest names in oil, which would give it a better negotiating 
position and would allow for more growth in Latin America. 
In the Argentine subcorpus, on the other hand, the Employment argument topic is more 
often represented as a real concern by the journalists. The way in which this argument 
topic is introduced into the Argentine newspaper discourse can be seen as another 
indication of the more delegitimating nationalistic perspective of the Argentine 
newspapers on the Repsol-YPF case. 
 
A close reading of the Argentine fragments reveals that the Argentine newspapers 
seldom include the perspective of union representatives and/or employees. However, 
there is one Argentine article which focuses entirely on the employees’ fear of layoffs. In 
this news report, the La Nación journalist includes several quotes of YPF employees. The 
following fragment illustrates their concerns about the potential layoffs and 
particularly how the management levels could be more sure of their jobs than the 
regular YPF workers95. 
[cuerpo] Los niveles gerenciales son los que se sienten más seguros –deslizó un 
empleado-. Los españoles van a necesitarlos para la transición, y lo más probable es 
que, a lo sumo, les pongan a algún ejecutivo de Repsol al lado, como pasó con 
Astra. Pero la tropa va a sentir el golpe.” (La Nación, 1999, 28 June) 
[body] “Managerial levels feel safest” said an employee. “The Spanish will need them 
during this transition, and in the worst case they will get a Repsol executive next to 
them, as happened with Astra. But the rank and file will feel the blow”. 
In four of the Argentine news reports in which this argument topic was identified, the 
concerns of the journalists who wrote these articles comes to the fore in a very specific 
way. In the first three examples below, the journalists explicitly write about how they 
interrogated Repsol on this topic. The fact that the Argentine journalists asked these 
questions and reported on their asking these questions illustrates how they considered 
this to be an important concern. In the following two fragments, Repsol is quoted 




                                                     
95
 The analysis of Repsol’s discursive strategizing in section 4.3.3 already revealed how the Spanish company 
repeatedly stated that it wanted to keep working with the YPF management in order to avoid the idea of a 
Spanish invasion at the top of the Argentine company. These statements were also found in Repsol’s M&A-
related press releases (see Vandenberghe, 2011). 
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[cuerpo] “Los activos de las compañías son altamente complementarios, así que no 
creo que tengamos un problema con el tema del personal”, dijo [Cortina] cuando se 
lo consultó sobre los ajustes que han acompañado las últimas fusiones de petroleras 
internacionales. (La Nación, 1999, 2 May[a]) 
[body] “The company’s assets are highly complementary, so I do not think we will 
have any issues with personnel”, he [Cortina] said when consulted about the 
adjustments that have been characteristic of the latest mergers of international oil 
companies. 
 
[cuerpo] -¿Van a reducir costos vía reducción de plantas de empleados, gerenciales y de 
producción en YPF?, preguntó Clarín a Cortina. 
-Se van a unificar las operaciones de Astra, Eg3 e YPF, pero insisto en que se trata 
de una operación estratégicamente mucho más diseñada para crecer que para 
reducir costos. Yo no me explico cómo se puede crecer y reducir personal. 
-Entonces, ¿van a despedir o no personal? 
-Vamos a concentrar todos los intereses que tenemos en Latinoamérica en YPF. 
Como consecuencia de esa concentración de intereses habrá una reducción (de 
personal), pero sobre la suma de Astra, Eg3 y todas las empresas, Repsol Perú, 
Venezuela, etc. Pero la plantilla de YPF crecerá. No lo duden, crecerá. (Clarín, 1999 
13 June [e]) 
[body]-“Are you going to lower costs by reducing staff, management and the production 
plant at YPF?”, Cortina was asked by Clarín. 
-“We are going to unify operations for Astra, Eg3 and YPF, but I insist that this is an 
operation that’s strategically designed for growth, much more than to reduce costs. 
I don’t understand how you can grow and reduce personnel.” 
-“So, are you or are you not going to lay off personnel?” 
-“We are focusing our interests in Latin America on YPF. As a result of that 
concentration of interests, there will be a reduction (of personnel), but of the sum of 
Astra, Eg3 and all companies, Repsol Peru, Venezuela, etc. But YPF’s payroll will 
grow. I guarantee you that it will grow. 
In the third fragment, the Clarín journalist reports that nobody at Repsol wanted to 
answer his or her questions about the employment concerns at YPF. The fact that the 
journalist included a question to which s/he did not even get an answer can be seen as 
an indication that the journalist considered it important to raise these concerns. 
[cuerpo] […] ningún ejecutivo de Repsol quiso contestar preguntas de Clarín 
referidas a los recortes de gastos y achicamientos de estructuras que afectarán a 
YPF. (Clarín, 1999, 5 June) 
[body] [...] none of the Repsol executives was willing to answer questions by Clarín 
regarding the cost cuts and structural reductions that will affect YPF. 
The excerpt taken from the fourth article is slightly different. The fragment is taken 
from an article published at the end of 1999, several months after Repsol’s all-cash offer 
for YPF. The article reports on the press conference given by Repsol-YPF’s CEO Alfonso 
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Cortina in Buenos Aires to announce the commencement of trading of the new company 
Repsol-YPF on the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange. In the excerpt, the La Nación journalist 
indirectly quotes the CEO saying that he was satisfied with the integration process. 
However, the journalist also deems it useful to add that he made no specific 
announcements regarding the restructuring programme. 
[cuerpo] Además, se mostró satisfecho [Cortina] con la marcha del proceso de 
integración con YPF, aunque no hubo anuncios concretos sobre la 
reestructuración del grupo y sobre el programa de desinversiones acordado con el 
Gobierno. (La Nación, 1999, 24 November) 
[body] Moreover, he [Cortina] expressed satisfaction about the integration process 
with YPF, although there have been no concrete indications regarding the 
restructuring of the group nor about the divestitures programme agreed upon with 
the government. 
 
Competition in the Argentine and Spanish news reports 
Table 26 (on p. 249) shows that the Argentine newspapers paid significantly more 
attention to the Competition argument topic than the Spanish newspapers. The more 
finegrained analysis of the fragments reveals that the Argentine newspapers already 
included this argument topic in the early stages when they reported on the Argentine 
government’s decision to sell its remaining shares and on the opposition voiced by a 
number of influential social actors. This argument topic was mainly presented by the 
members of the Argentine political opposition (see section 4.3.5). However, the concern 
about Repsol’s dominant position was also presented by other social actors. In the 
following fragment, the Argentine journalist writes about the complaint made by two 
(international) oil companies that already competed with YPF in the Argentine energy 
market: Shell and Esso. 
[cuerpo] El anuncio de la venta en una sola tanda de hasta el 15% de las acciones 
del Estado en YPF puso en alerta a las petroleras que ya compiten en el mercado 
local.Trascendió que las primeras en elevar su queja fueron Shell y Esso. (Clarín, 
1998, 24 October) 
[body] The announcement of the sale of up to 15% of the state’s shares in YPF in a 
single package alerted the oil companies who are already competing in the local 
market. It became known that Shell and Esso were the first to complain. 
In the Spanish subcorpus, this argument topic is mainly identified after Repsol made its 
all-cash offer for the remaining shares of YPF at the end of April 1999. It was only then 
that the Spanish newspapers started to pay attention to the concerns raised by both the 
Argentine political opposition, the dissident voices within the governing Justicialist 
Party and, in the end, the requirements set by the Argentine Ministry of Economic 
Affairs. 
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What is most revealing in the Spanish subcorpus is, however, that a close reading of 
the news reports reveals that this dominant perspective is described from an entirely 
different perspective. At times, the Spanish journalists describe Repsol’s newly acquired 
position not as problematic bus as a major opportunity to become the leader in the Latin 
American energy market. This positive evaluation was not found once in the Argentine 
subcorpus. Interestingly, these statements are again presented in a neutral, matter-of-
fact way and seemed to be internalized by the Spanish journalists who wrote with a 
touch of pride about the internationalization of their Spanish company. The following 
two fragments date from before Repsol’s all-cash offer for the entire Argentine 
company. 
[cuerpo] Y para Repsol […], la entrada en YPF supondría el liderazgo en los 
mercados argentino y peruano. (Cinco Días, 1998, 25 November) 
[body] And for Repsol […], , the entry into YPF would assert the company’s 
leadership position in the Argentine and Peruvian markets. 
 
[cuerpo] Si gana se convertiría en el líder petrolero de ese país [Argentina], […]. 
(Cinco Días, 1999, 20 January) 
[body] If it wins, it will become the leader of the oil business in that country 
[Argentina], [...]. 
After Repsol’s all-cash offer at the end of April, El País published an article in which it 
listed all of Repsol’s posessions in Argentina. In this article, the journalist does not refer 
once to the Argentine concerns about the Spanish company’s potentially dominant 
position in the Argentine energy market. Instead, the article was published under a title 
which can be considered to be a rather euphemistic description in view of the whole 
debate in Argentina. 
[título] Una extensa presencia (El País, 1999, 5 May[a]) 
 [headline] A broad presence 
In two of these articles, this legitimating Competition/Leadership argument topic is 
attributed to experts. The first article in which this expert opinion is identified was 
published right after Repsol acquired the 14.9% package from the Argentine 
government. In the article, the legitimating Competition/Leadership argument topic is 
presented alongside the legitimating rationalistic Size argument topics in a quote 
attributed to two different investment companies. 
[cuerpo] Tras la compra, la española pasa a ocupar el puesto 11 en el ranking 
mundial de petroleras y se convierte en líder del sector en Latinoamérica […], 
según Ibersecurities y Bestinver. (Cinco Días, 1999, 22 January[b]) 
[body] After the acquisition, the Spanish company occupies the 11th place on the 
global ranking of oil companies and becomes the sector leader in Latin America [...], 
according to Ibersecurities and Bestinver. 
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The second article was published in July, after Repsol’s dominant position in Argentina 
had been given substantial attention in both the Spanish and (especially) the Argentine 
newspapers. The text reports on the expert opinion of Warburg Dillon Read, a Swiss 
investment bank. In the article, this expert source is quoted presenting the legitimating 
rationalistic Size and Complementarity and Synergy argument topics (not reproduced 
here). In the following fragment, Warburg Dillon Read also provides a positive 
evaluation of Repsol’s acquisition of YPF, considering the Spanish company’s position in 
local gas market to be envidiable (enviable). 
[cuerpo] Además de una posición envidiable en el mercado gasista, la adquisición 
de YPF cuadruplicará las reservas de Repsol y aumentará la exposición de la 
compañía a las actividades de exploración y producción, que ofrecen más margen 
que el refine. (Cinco Días, 1999, 5 July) 
[body] Besides obtaining an enviable position on the gas market, the acquisition of 
YPF will quadruple Repsol’s reserves and will increase the company’s exposure to 
the activities of exploration and production, which offer a bigger margin than 
refinery. 
In conclusion, the finegrained comparative analysis of the three nationalistic argument 
topics Ownership, Employment and Competition further illustrates how the newspapers in 
the two directly involved news environment reported differently on the privatization 
and acquisition of YPF. The analysis of these argument topics provides further evidence 
for the contention that the writers of the Spanish news reports adopted a more 
legitimating rationalistic perspective and that the writers of the Argentine news reports 
adopted a more delegitimating nationalistic perspective when they discursively 
(re)presented and (re)constructed the same news event. 
4.4.4 Conclusion 
First and foremost, the comparative analysis of the Argentine and Spanish newspaper 
discourse produced in the context of the 1998-1999 privatization and acquisition of YPF 
clearly showed that the discourse analytic model as outlined in section 4.2 can be used 
effectively to unveil differences in the ways in which (written) media in two different 
news environments discursively (re)present and (re)construct the same news event. 
Furthermore, the analysis benefited from the methodological refinement that was 
added to the existing model of the Finnish School. The guidelines provided by Appraisal 
Theory (Martin & White, 2005; Thomson et al., 2008), the quantification of the 
qualitative codes (Miles & Huberman, 1994), and the comparative cross-textual 
approach (Vertommen et al., 2012) made it possible to gain detailed and novel insights 
into how exactly these different lines of vision come about. 
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The analysis complements the findings of the comparative studies conducted by 
Hellgren et al. (2002), Kuronen et al. (2005) and Tienari et al. (2003). These studies 
identified markedly different perspectives on the same cross-border business 
manoeuvre, depending on whether newspaper articles were produced in the winning or 
the losing news environment. In the Repsol-YPF case study analysed in this chapter, the 
(written) media in the Spanish winning news environment were found to be adopting a 
more legitimating rationalistic perspective. The analysis also showed how the Spanish 
journalists seemed to have internalized this legitimating perspective because they 
presented the advantages of the deal in a neutral, matter-of-fact way. The (written) 
media in the Argentine losing news environment, on the other hand, were found to be 
drawing more on delegitimating nationalistic discourse. 
 
The comparative analysis also extends the findings of earlier studies. Indeed, the 
refinement added to the discourse analytic model allowed for a more finegrained 
analysis of the ways in which the (written) media in the two directly involved news 
environments adopted a markedly different perspective on the same news event. The 
analysis first looked for significantly different patterns in the two subcorpora in order 
to unveil which discourses/argument topics were foregrounded/backgrounded. Then, a 
more finegrained analysis followed in order to shed light on the different ways in which 
these discourses/argument topics were introduced into the texts. In the following, the 
findings of the comparative analysis will be presented by formulating an answer to the 
research questions that guided the analysis in this section. 
 
The comparative analysis of the editorials 
RQ1: How did the Argentine and Spanish editorialists position themselves vis-à-vis the 
discourses/argument topics surrounding the 1998-1999 Repsol-YPF case? 
The analysis showed that the Argentine editorialists drew exclusively on nationalistic 
discourse and that Spanish editorialists on rationalistic discourse. The analysis also 
revealed that the Argentine editorialists were mostly against the deal (viz. 
delegitimating nationalistic discourse). The pattern in the Spanish editorials was not 
that clear. However, the more finegrained analysis provided more insights into the ways 
in which the Argentine and Spanish editorialists presented their respective 
perspectives. 
 
The analysis of the Argentine editorials provided more evidence that the 
privatization and acquisition of YPF deeply hurt the Argentine feelings. The sale of the 
state’s remaining shares to a foreign company was described as a big loss for Argentina 
(delegitimating nationalistic Ownership argument topic). The Argentine editorialists also 
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showed their concern about the consequences for the Argentine energy market 
(delegitimating nationalistic Competition argument topic). However, it must be 
emphasized that the analysis clearly revealed that the Argentine editorialists were not 
against the privatization per se. On the contrary, they wrote in positive terms about the 
first privatization of YPF. The Argentine editorialists openly took the view that it was 
better, for the country, to sell the shares on the international stock markets because 
they did not want to see another (foreign) company taking control of Argentina’s most 
valuable company. They also claimed that this privatization method was also used in 
developed (European) countries such as Great Britain. 
 
The Spanish editorialists adopted a legitimating rationalistic perspective when they 
declared that engaging in a high-profile M&A was the only wise thing to do for the 
Spanish company. Repsol’s economic internationalization at the end of the 20th century 
was also represented as an inevitable consequence of the unstoppable globalization of 
economic activity at the end of the 20th century (legitimating rationalistic Inevitability of 
global restructuring argument topic). As such, the Spanish editorialists clearly wrote from 
the same perspective as the Spanish company Repsol. It must be noted that they also 
showed their concern for the financial implications this major deal would have for 
Repsol (delegitimating rationalistic Repsol’s acquired debt argument topic). Still, these 
more critical observations were backgrounded in the texts. Apart from these concerns, 
the Spanish editorialists wrote openly in favour of the Argentine government’s decision 
to privatize and Repsol’s decision to acquire YPF. 
 
The comparative analysis of the news reports 
RQ2: What discourses/argument topics surrounding the 1998-1999 Repsol-YPF case are 
foregrounded/backgrounded in the Argentine and Spanish news reports? 
The analysis identified nationalistic discourse as the unquestionably dominant 
discourse in the Argentine news reports. Moreover, in the majority of the news reports 
on the Repsol-YPF case, the Argentine journalists described the Repsol-YPF case from a 
delegitimating perspective. The picture was, however, less clear for the Spanish news 
reports. Contrary to the Argentine subcorpus, neither of the two discourses emerges as 
the dominant one in the Spanish texts. As was expected, the different lines of vision 
were harder to trace in the hard news reports because these texts are characterized by a 
less explicitly evaluating writing style and because journalist authors often try to 
present both sides of the issues. 
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RQ3: How did the writers of the Argentine and Spanish news reports position 
themselves vis-à-vis the discourses/argument topics surrounding the 1998-1999 Repsol-
YPF case? 
The more finegrained comparative analysis of the news reports did reveal, however, 
that the generally positive attitude of the Spanish editorialists towards Repsol’s 
acquisition of YPF could, in fact, also be found in the Spanish news reports. In order to 
unveil these lines of vision, the analysis zoomed in on three aspects that were markedly 
different in the two news environments: (i) how the writers positioned themselves vis-
à-vis the discursive strategizing of the four main social actors, (ii) how the writers used 
expert opinion in their texts, and (iii) how they positioned themselves vis-à-vis three 
specific nationalistic argument topics: Ownership, Employment and Competition. 
 
First, the comparative analysis of the ways in which the journalists positioned 
themselves vis-à-vis the discursive strategizing deployed by the four main social actors 
revealed significant differences between the two subcorpora. The differences were 
mainly identified in the ways in which journalists reported on the discursive 
strategizing of the Argentine government and the Spanish acquiring company Repsol, 
the main proponents of the deal. 
 
The Argentine journalists included significantly more statements in which the 
proponents were found mobilizing relegitimating discourse to counter discursive 
attacks launched by the opponents. The Argentine government was mainly found 
reacting to the delegitimating nationalistic Contribution to the Argentine State Treasury and 
Competition argument topics, whereas Repsol was mainly found reacting to the 
delegitimating nationalistic Competition argument topic. This can be interpreted as an 
indication of the Argentine journalists’ concerns about the societal/national impact of 
the deal for Argentina. Indeed, by paying attention to the proponents’ relegitimating 
discourse, they also, implicitly, emphasized for their readers that the deal was met with 
significant opposition from several opposing social actors. 
 
The Spanish journalists, on the other hand, only included statements from the 
Argentine government when some of its representatives questioned the position of the 
Spanish company in the Argentine energy market (first dissident members, later the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs). Thus, the Argentine government was only mentioned 
when the Spanish company’s interests were in danger of being harmed. The Spanish 
journalists were also found observing that the Ministry’s concerns were in stark 
contrast with the governing party’s earlier firm support for the deal. The most 
remarkable difference between the two subcorpora was however found in the way the 
Spanish journalists positioned themselves vis-à-vis the discursive strategizing of the 
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Spanish company Repsol. A lot of the legitimating rationalistic arguments that were 
found to be attributed to Repsol in the Argentine subcorpus were presented as facts in 
the Spanish subcorpus. 
 
Second, the comparative analysis of how the writers used expert opinion in their 
texts revealed another notable difference between the two subcorpora. The findings 
suggest that the journalists often drew on experts that presented ideas that were in line 
with the general editorial line of the newspapers. Indeed, the experts in the Spanish 
news reports were primarily found adopting a legitimating rationalistic perspective. 
That does not mean that the Spanish journalists never included experts with a different 
opinion. However, these delegitimating expert observations were usually immediately 
downplayed in the news reports, either by the analysts themselves, or by the journalist 
authors of these texts. The analysis revealed the opposite pattern in the Argentine 
subcorpus. Journalists writing for the Argentine newspapers initially introduced experts 
who presented a delegitimating perspective on the privatization and acquisition of YPF. 
They also quoted experts presenting a legitimating perspective on the case, but only 
after Repsol had made its all-cash offer to acquire the whole company. As such, these 
findings reveal that the Argentine journalists only quoted experts with a legitimating 
point of view when the loss of YPF could no longer be averted. 
 
Finally, the comparative analysis of the three nationalistic argument topics 
Ownership, Employment and Competition also showed how the journalists in the two news 
environments adopted a markedly different perspective on the Repsol-YPF case. 
 
In the Spanish newspapers, the dominant position of Repsol-YPF in the Argentine 
energy market was described positively as a leadership position and staff reduction was 
described as an opportunity to cut costs. Moreover, when a certain percentage was 
mentioned revealing how many Spanish companies operated in Argentina, a Spanish 
journalist seized the opportunity to put the Spanish investors in general in a positive 
light by writing that Spain was “one of the main protagonists of the economic reform 
process” in Argentina (Cinco Días, 1999, 3 May[b]).  
 
The picture could not be more different in the Argentine newspapers. The analysis 
revealed that the Argentine journalists paid a lot of attention to social actors who 
voiced their concerns about the dominant position Repsol-YPF would come to hold in 
the Argentine energy market. Moreover, the employment issue was introduced at times 
as a concern formulated by the journalists. And finally, the analysis clearly showed that 
the journalists writing for the Argentine newspapers at times reported in decidedly 
negative terms on the denationalization of the Argentine economy. 
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In sum, the analysis of the news reports uncovered similar evaluative patterns as the 
ones that were identified in the Argentine and Spanish editorials. The Argentine 
journalists adopted a strongly delegitimating nationalistic perspective. The ways in 
which they foregrounded certain argument topics and backgrounded others, and the 
ways in which they positioned themselves vis-à-vis the discourses and argument topics 
uncovered their concern for the impact the deal might have on Argentina. The Spanish 
journalists, on the other hand, adopted a more legitimating rationalistic perspective 
which, at times, resembled the discursive strategizing of the Spanish acquiring company 
Repsol. The analysis showed how the Spanish pride in Repsol at times shone through 
the Spanish news, particularly when the acquisition of YPF was represented as a prime 
example of the economic internationalization of their country and of the role the 




4.5 Concluding remarks to Chapter 4 
This chapter focused on a corpus of Argentine and Spanish newspaper articles written 
on the topic of the (full) privatization of the Argentine oil company YPF and its 
subsequent acquisition by the Spanish oil company Repsol. In this concluding section, I 
will first present a summary of the main conclusions and contributions of this chapter. 
Then, I will go on to relate these findings to the broader perspective of the search for an 
appropriate balance between state and market in the economy. Indeed, the analysis in 
section 4.3 clearly showed that different social actors can have very different ideas 
about the role of the state in the economy. The analysis in section 4.4 showed how 
different perspectives on the appropriate balance also shine through the editorials and 
news reports published by the quality newspapers in the two news environments that 
are directly involved in a particular acquisition after privatization. 
 
The detailed empirical analysis of the data in the corpus contributes in different ways 
to the existing literature on the discursive underpinnings of cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions. The analysis presented in section 4.3 has added to our understanding of 
discursive strategizing in the context of a cross-border acquisition after privatization. 
The analysis showed that governments play a special role in acquisitions after 
privatization. Earlier studies have found that proponents often present a mix of 
rationalistic and nationalistic argument topics. The analysis of the Argentine 
government’s discursive strategizing revealed, however, that the government mainly 
mobilized nationalistic discourse to try to gain acceptance for its decision to sell its 
remaining YPF shares. The special attention paid to the proponents’ reactions to 
discursive attacks launched by different opponents also showed that relegitimation is 
an essential part of their discursive strategizing. 
 
The comparative analysis presented in section 4.4 has added to our understanding of 
the different perspectives that the (written) media in two directly involved news 
environments can take on the same (business) news event. The analysis of the editorials 
in the corpus showed that the newspapers on the Spanish winning side presented an 
exclusively legitimating rationalistic perspective, whereas the newspapers on the 
Argentine losing side presented an exclusively delegitimating (societal-)nationalistic 
perspective on the Repsol-YPF case. The analysis of the news reports in the corpus 
showed that it is also possible to uncover different lines of vision in these much less 
argumentative texts. The comparative analysis of the ways in which 
discourses/argument topics were foregrounded/backgrounded in these two sets of data 
also pointed towards a mainly delegitimating (societal-)nationalistic perspective on the 
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privatization and acquisition of YPF in the Argentine newspapers, and a generally more 
legitimating rationalistic perspective on the case in the Spanish newspapers in the 
corpus. 
 
Moreover, the analysis of the newspaper articles in the corpus also showed, on the 
one hand, that the Spanish company Repsol, the Argentine government and the Spanish 
newspapers presented a (primarily) legitimating perspective on the deal. The analysis of 
the ways in which they drew on the two dominant discourses and argument topics 
surrounding cross-border mergers and acquisitions showed that these three proponents 
mobilized a discourse infused with a strong belief in the opportunities of global 
capitalism. Both Repsol and the Spanish newspapers focused mainly on the advantages 
for the Spanish company (legitimating rationalistic discourse). The picture was 
different, however, for the Argentine government. The discursive strategizing mobilized 
by the Argentine government can be taken as an illustrative example of how the 
discourse of global capitalism can be adapted to be used at the local level. As such, its 
legitimating nationalistic discourse could also be characterized as a discourse of local 
capitalism (see also Erkama, 2010a, 2010b). What these three social actors have in 
common is their firm belief in one of the basic tenets of the Washington Consensus, 
namely that opening up to foreign direct investment is necessary for local development 
(Moran et al., 2005). 
 
On the other hand, the analysis also revealed that the Argentine company YPF, the 
Argentine political opposition and the Argentine newspapers adopted a (primarily) 
delegitimating (nationalistic) perspective on the deal. The analysis of the ways in which 
they drew on the dominant discourses and argument topics showed that these three 
opponents seriously questioned the strategy devised by the Argentine government to 
sell its remaining shares in YPF. The opponents, the Argentine opposition and the 
Argentine newspapers in particular, warned against the blind market forces of global 
capitalism. Instead, they advocated a stronger role of the state in the economy to 
protect both the nation’s strategic interests (Ownership) and the Argentine energy 
consumers (Competition). 
 
The general focus of this chapter was on the interplay between rationalistic and 
(societal-)nationalistic discourse. As was already explained in section 4.2.1.1, these two 
dominant discourses surrounding cross-border M&As can be linked to two ideological 
worldviews that are often taken to be opposites. Rationalistic discourse can be linked to 
(neoliberal) global capitalism, whereas nationalistic discourse can be linked to economic 
nationalism. Usually, the distinction between these two ideological positions is made on 
the basis of the binary opposition between a state interventionist (viz. economic 
nationalism) and a market oriented economic model (viz. global capitalism). 
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A very strict understanding of these two models would suggest that a market 
oriented model is ideologically incompatible with a state interventionist model. As the 
influence of (neoliberal) global capitalism grew stronger in the second half of the 20th 
century, it became something of a commonplace to claim that this evolution would 
eventually lead to the “hollowing out” of the state (see, for instance, Jessop, 2004; Peck 
& Tickell, 1994). Despite this trend, the state has shown amazing resilience. Therefore, 
several scholars recently raised objections to the simplistic market vs. state caricature to 
label the workings of the economy. They argue against the “hollowing out” hypothesis 
and claim, instead, that the state remains (and has always remained) at the core of 
economic governance96 (Birch & Mykhnenko, 2010; Brenner, Peck, & Theodore, 2010; 
Springer, 2012; Weiss, 2012). Harvey (2005) also emphasizes the ambiguous role of the 
state under a (neoliberal) global capitalist regime. 
On the one hand, the neoliberal state is expected to take a back seat and simply set 
the stage for market functions, but on the other it is supposed to be activist in 
creating a good business climate and to behave as a competitive entity in global 
politics. (Harvey, 2005, p. 79) 
These scholars emphasize that there is often a contrast between the common 
assumptions that go with the theory of (neoliberal) global capitalism (market good vs. 
state bad caricature) and the way it is actually put into practice because market oriented 
economic models are often also promoted by the state (see, for instance, Harvey, 2005, 
pp. 64-86). It follows that there is no and never has been a pure global capitalist model. 
Instead, as scholars such as Brenner et al. (2010) and Peck (2010) argue, a number of 
geopolitical and institutionally different hybrids can be found in the real word. Within 
these hybrid forms, certain practices may be inspired by (neoliberal) global capitalism 
whereas other practices may be closer to economic nationalism. These hybrids can 
display contrasting and contradictory characteristics (Geddes, 2010). As such, it is 
perfectly possible to find, for instance, a government vigorously pursuing free-market 
policies while at the same time placing quotas on certain foreign imports to assuage 
domestic disgruntlement. On the other hand, it is also possible to find social actors 
recognizing the virtues of free-market policies while at the same time advocating 
certain economic checks and balances imposed by the state. 
 
 
                                                     
96
 The analysis presented in Chapter 3 already showed that the nation-state also persists as an influential 
concept for our understanding of the world. Think about the adjective inter-national in combinations like 
international relations or international business. The adjective can only have meaning in a world divided by 
national borders (Cameron & Palan, 2003). 
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So how do the findings from the discourse analysis presented in the two empirical 
sections of this chapter relate to this broader perspective of the search for an 
appropriate balance between state and market in the economy? The analysis of the 
dominant discourses and argument topics surrounding the Repsol-YPF case certainly 
points towards the existence of these hybrids. The analysis clearly revealed, for 
instance, that the Argentine opposition openly advocated more state control over the 
energy sector than what the government of President Menem had in mind. But the 
analysis also found that even some of the most outspoken proponents of the 
privatization referred to the role of the state in their discursive strategizing. The 
Argentine government, for instance, was clearly determined to fully privatize the 
company in order to implement the Washington Consensus. However, in the end, the 
Argentine government did intervene in the economy when the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs formally demanded Repsol to divest some of its Argentine assets to reduce 
Repsol’s dominant position and increase competition in the Argentine energy market. 
The analysis of the acquiring company’s discursive strategizing revealed that the 
company showed understanding for the role of the state in the economy when it was 
found reacting to the delegitimating nationalistic Competition argument topic by stating 
that it never had the intention to achieve a dominant position and that it was prepared 
to divest some of its Argentine assets. This relegitimating discourse was also identified 
in the analysis of Repsol’s M&A-related press releases (Vandenberghe, 2011). These 
findings illustrate that multinational companies are aware that they have every interest 
in maintaining good relations with the local authorities of the regions in which they 
operate. 
 
The analysis of both the Spanish editorials and the Spanish news reports in the 1998-
1999 corpus revealed that the Spanish newspapers were very supportive of their 
company Repsol. In one of the editorials (El País, 1999, 1 May), the writer indicated that 
s/he believed that the Argentine government had made a good decision by opening up 
its energy market for foreign investors (see section 4.4.2.2). Thus, this Spanish 
editorialist clearly found that a government should actively promote (neoliberal) global 
capitalism in order to achieve local development. 
 
However, the analysis also showed that the opponents of the privatization and 
acquisition of YPF clearly wanted the state to exert more influence over the Argentine 
oil and gas reserves. Both the Argentine political opposition and the two Argentine 
quality newspapers Clarín and La Nación were found to be presenting a predominantly 
delegitimating nationalistic perspective on the privatization and acquisition of YPF. It 
must be emphasized, however, that this delegitimating nationalistic perspective can by 
no means be characterized as radically anti-global capitalist. The Argentine editorialists, 
for instance, were outspokenly positive about the first privatization of YPF (see section 
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4.4.2.1). They were certainly not against a market oriented economic model for the 
Argentine energy sector, but they did warn of the dangers of a too far-reaching 
(neoliberal) global capitalism. Thus, even though the newspapers clearly wanted to see 
the state taking more responsibility to protect the nation’s interest (Ownership argument 
topic), they did not advocate a return to a fully state-controlled YPF either. In the 
concluding Chapter 5, the Argentine and Spanish newspapers’ positioning vis-à-vis the 
1998-1999 privatization and acquisition of YPF will be compared to their perspective on 
the Argentine government’s controversial 2012 decision to (partially) expropriate and 
renationalize the Argentine oil company. 
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Chapter 5  
The 2012 (partial) expropriation of YPF: Revisiting 
the discourse analytic perspectives on media 
representations of Spanish FDI:  
5.1 Introduction 
When this research project was launched back in 2008, the consequences of Repsol’s 
acquisition of YPF in 1999 still resonated in both Argentina and Spain. The Argentine 
left-wing Kirchner governments, which came into power after the Argentine financial 
(and institutional) crisis with a promise to reverse the unpopular neoliberal reforms of 
the 1990s, did not make life easy for the Spanish companies operating in Argentina, 
particularly those providing public services such as Repsol-YPF. Both (the late) Néstor 
Kirchner (2003-2007) and his wife and successor Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007-
present) publicly wrestled with the Spanish (and other foreign) companies (see also 
sections 2.1.4.3 and 2.2.4). However, it could not be foreseen that the Repsol-YPF case 
would suddenly become the centre of the world’s attention. And yet, that is exactly 
what happened when on 16 April 2012, President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner 
announced that the Argentine government would (partially) expropriate and 
renationalize 51% of YPF. 
 
The 2012 (partial) expropriation and renationalization of YPF offers an excellent 
opportunity to revisit the discourse analytic perspectives on media representations of 
Spanish Foreign Direct Investment presented in the previous chapters. This new episode 
in the Repsol-YPF saga also offers an opportunity to add a new, specific type of cross-
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border business action to the existing body of research. To my knowledge, no study in 
any of the research traditions on which this analysis has drawn has looked into a 
renationalization after privatization. In this concluding chapter, the analysis of the 2012 
case will not only provide novel insights into the discursive underpinnings of this 
controversial cross-border action, the data in the 2012 corpus will also be used to reflect 
on the analytical conclusions presented in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 (for a description of 
the corpus, see section 1.3.3). 
 
Before presenting the findings of the analysis of the 2012 case, the two main sections 
will begin with a summary of the main findings of the chapter on which they build and 
reflect. Section 5.2 follows the structure of Chapter 3. Section 5.2.1 will look into the 
representation of the 2012 expropriation of YPF as a conflict between Argentina and 
Spain. Section 5.2.2 will scrutinize the newspaper articles in the 2012 corpus looking for 
historical references to Spain’s past in Latin America. The findings of the analysis of the 
2012 case will also be put into the perspective of the analysis presented in chapter 3. 
Section 5.3 follows the structure of Chapter 4. Section 5.3.1 will look into the discursive 
strategizing of the Argentine government as it was the main proponent of the 
expropriation. Section 5.3.2 will closely analyse the similarities and differences between 
the argumentative texts in the 2012 corpus. The findings will also be compared to the 
results of the analysis presented in Chapter 4 in order to unveil differences or 
similarities in the newspapers’ positioning vis-à-vis the privatization/acquisition of YPF 
in 1998-1999 and the expropriation/renationalization of YPF in 2012. The analysis will 
reveal that the Spanish government played a prominent role in the public forum at the 
time of the expropriation of YPF. This observation raises, for instance, the question why 
the Spanish government was hardly mentioned in the newspaper articles in the 1998-
1999 corpus. This remarkable difference between the 1998-1999 and the 2012 cases will 
be further explore in the concluding remarks section 5.4. 
 
Before embarking on the analysis of the data in the 2012 corpus, it is useful to briefly 
reconsider the most important institutional characters and storylines in the Repsol-YPF 
saga. Both Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner belong to the same 
Peronist party of Carlos Menem who decided to gradually privatize the Argentine oil 
company between 1989 and 1999. In the 1990s, Néstor Kirchner supported the different 
phases in the privatization of YPF from his position as Governor of Santa Cruz, a 
wealthy oil-producing province in Argentina’s extreme south. In 1999, Néstor Kirchner 
accepted Repsol’s offer to acquire the 5% stake in YPF that belonged to the Province of 
Santa Cruz. Thus, his support for the privatization of YPF during his Governorship in the 
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1990s is in sharp contrast with the Kirchners’ critical attitude towards the privatization 
during their respective times as President of the Republic of Argentina97. 
 
So how did this U-turn come about? In order to understand this evolution, the 
decision to privatize (1998) and the decision to renationalize YPF (2012) need to be seen 
in the light of their respective contexts. The decision to fully privatize the Argentine oil 
company was taken at a time when many Latin American governments were applying 
the economic reforms of the Washington Consensus in an attempt to attract more 
foreign capital to the region. However, in hindsight we now know that the privatization 
of YPF occurred at a moment when Argentina was at a crossroads between two radically 
different economic models, separated by the disastrous economic meltdown at the turn 
of the 20th and 21st centuries. The analysis presented in Chapter 4 provided further 
evidence that (at least part of) the Argentine public opinion was becoming increasingly 
critical of the local impact of the far-reaching neoliberal policies implemented during 
the 1990s. The financial crisis that struck Latin America at the beginning of the 21st 
century further undermined faith in the neoliberal policies of the 1990s and paved the 
way for a much more nationalist and anti-foreign capital rhetoric in countries such as 
Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela. In Argentina, these anti-noventista (anti-1990s) 
sentiments paved the way for the electoral victories of first Néstor Kirchner and later 
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner with their promises to reconsider the role and the 
weight of the state versus the market in the economy. The decision to expropriate YPF 
fits in with the rhetoric of the most radical wing of the so-called Latin American New 
Left, of which (the late) Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez was perhaps the most 
illustrious exponent (Grugel & Riggirozzi, 2012; Weyland, 2010). 
 
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner announced the expropriation of YPF on 16 April 2012 
after months of increasing tensions between the Argentine government and the 
Spanish-Argentine company Repsol-YPF. One of the causes of the conflict between the 
two parties was the increasing imbalance between energy consumption and production 
in Argentina. According to the Barclays Investment Bank, “consumption of oil and gas 
increased 38% and 25%, respectively, from 2003 to 2010, but oil and gas production 
decreased 12% and 2.3% in that period” (Wall Street Journal, 2012, 17 April)98. Nobody 
 
                                                     
97
 On 16 April 2012, the Spanish newspaper El País also published an article about the Kirchners’ support for 
the privatization of YPF: Los Kirchner apoyaron la privatización (The Kirchners were in favour of the 
privatization) (El País, 2012, 16 April). The article was not taken up in the 2012 corpus because for each 
newspaper, only the news report on Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s announcement was selected. 
98
 This fragment is taken from one of the English-language newspaper articles in the 2012 corpus of media 
articles on the expropriation of YPF. 
 276 
denied that the country’s economy suffered greatly from the energy crunch, but the two 
versions that were given to explain the problem could not have been more different. 
The Argentine government blamed the Spanish-Argentine company Repsol-YPF for the 
energy shortage, claiming that production had dropped because of the company’s 
reluctance to invest in Argentina. The government claimed that this had forced 
Argentina to spend heavily on imported energy. On the other hand, the critics of the 
expropriation blamed the government’s interventionist policies for the country’s 
problems, claiming that measures such as high taxes, price caps and unpredictable rule 
changes had discouraged investments in the Argentine energy sector (Escribano, 2012). 
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5.2 Conflict metaphors, (supra)nation metonyms and 
metaphor scenarios in newspaper accounts of the 2012 
expropriation of YPF 
The media representation of the 2012 (partial) expropriation of YPF offers an 
opportunity to look from a different perspective at the findings obtained from the 
analysis presented in Chapter 3. The chapter focused on the use of conflict metaphors, 
(supra)nation metonyms and metaphor scenarios in both English-language newspaper 
accounts of Spanish FDI in general between 1990 and 2009 and in Argentine and Spanish 
newspaper accounts of the specific case of Repsol-YPF in 1998 and 1999. Before 
presenting the analysis of the newspaper articles on the 2012 Repsol-YPF case, the main 
findings of the analysis in Chapter 3 will be briefly summarized. In the two empirical 
sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2, the analysis of the 2012 case will be put into the perspective of 
the 1998-1999 case. Section 5.2.3 will answer the case-specific research questions that 
will guide the analysis of the 2012 case99 and reflect on the ways in which this new 
perspective has helped to further develop and extend the findings from the analysis 
presented in Chapter 3. 
 
The analysis of the corpus of English-language newspaper articles (1990-2009) 
presented in section 3.3 revealed that Spanish Foreign Direct Investment was often 
represented at the level of the nation/region. In these texts, Spanish companies are 
often grouped together on the basis of one salient aspect of their (multi-layered) 
identities: their (perceived) nationality. The combination of this framing at the level of 
the nation with conflict metaphors makes it possible to represent the Spanish investors 
as Spanish forces invading other territories. In turn, this representation makes it 
possible to draw historical comparisons between Spain’s contemporary economic 
expansion and its imperial expansion from the past. These comparisons are rooted in 
broader socio-culturally grounded scenarios with rich conceptual structures: colonial 
metaphor scenarios. In their news stories on the first wave of Spanish FDI, when 
Spanish companies made eye-catching investments in Latin America, the English-
language journalists mainly tapped into the socio-culturally grounded narratives 
related to the discovery and colonization of that same region 500 years earlier. At times, 
they also referred to the end of Spain’s colonial empire in 1898. Later, when they wrote 
about the second wave of Spanish FDI, when Spanish companies started to diversify 
 
                                                     
99
 These research questions will be formulated at the end of this introductory section. 
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their investments into other regions than Latin America, the English-language 
journalists still referred to the discovery and colonization of the New World. However, 
when they wrote specifically about the Spanish investors venturing into Great Britain, 
the journalists compared these Spanish business actions to a specific historical 
encounter between Spain and England, one that became the symbol of all conflicts 
between the two medieval superpowers: the Spanish Armada. The analysis also showed 
how these colonial metaphor scenarios transfer deeply rooted cultural prejudices and 
preconceptions about Spain from one generation to the other. As a result of these 
continued discursive legacies, Spain has, until today, a rather harsh and cruel 
reputation, particularly in the English-speaking world. However, the analysis of the 
English-language texts also revealed that these colonial metaphor scenarios were also 
used to highlight positive characteristics of the Spanish investors. Still, it must be added 
that the fragments in which they were admired and lauded for their audacity represent 
only a small fraction in this corpus. 
 
Section 3.4 looked into the use of emotive framing and colonial metaphor scenarios 
in a selection of Argentine and Spanish newspaper articles on the 1998-1999 Repsol-YPF 
case. The analysis revealed that the Argentine journalists at times did draw on an 
emotively charged narrative frame based on a local/foreign dichotomy when they 
described the privatization and acquisition of YPF as a threat to the Argentine nation’s 
sovereign territory and integrity. The emotive framing in this context can be seen as 
giving an insight into the hurt national feelings caused by, first, the threat of losing the 
control over YPF to a foreign company and, in the end, the actual loss of control over 
YPF to the Spanish company Repsol. Colonial metaphor scenarios were identified in the 
Argentine subcorpus, although less than expected. Interestingly, the historical 
references to Spain’s colonial past in the region were mostly found in articles about the 
impact of the Spanish investments in general on the Argentine economy. Indeed, there 
are a number of articles in the 1998-1999 corpus in which Argentine journalists used the 
Repsol-YPF case as a stepping stone to write about the broader picture of el proceso de 
extranjerización (the process of denationalization) of the Argentine economy at the end 
of the 1990s. As such, the findings of the analysis of the English-language 1990-2009 
corpus and the Argentine 1998-1999 subcorpus suggest that colonial metaphor scenarios 
are more likely to be used in contexts in which a number of companies can be grouped 
together on the basis of their (perceived) Spanish nationality. 
 
In the Spanish newspaper articles, the nationalities of the companies involved in the 
privatization and acquisition of YPF were also mentioned. However, the confrontation 
between Repsol and YPF was represented as a power game between two private 
companies, not between nations. Still, the analysis also revealed a (perhaps more subtle) 
emotive framing at the level of the nation on the part of the Spanish journalists. At 
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times, they used the example of Repsol’s expansion into Argentina as the stepping stone 
to write about the important role Spanish investors in general were playing in the 
modernization of the economies of developing countries, such as Argentina. Colonial 
metaphor scenarios were not used actively in the newspaper articles in the Spanish 
subcorpus. However, the follow-up search looking for El País articles containing the 
discourse metaphor “nuevos conquistadores” in section 3.5 did reveal the frustration of 
the Spanish journalists with the modern-day revival of the Black Legend, particularly in 
the English-language (written) media, through which the stereotype of the aggressive 
Spaniards was passed on to future generations. 
 
Beside the aim to revisit the analytical findings presented in Chapter 3, two new case-
specific research questions will guide the analysis of the use of emotive framing in 
newspaper articles on the 2012 (partial) expropriation of YPF. 
RQ1: Was the 2012 (partial) expropriation of YPF represented as a conflict between 
Spain and Argentina? 
 
RQ2: Were colonial metaphor scenarios used in media accounts of the 2012 
(partial) expropriation of YPF? 
5.2.1 The expropriation of Repsol’s YPF shares as a conflict between 
Spain and Argentina. An Argentine attack on Spain? 
What makes the comparison between the (full) privatization of YPF in 1999 and the 
(partial) renationalization in 2012 interesting is that the roles of the Argentine 
government and the Spanish company were reversed. In 1998-1999, Repsol was a 
confident private company looking to expand into Argentina by participating in 
President Menem’s plans to deregulate the Argentine energy sector. In 2012, the 
Spanish company fell victim to the paradigm shift envisioned by President Fernández de 
Kirchner to increase state control over its natural resources. As such, whereas in 1998-
1999 Repsol and the Argentine government were business partners working towards the 
same goal, the 2012 (partial) expropriation pitted them against each other in a bitter 
battle over control of the Argentine oil company. This section will first take a closer 
look at the headlines of the news reports in the 2012 corpus to examine whether the 
expropriation of YPF was represented as a conflict between two nations (section 5.2.1.1). 
Then, a more finegrained analysis of the entire texts will show that the most emotional 
reaction to the expropriation came from a number of representatives of the Spanish 
government (section 5.2.1.2). 
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5.2.1.1 Representations at the level of the nation in the headlines of the news 
reports 
In the headlines of the English-language news reports on the expropriation of YPF, the 
focus is mainly on the active role of the Argentine government. In the following three 
headlines, the nation metonym Argentina is used in subject position. The name of the 
Argentine company is mentioned only in the Financial Times article. No reference is 
made to the Spanish company Repsol in these three headlines. 
[headline] Argentina to renationalise oil group YPF (Financial Times, 2012, 17 April) 
 
[headline] Argentina to seize control of oil company (New York Times, 2012, 17 
April) 
 
[headline] Argentina to seize control of oil firm (Wall Street Journal, 2012, 17 April) 
In the headline of the Huffington Post report, the decision is attributed to Fernández de 
Kirchner who is introduced, in subject position, as the Argentine president. The name of 
the Argentine company is also mentioned. 
[headline] Argentine President Cristina Fernandez pushes to nationalize oil 
company YPF (Huffington Post, 2012, 17 April) 
The Argentine president also appears in subject position in the headline of the article 
published by The Guardian. Interestingly, the Argentine company is described here as 
Spanish-owned oil assets. The explicit mention of the nationalities of these two crucial 
social actors (perceived nationality in the case of the private company Repsol) means 
that this headline has the potential to be read as a more emotionally/territorially 
charged headline than the previous ones. 
[headline] Argentinian president moves to nationalise Spanish-owned oil assets 
(Guardian, 2012, 16 April) 
The most explicit emotive framing is found in the headline of the article published by 
Time Magazine. The headline is firmly built on an inter-national conflict frame through 
the combination of the conflict metaphor oil war and the nation metonyms Spain and 
Argentina. 
[headline] The oil war between Spain and Argentina (Time, 2012, 18 April) 
In the headlines of the Spanish news reports, the active role of the Argentine 
government is also emphasized by either using the Argentine president’s name Kirchner 
(El Mundo) or the nation metonym Argentina (El País) in subject position. In these two 
headlines, the names of the two companies involved are mentioned, but no reference is 
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made to their (perceived) nationalities. From the ways in which the information is 
structured in these headlines, it can be deduced that the Spanish newspapers believed 
Repsol to be the rightful owner of YPF and, therefore, that Argentina acted unlawfully. 
In the headline published by El Mundo, this interpretation can be derived from the use 
of the verb arrebatar (to snatch). In the El País headline, YPF is described as belonging to 
Repsol through the use of the possessive pronoun in su filial (its subsidiary). These 
findings can be seen as a first indication of the Spanish newspapers’ firm support of their 
company in its power battle with the Argentine government, just like they backed 
Repsol’s internationalization strategy in 1998 and 1999. 
[título] Kirchner menciona la ‘trompa de un elefante’100 para arrebatar YPF a Repsol 
(El Mundo, 2012, 17 April) 
[headline] Kirchner mentions the ‘trunk of an elephant’ to snatch YPF from Repsol 
 
[título] Argentina expropia a Repsol su filial YPF (El País, 2012, 17 April) 
 [headline] Argentina expropriates Repsol’s subsidiary YPF 
The headlines of the Argentine news reports published by Clarín and La Nación do not 
contain references to nations or nationalities. President Fernández de Kirchner is 
referred to by using only her first name Cristina and the company name YPF is used to 
refer to the Argentine company. Repsol is not mentioned in these headlines. 
[título] Cristina decidió la expropiación de YPF (La Nación, 2012, 17 April) 
 [headline] Cristina decided to expropriate YPF 
 
[título] Cristina expropió YPF: ya la manejan De Vido y Kicillof (Clarín, 2012, 18 
April) 
 [headline] Cristina expropriated YPF: De Vido and Kicillof already run it 
The headline used by Página 12 to introduce the news report on the expropriation gives 
a first indication that this newspaper followed the argumentation put forward by the 
Argentine government: it is in the nation’s interest to take back control of YPF. Not only 
is the verb recuperar (to recover) used instead of the verb expropiar (to expropriate), the 
decision to expropriate is also represented as un cambio de paradigma (a paradigm shift). 
  
 
                                                     
100
 A few days before the announcement, Spain’s King Juan Carlos came under media fire after the news broke 
that he had gone on an expensive elephant hunting trip in Botswana. In her official announcement, President 
Fernández de Kirchner defiantly referred to the incident when she declared that the curve of the divestment 
of Repsol was very much like the trunk of an elephant. Repsol’s (alleged) reluctance to invest in Argentina was 
one of the Argentine government’s main arguments in favour of the expropriation (see section 5.3.1). 
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[título] Un cambio de paradigma para recuperar YPF (Página 12, 2012, 17 April[a]) 
 [headline] A paradigm shift to recover YPF 
Thus, the headlines of the hard news reports in the 2012 corpus show that the 
newspapers mainly focused on the active role of the Argentine government in the 
(partial) expropriation and renationalization of YPF. The headline that draws the most 
on emotive framing is the one published by Times Magazine. It is the only headline in 
which the expropriation is explicitly represented as a confrontation between two 
nations. 
5.2.1.2 Representations at the level of the nation in the public statements of 
Spanish government officials 
The analysis of the newspaper articles reveals that the most emotional reaction to the 
Argentine government’s threats to make a move on YPF came from a number of 
representatives of the Spanish government. Indeed, in the days preceding the decision 
and right after the official announcement, the Spanish government treated the dispute 
between the private company and the Argentine government as a matter of state by 
speaking out in defence of not only Repsol but all Spanish companies operating abroad. 
In the following excerpt, taken from the Financial Times, the Spanish government is 
represented through the nation metonym Spain. The metonymic reading of the location 
is triggered by the human agency verbs to retaliate and to summon. Moreover, the 
Financial Times journalist also writes about the “escalation of tensions between the two 
countries” as a result of the decision to expropriate YPF. 
[body] Spain retaliated on Tuesday by summoning the Argentine ambassador in an 
escalation of tensions between the two countries. (Financial Times, 2012, 17 April) 
Several high-ranked politicians of the Spanish ruling Popular Party are quoted in the 
texts. Mariano Rajoy, the Spanish Prime Minister, warned that the Spanish government 
would protect the interests of the Spanish companies as its own national interests. 
Maria Dolores Cospedal, the PP Secretary General, also declared that Spain would 
protect its national interests. And José Manuel Soria, the Spanish Minister of Industry, 
warned the Argentine authorities that any move against the Spanish companies would 
be perceived as a hostile act against Spain and its government. As such, the Spanish 
government is found creating an emotively charged metonymic chain through which 
the harmed interests of either the whole nation or all Spanish companies stand 
metonymically for the violated interests of the Spanish company. 
[body] [...] the Spanish prime minister, Mariano Rajoy, warned: “Wherever there is a 
Spanish company, the Spanish government will be there defending its interests as 
its own. (Guardian, 2012, 16 April) 
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[body] Maria Dolores Cospedal, general secretary of Spain’s ruling Popular Party, said 
Spain would act to protect its national interests. (Financial Times, 2012, 17 April) 
 
[cuerpo] […] el ministro de Industria, José Manuel Soria […] aseguró que la 
expropiación decidida por el Gobierno argentino es “una decisión contra Repsol y, 
por tanto, contra España y contra el Gobierno de España”. (El País, 2012, 17 
April[a]) 
[body] […] the Minister of Industry, José Manuel Soria […] stated that the Argentine 
government’s decision to expropriate is “a decision against Repsol and, 
therefore, against Spain and against the Spanish government”. 
These statements are not found in the Argentine newspaper articles. The Argentine 
journalists focused much more on the role of Fernández de Kirchner and her 
government than on the Spanish reactions to the Argentine move against Repsol. They 
did not pay much attention to Repsol, the Spanish investors nor the Spanish 
government. When they did, they referred in general terms to the negative reactions of 
Spanish social actors to the Argentine government’s decision. 
[cuerpo] El gobierno español […] condenó la “decision arbitraria” y 
“discriminatoria”. (Clarín, 2012, 17 April[a]) 
[body] The Spanish government […] condemned the “arbitrary” and “discriminatory 
decision”. 
 
[cuerpo] Repsol y el gobierno español cuestionaron en duros términos la decisión. 
(Página 12, 2012, 17 April[a]) 
[body] Repsol and the Spanish government used harsh terms when they spoke out 
against the decision. 
The Spanish commentators of El Mundo and El País, on the other hand, did write about 
the emotional declarations made by their government. The two Spanish newspapers 
welcomed the fact that the Spanish government was willing to act in defence of Repsol’s 
interests and, by extension, the interests of the Spanish companies operating anywhere 
in the world. They did, however, formulate mixed reactions to the emotionally charged 
statements of some of the Spanish officials. 
 
El Mundo explicitly supported the defiant tone in the public statements of the 
Spanish government. The support is clearly observable in the headline of the editorial 
published on 13 April: Kirchner se merece una respuesta contundente del Gobierno español 
(Kirchner deserves a strong response from the Spanish government). In the first 
fragment below, the editorialist first quotes the Spanish Minister of Industry who had 
publicly declared that the Spanish government considered any move against the 
Spanish companies as hostilidades contra España (hostilities against Spain) and then adds 
that these strong warnings should be supported without reservation. In the second 
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fragment, taken from an editorial published right after the announcement, the writer 
also quotes the Spanish Minister of Industry and then states that the whole Spanish 
society is expecting a forceful reaction from the Spanish government. 
[título] Kirchner se merece una respuesta contundente del Gobierno español 
[cuerpo] […] “gestos de hostilidad contra las empresas españolas” serán también 
considerados como “hostilidad hacia España y hacia el Gobierno de España” [cita 
del ministro de Industria español]. Se trata de un aviso contundente -aunque 
quizás tardío- que hay que apoyar sin reservas. (El Mundo, 2012, 13 April) 
[headline] Kirchner deserves a strong response from the Spanish Government 
[body] […] “acts of hostility against the Spanish companies” will also be considered 
“hostilities against Spain and against the government of Spain” [quote attributed to 
the Spanish Minister of Industry]. This is a strong warning -although perhaps late- 
which should be supported without reservation. 
 
[cuerpo] El Gobierno se reunió de urgencia nada más conocer la decisión. Al 
terminar, los ministros de Asuntos Exteriores y de Industria denunciaron que la medida 
“discrimina” a YPF y a sus accionistas y calificaron la expropiación de “hostil” 
contra España y contra sus empresas. […] A la vista de la tropelía, los accionistas 
de Repsol, el mundo empresarial y toda la sociedad esperan del Gobierno de Rajoy 
una respuesta directamente proporcional a lo que, como hemos dicho, los 
ministros calificaron de operación “hostil, discriminatoria” y ajena al derecho de 
propiedad. (El Mundo, 2012, 17 April) 
[body] The government held an emergency meeting shortly after the 
announcement. Afterwards, the ministers of Foreign Affairs and Industry declared that 
the measure “discriminates” against YPF and its shareholders and described the 
expropriation as “hostile” against Spain and against its companies”. […] In view of 
the outrage, the shareholders of Repsol, the corporate world and the whole society 
expect from the Rajoy government a directly proportional response to, as we have 
written, what the ministers described as an act that is “hostile, discriminatory” and 
that violates the right of ownership. 
At first sight, the writer of the editorial published by El País on 14 April seems to share 
the opinion of the El Mundo editorialists when s/he writes that “it is wise for the 
government to act in defence of Spanish private companies operating abroad”. 
However, in the second part of the fragment, the editorialist goes on to strongly 
condemn the nationalistic tone in the public statements of high-ranked Spanish officials 
(una escalada verbal (verbal escalation) as s/he calls them). Instead, s/he argues in favour 
of a more subtle, diplomatic approach. 
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[cuerpo] Rajoy ha sacado su artillería pesada en defensa de Repsol en Argentina. Es 
razonable que el Gobierno defienda a las empresas privadas españolas en el extranjero. 
La mejor diplomacia es la que sabe jugar con la negociación discreta y evita la 
amenaza pública. Una escalada verbal, como la que han protagonizado los ministros 
de Industria, José Manuel Soria, y de Exteriores, José Manuel García Margallo, solo 
puede alimentar el círculo vicioso de los reproches mutuos y en poco contribuirá, 
por desgracia, a la resolución del contencioso. (El País, 2012, 14 April) 
[body] Rajoy has deployed his heavy artillery in defence of Repsol in Argentina. It is 
wise for the Government to act in defence of Spanish private companies operating abroad. 
The best diplomacy engages in discrete negotiations and avoids public threats. A 
verbal escalation, as in the statements of the Minister of Industry, José Manuel Soria, 
and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, José Manuel García Margallo, can only aggravate 
the vicious circle of mutual recriminations and will help little, unfortunately, to 
settle the dispute. 
This argumentation is found in two more Spanish editorials, both of them published by 
El País after President Fernández de Kirchner made the official announcement. In both 
fragments, the editorialist strongly condemns the nationalist tone of the Spanish 
government’s public reactions. 
[cuerpo] El conflicto […] entra en una fase muy delicada en términos políticos y 
diplomáticos en la que, en todo caso, el Gobierno español debería evitar una 
política de cruda confrontación nacionalista. (El País, 2012, 18 April) 
[body] The conflict […] enters a critical phase in political and diplomatic terms in 
which, in any case, the Spanish Government should avoid the politics of crude 
nationalist confrontation. 
 
[cuerpo] No parece que la encendida retórica del Gobierno español […] sea la mejor vía; 
sí lo es, en cambio, su activismo ante los organismos internacionales. (El País, 2012, 
21 April) 
[body] It does not seem that the heated rhetoric of the Spanish Government […] is the 
best option. The best option is to continue its activism in international 
organizations. 
In any case, all of these fragments show that, even though there was some debate about 
how the Spanish government should react, the Spanish editorialists clearly expected 
their government to defend the interests of their companies operating abroad. 
 
The Argentine journalists did not refer to the public declarations of the Spanish 
officials in the hard news reports, but they were mentioned in one Clarín editorial. In 
the following fragment, the Argentine editorialist points out that the Argentine 
government’s pressure on the Spanish company Repsol is causing quite a stir in Spain. 
S/he quotes both the CEO of Repsol, Antonio Brufau, and the Spanish minister of 
Industry. The editorialist uses these declarations in order to make the point that the 
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expropriation will not be without obstacles: la expropiación no sera exactamente un paseo 
(the expropriation is not going to be exactly a walk in the park). 
[cuerpo] “Piensen en las consecuencias de lo que van a hacer”, advirtió Brufau 
mientras el ministro de Industria de su país afirmó que “la hostilidad contra las 
empresas españolas es hostilidad hacia España”. La expropiación no será 
precisamente un paseo. (Clarín, 2012, 13 April) 
[body] “Think about the consequences of what you are about to do”, warned Brufau 
[Repsol’s CEO] while the minister of Industry of his country declared that “hostility 
against Spanish companies is hostility against Spain”. The expropriation is not going 
to be exactly a walk in the park. 
5.2.2 Colonial metaphor scenarios in newspaper accounts of the 2012 
(partial) expropriation of YPF. The end of the Spanish rule over 
Argentina’s corporate treasure(s)? 
In the previous section, the analysis showed that the (written) news media used national 
frames of reference to report on the 2012 (partial) expropriation of YPF, but also that 
they mainly focused on the active role of the Argentine government. It was also found 
that it was the representatives of the Spanish government who most forcefully 
represented the power battle between the Argentine government and Repsol as a 
confrontation between Argentina and Spain. It seems unlikely, however, that these 
high-ranked Spanish officials would take this emotive framing one step further by 
tapping into the socio-cultural background knowledge about the shared past between 
the two nations in order to condemn the move on Repsol’s subsidiary YPF. The analysis 
of the 2012 corpus reveals that there are no news texts which are firmly built on 
colonial metaphor scenarios. However, there are isolated historical references to 
colonial times in three Spanish-language argumentative texts in the corpus: in a Spanish 
editorial published by El Mundo, in an Argentine editorial published by La Nación and in 
one of the columns published by the Argentine newspaper Página 12. 
 
In the La Nación editorial, metaphor scenarios are not used actively but the writer 
does put the diplomatic crisis between Argentina and Spain into the historical 
perspective of the difficult relations at the time of Spain’s colonial empire. The 
editorialist presumably refers to the Latin American Wars of Independence, a series of 
armed conflicts against Spanish rule that took place in the colonies between 1808 and 
1829 (Archer, 2000). The writer is also very clear about his/her rejection of the 
procedure chosen by the Argentine government as s/he begins this sentence with no 
puede esperarse nada bueno de […] (nothing good can be expected from […]). 
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[cuerpo] No puede esperarse nada bueno del procedimiento elegido, que amenaza 
con colocarnos al borde de la peor crisis bilateral con España desde los tiempos de la 
colonia. (La Nación, 2012, 17 April) 
[body] No good can be expected from the chosen procedure, which threatens to put 
us on the brink of the worst bilateral crisis with Spain since colonial times. 
The following fragment is taken from one of the columns published by Página 12. The 
text was written by Claudio Scaletta, a freelance journalist and a regular columnist for 
the Argentine newspaper. The fragment already shows that this columnist presents a 
completely different perspective on the expropriation than, for instance, the La Nación 
editorialist who wrote the fragment above101. In the excerpt, Scaletta first states that the 
Argentine government had every right to expropriate YPF and then describes the 
Spanish hurt feelings for this sovereign decision by describing Spain rather gloatingly as 
la metrópoli en decadencia (the Mother Country in decay). In this fragment, the colonial 
reference metrópoli (Mother Country) is combined with a reference to the difficult 
situation in Spain in 2012 when the country was still feeling the effects of the global 
economic meltdown that had begun in 2007: en decadencia (in decay). The combination 
of these two elements has the potential to activate the socio-cultural background 
knowledge of another moment in Spanish history when the country suffered a 
substantial setback after a period of experiencing exponential growth. After the Spanish 
Golden Age (16th century), which resulted from the discovery and colonization of the 
New World, the Spanish empire slowly fell into decay. The decline of Spain as a world 
power came with a long period of socio-economic difficulties, often called la decadencia 
española (see also section 2.3.2). 
[cuerpo] La decisión argentina sólo fue un acto de independencia, mal que le pese a 
la metrópoli en decadencia. (Página 12, 2012, 17 April[c]) 
[body] The Argentine decision was nothing more than an act of independence, as 
much as it may pain the Mother Country in decay. 
The writer of one of the editorials published by the Spanish newspaper El Mundo also 
used a colonial metaphor scenario. What is telling about this fragment is that the 
Spanish editorialist again writes about the use of colonial metaphor scenarios by non-
Spaniards to portray the Spanish investors in a bad light. The follow-up study in the 
concluding remarks section of Chapter 3 (section 3.5) also found that Spanish journalists 
at times showed their displeasure with the international (written) media’s reproduction 
and dissemination of the stereotype of the aggressive Spanish conquistadors in the 
context of Spain’s economic expansion through the use of the discourse metaphor 
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 A finegrained comparative cross-textual analysis of the Argentine and Spanish argumentative texts in the 
2012 corpus will be presented in section 5.3.2. 
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nuevos conquistadores. In the excerpt, the El Mundo editorialist writes about the 
Argentine supporters of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and her government who used 
anti-Spanish slogans for which they also tapped into the socio-cultural narrative of the 
Spanish conquest of the New World. The expropriation of YPF is metaphorically 
represented as el final de la conquista española (the end of the Spanish conquest) and the 
Spanish representatives of multinational companies operating in the country are 
described as piratas (pirates) and colonialistas (colonialists). The fact that the Spanish 
editorialist discursively (re)constructed this scene for a Spanish media audience can be 
interpreted as an indication that this writer felt it was important to show that these 
anti-Spanish, anti-colonialist feelings were still very much present in Argentina, 
particularly among the supporters of the Argentine government. 
[cuerpo] En las afueras de la Casa Rosada, un grupo de manifestantes enarboló la 
bandera nacional y carteles que pregonaban “El final de la conquista española” 
[…]. “Piratas... colonialistas”, exclamaban los integrantes de La Cámpora, el 
movimiento juvenil kirchnerista que es invitado a los actos presidenciales. (El 
Mundo, 2012, 17 April[a]) 
[body] Outside the Casa Rosada [presidential palace in Buenos Aires], a group of 
demonstrators raised the national flag and protest signs that read “The end of the 
Spanish conquest” […]. “Pirates… colonialists”, shouted the members of La Cámpora, 
the Kirchnerist youth organization which is invited to all presidential events. 
5.2.3 Conclusion 
The aim of the first analytical section of this concluding chapter was to use the data in 
the 2012 corpus to revisit the findings of the analysis presented in Chapter 3. First, the 
analysis set out to explore whether journalists writing for English-language and/or 
Spanish-language (quality) newspapers used conflict frames and national frames of 
reference to represent the 2012 (partial) expropriation and renationalization of YPF as a 
conflict between Argentina and Spain. Second, the analysis also set out to identify 
references to Spain’s colonial past in the region in the newspaper texts on the 2012 
(partial) expropriation. The analysis of the English-language 1990-2009 corpus (section 
3.3) and the Spanish-language 1998-1999 corpus (section 3.4) already showed that these 
two emotive framing strategies were mainly found to be used in combination in news 
stories about Spanish FDI in general. The research questions guiding the analysis of the 
2012 case aimed at finding out if and how these strategies were used in the news reports 
on the Argentine government’s highly controversial decision to (partially) expropriate 
and renationalize Repsol’s subsidiary YPF. The answers to these research questions are 
also used to reflect on the findings of the analysis presented in Chapter 3. 
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RQ1: Was the 2012 (partial) expropriation of YPF represented as a conflict between 
Spain and Argentina? 
The analysis of the headlines introducing the news reports in the 2012 corpus revealed 
that the newspapers mainly focused on the actions of the Argentina government and 
not as much on Repsol’s side of the story. The nation metonym Argentina or the 
references to the Argentine President were mostly used in subject position in both the 
English-language and Spanish-language newspapers. This places the focus on the fact 
that the Argentine government made the decision to (partially) expropriate and 
renationalize the oil company. In these headlines, the Argentine decision was not 
represented as a conflict between Spain and Argentina. As such, this representation 
differs from the (written) media’s conventionalized use of conflict and national frames 
in news stories about cross-border M&As, as was shown in Chapter 3. In the 2012 corpus, 
the headline of the article published by Time Magazine (2012, 18 April) is, however, an 
exception. This headline is firmly built on a combination of a conflict frame and a 
national frame of reference to represent the expropriation as a warlike conflict between 
the two nations involved in the process: The oil war between Spain and Argentina. 
 
The analysis of these emotive framing strategies also revealed a number of revealing 
differences in the ways in which the journalists writing for the different newspapers 
positioned themselves vis-à-vis the expropriation. The English-language newspapers 
focused on the Argentine government’s active role in taking back control of YPF. In 
these texts, the company’s perceived nationalities and Repsol’s interests in YPF are not 
always mentioned, except in the article published by The Guardian, were Repsol’s 
subsidiary is described as Spanish-owned oil assets. The Spanish newspapers did refer to 
Repsol’s ownership of YPF. Moreover, the wording in the two headlines can be seen as 
an indication of the Spanish newspapers’ rejection of the legitimacy of the Argentine 
government’s decision. As such, this already suggests that, just like they did in 1998 and 
1999, the Spanish newspapers backed Repsol’s international endeavours. In the 
headlines of the news reports published by the Argentine newspapers Clarín and La 
Nación, Kirchner or Argentina were also put in subject position. Repsol’s ownership of 
YPF was not mentioned in these headlines. The headline introducing the news report 
published by the Argentine daily Página 12 can, on the other hand, be seen as giving an 
insight into the newspaper’s positive evaluation of the expropriation, as the 
government’s decision was described in positive terms as a paradigm shift to recover YPF. 
The Spanish-language newspapers’ perspectives on the 2012 case will be further 




The close reading of the texts in the 2012 corpus revealed that the most emotively 
charged framing was found in quotes attributed to high-ranked representatives of the 
Spanish government. These quotes clearly illustrate how the Spanish government 
represented the Argentine government’s move on Repsol’s subsidiary YPF not only as 
an attack on one of its companies, but also as an attack on Spain’s national interests in 
general. These Spanish officials were found creating a metonymic chain as they stated 
that the expropriation was a declaration of economic hostility against not only Repsol 
but all Spanish companies operating in Argentina and, as such, as an act of defiance 
against the whole Spanish nation. The prominence of the Spanish government in the 
public forum is remarkable as this social actor was hardly mentioned in the 1998-1999 
corpus. This difference between the 1998-1999 privatization and the 2012 (partial) 
expropriation of YPF deserves a closer look in the concluding remarks section 5.4 of this 
concluding chapter. 
 
The analysis of the Spanish 2012 editorials also revealed that the two leading Spanish 
newspapers wanted their government to react to the Argentine government’s seizure of 
YPF. However, it was also found that they had different ideas about the appropriate 
course of action. El Mundo showed support for the defiant and nationalist tone in the 
public statements of some of the Spanish officials. El País, on the other hand, strongly 
condemned these emotional reactions and argued in favour of a more diplomatic 
approach to put pressure on the Argentine forces that worked against the corporate 
interests of their companies in general and Repsol in particular. 
RQ2: Were colonial metaphor scenarios used in media accounts of the 2012 (partial) 
expropriation of YPF? 
In contrast to the 1998-1999 corpus on the privatization and acquisition of YPF, there 
are no news texts in the 2012 corpus on the expropriation of YPF that are entirely built 
on colonial metaphor scenarios. Still, the analysis found three references to Spain’s 
colonial past in three different argumentative texts in the corpus. One of the La Nación 
editorialists compared the 2012 diplomatic crisis to the difficult relations at the time of 
the Spanish American wars of independence (1808-1829). One of the Página 12 
columnists subtly compared 2012 crisis-hit Spain, the Mother Country, to the difficult 
period that followed the Spanish Golden Age. And one of the El Mundo editorialists 
referred to the active use of colonial metaphor scenarios by the most radical supporters 
of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s anti-foreign capital rhetoric, such as the Kirchnerist 
youth organization La Cámpora. The fragment illustrates how Spanish investors were 
still called conquistadors, colonialists and pirates. 
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Crucially, these references show how easily Spain’s colonial past is conjured up in the 
context of cross-border business actions involving a Spanish company. Moreover, these 
three references again give an insight into the difficult relationship between Spain and 
its former colonies, particularly in the context of Spain’s economic expansion into the 
Latin American region in the 1990s and the anti-Spanish feelings that resulted, mainly, 
from the rejection of the neoliberal policies of the 1990s after the Latin American 
economic crisis at the turn of the centuries. The fragments in the Spanish newspaper El 
Mundo and in the Argentine newspaper Página 12, a newspaper known for its support of 
the Kirchner government, suggest that colonial metaphor scenarios were particularly 
used by supporters of the Argentine government in order to continue to fuel anti-
Spanish feelings in the Argentine society. As such, these references provide further 
evidence for one of the conclusions of the analysis of the English-language 1990-2009 
corpus presented in Chapter 3, namely that colonial metaphor scenarios are mainly 




5.3 Discursive (de)legitimation in a renationalization after 
privatization: The discursive struggle over the legitimacy 
of the 2012 (partial) expropriation of YPF 
The data in the 2012 corpus also offer an opportunity to revisit the findings obtained 
from the analysis presented in Chapter 4. The chapter focused on the discursive struggle 
over the legitimacy of the privatization and acquisition of YPF between 1998 and 1999 as 
represented in the Argentine and Spanish (written) media. In the following, a summary 
of the findings of the analysis in Chapter 4 will be presented. In the two empirical 
sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2, the analysis of the 2012 case will be put into the perspective of 
the 1998-1999 case. The two analytical sections are followed by section 5.3.3 which will 
answer the case-specific research questions that will guide this analysis of the 2012 
case102. 
 
The first analytical section in Chapter 4 set out to explore the discursive strategizing 
of the four most prominent social actors in the Argentine and Spanish newspaper 
coverage of the 1998-1999 Repsol-YPF case. The analysis presented in section 4.3 
provided a deeper understanding of the ways in which social actors mobilize 
rationalistic and/or nationalistic discourse in a specific cross-border acquisition after 
privatization. The analysis revealed that the discursive strategizing to legitimate the 
Repsol-YPF deal was much more complex than the discursive strategizing deployed to 
delegitimate the deal. The Argentine target company YPF and the Argentine political 
opposition were the most prominent opponents of the full privatization of the oil 
company. They were mainly found mobilizing nationalistic discourse to delegitimate 
the deal. The Argentine government and the Spanish acquiring company Repsol were 
the most prominent proponents of the privatization and acquisition. The analysis 
showed that Repsol’s discursive strategizing to legitimate its decision to acquire YPF 
unfolded along the lines of the findings of earlier studies. Repsol was found presenting a 
mix of both rationalistic and nationalistic discourse. Acquiring companies need to cater 
to multiple and diverse audiences. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that they 
mobilize rationalistic discourse for the global financial community and nationalistic 
discourse for the local stakeholders in the target company’s environment. 
 
 
                                                     
102
 These research questions will be formulated at the end of this introductory section. 
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In an acquisition after privatization, a crucial role is played by the government that 
decides to put its stake up for sale. In the Repsol-YPF case, the analysis of the discursive 
strategizing deployed by the Argentine government showed that this proponent did not 
present a mix of both discourses. Instead, the Argentine government mainly mobilized 
nationalistic discourse to legitimate its decision to sell its remaining YPF shares. The 
finegrained analysis of the fragments further revealed that the government sought to 
maximize the revenue from the privatization for the benefit of Argentina and its people. 
As such, its legitimating nationalistic discourse could also be characterized as a 
discourse of local capitalism. Moreover, the analysis also revealed that relegitimation is 
an essential part of the proponents’ discursive strategizing. Both proponents mobilized 
relegitimating discourse in response to the discursive attacks launched by sceptical 
social actors who sought to delegitimate the decision. 
 
In section 4.4.3, the second analytical section in Chapter 4, the Argentine and Spanish 
subcorpora were cross-textually compared in order to gain insights into the different 
beliefs, feelings and conceptions about the Repsol-YPF case that either explicitly or 
implicitly shine through the media texts produced in the two directly involved news 
environments. The analysis of the editorials (characterized by a more argumentative 
writing style) and the news reports (characterized by a professional desire for 
objectivity) were presented separately. It was assumed that the editorialists would be 
more explicit in the way they positioned themselves vis-à-vis the legitimacy of the 
privatization and acquisition of YPF. However, it was also assumed from the outset that 
the comparative cross-textual analysis of the news reports would provide valuable 
insights into the different perspectives on the case in both news environments as well. 
 
The cross-textual analysis of the 1998-1999 editorials revealed that the Argentine 
editorialists wrote decidedly against the deal. They mostly drew on delegitimating 
nationalistic discourse. The analysis of the Argentine editorials revealed that the 
editorialists were not against the privatization of YPF per se as they wrote positively 
about the first privatization of the company at the beginning of the 1990s, when the 
Argentine state’s shares were sold on the international stock markets. At the time of the 
second (full) privatization of YPF at the end of the 1990s, the Argentine editorialists had 
serious concerns about the loss of control of YPF to a foreign company. As such, the 
analysis clearly showed that the (full) privatization of YPF deeply hurt the Argentine 
feelings. The analysis of the Spanish editorials, on the other hand, revealed that the 
Spanish editorialists were openly in favour of Repsol’s internationalization strategy. 
 
The analysis of the 1998-1999 news reports showed that a cross-textual comparison 
of news reports from different news environments on the same event can be used to 
uncover evaluative similarities and differences by closely analysing the ways in which 
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certain argument topics (and the dominant discourses to which they are linked) are 
foregrounded or backgrounded in the texts. The analysis also revealed that the 
evaluative patterns that were found in the news reports were similar to the ones that 
were identified in the newspapers’ editorials. Three aspects that were markedly 
different in the two news environments were discussed: (i) the journalist authors’ 
positioning vis-à-vis the discursive strategizing of the four main social actors, (ii) the 
use of expert opinion int the texts, and (iii) the journalist authors’ positioning vis-à-vis 
three specific (societal-)nationalistic argument topics: Ownership, Employment and 
Competition. 
 
The analysis of the news reports uncovered similar evaluative patterns as the ones 
that were found in the editorials. The Spanish newspapers (on the winning side of the 
spectrum) adopted a more legitimating rationalistic perspective which often resembled 
Repsol’s discursive strategizing. Many legitimating rationalistic argument topics that 
were found to be attributed to Repsol in the Argentine news reports were presented as 
facts in the Spanish texts. The Argentine newspapers (on the losing side of the spectrum) 
adopted a strongly delegitimating nationalistic perspective. They showed great concern 
for the impact the deal might have on Argentina. They paid, for instance, considerable 
attention to the dominant position Repsol-YPF would come to hold in the Argentine 
energy market and to the layoffs that could result from the acquisition. In the Spanish 
newspapers, on the other hand, this dominant position was described as a leadership 
position and staff reduction as an opportunity to cut costs.  
 
Beside the aim to revisit the analytical findings presented in Chapter 4, two new case-
specific research questions will guide the analysis of the discursive (de)legitimation 
processes surrounding the Argentine government’s controversial decision to 
expropriate Repsol’s subsidiary YPF. 
RQ1: How did the Argentine government discursively legitimate its decision to 
(partially) expropriate and renationalize YPF? 
 
RQ2: How did the Argentine and Spanish argumentative text writers discursively 
position themselves vis-à-vis the (partial) expropriation and renationalization of 
YPF? 
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As this is the first attempt to look into the discursive struggle over a renationalization 
after privatization, a new typology was needed for the analysis of the 2012 case. The 
different stages that were gone through to set up the discourse analytic model for the 
analysis of the 1998-1999 case were used again to set up this new case-specific 
typology103 (see section 4.2.2.2). First, the newspaper articles in the 2012 corpus were 
closely read to select a number of argument topics that stood out for being used to 
either legitimate or delegitimate the (partial) expropriation and renationalization of 
YPF. For this analysis, the selection was restricted to those argument topics that could 
be linked to the two dominant discourses surrounding cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions: rationalistic and nationalistic discourse. The following Table 27 gives an 
overview of the argument topics that were selected for the analysis. 
Table 27 The two dominant discourses and their argument topics in the newspaper articles 









Confidence in Argentina 
Argentina’s national sovereignty 
The finegrained analysis of the articles in the corpus will show that proponents and 
opponents of the expropriation and renationalization of YPF differed drastically in the 
way they presented these argument topics. They are usually found presenting a totally 
different evaluation of the semantic content of the argument topics. The analysis will 
show that those who sought to legitimate the expropriation generally presented a 
negative evaluation of the rationalistic argument topics and a positive evaluation of the 
nationalistic argument topics, whereas those against the decision usually evaluated the 
rationalistic argument topics positively and the nationalistic argument topics 
negatively. 
 
                                                     
103
 As this is the first attempt to set up a typology to analyse a renationalization after privatization, the 
categories could not be checked against other typologies. As a result, the fourth phase (comparing the open 
coding categories to other typologies) had to be skipped. This also means that the first stage (close reading of 
both the texts in the corpus and other specialized news sources, academic essays and reference works) became 
all the more important (see sections 2.1.4.3 and 2.2.5). 
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5.3.1 Discursive strategizing of the Argentine government in the 2012 
Repsol-YPF case 
The discursive strategizing deployed by the government of Cristina Fernández de 
Kirchner in 2012 to legitimate the decision to (partially) expropriate YPF was radically 
different from the Menem government’s discursive strategizing in 1998 and 1999 to gain 
acceptance for the (full) privatization of the Argentine oil company by selling the state’s 
shares to the Spanish company Repsol. In 1998-1999, the Argentine government 
mobilized a discourse of local capitalism, with a clear focus on maximizing the revenue 
from the privatization for the benefit of Argentina (even though critics claimed that the 
government needed the money to ease the country’s budget crisis). In any case, the 
privatization and acquisition of YPF came at a moment when Menem’s (neoliberal) 
global capitalist economic model came under increasing pressure. The Latin American 
financial crisis that severely hit Argentina between 2001 and 2003 further undermined 
faith in the neoliberal policies of the 1990s and paved the way for the successive 
Kirchner governments to attempt to create a more dynamic role for the state in the 
pursuit of growth and social stability. Then, on 16 April 2012, after months of increasing 
tensions between the Argentine government and the Spanish-Argentine oil company 
Repsol-YPF, President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner finally announced the 
expropriation of 51% of YPF shares. Only Repsol shares were expropriated (the Spanish 
company owned 57.43% of its subsidiary YPF). The Argentine company Grupo Petersen 
(the second largest shareholder, holding 25.46% of the shares) and the other private 
shareholders (17.09%) escaped the expropriation. 
 
The Argentine government was the most prominent social actor in the 2012 corpus. 
President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and her Secretary for Economic Policy and 
Developmental Planning Axel Kicillof were identified as the two main representatives of 
the Argentine government. They were found presenting argument topics in 58.5% of the 
texts in the 2012 corpus (21/36). The analysis reveals that the government, naturally, 
presented a clear legitimating perspective on the (partial) expropriation and 
renationalization of YPF. Table 28 gives an overview of the Argentine government’s 
discursive strategizing to gain legitimacy for its decision. 
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Market principles 0 
1990s neoliberal reforms104 1 
Repsol-YPF’s performance 14 
NATIONALISTIC 
ARGUMENT TOPICS 
State interventionism 6 
Confidence in Argentina 0 
Argentina’s national sovereignty 11 
The table shows that the Argentine government primarily focused on two argument 
topics: the rationalistic Repsol-YPF’s performance and the nationalistic Argentina’s national 
sovereignty argument topics. The government was also found presenting the 
nationalistic State interventionism argument topic. A close reading of these fragments 
reveals that the government discursively legitimated its decision by presenting a 
negative evaluation of the rationalistic argument topics and a positive evaluation of the 
nationalistic argument topics. In the following, a more finegrained analysis of a number 
of relevant fragments from the corpus will be presented to further assess these initial 
findings. 
 
Negative evaluation of Repsol-YPF’s performance 
In January 1999, the Argentine Minister of Economic Affairs was extremely pleased with 
Repsol’s bid for the 14.9% stake in YPF that had been put on the market by the 
government of President Carlos Menem. This can be observed from the following 
fragment, taken from a Clarín article published on 21 January 1999, the day after the 
government announced that Repsol had submitted the highest bid105. 
[cuerpo] Roque Fernández [ministro de Economía] no pudo reprimir una sonrisa 
satisfecha cuando terminó de leer la oferta de Repsol, ayer, en el Ministerio de 
Economía. Metía al bolsillo 2.010 millones de dólares. Le agregaba casi un 5% a su 
planeada recaudación del 99. (Clarín, 1999, 21 January[b]) 
 
                                                     
104
 The presentation of this argument topic was found in an editorial published by the Argentine newspaper 
Clarín. As the editorialist formulates an interesting reaction to this argument topic presented by the 
Argentine government, the fragment will be discussed in the section 5.3.2 (the comparative analysis of the 
Argentine and Spanish argumentative texts in the 2012 corpus). 
105
 Of the companies that had shown interest in acquiring the package put up for sale by the Argentine 
government, Repsol was the only company that actually submitted a bid (see section 2.2.3). 
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[body] Roque Fernández [Minister of Economic Affairs] was unable to suppress a smile of 
satisfaction when he finished reading the bid presented by Repsol yesterday at the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs. He bagged 2.01 billion dollars. It would add almost 5% 
to his revenue forecast for the year 1999. 
Thirteen years later, the government of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner no longer 
believed that selling the state’s shares to Repsol and allowing the Spanish company to 
take full control of YPF was a good decision. However, in their public statements in April 
2012, the representatives of the Argentine government did not refer back to the 
decisions made in the 1990s. Their main focus was on blaming Repsol-YPF for the 
Argentine energy crisis by claiming that the company should have invested more in 
Argentina and should have produced more oil and gas for the Argentine energy market. 
[body] Mrs. Kirchner blamed YPF for declining oil and gas production and said the 
company is largely responsible for forcing Argentina to become dependent on 
imported oil and gas for the first time in 17 years. She said a lack of investment in 
the sector led Argentina to incur an energy deficit surpassing $3 billion last year. 
(Wall Street Journal, 2012, 17 April) 
Both Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and Axel Kicillof were quoted using strident 
language – vaciamiento (emptying), desastre (disaster) – when referring to Repsol’s 
management of its Argentine subsidiary. 
[cuerpo] Kicillof habló de “vaciamiento”, de “desastre”, al referirse a la gestión de 
la española Repsol al frente de la petrolera oficial. (Clarín, 2012, 18 April) 
[body] Kicillof spoke of “emptying”, of “disaster” when referring to Spanish Repsol’s 
management of the national oil company. 
 
[body] But Fernandez said the shortage is the result of Repsol’s “emptying” of YPF, 
[…]. (Huffington Post, 2012, 17 April) 
The Argentine government presented this argumentation to legitimate its decision to 
only expropriate the shares owned by the Spanish company Repsol. The shares that 
were controlled by the Argentine Grupo Petersen and other minorities were not 
affected. In the following fragment, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner is found contrasting 
Repsol’s actions with those of the other YPF partners who, unlike Repsol she implies, 
were in good faith when they bought YPF shares. 
[cuerpo] Cristina Fernández de Kirchner dejó en claro, además, que la expropiación 
alcanzará sólo a las acciones de Repsol: “No hemos afectado a aquellos que con 
buena fe compraron acciones en la Bolsa ni a ningún otro socio”. (Página 12, 2012, 
17 April[a]) 
[body] Cristina Fernández de Kirchner also made it clear that the expropriation will 
only affect Repsol’s shares: “We have not affected those who bought shares in good 
faith on the Stock Market or any other partner”. 
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The move against Repsol is illustrative of the Kirchner government’s anti-global 
capitalist ethos and its determination to roll back the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s 
and implement, instead, a much more interventionist model for its national energy 
sector. This economic model for the Argentine energy sector is, of course, diametrically 
opposed to the market oriented model implemented in the 1990s by the government of 
President Carlos Menem. 
 
Positive evaluation of Argentina’s national sovereignty 
In the period between 1998 and 1999, the critics of President Menem’s decision to fully 
privatize YPF were very much concerned about the loss of control of the (strategically 
important) oil company, particularly if the state’s shares would end up exclusively in 
the hands of a foreign company. In 2012, the Argentine government presented its 
decision to (partially) expropriate and renationalize YPF as a matter of state 
importance. The analysis of the government’s discursive strategizing shows its strong 
belief in the idea that Argentina urgently needed to take matters (back) into its own 
hands in order to solve the energy crisis. The Kirchner government believed that 
foreign companies always place their business strategy above the interests of the nation 
in which they operate. Interestingly, that is exactly what the Argentine political 
opposition was concerned about when the Menem government decided to fully 
privatize YPF and sell its majority stake to the Spanish company Repsol in 1998-1999 
(see section 4.3.5). In 2012, the Argentine government claimed that a state-controlled 
YPF would solve the energy problems because it would make it easier for the 
government to order the company to increase its production. 
[body] Mrs. Kirchner said that the expropriation of YPF, […], was a “recovery of 
sovereignty and control”. She said the move would allow Argentina to raise 
production, after the country recently became an energy importer. (New York 
Times, 2012, 17 April) 
The Argentine government of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner worked hard to convey 
the idea that a direct state intervention in YPF was the only way to successfully defend 
Argentina’s national sovereignty over its natural resources (i.c. oil and gas) for the 
benefit of its future generations106. The analysis of the discursive strategizing deployed 
by the four most prominent social actors at the time of the privatization and acquisition 
of YPF at the end of the 1990s showed that the Argentine government of Carlos Menem, 
 
                                                     
106
 Perreault and Valdivia (2010) found a similar argumentation when President Evo Morales of Bolivia 
announced that he would nationalize his country’s oil and gas reserves on 1 May 2006. 
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in contrast, mobilized a discourse of local capitalism by claiming that Argentina and its 
people would benefit from the privatization of YPF. 
[cuerpo] […] la presidenta argentina anunció ayer el envío al Congreso de un 
proyecto de ley con el que pretende “defender la soberanía hidrocarburífera de 
Argentina, en beneficio de las generaciones futuras”. (El Mundo, 2012, 17 April[a]) 
[body] […] yesterday the Argentine President announced the submission to Congress of 
a bill that aims to “defend the Argentine sovereignty over its hydrocarbon resources 
for the benefit of its future generations”. 
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner also explicitly linked her decision to the initiatives 
taken by other Latin American New Left governments to enhance the role of the state in 
the socio-economic development of their respective nations. In the following fragment, 
she represents Argentina as the odd one out amidst the other Latin American nations 
because its natural resources are controlled by a foreign company and not (not even 
partially) by the Argentine state. 
[body] Argentina is the only major Latin American country without a significant 
state presence in the oil industry, she said. Mexico, Chile, Brazil, Venezuela, Peru, 
Colombia, and even tiny Uruguay, all boast state-run firms that are important 
players in their respective oil and gas industries. “We are the only country in Latin 
America that doesn’t control its own energy policy,” she said. (Wall Street Journal, 
2012, 17 April) 
 
Positive evaluation of State interventionism 
The decision to (partially) expropriate and renationalize YPF fits in with the paradigm 
shift envisioned by the Kirchner governments to roll back the neoliberal policies 
implemented by the Menem government. In the 1990s, under the influence of the 
Washington Consensus, Argentina’s economic model was all about opening up the 
economy and reducing the role of the state. The (full) privatization of YPF in 1999 fits 
perfectly into that picture. After the financial crisis between 2001 and 2003, the 
successive Kirchner governments tried to find a different balance between market and 
state influence. The decision to renationalize a previously privatized company is, of 
course, a radically interventionist move which caused considerable controversy, both 
nationally and internationally. In the 2012 corpus, there are a number of fragments that 
show how the Argentine government felt forced to respond to critics who voiced 
concerns about the future performance of YPF as a state-run company. Indeed, for many 
opponents of state intervention in the economy, state-managed companies are, by 
definition, inefficient and slow to respond to global change (Grugel & Riggirozzi, 2007, p. 
105). In the following fragments, the Argentine government is explicitly described as 
reacting to the discursive attacks launched by its critics. 
  301 
[body] “We’ve shown that state projects can be managed well too,” she [Fernández 
de Kirchner] said in response to critics who have claimed the government doesn’t 
have the technical expertise or the money to run YPF. (Wall Street Journal, 2012, 
17 April) 
 
[cuerpo] Una vez que detalló los motivos por los cuales decidió intervenir en el 
mercado, la Presidenta intentó espantar algunos fantasmas dando precisiones sobre lo 
que el Gobierno planea hacer de ahora en más. “El modelo que hemos elegido no 
es de estatización porque seguimos conservando la forma de sociedad anónima. 
Vamos a hacer una conducción de la empresa absolutamente profesionalizada”, 
prometió. (Página 12, 2012, 17 April[a]) 
[body] After explaining her motives for this market intervention, the President 
attempted to eliminate some fears by providing details about what the government 
plans to do from now on. “The model that we have chosen is not a nationalization 
because we are maintaining the company as a PLC. We will manage the company in 
an absolutely professional way”, she promised. 
These fragments show that the Argentine government was aware of the inefficiencies 
that are often associated with many forms of state intervention. In order to counter this 
predictable criticism, the government drew on a more rationalistic discourse to show 
that it intended to turn YPF into an efficiently run competitive oil company. As such, 
these fragments also demonstrate the government’s determination to break the myth 
that state intervention is archaic and cannot work in a global economy. 
 
This section provided insights into the Argentine government’s discursive 
strategizing to legitimate its decision to (partially) expropriate and renationalize the 
Argentine oil company YPF. The following section aims to unveil how the Argentine 
government’s decision was received by the editorialists of the two leading Argentine 
and Spanish newspapers and by the columnists writing for the Argentine centre-left 
newspaper Página 12. 
5.3.2 Comparative analysis of the Spanish-language argumentative 
texts in the 2012 corpus 
This section aims to unveil how the newspapers in the two news environments 
positioned themselves vis-à-vis the (partial) expropriation and renationalization of YPF. 
The analysis focuses on the explicitly argumentative Argentine and Spanish texts in the 
2012 corpus. First, there are the editorials that were published between 13 and 21 April 
2012 by the two leading Spanish newspapers El Mundo (3) and El País (4) and the two 
leading Argentine newspapers Clarín (9) and La Nación (5). The findings of the analysis 
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of the Argentine and Spanish editorials will also be compared to the newspapers’ 
editorial positions in the 1998-1999 Repsol-YPF case, as presented in section 4.4.2. 
 
However, since the two Argentine dailies Clarín and La Nación are known to be 
generally critical of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and her government (Cuestas et al., 
2009), it was also deemed relevant to include a number of texts that were published the 
day after the announcement (17 April) by the more supportive quality newspaper 
Página 12 (Dominguez, 2012, p. 80). This Argentine daily did not publish an editorial, but 
it did issue four columns that day in which four different guest writers gave their view 
on the Argentine government’s decision107. 
 
Table 29 gives a first indication of the argumentative positions of these newspapers. 
The numbers in the table show that the editorialists of the Argentine newspapers Clarín 
and La Nación adopted more or less the same delegitimating perspective on the 
Argentine government’s decision as the editorialists of the Spanish newspapers and that 
the columnists writing for the Argentine centre-left daily Página 12 presented exactly 
the opposite perspective on the expropriation. The findings for the three Argentine 
newspapers are consistent with their general stance towards the Kirchner government. 
Table 29 Editorials in the 2012 corpus: Rationalistic and nationalistic argument topics 
presented to legitimate or delegitimate the (partial) expropriation of YPF 












Legitimation of  
the expropriation 
0/7 0/14 4/4 
Delegitimation of 
the expropriation 






0/7 0/14 4/4 
Delegitimation of 
the expropriation 
6/7 9/14 0/0 
The table gives an indication of the ways in which the argumentative text writers 
(editorialists in the leading newspapers, columnists in Página 12) presented an either 
legitimating or delegitimating perspective on the Argentine government’s decision to 
(partially) expropriate YPF. A close reading of the texts shows that the opponents (i.c. 
 
                                                     
107
 Three of these guest writers are journalists with an economic background, the fourth is a professor of 
Economic History (see also section 1.3.3). 
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both Argentine and Spanish editorialists) combined a negative evaluation of 
nationalistic argument topics with a positive evaluation of rationalistic argument topics. 
The proponents (i.c. the Página 12 columnists) did exactly the opposite as they are 
found mobilizing a positive evaluation of nationalistic and a negative evaluation of 
rationalistic argument topics. 
 
The next three sections will provide a detailed account of the ways in which the 
editorialists of the two leading Argentine and Spanish newspapers and the four Página 
12 columnists positioned themselves vis-à-vis the expropriation and (partial) 
renationalization of YPF. The findings are also put into the perspective of the 
newspapers’ positions vis-à-vis the (partial) privatization and renationalization of YPF 
as identified in the 1998-1999 corpus. 
5.3.2.1 The Spanish editorials in the 2012 corpus 
The analysis in Chapter 4 revealed that, in 1998-1999, the Spanish editorialists were 
openly supportive of Repsol’s internationalization strategy. Therefore, it seems 
reasonable to expect that they would continue to support the Spanish company and 
react negatively to the Argentine government’s decision to expropriate its subsidiary 
YPF. The analysis of the 2012 Spanish editorials reveals that the Spanish editorialists 
were indeed extremely critical of the expropriation. The following fragments illustrate 
how the editorialists of both newspapers condemned the move in the strongest possible 
terms. El Mundo describes the move as an ataque (attack), acoso (harassment) and 
atropello (outrage) against the Spanish company’s legitimate ownership of YPF. El País 
describes the move as una declaración de hostilidad económica (a declaration of economic 
hostility) and un expolio (a plunder). 
[cuerpo] Por eso, el ataque a Repsol […] vuelve a cuestionar si se trata de una 
nación fiable desde el punto de vista de las garantías para el inversor. (El Mundo, 
2012, 14 April) 
[body] That is why the attack on Repsol […] brings back doubts about whether it is a 
reliable nation in terms of investor guarantees. 
 
[cuerpo] El acoso a Repsol ha sido perfectamente planeado por las autoridades 
argentinas […]. (El Mundo, 2012, 14 April) 
[body] The harassment of Repsol has been perfectly planned by the Argentine 
authorities […] 
 
[cuerpo] […] el atropello que supone la expropiación de YPF a sus legítimos dueños 
[…]. (El Mundo, 2012, 17 April) 
[body] […] the expropriation of YPF is an outrage to its legitimate owners […] 
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[cuerpo] La decisión […] supone a todos los efectos una declaración de hostilidad 
económica que debería ser repudiada […]. (El País, 2012, 17 April[b]) 
[body] The decision […] is, in all respects, a declaration of economic hostility which 
ought to be repudiated […] 
 
[cuerpo] Tales movimientos […] ratifican que la expropiación es un expolio, […]. 
(El País, 2012, 18 April) 
[body] Said operations […] confirm that the expropriation is a plunder, […] 
Table 30 gives an overview of the argument topics identified in the editorials that were 
published by El Mundo and El País on the topic of the 2012 (partial) expropriation and 
renationalization of YPF. The Spanish commentators are mainly found presenting the 
rationalistic Repsol-YPF’s performance argument topic and the three nationalistic 
argument topics taken up for this analysis: State interventionism, Confidence in Argentina 
and Argentina’s national sovereignty. 
Table 30 Spanish editorials in the 2012 corpus: Rationalistic and nationalistic argument 
topics to delegitimate the expropriation 





Market principles 1/7 
1990s neoliberal reforms 0/7 
Repsol-YPF’s performance 4/7 
NATIONALISTIC 
ARGUMENT TOPICS 
State interventionism 3/7 
Confidence in Argentina 4/7 
Argentina’s national sovereignty 3/7 
A more finegrained analysis of the fragments gives further insights into the Spanish 
editorialists’ strong disapproval of the Argentine government’s decision. Their 
delegitimating perspective consists of a positive evaluation of rationalistic and a 
negative evaluation of nationalistic argument topics. 
 
Positive evaluation of Market principles 
The analysis of the Spanish editorials in the 1998-1999 corpus already showed that they 
supported the rationalistic reasoning behind Repsol’s internationalization strategy. In 
the 2012 corpus, there is one Spanish editorial in which the rationalistic Market principles 
argument topic is explicitly evaluated positively as well. In the following fragment, the 
El País editorialist implicitly contrasts the Argentine government’s economic 
interventionism, described as a thing of the past, to a more open take on economic 
policy making, which is described here as nothing to be afraid of. 
  305 
[cuerpo] Estamos en otros tiempos. No hay que temer la apertura de las 
economías. (El País, 2012, 14 April) 
[body] These are different times. There is no need to fear the opening up of the 
economies. 
 
Positive evaluation of Repsol-YPF’s performance 
The analysis further reveals that, just like in 1998-1999, the Spanish editorialists are 
right behind their company. In the 2012 editorials, they openly support Repsol’s 
management of its Argentine subsidiary. The editorialists are found countering the 
critique formulated by the Kirchner government to legitimate its move against 
Repsol108. The editorialists used categorical assertions to claim that the company has 
always acted properly. In the fragments below, the structures ha cumplido 
escrupulosamente (has scrupulously complied with), no hay razones que justifiquen (there 
are no reasons that justify) and son datos públicos que (it is public information that) leave 
no room for alternative positions. 
 
In the first fragment, the El País editorialist writes that Repsol-YPF has always 
honoured its contracts and that, therefore, the government’s justification is just not 
credible. In the second fragment, the El Mundo editorialist writes that the Argentine 
government’s criticism that Repsol failed to invest in YPF makes absolutely no sense 
because YPF is extremely important for the Spanish company. S/he then goes on to 
state that the company has always communicated openly about its past and future 
investments and that, as such, anyone could look into the investment figures and see 
that the company had made a historic investment and planned to do even better in the 
future. 
[cuerpo] YPF ha cumplido escrupulosamente todos los términos financieros, 
económicos y laborales establecidos en sus contratos. No hay razones que 
justifiquen no ya la expropiación […]. (El País, 2012, 17 April[b]) 
[body] YPF has scrupulously complied with all financial, economic and employment 





                                                     
108
 The analysis of the Argentine government’s discursive strategizing in the 2012 Repsol-YPF case already 
showed that the government blamed the Spanish company for the Argentine energy crisis (see section 5.3.1). 
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[cuerpo] Son datos públicos que en 2011 YPF realizó una inversión histórica de 
2.327 millones de euros -el doble que el beneficio obtenido en ese ejercicio- y para 
2012 el compromiso era elevar esa cifra hasta los 2.600 millones. (El Mundo, 2012, 
17 April[b]) 
[body] It is public information that in 2011 YPF made a historic investment of 2.3 
billion euros, double the profit earned during that fiscal year – and for 2012 there 
was a commitment to raise that number to 2.6 billion. 
 
Negative evaluation of State interventionism 
The analysis of the 1998-1999 corpus in Chapter 4 already showed that the Spanish 
newspapers supported the Argentine government’s decision to open up its economy to 
Foreign Direct Investment. Many Spanish companies had benefited from the neoliberal 
policies of the 1990s as they successfully participated in the privatization of Argentina’s 
public sector. Thus, it does not come as a surprise that the editorialists described the 
2012 decision to roll back the free market policies in favour of more state 
interventionism as extremely ill-advised. The Spanish editorialists did not deny that 
Argentina faced serious problems and that the government needed to find solutions, but 
they refuted the argumentation that taking back control of YPF was the key to solve the 
energy crisis. On the contrary. In the following fragment, the editorialist writes that the 
expropriation will not solve a single one of the country’s energy problems and that these 
are caused by the disastrous (interventionist) energy policy that was already in place. 
[cuerpo] La expropiación […] no resuelve ni uno solo de los problemas a los que ha 
llevado una desastrosa política energética. (El País, 2012, 14 April) 
[body] The expropriation […] does not resolve a single one of the problems caused 
by disastrous energy policies. 
The writer of the next fragment clearly does not believe that YPF could become an 
efficient and competitive state-run company, particularly if it would be placed under 
the control of the Argentine government led by Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. The 
editorialist is certainly not optimistic about the prospect of YPF being used as otro 
instrument estéril de subvenciones (another sterile subsidy-distributing instrument) to 
enable the government to keep paying for its expensive interventionist measures. 
[cuerpo] No es difícil pronosticar que la YPF dominada por la camarilla que 
gobierna Argentina perderá cualquier posibilidad de beneficio y se convertirá en 
otro instrumento estéril de subvenciones que acabará por dilapidar los recursos 
del país. (El País, 2012, 17 April[b]) 
[body] It is not difficult to foresee that a YPF dominated by Argentina’s ruling clique 
will lose any possibility of obtaining benefits and will be converted into another 
sterile subsidy-distributing instrument which will end up squandering the country’s 
resources. 
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Negative evaluation of Argentina’s national sovereignty 
The Spanish newspapers also reacted to the national sovereignty element in the Argentine 
government’s discursive strategizing to legitimate the expropriation of 51% of YPF. The 
editorialists questioned the legal grounds of this decision and claimed it to be an 
incorrect application of a government’s sovereign right to expropriate in the public 
interest. In the following fragment, the Spanish editorialist pits this negative evaluation 
of the nationalistic argument topic Argentina’s national sovereignty against what these 
Spanish writers unanimously considered to be the real reason behind the move: the 
government was going to (ab)use YPF to solve the Argentine energy crisis. Again, the 
state interventionist measures are described as una política errónea (a misguided policy). 
[cuerpo] Los ciudadanos argentinos deben ser conscientes de que la expropiación 
de YPF no responde a la preservación de las reservas petroleras del país, sino a los 
efectos de una política errónea que ha conseguido hacer deficitaria la balanza 
energética del país. (El País, 2012, 17 April[b]) 
[body] Argentine citizens should be aware that the expropriation of YPF has less to 
do with the preservation of the country’s petroleum resources than with the effects 
of misguided policies which have led to a negative energy balance for the country. 
In the next fragment, the Spanish editorialist writes that the expropriation goes beyond 
Argentina’s legal right to lay claim to the country’s energy resources. 
[cuerpo] Declarar “sujeto a expropiación” el 51% del capital de YPF va más allá de 
la reivindicación de los recursos energéticos del país. (El País, 2012, 17 April[b]) 
[body] Declaring 51% of YPF’s capital “subject to expropriation” goes beyond 
reclaiming the country’s energy resources. 
According to international law, any sovereign country has indeed the legal right to 
intervene in the economic sphere to defend the public interest. However, the Spanish 
editorialists clearly believed that the Argentine government’s decision was illegal 
because even though the text decreed the nationalization of the entire hydrocarbon 
sector, in reality only Repsol’s shares were going to be expropriated (Bermejo García & 
Garciandía Garmendia, 2012; see also sections 2.2.5 and 5.3.1). 
[cuerpo] El texto de la Ley de Soberanía de Hidrocarburos que ha enviado al 
Congreso decreta en teoría la nacionalización del sector y, en la práctica, sólo la 
incautación del 51% de YPF al considerar sus actividades de “interés público 
nacional”. (El Mundo, 2012, 17 April[b]) 
[body] In theory, the Hydrocarbon Sovereignty Law that has been sent to Congress, 
decrees the nationalization of the sector, but in practice it just dictates the seizure 




Negative evaluation of Confidence in Argentina 
The analysis of the Spanish editorials in the 1998-1999 corpus also revealed that the 
Spanish editorialists did not pay any attention to the nationalistic Confidence in Argentina 
argument topic. In 2012, they presented a negative evaluation of this argument topic 
because they believed that the expropriation would seriously harm foreign investor 
confidence. In the following fragment, taken from an editorial published before the 
actual announcement, the writer shows that s/he believes in the (local capitalist) tenet 
that most countries need foreign investment to spur local development and that 
Argentina certainly cannot afford to scare these investors away. 
[cuerpo] Pero cambiar las leyes para una nacionalización a bajo coste dañaría de 
forma irreparable la seguridad jurídica en una Argentina que, como casi todos los 
países, España incluida, necesita de los capitales y de la tecnología extranjeros. (El 
País, 2012, 14 April) 
[body] Changing the law in order to obtain a low-cost nationalization would 
irreparably damage the legal security in Argentina where, as in almost all countries 
(including Spain), there is a need for foreign capital and technology. 
In the following two fragments, the Spanish writers put this investor confidence in a 
larger perspective by rather subtly suggesting that it was not the first time that 
Argentina put its international reputation at stake. For instance, the decision to default 
on the larger part of public debt at the end of 2001 was greatly frowned upon by the 
international financial community. In the first fragment, the editorialist writes that the 
decision would scare “even more” foreign investors away. In the second fragment, the 
editorialist writes that the move against Repsol brings back doubts about whether 
Argentina is a reliable and secure environment for foreign investors. 
[cuerpo] Sin olvidar que Argentina se pega un tiro en el pie porque la inseguridad 
jurídica que genera alejará aún más del país a los inversores internacionales. (El 
Mundo, 2012, 13 April) 
[body] It should not be forgotten that Argentina is shooting itself in the foot as the 
legal insecurity it is generating will scare away international investors even more. 
 
[cuerpo] Por eso, el ataque a Repsol, con la amenaza más que creíble de la 
nacionalización de su filial, vuelve a cuestionar si se trata de una nación fiable 
desde el punto de vista de las garantías para el inversor. (El Mundo, 2012, 14 April) 
[body] That is why the attack on Repsol, and the more than credible threat to 
nationalize its subsidiary, brings back doubts about whether it is a reliable nation in 
terms of investor guarantees. 
 
  309 
5.3.2.2 The Argentine editorials in the 2012 corpus 
The analysis of the editorials published by the two leading Argentine newspapers Clarín 
and La Nación 1998-1999 revealed that the Argentine editorialists were very much 
concerned about President Menem’s strategy to fully privatize YPF. Selling the shares in 
one package would indeed result in a higher bid but it would also mean that the control 
of YPF, and, consequently, of the country’s natural resources, would come into the 
hands of a foreign company. In the end, the Spanish company Repsol indeed made an all-
cash offer to acquire the whole company. Still, the analysis also revealed that the 
Argentine commentators wrote in positive terms about the first privatization of YPF at 
the beginning of the 1990s, when the state’s shares were sold on the international stock 
markets. This privatization procedure was also used in countries such as Great Britain 
and ensured, according to the Argentine editorialists, that former state-controlled 
companies could still be run by a primarily local management. 
 
So how would the two Argentine newspapers that were so critical of President 
Menem’s 1998-1999 decision to sell the state’s shares to a foreign company (i.c. Spanish 
Repsol) react to Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s 2012 decision to bring the control of 
YPF back into local hands and her promise to keep running the company professionally? 
Surely, they would not be against the prospect of Argentines having more influence 
again on the day-to-day management of the company. On the other hand, the analysis of 
the 1998-1999 editorials also showed that the Argentine newspapers were not against 
privatization per se. As such, it is also possible that they took a critical stance towards 
the more interventionist economic model envisioned by the Kirchner governments. 
This perspective would indeed be more in line with the two leading newspapers’ 
increasingly critical stance towards the ideological project of the Argentine government 
in the 21st century (Cuestas et al., 2009). 
 
The analysis of the 2012 Argentine editorials published by Clarín and La Nación 
reveals that the editorialists adopted a strongly delegitimating perspective on Cristina 
Fernández de Kirchner’s decision to (partially) expropriate and renationalize YPF. The 
Clarín editorialists generally describe the move by using the legal term expropiación 
(expropriation). The La Nación editorialists, on the other hand, display a range of 
derogatory terms such as asalto (assault), depredación (depredation), dislate (absurdity) 
and robo (robbery). 
[cuerpo] Este abordaje, muy parecido a un asalto, es otra demostración de 
menosprecio por la empresa petrolera que tal vez anticipe otras depredaciones. 
(La Nación, 2012, 18 April) 
[body] This tactic, very similar to an assault, is another show of the disdain for the 
oil company which may be the prelude to other depredations. 
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[cuerpo] En lugar de aprovechar esta oportunidad histórica [la muy favorable 
situación en los mercados de commodities], el gobierno argentino parece decidido a 
desperdiciarla con este nuevo dislate que se encuentra en vías de consumar. (La 
Nación, 2012, 21 April) 
[body] Instead of taking advantage of this historic opportunity [the very favourable 
situation on the commodities market], the Argentine government looks decided to 
waste it on this new absurdity which is about to take place. 
 
[cuerpo] […] la maquiavélica idea de que […] YPF debe ser estatal a cualquier 
precio y sin importar el atropello que significa este robo. (La Nación, 2012, 22 
April) 
[body] […] the Machiavellian idea that […] YPF should be state-owned at any price, 
regardless of the outrageous nature of this robbery. 
The editorialists of both Clarín and La Nación are found to be strongly condemning the 
(partial) expropriation and renationalization of YPF. Table 31 gives an overview of the 
argument topics identified in the Argentine editorials published by Clarín and La 
Nación. The main argument topics in these texts are the nationalistic State 
interventionism and Confidence in Argentina argument topics. As such, the numbers in the 
table reveal that the Argentine editorialists approach the expropriation mainly from a 
nationalistic perspective. A close reading of the fragments further shows that their 
delegitimating perspective consists of a negative evaluation of the nationalistic 
argument topics and, albeit in only two editorials, a positive evaluation of the 
rationalistic Market principles argument topic. 
Table 31 Argentine editorials in the 2012 corpus: Rationalistic and nationalistic argument 
topics to delegitimate the (partial) expropriation of YPF 





Market principles 2/14 
1990s neoliberal reforms 0/14 
Repsol-YPF’s performance 0/14 
NATIONALISTIC 
ARGUMENT TOPICS 
State interventionism 9/14 
Confidence in Argentina 5/14 
Argentina’s national sovereignty 1/14 
Before embarking on a more finegrained analysis of the Argentine editorials, some 
clarification is in order to explain why argument topics were only identified in 9 of the 
14 texts. Several argument topics were identified in all 5 of the La Nación editorials, but 
not in all 9 Clarín editorials. In the days before the official announcement, the Clarín 
editorials are found to be less argumentative than expected. They present more of an 
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overview of the different social actors and their positions (Clarín, 2012, 13 April, 14 
April, 15 April). In the editorial published on 21 April, the writer considers the broader 
consequences for the country, claiming that [l]a situación energética necesitará respuestas 
más allá de las reacciones a favour y en contra que está generando la expropiación (Clarín, 2012, 
21 April)([t]he energy crisis will need answers that go beyond the reactions in favour 
and against the expropriation). However, s/he does not go much into the pro and contra 
positions. The fragment below is taken from the editorial published on 18 April. The text 
is argumentative but the author writes more about the irresponsible behaviour of the 
Argentine government in general, rather than specifically in the context of the 
expropriation. The fragment was not taken up for the analysis because the 
expropriation is not explicitly referred to. In any case, the writer’s evaluation of the 
actions (in general) of the Argentine government is very critical indeed. 
[cuerpo] Ese fenómeno de nacer todos los días sin responsabilidad por lo que se 
hizo ayer es una curiosidad de este gobierno kirchnerista, siempre listo a 
encontrar afuera un culpable de sus propios errores. (Clarín, 2012, 18 April) 
[body] This phenomenon of being born each day without a sense of responsibility 
for what it did in the past is a peculiarity of this Kirchnerist government, which is 
always prepared to look for the cause of its errors outside its own ranks. 
 
Positive evaluation of Market principles 
In 1998-1999, the Argentine editorialists wrote about the Argentine hurt feelings caused 
by the state’s shares ending up in the hands of the foreign company Repsol. However, the 
analysis presented in Chapter 4 also revealed that they would not have been against the 
privatization if the state would have decided to sell its remaining shares on the 
international stock markets. In 2012, the Argentine commentators wrote against 
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s decision to have the state intervene in YPF. In two of 
the editorials published by La Nación, the Argentine writers are found writing in 
positive terms about a more market oriented economic model than the one envisioned 
by the Kirchner government. 
 
The following fragment is taken from the editorial published before the 
announcement. The author clearly writes against the interventionist economic model 
proposed by the Kirchner government when s/he claims that the government’s policies 
have been characterized by populismo y cortoplacismo (populism and short-term 
thinking). However, s/he also writes that it is possible, and more reasonable, to change 
to a more rationalistic economic model. 
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[cuerpo] La corrección de las dificultades económicas es posible, aunque exigiría 
un cambio sustancial en los principios económicos aplicados. El populismo y el 
cortoplacismo, que han impregnado las políticas de los últimos años, debieran ser 
sustituidos por criterios de racionalidad y por un estricto respeto por las normas 
de convivencia internacional y por la revalorización de las instituciones y de los 
fundamentos de la Constitución Nacional. (La Nación, 2012, 15 April) 
[body] The improvement of the economic problems is possible, although it would 
require a considerable change in the economic principles that are applied. Populism 
and short-term thinking have impregnated politics over the last few years. They 
should be replaced with rational criteria, strict respect for international rules of 
coexistence and a revaluation of the institutions and fundaments of the National 
Constitution. 
The next fragment was also coded as a Market principles argument topic. In the excerpt, 
the editorialist writes in outspokenly positive terms about the first deregulation of the 
oil sector and the first privatization of YPF. They are described explicitly as un éxito 
indiscutible (an indisputable success). The writer also subtly refutes the Argentine 
government’s claim that the renationalization of YPF is needed to make Argentina self-
sufficient again. According to this editorialist, Argentina became self-sufficient as a 
result of the deregulation of the oil sector in the 1990s. However, this exaltation of the 
rationalistic reasoning behind the first privatization of YPF is followed by an apparent 
ideological contradiction when the writer indicates that it was a good thing that the 
then CEO of YPF, José Estensoro, always kept in mind that the Argentine state was one of 
the oil company’s most important stakeholders. 
[cuerpo] La desregulación del sector y la privatización de YPF, en 1990, que lideró 
José Estensoro, fueron un éxito indiscutible. YPF pasó de ser una empresa 
deficitaria e ineficiente a ser una empresa competitiva a nivel internacional y la 
Argentina sobrepasó con creces el tan ansiado objetivo del autoabastecimiento 
energético. Estensoro siempre entendió que, aunque YPF había sido privatizada, 
era necesario “cuidar” a su accionista más importante, que era el Estado. (La 
Nación, 2012, 21 April) 
[body] The deregulation of the sector and the privatization of YPF in 1990, under the 
leadership of José Estensoro, were an indisputable success. YPF was transformed 
from a deficient and ineffective company into an internationally competitive 
company and Argentina amply exceeded the objective of energetic self-sufficiency 
that is so desired. Estensoro always understood that, although YPF had been 
privatized, it was important to “look after” its most important shareholder, the 
state. 
When these findings are put into the perspective of the analysis of the Argentine 1998-
1999 editorials, what emerges is the economic model that the Argentine newspapers 
saw as ideal for their national energy sector. In 1998-1999, the editorialists considered 
the deregulated model envisioned by the Menem government to be too market oriented 
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because it allowed a foreign (i.c. Spanish) company to take control of YPF and, as a 
result, of the country’s natural resources. In 2012, they considered the politico-
economic project thought out by the Kirchner government to be too interventionist. 
The analysis of both sets of data also reveals that, in both periods, the Argentine 
editorialists had nostalgia for the first phase in the privatization of YPF, when most 
shares were held by small investors and the day-to-day management was in the hands 
of a primarily Argentine Board of Directors. 
 
Negative evaluation of State interventionism 
At the time of the 1998-1999 privatization and acquisition of YPF, the Argentine 
editorialists and the Menem government had different ideas about what would be best 
for YPF and Argentina. Even though the editorialists were not against the prospect of a 
privatized YPF, they were very critical of the government’s decision to sell the shares in 
one package because that would result in a further denationalization of the Argentine 
energy sector and, by extension of the whole Argentine economy. As such, even though 
the two newspapers were against the privatization method chosen by the government, 
they did not argue for a radically different politico-economic project. After the financial 
crisis at the beginning of the 21st century, the Kirchners came to power with the 
promise to reverse the neoliberal policies of the 1990s. One of Cristina Fernández de 
Kirchner’s most radically interventionist measures was to take back control of YPF in 
2012. The analysis of the 2012 editorials published by Clarín and La Nación shows that 
both newspapers present a negative evaluation of the Argentine government’s decision 
to expropriate YPF. The following fragments clearly illustrate that they did not believe 
that state interventionism will solve the country’s energy problems. In this respect, the 
editorial position of the two leading Argentine newspapers in 2012 is similar to that of 
the Spanish newspapers in 2012 (see section 5.3.2.1). 
[cuerpo] Y nada de esto resuelve el problema estructural: la falta de gas y de 
petróleo que le pegan a la balanza comercial y a las finanzas públicas. (Clarín, 
2012, 17 April[b]) 
[body] None of this resolves the structural issue: the lack of gas and oil that damage 
the trade balance and the public finances. 
 
[cuerpo] La confiscación de la petrolera será un remedio peor que la enfermedad 
que hoy sufre la Argentina en materia energética. (La Nación, 2012, 17 April) 
[body] The confiscation of the oil company will be a cure that is worse than the 
disease that Argentina is currently suffering with regards to energy.  
The following two fragments illustrate that the editorialists believed that the Argentine 
government attacked YPF because it was in desperate need of more revenue. In the 
second fragment, the Clarín editorialist claims that the expropriation is also a political 
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decision because the government feared that it would quickly lose popular support if it 
failed to keep up its interventionist policies. 
[cuerpo] El Gobierno ha debido recurrir a manotazos a diversas cajas para resolver 
sus penurias fiscales […]. (La Nación, 2012, 15 April) 
[body] The government has been forced to raid several of its piggy banks in order to 
resolve its fiscal shortages […]. 
 
[cuerpo] Lo malo es que semejante paso se dé sólo para quedarse con la caja de la 
compañía y para recuperar adhesión popular, agitando una bandera nacionalista 
en un momento en que caen las acciones del Gobierno. (Clarín, 2012, 17 April) 
[body] The worst part is that this measure is only being taken to get a hold of the 
company’s money box and to recover popular following, by waving a nationalist flag 
at a time when the government’s popularity is decreasing. 
Both newspapers also formulated a delegitimating reaction to the Argentine 
government’s discursive strategizing to legitimate its interventionism. In the Clarín 
editorial published on 20 April, the writer refers to the Argentine government’s 
rejection of the 1990s neoliberal reforms as a way to legitimate its intervention in 
YPF109. The editorialist notes that the government called anyone who opposed the 
expropriation un vendepatria (a traitor to the national cause) and un liberal de los 90 (a 
liberal of the 1990s). However, s/he also points towards the irony of these insults 
because in 1999, the Kirchners were in favour of the privatization of YPF110. Moreover, 
the second privatization of YPF is described negatively as la entrega de la petrolera 
nacional (the handing over of the national oil company) to the Spanish company Repsol. 
[cuerpo] El Gobierno ha logrado instalar la idea de que el que no vota a favor de la 
expropiación de YPF es un vendepatria. […] Dicen que “el que no apoya es un 
liberal de los 90”. Otra ironía. En los 90, los Kirchner aplaudieron todo lo contrario: la 
entrega de la petrolera nacional. (Clarín, 2012, 20 April) 
[body] The government has been able to install the idea that whoever votes against 
the expropriation of YPF is a traitor to the national cause. […] They say that 
“whoever does not support the measure is a liberal of the 1990s”. More irony. In the 
1990s, the Kirchners applauded the exact opposite: the handing over of the national 
company. 
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 This fragment was not taken up for discussion in the section on the Argentine government’s discursive 
strategizing in the 2012 Repsol-YPF case (section 5.3.1) because it was deemed more relevant to discuss it in 
the context of the editorialist’s reaction to this statement. 
110
 In the 1990s, Néstor Kirchner was Governor of the oil-producing province of Santa Cruz. In 1999, he made 
the decision to sell the province’s stake in YPF to Repsol in 1999 (see also section 5.1). 
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In La Nación, the editorialist formulated a different reaction to the Argentine 
government’s nationalistic State interventionism argument topic. The analysis of the 
government’s discursive strategizing already revealed that the government claimed to 
have shown that state companies can be run professionally (see section 5.3.1). In the La 
Nación editorial published on 21 April, the writer openly questions these legitimating 
statements by referring to the performance of two specific companies that were already 
run by the Argentine government at that moment: Enersa (a state-run energy company 
created by Néstor Kirchner in 2004) and Aerolíneas Argentinas (Argentina’s flag carrier 
airline which was renationalised in 2008111). In the fragment, the editorialist is also very 
critical of the two men that were going to be in charge of the renationalised YPF. The 
editorialist holds Julio De Vido (Minister of Planning) responsible for the Argentine 
energy crisis and Axel Kicillof (Secretary for Economic Policy and Developmental 
Planning) for the losses that Aerolíneas Argentinas had been accumulating. The 
editorialist clearly did not want to see these two politicans running Argentina’s most 
important company. 
[cuerpo] Cuesta encontrar ejemplos de su gobierno para sustentar tal afirmación. 
¿Se referirá a Enarsa? ¿O a Aerolíneas Argentinas, que pierde dos millones de 
pesos por día? Resulta, a su vez, notable que la conducción transitoria de YPF haya 
recaído en un ministro como Julio De Vido, que es responsable de la crisis energética 
que tantas veces pretendió negar, y en quien condujo las finanzas de la empresa 
aérea, que fue el propio Kicillof. (La Nación, 2012, 21 April) 
[body] It is difficult to find examples in its government to support said declaration. 
Is it referring to Enarsa? Or to Aerolíneas Argentinas, that is losing two million pesos 
per day? It is also noteworthy that the temporary leadership of YPF should befall a 
Secretary like Julio De Vido, who is responsible for the energy crisis he has tried to 
deny so many times, and Kicillof, the person who managed the financial affairs of the 
airline company. 
 
Negative evaluation of Confidence in Argentina 
In 1998-1999, the Argentine editorialists did not write about the impact the 
privatization and acquisition of YPF would have on foreign investor confidence in 
Argentina. In 2012, on the other hand, both Argentine newspapers delegitimated the 
expropriation of YPF by claiming that the decision would scare away foreign investors. 
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 Aerolíneas Argentinas was one of the first Argentine state companies that came into Spanish hands after 
privatization. In 1990, Spain’s flag carrier airline Iberia bought an 85% stake in the company. In 2008, the 
Argentine government renationalised Aerolíneas Argentinas after acquiring 99.4% of the company. The other 
0.6% remained in the hands of the company’s employees (Financial Express, 2008, 22 July). 
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According to the Clarín editorialist in the first fragment below, foreign investments are 
needed to exploit the full potential of YPF’s oil and gas reserves. 
[cuerpo] El Gobierno ha resuelto pagar el costo de […] la eventualidad de espantar 
inversores imprescindibles para potenciar YPF. (Clarín, 2012, 17 April[b]) 
[body] The government has decided to pay the cost of […] the possibility of scaring 
away investors that it so desperately needs to power YPF. 
 
[cuerpo] En un país con escasez crónica de capitales como es la Argentina, el 
Gobierno no puede darse el lujo de ahuyentar inversiones. (La Nación, 2012, 21 
April) 
[body] In a country like Argentina that chronically lacks capital, the government 
cannot afford to scare investors away. 
In the concluding paragraph of the 18 April La Nación editorial, the writer gives an 
insightful overview of the newspaper’s perspective on the case by presenting the two 
argument topics that are most forcefully evaluated negatively in the Argentine 
editorials: the nationalistic argument topics State interventionism and Confidence in 
Argentina. As such, this La Nación fragment perfectly illustrates the openly critical 
stance of the two leading Argentine newspapers towards the interventionist economic 
model proposed by Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and her government. 
[cuerpo] En síntesis, la suma de errores del Gobierno en su política energética y su 
apuesta al capitalismo de amigos, han terminado en una fase de máximo 
intervencionismo, que además de ahogar al sector privado y de desalentar la 
inversión, generará enormes costos al país, que se podrán medir en términos 
económicos como en materia de seguridad jurídica y de aislamiento internacional. 
(La Nación, 2012, 18 April) 
[body] In short, the sum of the errors committed by the government in its energy 
policies and its bet on crony capitalism has ended up in a phase of full 
interventionism. Besides choking the private sector and discouraging investment, it 
will generate enormous costs for the country, which will be measurable in terms of 
the economy, legal security and international isolation. 
 
Negative evaluation of Argentina’s national sovereignty 
In one La Nación editorial, the Argentine government’s argument that the expropriation 
was an act of national sovereignty is evaluated negatively. In the fragment, the negative 
evaluation is similar to the evaluation found in the 2012 Spanish editorials as this 
Argentine writer also questions the legal grounds of the expropriation. Here, the 
editorialist claims that an expropriation in the public interest can only apply to an 
activity, not to one specific company. 
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[cuerpo] En todo caso, ese interés [nacional] puede estar en una actividad, no en 
una empresa específica. (La Nación, 2012, 18 April) 
[body] In any case, this [national] interest may lie in an activity, not in a specific 
company. 
Elsewhere in the text, the writer also openly defends the Spanish company’s argument 
that the decision was discriminatory because the Argentine government only wanted to 
expropriate the shares held by Repsol. The fact that the Argentine editorialist writes in 
defence of the Spanish company can only be explained by his/her deep-seated distrust 
of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and her government. 
[cuerpo] Le asiste la razón a Repsol cuando sostiene que la determinación oficial es 
arbitraria y discriminatoria, ya que recae en el paquete mayoritario de un único 
accionista. (La Nación, 2012, 18 April) 
[body] Repsol is supported by reason when it says that the government’s decision is 
arbitrary and discriminatory, considering it is based on the majority package of a single 
shareholder. 
5.3.2.3 The Página 12 columns in the 2012 corpus 
The four Página 12 columns were added to the 2012 corpus because it was also deemed 
relevant to include the perspective of a newspaper known for its more positive attitude 
towards the Kirchner government. Página 12 does not publish an editorial but the day 
after the official announcement the newspaper did publish four argumentative texts 
written by guest writers who gave their view on the expropriation. Three of these 
columnists are Argentine journalists with an economic background. The fourth 
columnist is a professor of Economic History at the University of Buenos Aires (see also 
section 1.3.3). 
 
The analysis of the editorials published by Clarín and La Nación already revealed that 
their generally critical stance towards Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and her 
government resulted in a delegitimating perspective on the expropriation of YPF. It is 
assumed that Página 12 mainly published columns in which the argumentation goes 
along the lines of the newspaper’s editorial position. The four guest writers are, 
therefore, also expected to present a legitimating perspective on the Argentine 
government’s decision. 
 
Table 32 gives on overview of the argument topics identified in the four columns 
published by Página 12. The numbers in the table show that the guest writers are mainly 
found presenting the rationalistic 1990s neoliberal reforms and Repsol-YPF’s performance 
argument topics and the nationalistic State interventionism argument topic. As such, this 
table shows that the Página 12 guest writers’ perspective on the expropriation is indeed 
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markedly different from the perspective identified in the Clarín and La Nación editorials 
(see section 5.3.2.2). 
Table 32 Página 12 columns in the 2012 corpus: Rationalistic and nationalistic argument 
topics to legitimate the (partial) expropriation of YPF 





Market principles 1/4 
1990s neoliberal reforms 4/4 
Repsol-YPF’s performance 3/4 
NATIONALISTIC 
ARGUMENT TOPICS 
State interventionism 4/4 
Confidence in Argentina 0/4 
Argentina’s national sovereignty 0/4 
A close reading of the fragments shows that the perspective of the four guest writers 
bares resemblance to the Argentine government’s discursive strategizing to legitimate 
the expropriation (see section 5.3.1). In the Página 12 columns, the support for the 
decision is found in the presentation of a negative evaluation of rationalistic and a 
positive evaluation of nationalistic argument topics. The added value of these Página 12 
columns for the current analysis is that, when contrasted to the editorials published by 
Clarín and La Nación, they illustrate how the 2012 (partial) expropriation and 
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 At times, the use of generic references in news reports (such as, for instance, the inhabitants metonym 
Argentines) might give the impression that all Argentines are behind the government of Cristina Fernández de 
Kirchner and its interventionist economic policies. These generic references would be mainly used by 
journalist authors who work in news environments that are not directly involved in the 2012 Repsol-YPF case. 
A few illustrations can be found in the English-language news reports in the 2012 corpus. The following 
fragment is taken from the report published by The Huffington Post: “Argentines gathered in Buenos Aires’ 
main square shouting slogans, waving national flags and carrying banners supporting the government takeover” 
(Huffington Post, 2012, 17 April). In the second fragment, published by Time Magazine, the journalist writes: 
“The Argentine President’s move, however, was extremely popular at home” (Time, 2012, 18 April). In these 
texts, the journalist authors do write about the negative reactions to the expropriation of YPF in Spain and 
some Latin American countries such as Chile, Mexico and Brazil. They do not, however, refer to the Argentine 
opposition to the decision taken by Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. The analysis of the editorials published by 
the quality newspapers Clarín and La Nación clearly showed that not all Argentines approved of the 
expropriation. 
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Negative evaluation of Market principles 
In his column, Alfredo Zaiat, chief editor of the Página 12 Economics section, presents a 
clearly negative evaluation of the rationalistic Market principles argument topic. In the 
fragment, he claims that Argentina cannot become self-sufficient if its energy reserves 
continue to be controlled by private companies. The reasoning behind this is that, he 
writes, private companies only seek to maximize profits in the shortest possible time. 
He goes on to add that the situation is even more serious in the case of foreign private 
companies because they are known to transfer their profits back to their home 
countries. This is also what the Argentine political opposition warned for when they 
spoke out against the privatization and acquisition of YPF in 1998 and 1999 (see section 
4.3.5). 
[cuerpo] Ese objetivo [autoabastecimiento] se enfrentaba con una limitación si los 
recursos hidrocarburíferos seguían siendo considerados una materia prima de 
libre disponibilidad, con el predominio del criterio privado de maximizar 
utilidades en el período más corto, y si son empresas extranjeras, enviar esas 
ganancias a sus casas matrices. (Página 12, 2012, 17 April[d]) 
[body] This goal [self-sufficiency] could not be reached if hydrocarbon resources 
continued to be considered freely available raw materials, because of the private 
sector’s interest in maximizing utilities in the shortest possible period, and because 
foreign companies transfer their profits back to their headquarters. 
 
Negative evaluation of the 1990s neoliberal reforms 
The fragments coded as rationalistic 1990s neoliberal reforms argument topics could, in 
fact, also be seen as a more (case-)specific evaluation of market principles. The analysis 
reveals that the four Página 12 columnists are extremely critical of the (neoliberal) 
global capitalist market reforms that were introduced by the Menem government 
during the 1990s. In the next fragment, regular Página 12 columnist Martín Granovsky 
claims that Argentina is the only country in Latin America that completely cut the ties 
between the state and the energy sector. 
[cuerpo] Pero el único país que rompió el molde del todo fue la Argentina, a 
comienzos del primer gobierno de Carlos Menem y a fines del segundo. Lo hizo, 
inclusive, yendo más allá de otras gestiones neoliberales, […].(Página 12, 2012, 17 
April[b]) 
[body] But the only country that broke the mould entirely was Argentina, at the 
beginning of Carlos Menem’s first government and the end of his second. It even 
went further than other neoliberal governments, […]. 
In the following excerpt, Professor of Economic History Mario Rapoport writes that 
other Latin American countries did not privatize their oil sector, and that, in 1998-1999, 
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the Argentine government had acted too hastily in selling its national company. His 
position in favour of a state-controlled energy sector shines through this fragment 
because of the negative evaluation of the Argentine decision and the positive evaluation 
of the choices made by the other countries. 
[cuerpo] Mientras que países vecinos como Brasil con Petrobras, Venezuela con 
Pvdsa y México con Pemex mantenían el petróleo en manos del Estado, la 
Argentina lo vendía apresuradamente […]. (Página 12, 2012, 17 April[e]) 
[body] While neigbouring countries like Brazil with Petrobras, Venezuela with Pvdsa 
and Mexico with Pemex kept the oil in the hands of the state, Argentina rushed to 
sell it […]. 
In the next fragment, freelance journalist Claudio Scaletta reminds the readers of Página 
12 that the wave of privatizations in the 1990s led to an unprecedented penetration of 
Spanish capital into the Argentine deregulated sectors which, in turn, led to a deep 
crisis of confidence between the two people. Interestingly, Scaletta blames specific 
sectors of both nations for this crisis. He first refers to the Argentines who implemented 
the neoliberal reforms in the 1990s. Then, he goes on to refer to the Spanish companies, 
which he describes in very harsh terms as arrogant, neo-colonialist and indifferent 
capitalists. 
[cuerpo] […] la infausta década del ’90 dejó entre su mala herencia la ruptura 
parcial, quizá sólo transitoria, de estos lazos de hermandad [entre Argentina y 
España]. No fue sólo por el comportamiento de los connacionales que, siguiendo la 
receta de los organismos financieros internacionales, profundizaron el ciclo de 
apertura, desregulación y privatizaciones iniciado a mediados de los ’70, sino 
también con la soberbia y displicencia neocolonialista de los capitalistas españoles. 
(Página 12, 2012, 17 April[c]) 
[body] […] the infamous decade of the 1990s left its bad legacy of a partial rupture, 
albeit temporary, of these ties of brotherhood [between Argentina and Spain]. It was 
not only the behaviour of the compatriots who, following the recipe of international 
financial organisms, further developed the cycle of openness, deregulation and 
privatizations that began halfway through the 1970s, but also the arrogance and the 
neo-colonial indifference of the Spanish capitalists. 
Finally, Alfredo Zaiat, chief editor of the Página 12 Economics section, combines a 
negative evaluation of the 1990s economic reforms with a positive evaluation of the 
state interventionist policies introduced by the two Kirchner governments. The 
expropriation of YPF is described in positive terms as one of the most profound reforms 
to roll back the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s which, according to the author, had been 
devastadores (devastating) for Argentina. 
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[cuerpo] La expropiación del 51 por ciento de las acciones de la petrolera nacional 
YPF en manos de la española Repsol pasa a integrar el podio de las principales 
iniciativas de reparación de los efectos devastadores de la reestructuración 
neoliberal de los noventa. (Página 12, 2012, 17 April[d] 
[body] The expropriation of 51 per cent of the national oil company YPF’s shares 
from the hands of Spanish Repsol takes its place on the stage as one of the main 
initiatives to repair the devastating effects of the neoliberal restructuring of the 
nineties. 
 
Negative evaluation of Repsol-YPF’s performance 
The fragments in which the rationalistic Repsol-YPF’s performance argument topic is 
evaluated negatively show that the Página 12 columnists shared the Argentine 
government’s view that Repsol had been emptying YPF (see also section 5.3.1). In the 
following two fragments, Alfredo Zaiat and Claudio Scaletta describe Repsol-YPF’s 
performance in derogatory terms as predatory. In the first fragment, Zaiat writes that 
the expropriation puts an end to catorce años de predación (fourteen years of predation). 
In the second fragment, Scaletta is found agreeing with the Argentine government’s 
argumentation that Repsol did not invest enough in its Argentine subsidiary. Repsol-
YPF’s performance is described as una extracción predatoria (predatory extraction) 
because of its limited investment in reserve replacement. 
[cuerpo] Ahora se anunció que termina la historia de los españoles de Repsol en 
YPF luego de casi catorce años de predación de recursos naturales estratégicos no 
renovables. (Página 12, 2012, 17 April[d]) 
[body] Now it has been announced that Spanish Repsol’s history in YPF is over after 
almost fourteen years of predation of non-renewable strategic natural resources. 
 
[cuerpo] El resultado fue una extracción predatoria sin que exista la contrapartida 
de las buenas prácticas del negocio, esas que dicen que deben realizarse inversiones de 
reposición de reservas. (Página 12, 2012, 17 April[c]) 
[body] [translation] The result was a predatory extraction without the 
counterweight of good business practices which stipulate that it is important to invest in 
reserve replacement is  
In the next fragment, journalist Claudio Scaletta reproduces the Argentine 
government’s argumentation that Repsol had been emptying YPF. However, he extends 
the argument to include other Spanish companies as well and concludes that Spanish 
capital has benefited from the emptying of emblematic Argentine companies such as the 
national airline Aerolíneas Argentinas and the national oil company YPF. 
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[cuerpo] El capital español vació firmas emblemáticas como Aerolíneas Argentinas 
y, como quedó plasmado en las importaciones de combustibles de 2011, fue uno de 
los principales beneficiarios, no el único, del saqueo del subsuelo. (Página 12, 2012, 
17 April[c]) 
[body] Spanish capital emptied emblematic companies such as Aerolíneas 
Argentinas. As can be seen from the fuel import during 2011, it was one of the main 
beneficiaries of the pillaging of the subsoil, although not the only one. 
 
Positive evaluation of State interventionism 
The analysis also reveals that the Página 12 columnists echoed the Argentine 
government’s discursive strategizing when they wrote in positive terms about the 
Argentine interventionist policies. According to the guest writers, the only way to solve 
the current energy problem and achieve self-sufficiency is by having the state interfere 
with YPF’s core business. 
[cuerpo] Por eso resulta imprescindible la intervención del Estado en la gestión y 
control del mercado de hidrocarburos […]. (Página 12, 2012, 17 April[d]) 
[body] Consequently, the state’s intervention is essential to the management and 
control of the hydrocarbons market […]. 
In the next fragment, chief editor Alfredo Zaiat also indicates an attitude in favour of 
the decisive shift from the previous, much more market oriented (and therefore, in the 
centre-left logic, disastrous) economic model to a new (and better suited) 
interventionist economic model. One of the crucial steps in this process is, according to 
Zaiat, to order the expropriation of Repsol’s YPF shares and to declare hydrocarbon self-
sufficiency to be in the interest of the nation. 
[cuerpo] Ahora se abordó con decisión la tarea de empezar a cambiarlo [el modelo 
energético de desregulación y privatización] con el proyecto de ley enviado al 
Congreso disponiendo la expropiación de acciones de Repsol y declarando de 
interés público nacional el autoabastecimiento. (Página 12, 2012, 17 April[d]) 
[body] The task of beginning to change [the energy model of deregulation and 
privatization] has been initiated decisively now that a bill has been sent to Congress to 
order the expropriation of Repsol’s shares and to declare the goal of self-sufficiency 
of national public interest. 
  
  323 
Journalist Martín Granovsky also compares the situation in Argentina with the rest of 
South America. In the following fragment, he is found stating that it has become 
generally accepted in all South American countries (except Chile113) to demand and 
promote more state control over national energy reserves. 
[cuerpo] En la mayoría de Sudamérica, con excepción de Chile, hoy no pesan las 
opiniones que cuestionan el papel del Estado y menos las críticas que apuntan 
como negativo el manejo de los hidrocarburos como responsabilidad de los 
gobiernos. (Página 12, 2012, 17 April[b]) 
[body] In the majority of South America, with the exception of Chile, there are 
currently no voices that question the role of the state and even less criticism against 
the management of hydrocarbons by governments. 
In two columns, the guest writers also react to the delegitimating perspective 
formulated by the opponents of the (partial) expropriation and renationalization of YPF. 
In the first column, journalist Claudio Scaletta counters the negative reaction 
formulated by two different opponents. First, he is found responding to los lobistas 
sectoriales (the [energy] sector lobbyists) who believed that the Argentine energy 
problems were caused by the government’s interventionist policies. Then, he goes on to 
criticize the reactions coming from Spain. He is found backing the government’s 
argumentation that Argentina has every right to expropriate YPF by presenting it as a 
bare assertion and goes on to add in a highly critical tone that Spain, the Mother Country 
in decay, has no right to interfere with the decision. 
[cuerpo] El resultado de la experiencia histórica permite afirmar que la estrepitosa 
caída de reservas liderada por Repsol YPF no fue consecuencia, como afirmaban 
los lobistas sectoriales, de la política de precios.  
[…] La decisión argentina sólo fue un acto de independencia, mal que le pese a la 
metrópoli en decadencia. (Página 12, 2012, 17 April[c]) 
[body] History shows that the spectacular decline in reserves led by Repsol YPF was 
not a result of the pricing policy, as had been claimed by sector lobbyists. 
[…] The Argentine decision was nothing more than an act of independence, as much 
as it may pain the Mother Country in decay. 
  
 
                                                     
113
 Chile is generally regarded as the country with the most neoliberal market oriented economic model in 
Latin America (see, for instance, Bernal-Meza & Fryba Christensen, 2012; Rindefjäll, 2009). 
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The next fragment is taken from the column written by journalist Martín Granovsky. 
Here, the author is found referring to the hostile reactions which the expropriation 
evoked in (Western) Europe and (North) America114. He claims that these reactions are 
unfounded because many of these countries had also been exerting more state control 
in an attempt to counter the banking crisis. He specifically refers to the government of 
Great Britain because it partially nationalized four British banks in 2008. From this 
comparison, it can be concluded that Granovsky believed that if the British government 
was allowed to intervene in the banking sector to try to solve the banking crisis, than 
surely, the Argentine government should not be frowned upon for intervening in the 
energy sector to try to solve the energy crisis. 
[cuerpo] En realidad [las críticas] tampoco deberían pesar, honestamente, en 
Europa occidental. En octubre de 2008, un mes después de la caída de Lehman 
Brothers, el ministro del Tesoro de Gran Bretaña Alistair Darling anunció que el Estado 
compraría hasta 60 mil millones de dólares en acciones de cuatro bancos 
británicos. Es decir, una nacionalización parcial. (Página 12, 2012, 17 April[b]) 
[body] In fact, there honestly should not be any [criticism] in Western Europe either. 
In October 2008, one month after the fall of Lehman Brothers, Chief Secretary of the 
Treasury of Great Britain Alistair Darling announced that the state would buy shares of 
four British banks for up to 60 billion dollars. In other words, a partial 
nationalization. 
Interestingly, the analysis of the Argentine editorials in the 1998-1999 corpus already 
showed that Great Britain was also referred to in two La Nación editorials published on 
the topic of the (full) privatization of YPF (see section 4.4.2.1). However, when these 
references in the 1998-1999 La Nación editorials are compared to the reference in the 
column published by Página 12, a crucial difference emerges. Whereas Martín 
Granovsky referred to the British government to legitimate President Fernández de 
Kirchner’s decision to intervene in the energy sector, the La Nación editorialists 
referred to the example set by British privatizations to delegitimate President Menem’s 
decision to sell the state’s shares in one package. They approved of the British tradition 
to privatize state-controlled companies by selling the state’s shares on the international 
stock markets but disapproved of Menem’s strategy to maximize the revenue by selling 
the state’s shares in one package to the highest bidder (i.c. the Spanish company 
Repsol). 
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 The analysis found more evidence of this hostile reaction in the rest of the world. In the 21 April La Nación 
editorial, for instance, the author also wrote that the expropriation had been called an act of patoterismo 
(hooliganism) and piratería (piracy) in several countries in (Western) Europe and (North) America (La Nación, 
2012, 21 April). 
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5.3.3 Conclusion 
The aim of the second analytical section of this concluding chapter was to further 
develop and extend the findings of the analysis presented in Chapter 4. First, the 
analysis focused on the Kirchner government’s discursive strategizing to gain 
legitimacy for its decision to (partially) expropriate YPF. The Argentine government of 
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner was the most interesting social actor, not only because it 
took a highly controversial decision, but also because its position was diametrically 
opposed to that of the Menem government in 1998-1999. Second, the Spanish-language 
argumentative texts in the 2012 corpus were closely analysed in order to unveil how the 
newspapers in the two news environments positioned themselves vis-à-vis the (partial) 
expropriation and renationalization of YPF. The findings for the two leading Argentine 
newspapers Clarín and La Nación are most revealing because their 2012 editorials 
clearly revealed that they did not welcome President Fernández de Kirchner’s decision 
to take back control of YPF in 2012, even though their 1998-1999 editorials showed that 
both newspapers were very critical of President Menem’s decision to hand the control 
of YPF over to Repsol at the end of the 1990s. 
RQ1: How did the Argentine government discursively legitimate its decision to 
(partially) expropriate and renationalize YPF? 
The discursive strategizing deployed by the Argentine government when it announced 
the (partial) expropriation and renationalization of YPF in April 2012 primarily revolved 
around blaming Repsol-YPF for its management of YPF and insisting that it was of 
utmost importance to regain control over Argentina’s natural resources in order for 
them to be used for the benefit of the Argentine people. The Argentine government also 
showed great determination to break the myth that companies cannot be run efficiently 
by the state. However, it also seemed to mix this markedly nationalist and anti-global 
capitalist rhetoric with a more rationalistic discourse when it was found countering the 
critique of opponents by declaring that YPF would continue to operate under its 
existing corporate form. This again illustrates how even the most extreme 
interventionist measures can coexist with other, seemingly contradictory, more market 
oriented policies (see also section 4.5). 
 
In any case, when these findings are put into the perspective of the analysis of the 
1998-1999 Repsol-YPF case, it emerges that the discursive strategizing deployed in 2012 
by the Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and her government could not be more different 
from the one deployed by the Menem government in 1998-1999. In order to legitimate 
its decision to privatize YPF at the end of the 20th century, President Menem mobilized a 
discourse of local capitalism, consisting of a number of nationalistic argument topics, to 
convince the Argentine citizens that their country would benefit from the privatization. 
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The opponents, however, claimed that his government desperately needed the money 
to ease the budget crisis. In 2012, the government led by Cristina Fernández de Kirchner 
used a distinctly nationalist and anti-global capitalist rhetoric. It did so by presenting a 
negative evaluation of the rationalistic Repsol-YPF’s performance argument topic and a 
positive evaluation of the nationalistic Argentina’s national sovereignty and State 
interventionism argument topics. Thus, central in its discursive strategizing deployed to 
gain legitimacy for the expropriation was that the state needed to take back control 
over the country’s natural resources for the benefit of Argentina’s future generations 
because foreign investors (i.c. Repsol) were transferring the profits made in Argentina 
back to their home countries. The government’s critics, however, reacted to this 
argumentation by presenting the delegitimating nationalistic State interventionism 
argument topic. They claimed that the government needed the oil money to keep 
financing its expensive interventionist policies. 
RQ2: How did the Argentine and Spanish argumentative text writers discursively 
position themselves vis-à-vis the (partial) expropriation and renationalization of YPF? 
The analysis of the Spanish editorials in the 2012 corpus revealed that the Spanish 
editorialists wrote decidedly against the Argentine government’s use of nationalist and 
anti-global capitalist rhetoric to legitimate the expropriation of YPF. The Spanish 
delegitimating perspective was expected after the analysis of the 1998-1999 corpus in 
Chapter 4 had already revealed that the internationalization strategies of Repsol and 
other Spanish companies in the 1990s were a source of pride for the Spanish 
newspapers. The analysis of the Spanish editorials in the 2012 corpus revealed that the 
Spanish newspapers were still right behind their company. They rejected the Argentine 
government’s argumentation that Repsol had caused the Argentine energy crisis 
because of its reluctance to invest in its Argentine subsidiary. Instead, they presented a 
positive evaluation of Repsol’s performance in Argentina. They also mobilized a decidedly 
negative evaluation of the three nationalistic argument topics that the analysis focused 
on. The Spanish editorialists did not believe in the extreme interventionism preached 
by the Argentine government. They doubted that the country’s energy crisis could be 
solved by implementing more interventionist policies. On the contrary. They pointed to 
the interventionist policies that were already in place as the cause of many Argentine 
problems. The Spanish commentators also believed that the Argentine government 
could not afford to scare foreign investors away. In sum, the Spanish editorialists 
believed in a radically different economic model for the Argentine energy sector (and, 
by extension, for Argentina). They believed that Argentina would benefit from a much 
more market oriented model because it attracts foreign investors whose capital is 
needed to spur local development. The analysis of the Argentine government’s 
discursive strategizing in the 2012 Repsol-YPF case clearly showed that it, in contrast, 
believed in a much more interventionist approach to stimulate the local economy. 
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The analysis of the Argentine editorials in the 2012 corpus revealed that the 
commentators of Clarín and La Nación adopted a clearly delegitimating perspective on 
the paradigm shift envisioned by the government of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. 
This perspective is also in line with the newspapers’ general critical stance towards the 
Kirchner government(s). The analysis of the Argentine editorials in the 1998-1999 
corpus already showed that even though Argentina’s two leading newspapers lamented 
the loss of control over YPF after President Menem decided to sell the state’s remaining 
shares in one package to a foreign (i.c. Spanish) company, they certainly did not 
advocate a radically interventionist economic model for the Argentine energy sector. In 
both the 19998-1999 and the 2012 corpus, the Argentine editorialists were found 
presenting a positive evaluation of the initial phases of deregulation of the Argentine 
energy sector at the beginning of the 1990s. Not only was YPF converted into an 
efficient and competitive oil company thanks to these early free market policies, they 
also ensured, according to the commentators, that Argentina became self-sufficient in 
energy. Moreover, the fact that the editorialists mainly presented a negative evaluation 
of the three nationalistic argument topics taken up for the analysis illustrates that they 
believed the Argentine government’s politico-economic project to be too radically 
interventionist. The commentators even claimed that the Argentine energy crisis was 
caused by the interventionist policies that were already in place and that the 
government needed YPF to keep paying for them. They also feared that the 
expropriation would scare away the much needed foreign investors. 
 
It was also deemed relevant to include a number of argumentative texts published by 
the centre-left Argentine quality newspaper Página 12 which is known to be more 
supportive of the Kirchner governments than Clarín and La Nación. The analysis of the 
four columns in the 2012 corpus showed how the Página 12 guest writers, as expected, 
adopted a radically different perspective on the expropriation of YPF. These Argentine 
writers were mainly found echoing the Argentine government’s discursive strategizing. 
They also adopted a distinctly anti-global capitalist perspective, particularly when they 
wrote about the 1990s neoliberal reforms. They held the Argentine political generation 
of the turn of the centuries responsible for handing over the control of the country’s 
natural resources to foreign investors. None of these columnists mentioned, however, 
that the Kirchners were also in favour of the full privatization of YPF in 1998-1999. The 
guest writers also accused the foreign investors, and particularly the Spanish 
management of Repsol, of transferring the profits made in Argentina back to their home 
countries. The Página 12 columnists also wrote positively about the paradigm shift 
envisioned by the Argentine government. They strongly believed that the only way to 
solve the energy problems and achieve the much desired goal of self-sufficiency was by 
having the state interfere in the Argentine energy sector. Thus, the Página 12 columns 
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certainly proved their expected added value. The comparison between the 
argumentative texts published by the supportive quality newspaper Página 12 on the one 
hand, and the two critical quality newspapers Clarín and La Nación on the other, clearly 
showed how the 2012 (partial) expropriation and renationalization of YPF divided the 
Argentine public opinion. 
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5.4 Concluding remarks to Chapter 5 
The purpose of this concluding chapter was to revisit the previously presented 
discourse analytic perspectives on media representations of Spanish Foreign Direct 
Investment through the lens of the 2012 (partial) expropriation and renationalization of 
YPF. This new episode in the Repsol-YPF saga offered an opportunity to, on the one 
hand, revisit the results obtained from the analysis presented in Chapter 3 and Chapter 
4 and, on the other hand, add the case of a renationalization after privatization to the 
existing body of discourse analytic research on cross-border business manoeuvres. The 
findings were presented at the end of each of the two main analytical sections (see 
sections 5.2.3 and 5.3.3). 
 
The analysis of these two episodes clearly showed how two different Argentine 
governments with a distinctly different perspective on the appropriate balance between 
state and market in the economy have used YPF over the past 25 years for political 
purposes. The decision taken by the government of President Menem at the end of the 
1990s to fully privatize the company and leave its control in the hands of the Spanish 
company Repsol must be seen in the light of the at times vigorous application of the 
economic reforms of the Washington Consensus in a number of Latin American 
countries. The analysis of the government’s discursive strategizing showed that it tried 
to convince the Argentines that its strategy to maximize the revenue from the 
privatization would be to the benefit of Argentina. However, the analysis of the 
Argentine newspaper articles in the 1998-1999 corpus clearly revealed that (at least part 
of) the Argentine public opinion was not convinced. At the end of the 20th century, many 
Argentines had become critical of the local impact of the Washington Consensus 
reforms. In one of the more investigative newspaper articles published by La Nación in 
1999, entitled La Argentina extranjera (Argentina, owned by foreigners), the journalist 
author writes about these changing attitudes. In the following fragment, s/he is found 
observing that concepts such as el campo nacional (the national level), empresa nacional 
(national company) and Nación (Nation) are making a surprising reappearance in 
Argentine discussions about the local economy. 
[cuerpo] Hoy, sin embargo, algunos de quienes repetían esta fórmula [la apertura 
de la economía y el flujo de capitales] cuestionan el mismo modelo que ayer 
defendían a raja tabla. Con sutiles y significativas diferencias respecto del uso que 
tradicionalmente le dieron los paladines del proteccionismo o de la burguesía 
nacional, conceptos y argumentos que hace cuatro o cinco años (que en la 
Argentina de hoy parecen cuatro o cinco siglos) hubieran sido rechazados con 
desprecio por la mayoría de los empresarios, han hecho una sorprendente 
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reaparición, pero esta vez de la mano de incuestionables defensores del liberalismo 
local. Se vuelve a hablar de campo nacional. De empresa nacional. De Nación. (La 
Nación, 1999, 9 May[b]). 
[body] Today, however, some of those who repeated this formula [opening up the 
economy and the flow of capital] are questioning the model that they vehemently 
defended in the past. Four or five years ago (which in today’s Argentina may as well 
be four or five centuries) certain concepts and arguments that would have been 
rejected with disdain by the majority of businessmen, have made a surprising 
reappearance, though with subtle and significant differences to the ways in which 
they were traditionally used by the advocates of protectionism or by the national 
bourgeoisie. This time, however, they are being introduced by unquestionable 
defenders of local liberalism. People are talking again about the national level. About 
national companies. About the Nation. 
At the turn of the centuries, the privatization and acquisition of YPF triggered an 
interesting debate about the role of the state in the economy in Argentina. The 
Argentine newspapers Clarín and La Nación were very critical of the Argentine 
government’s decision to sell its remaining shares in one package to Repsol because it 
meant, de facto, handing over the control of the country’s most important company to a 
foreign company. However, it must be added that these two quality newspapers were not 
against the idea of an efficiently run privatized YPF. In other words, they were clearly in 
favour of a less market oriented model for the Argentine energy sector than the one the 
Menem government had in mind, but they certainly did not advocate a radically 
interventionist model. 
 
After the financial crisis that hit Argentina really hard between 2001 and 2003, the 
debate became increasingly strident and polarized. The Kirchners came to power thanks 
to their promises to reverse the neoliberal policies of the 1990s. In 2012, Cristina 
Fernández de Kirchner’s announced that her government had decided to (partially) 
expropriate and renationalize the very company that had been privatized by President 
Menem, a member of her own Justicialist Party. Again, YPF was at the centre of an 
Argentine and for about a week a worldwide debate about the role of the state in the 
economy. The analysis of the Argentine argumentative texts in the 2012 corpus showed 
that the Argentine public opinion was divided on the topic. The four Página 12 guest 
writers supported the 21st century interventionist economic model envisioned by the 
Argentine government but the commentators of Clarín and La Nación wrote decidedly 
against it. As such, in both episodes of the Repsol-YPF saga, these two quality 
newspapers did not believe that the economic model proposed by the Argentine 
government was in the interest of the nation and its people, even though that is exactly 
how both Menem and Fernández de Kirchner attempted to gain legitimacy for their 
respective decisions. In both episodes, Clarín and La Nación believed that the Argentine 
government needed YPF to pay for a budget crisis. 
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In section 5.2.3 it was already mentioned that one of the differences that was 
uncovered by contrasting the analysis of the 1998-1999 privatization/acquisition of YPF 
and the 2012 (partial) expropriation/renationalization deserves some further attention 
in this concluding remarks section. The analysis of the newspaper articles in the 2012 
corpus revealed that a number of high-ranked Spanish officials publicly spoke out in 
defence of Repsol and, by extension, all Spanish companies operating abroad. The 
appearance of the Spanish government as a crucial social actor in the 2012 Repsol-YPF 
case raises some additional questions. What role did the Spanish government play in 
Repsol’s acquisition of YPF in 1998-1999? Did the newspapers report on this role? How 
did they write about it? 
 
There can be no doubt that the Spanish government played an important role in 
stimulating Repsol and other Spanish companies to venture into new markets in the 
1990s. The entry of Spain into the European Union had led to increased competition in 
the home economy and in order to protect its companies from European competition, 
the government encouraged them to grow outside their home economy. For a number 
of different reasons (see section 2.1.1), Latin America became the preferred investment 
destination. Still, the analysis of the 1998-1999 newspaper corpus revealed that the 
Spanish government certainly could not be seen as a crucial social actor in the 
discursive struggle over the legitimacy of Repsol’s acquisition of YPF. In the whole 1998-
1999 corpus, there is only one quote that is directly attributed to a representative of the 
Spanish government. In a La Nación report published on 2 May 1999, the author 
includes a quote in which the Spanish Minister of Industry and Energy states that the 
Spanish government supports Repsol’s internationalization strategy. 
[cuerpo] El ministro de Industria y Energía de España, Josep Piqué, dijo que “el Gobierno 
apoya el proceso de internacionalización” que afronta Repsol. (La Nación, 1999, 2 
May[b]) 
[body] The Minister of Industry and Energy of Spain, Josep Piqué, said that “the 
government supports the internationalization process” that Repsol pursues. 
That does not mean, of course, that the government could not have played a crucial role 
behind the scenes. In fact, in one of the English-language news reports in the 1990-2009 
corpus, the journalist author is also found commenting on the involvement of the 
Spanish authorities in the internationalization strategies of its most important 
companies. The description of the tax breaks as absurdly generous can be interpreted as 
an indication that this writer found it unacceptable that the Spanish state interfered so 
much in the economy for the benefit of its companies. 
[body] And the absurdly generous 30 per cent tax breaks the Spanish government 
offers to firms taking over foreign companies have put extra wind in the sails of 
its new Armada. (Express, 2006, 18 December) 
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A closer look at the Argentine newspaper articles in the 1998-1999 corpus also reveals 
that both newspapers at times wrote about the good relationship between Repsol and 
the Spanish government. In the following fragment, the La Nación journalist first writes 
about the fact that Repsol’s CEO Alfonso Cortina has good ties with the Spanish 
government and then goes on to specify that the government stimulates the growth of 
the Spanish energy companies. 
[cuerpo] [Alfonso Cortina] asumió la presidencia de la empresa como 
representante del Estado español, que en aquel tiempo todavía seguía siendo el 
mayor accionista con el 10% del paquete. De ahí su buena relación con el gobierno, 
que alienta el crecimiento de los grupos energéticos locales. (La Nación, 1999, 4 
May[d]) 
[body] [Alfonso Cortina] became president of the company as a representative of the 
Spanish state, which at that time was still the largest shareholder with 10% of the 
shares. Hence his good relationship with the government, which actively encourages 
the growth of local energy groups. 
In the next two fragments, the Clarín journalists write about how both the Spanish 
prime minister and the king of Spain used their influence to lobby in favour of Repsol’s 
acquisition of YPF. 
[cuerpo] […] desde el jefe del gobierno español, José María Aznar, hasta el propio rey 
Juan Carlos hicieron valer su lobby a favor de Repsol. (Clarín, 1999, 13 June[f]) 
[body] […] the Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar and even King Juan Carlos lobbied 
in favour of Repsol. 
 
Para que Repsol absorbiera YPF militaron reyes y presidentes. Juan Carlos de 
España fue el primero en interesar a la Argentina sobre la operación. […] El 
presidente español José Aznar apoyó la adquisición multimillonaria. (Clarín, 1999, 25 
June[b]) 
[body] Kings and presidents campaigned for Repsol to absorb YPF. Juan Carlos of 
Spain was the first to make Argentina interested in the operation. […] The Spanish 
Prime Minister José Aznar supported the multi-million dollar acquisition. 
King Juan Carlos seemed to have been particularly keen on helping Repsol to venture 
into Argentina. In October 1998, Clarín reported on the telephone calls between King 
Juan Carlos and President Menem in which, according to Menem, the Spanish king 
wanted to discuss the privatization of YPF and the role Repsol could play in it. 
[cuerpo] El rey Juan Carlos me llama cada dos por tres por ese tema, se sinceró el 
presidente Carlos Menem […]. (Clarín, 1998, 23 October) 
[body] King Juan Carlos calls me every other day about the matter, said President 
Carlos Menem […]. 
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According to Clarín, the Spanish king played a crucial role in setting up a meeting 
between Repsol and the Argentine Ministry of Economic Affairs, the institution charged 
with deciding upon the privatization method. The first fragment is taken from one of 
the first articles in the 1998-1999 corpus. The second fragment is from an article 
published at the end of May 1999 in which the author gives an overview of the Repsol-
YPF saga. 
[cuerpo] Primero fue un llamado del rey Juan Carlos de España. […] A los pocos días, 
Carlos Menem cumplió con el rey […]: Roque Fernández hizo lugar en su agenda y 
atendió a los petroleros de Repsol. (Clarín, 1998, 2 August) 
[body] First there was a call from King Juan Carlos of Spain. […] A few days later, Carlos 
Menem fulfilled the king’s wishes […]: Roque Fernández made time in his schedule 
and received the oil barons of Repsol. 
 
[cuerpo] Anteriormente [Cortina] le había pedido al mismísimo rey de España que 
intercediera ante Menem para conseguir una audiencia con Roque Fernández. 
(Clarín, 1999, 30 May[b]) 
[body] Previously [Cortina] had asked the king of Spain to intercede with Menem to 
arrange a meeting with Roque Fernández. 
After Repsol had launched its offer to acquire the remaining 85.1% of YPF at the end of 
April 1999, both La Nación and Cinco Días referred to the statement made by President 
Menem that King Juan Carlos had called him (again) to say that he very much wanted 
Repsol to close the deal. The fragment published by Cinco Días on 3 May 1999 is the only 
reference to the Spanish state (government or king) that was found in the Spanish 
subcorpus (1998-1999). 
[cuerpo] El presidente Carlos Menem dijo que el rey Juan Carlos de España se 
comunicó telefónicamente con él para decirle que estaba interesado en que la 
compañía pueda concretar la compra. (La Nación, 1999, 2 May[b]) 
[body] President Carlos Menem said that King Juan Carlos of Spain had called him over 
the phone to say that he wanted the company to complete the deal. 
 
[cuerpo] Menem recibió una llamada telefónica del rey Juan Carlos en el cual éste, 
según el jefe del Estado argentino, le expresó su interés en que Repsol pudiese 
concretar la toma del control de YPF. (Cinco Días, 1999, 3 May[d]) 
[body] Menem received a call from King Juan Carlos in which he, according to the 
Argentine head of state, expressed his wish that Repsol could finalize the takeover of 
YPF. 
These (mainly Argentine) fragments show how the Spanish government, and King Juan 
Carlos in particular, did play an important role in Repsol’s acquisition of YPF in 1998-
1999, although, unlike in 2012, it did not actively participate in the discursive struggle 
over the legitimacy of the deal in the public forum. Moreover, however scarce the 
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references to the Spanish government are, these fragments also add to the Argentine 
newspapers’ general delegitimating perspective on the (full) privatization and 
acquisition of YPF in 1998-1999. The fact that both Clarín and La Nación wrote about the 
Spanish government’s strenuous efforts to help Repsol close the deal can be seen as 
another way of lashing out against the determination of the Menem government to 
hand the control of YPF, a company of symbolic importance in the Argentine collective 
imagination, over to the foreign (i.c. Spanish) company Repsol. 
 
Furthermore, these fragments also prove the point made by Harvey (2005) about the 
ambiguous role of the state under a (predominantly) global capitalist regime. The 
fragment in the 2006 Express article and the fragments in the 1998-1999 corpus indicate 
that the Spanish government indeed actively intervened by attempting to pave the way 
for the economic expansion of its companies. In 2012, the Spanish government publicly 
spoke out in defence of its companies operating abroad after the arbitrary and 
discriminatory move on Repsol. The findings of the analysis of the editorials published in 
the two news environments also suggest that that is also what the public opinion 
generally expects from their national government. In the context of the 1998-1999 
privatization and acquisition of YPF, the Argentine commentators clearly wanted to see 
their government taking more responsibility to protect their country’s national 
interest115. In the context of the 2012 (partial) expropriation and renationalization of 
YPF, the Spanish commentators clearly expected their government to defend the 
interests of their companies. 
 
 
                                                     
115
 Again, it is important to highlight that they did not advocate a return to a fully state-controlled YPF either, 
not in 1998-1999 and not in 2012. 
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Summary of the findings 
In this dissertation, I presented a thorough discourse analysis of (written) media 
representations of Spanish Foreign Direct Investment. Three different sets of newspaper 
articles on Spanish Foreign Direct Investment were analysed and discussed in relation 
with each other. The data were used to investigate the following four broad research 
topics: (i) the discursive representation of business manoeuvres performed by Spanish 
companies as confrontations between Spain and other nations/regions, (ii) the use of 
historical references to Spain’s colonial past in newspaper accounts of Spanish Foreign 
Direct Investment, (iii) the discursive strategizing deployed by prominent social actors 
to (de)legitimate controversial decisions involving a Spanish company operating abroad 
(i.c. Repsol-YPF in Argentina), and (iv) the positioning of quality newspapers vis-à-vis 
corporate controversies (i.c. cross-border acquisition and (partial) renationalization) in 
the directly involved news environments (i.c. Argentina and Spain). 
 
In Chapter 1, the central theme of the dissertation was introduced, the two discourse 
analytic perspectives that guided the analysis were briefly reviewed, the corpora were 
presented and the dissertation was outlined. Chapter 2 explored the wider context of 
the events that are the object of this discourse analysis. As any description of reality is 
always partial, the chapter must be seen as a presentation of a consciously selected 
series of elements from the wider context that are deemed relevant for the analysis of 
the different sets of newspaper articles, which was presented in the analytical Chapters 
3, 4 and 5. In Chapter 3 the analysis focused on the use of conflict metaphors, 
(supra)nation metonyms and metaphor scenarios in both English-language newspaper 
accounts of Spanish FDI in general between 1990 and 2009 and in Argentine and Spanish 
newspaper accounts of the specific case of Repsol-YPF in 1998 and 1999. The chapter 
showed the added value of combining the concepts discourse metaphor and metaphor 
scenario for the study of these complex historical references in (written) media 
discourse. The analysis presented in Chapter 4 focused on the discursive struggle over 
the legitimacy of the 1998-1999 privatization and acquisition of YPF as represented 
through the lens of two Argentine and two Spanish quality newspapers. The analysis 
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benifited from the methodological refinement that was added to the discourse analytic 
model of the Finnish School. The incorporation of Appraisal Theory guidelines, of 
quantitative elements and of recent advances in the study of journalistic stance allowed 
for a more detailed analysis of the (written) media discourse. In the concluding Chapter 
5, the case of the 2012 (partial) expropriation and renationalization of YPF was used to 
revisit the discourse analytic insights gained from the analysis of the newspaper 
accounts of Spanish FDI presented in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. 
(i) The discursive representation of business manoeuvres performed by Spanish 
companies as confrontations between Spain and other nations/regions. 
The analysis first set out to study the (written) media’s conventionalized use of conflict 
metaphors and (supra)nation metonyms to set up national frames of reference in news 
stories about cross-border business manoeuvres. Both the English-language and 
Spanish-language sets of newspaper accounts of Spanish FDI were used to confirm and 
extend the findings of earlier studies that newspaper journalists have the tendency to 
both emphasize possible conflict scenarios and represent these business events as 
confrontations between nations (see section 3.2.3). 
 
The analysis of the 1990-2009 corpus of newspaper articles on Spanish FDI in general 
(section 3.3.4) revealed that English-language journalists used conflict metaphors and 
(supra)national frames of reference to introduce their accounts of these events into an 
emotively charged narrative frame of territorial threats and potential losses of national 
patrimony. It was argued that this emotive framing has great rhetorical potential 
because readers can identify easily with a threat to national territory and integrity, 
even if they do not actually live in the territory that is, metaphorically, under attack. 
 
In the 1998-1999 newspaper articles on the privatization and acquisition of YPF 
(section 3.4), conflict frames and national frames of reference were identified in both 
the Argentine and Spanish subcorpus. However, the analysis also found that the news 
reports in the two news environments were different in that these elements were not 
always combined in the same way to introduce emotive framing into the texts. In the 
Argentine newspapers, the privatization and acquisition of YPF was indeed at times 
emotively framed as a threat to Argentina’s sovereign territory and integrity. The 
Spanish newspapers described the event more as a confrontation between private 
companies, without bringing the conflict to the level of the nation. Still, in a number of 
Spanish fragments, a sense of national pride shines through when the Spanish authors 
wrote in positive terms about the economic internationalization of their companies. 
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The picture was different in the case of the 2012 expropriation and renationalization 
of YPF. The analysis of the newspaper articles in the 2012 corpus (section 5.2.1) showed 
that most newspapers focused mainly on the crucial role of the Argentine government, 
and not as much on the Spanish company’s side of the story. The most emotively 
charged narrative frame was in fact found in the public statements of Spanish 
government officials who were found publicly declaring that the expropriation was an 
act of defiance against the whole Spanish nation. 
(ii) The use of historical references to Spain’s colonial past in newspaper articles about 
Spanish Foreign Direct Investment. 
One of the main triggers that started this research project was the observation that 
Spanish investors were at times compared to Spanish conquistadors known from the 
history books. These historical references can be seen as discourse metaphors which 
evoke metaphor scenarios. These socio-culturally grounded narratives with rich 
conceptual structures have the potential to activate a whole set of assumptions about 
the participants (i.c. Spaniards – Latin Americans) and their roles in these scenarios (i.c. 
aggressors – victims) (see sections 1.2.1 and 3.2.4). 
 
The analysis of the English-language 1990-2009 newspaper corpus (section 3.3.5) 
showed that three salient historical moments from Spain’s colonial history were evoked 
in the context of Spanish FDI in general: the discovery of the New World in 1492 (and its 
subsequent colonization), the failed attempt to invade England in 1588 (the Spanish 
Armada) and the Spanish-American War in 1898 (and the USS Maine) which marks the 
end of Spain’s colonial empire. It was found that the historical references to the 
conquest and colonization of the New World were first used in the context of the 
Spanish expansion in Latin America, but also that the same narratives were later used in 
the context of the Spanish investments in other regions at the beginning of the 21st 
century as well. The source domain of the Spanish-American War was only used in the 
context of the Spanish investments in Latin America at the end of the 20th century. The 
references to the Spanish Armada were mostly identified in the context of the wave of 
Spanish investments in Great Britain in 2006. Furthermore, the analysis of this data set 
also revealed that the English-language journalists were found to be using these colonial 
metaphor scenarios mostly to represent the Spanish investors as forceful aggressors. It 
was argued that deeply rooted stereotypes about the Spaniards were reactivated and 
carried on to next generations through this modern-day revival of the Black Legend. 
However, the analysis also found a (significantly smaller) number of fragments in which 
the English-language journalists used these colonial metaphor scenarios to highlight the 
Spanish investors’ audacity and determination when venturing into new territories. 
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The Spanish-language 1998-1999 newspaper accounts of the privatization and 
acquisition of YPF (a specific case of Spanish FDI in Latin America) were also scrutinized 
for historical references to Spain’s colonial past in the region (section 3.4). The analysis 
showed that colonial metaphor scenarios were mostly used in the context of the 
Spanish investments in general. In the Argentine subcorpus, for instance, colonial 
references were identified in a few texts in which the YPF case was used as a stepping 
stone to write about the impact of the Spanish recolonización (recolonization) of the 
Argentine/Latin American economy. The only historical reference in the Spanish 
subcorpus was found in a discussion about a colonial slip of the tongue attributed to a high-
ranked Spanish official who talked about the Spanish companies as emperadoras 
(emperors) of the Argentine companies whereas he meant to say operadoras (operators). 
The (relative) absence of colonial metaphor scenarios in the Spanish subcorpus raised 
the question whether Spanish journalists used them in texts about Spanish FDI in 
general. Therefore, a follow-up search was performed looking for the specific discourse 
metaphor nuevos conquistadores in newspaper articles published by the Spanish quality 
newspaper El País (section 3.5). The fragments that were found through this extra 
search not only revealed that Spanish journalists at times expressed their dissatisfaction 
with the reproduction and dissemination of the stereotype of the aggressive Spanish 
conquistadors in the context of Spain’s economic expansion but also that they mainly 
pointed at their historic rivals in the English-speaking world for this modern-day 
revival of the Black Legend. 
 
In the 2012 corpus there are no newspaper articles that are firmly built on colonial 
metaphor scenarios. Still, the analysis identified three references to colonial times in 
three different Spanish-language argumentative texts (section 5.2.2). These fragments 
not only illustrate how Spain’s colonial past continued to be used in the context of 
cross-border business actions involving Spanish companies operating abroad. They also 
further illustrate how the business actions of Spanish companies at times put a strain on 
the so-called special relationship between Spain and its former colonies. 
(iii) The discursive strategizing deployed by prominent social actors to (de)legitimate 
controversial decisions involving a Spanish company operating abroad (i.c. Repsol-YPF 
in Argentina). 
The media representations of the two episodes in the Repsol-YPF saga were also used to 
gain further insights into the ways in which prominent social actors discursively try to 
either legitimate or delegitimate controversial cross-border business decisions. What 
sets this study apart from previous studies on the discursive underpinnings of cross-
border M&As is the special role of a national government as one of the main proponents 
of the privatization and acquisition of YPF in 1998-1999 and of the (partial) 
expropriation and renationalization of YPF in 2012. 
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The analysis of the discursive (re)presentation and (re)construction of the 1998-1999 
privatization and acquisition of YPF by two Argentine and two Spanish quality 
newspapers revealed that the discursive strategizing to gain legitimacy for a particular 
cross-border M&A is more complex than the discursive strategizing to reject such a 
decision (section 4.3). In the 1998-1999 corpus, the opponents of the deal (i.c. the YPF 
management and the Argentine political opposition) were almost exclusively found 
presenting delegitimating nationalistic argument topics. The analysis of the discursive 
strategizing deployed by the two most prominent proponents (i.c. the Argentine 
government of Carlos Menem and the Spanish acquiring company Repsol) revealed that 
they adopted very different perspectives. The study confirmed the findings of previous 
studies in that the analysis of the 1998-1999 Repsol-YPF case also found that the 
acquiring company presented a mix of both rationalistic and nationalistic discourse. In 
contrast, the findings also revealed that this was not the case for the second proponent 
of the deal. The Argentine government was found to be trying to gain legitimacy for its 
decision by pointing out that it wanted to maximize the revenue from the privatization 
so that Argentina and its people could benefit from it. It was argued that the Menem 
government had adapted the rationalistic discourse of global capitalism to be used at the 
local level and that it was therefore more suitable to describe the legitimating 
nationalistic discourse mobilized by the Argentine government as a discourse of local 
capitalism. Special attention was given to the relegitimating discourse mobilized by 
proponents in response to the discursive attacks launched by their opponents. The 
analysis revealed that both the Argentine government and the Spanish acquiring 
company Repsol felt forced to react to some intense (societal/nationalistic) pressures 
coming from Argentina. The findings suggest that relegitimation is an essential part of 
the discursive strategizing of the proponents of any merger or acquisition. 
 
The analysis of the 2012 corpus focused exclusively on the discursive strategizing 
deployed by the Argentine government of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner to legitimate 
its controversial decision to (partially) expropriate and renationalize YPF (section 5.3.1). 
The findings showed that its 2012 discursive strategizing was fundamentally different 
from the one deployed by the Menem government in 1998-1999. In 2012, the 
government mobilized a distinctly anti-global capitalist and nationalist discourse. The 
findings illustrate how the two governments proposed a diametrically opposed 
economic model for the Argentine energy sector, even though Carlos Menem and 
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner belong to the same political party. In 2012, the 
government blamed Repsol for its management of YPF and it emphasized that 
Argentina urgently needed to regain control over its natural resources in order for them 
to be used for the benefit of the nation and its people. However, the findings again 
showed that it is not easy to gain legitimacy for far-reaching business decisions as the 
government was also found countering the critique of opponents that state run 
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companies cannot perform efficiently by drawing on a more rationalistic discourse 
when President Fernández de Kirchner declared that YPF would continue to operate 
under its existing corporate form. 
(iv) The positioning of quality newspapers vis-à-vis corporate controversies (i.c. cross-
border acquisition and (partial) renationalization) in the directly involved news 
environments (i.c. Argentina and Spain). 
The analysis of the two episodes in the Repsol-YPF saga presented in this dissertation 
also further develop and extend the findings of earlier studies that previously identified 
differences in the ways in which (quality) newspapers in directly involved news 
environments position themselves vis-à-vis cross-border business manoeuvres. The 
analysis of the argumentative texts and the news reports in the different sets of data 
were presented separately because it was assumed that the different perspectives would 
be more clearly observable in texts that are characterized by a more argumentative 
writing style. 
 
The comparative analysis of the Argentine and Spanish editorials in the 1998-1999 
corpus immediately showed that the newspapers in the two news environments indeed 
adopted a markedly different perspective on the privatization and acquisition of YPF. 
The Argentine editorialists drew exclusively on nationalistic discourse whereas the 
Spanish journalists exclusively drew on rationalistic discourse. The analysis of the 
Argentine editorials provided more insights into the Argentine hurt feelings at the 
prospect of seeing Argentina’s most important company end up in the hands of a 
foreign/Spanish management. The Argentine editorialists strongly disagreed with the 
Argentine government about the appropriate way to sell the state’s remaining shares in 
the oil company. They were also very much concerned about the consequences for the 
Argentine energy market. The analysis also revealed, however, that they were certainly 
not against the privatization of the company. The analysis of the Spanish editorials 
showed how the Spanish newspapers fully supported Repsol’s economic 
internationalization strategy. The Spanish editorialists did show their concern for the 
financial implications for the company, but the analysis also revealed that these critical 
observations were backgrounded in the texts. 
 
As was expected, the different lines of vision were harder to trace in the news reports 
because these texts are characterized by a less argumentative writing style. Still, the 
comparative approach and the focus on the argument topics belonging to the two 
dominant discourses surrounding cross-border M&As showed how the different 
perspectives that were clearly observable in the editorials could also be identified in the 
news reports. The comparative analysis of the ways in which the journalist authors 
foregrounded certain argument topics and backgrounded others and the ways in which 
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they positioned themselves vis-à-vis different argument topics unveiled a strongly 
delegitimating nationalistic perspective in the Argentine news reports, and a more 
legitimating rationalistic perspective in the Spanish news reports. Thus, it was argued 
that the Argentine concern for the impact of the deal (and of other foreign investments) 
on their country shines through the Argentine texts, whereas the Spanish pride in the 
economic internationalization of Repsol (and other Spanish companies) shines through 
the Spanish texts. 
 
The comparative analysis of the positioning of Argentine and Spanish quality 
newspapers vis-à-vis the 2012 (partial) expropriation and renationalization of YPF 
focused exclusively on a selection of argumentative texts on the topic. The analysis 
revealed that the Spanish editorialists continued to support their company Repsol and 
that they strongly disapproved of the Argentine government’s use of anti-global 
capitalist and nationalist rhetoric to legitimate its decision. The Argentine 
commentators of Clarín and La Nación, two quality newspapers that were known to be 
critical of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and her government, were also very much 
against the paradigm shift envisioned by the government. The analysis revealed that 
their delegitimating perspective was not so different from the delegitimating 
perspective identified in the Spanish editorials. The 2012 corpus also contains four 
argumentative texts published by the Argentine quality newspaper Página 12, which 
was known to be more supportive of the centre-left government of Cristina Fernández 
de Kirchner. This newspaper does not publish an editorial but the day after the 
announcement it did publish these four argumentative texts which were written by four 
different renowned Argentine guest writers. The analysis of these texts found that they, 
as expected, presented a radically different perspective on the event. In fact, they were 
found presenting the same argument topics that were identified in the discursive 
strategizing deployed by the Argentine government. Their texts also echoed the 
distinctly anti-global capitalist rhetoric of the Argentine government, particularly when 
they discussed the 1990s neoliberal reforms. 
 
This summary of the main findings shows how I tried to illuminate several discourse 
analytic aspects of different (written) media representations of Spanish Foreign Direct 
Investment. As is often the case in research, this dissertation not only provides answers 
to a number of specific research questions, it also raises new ones. I would like to 
conclude this dissertation by suggesting some areas that in my opinion deserve further 
attention in the future. 
 
The media discourse analysis presented in this dissertation considered the final 
products of highly complex news production processes. Several studies have provided 
important and novel insights into these processes by moving their attention away from 
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news products to analyse news production in its own right (see, for instance, 
NewsTalk&Text Research Group, 2011; Perrin, 2013). However, it is no coincidence that 
these studies often focus on routine journalistic practices. In retrospect, I do wonder 
about the indredibly rich ethnographic data that could have been gathered if a team of 
researchers had been at the news desks of the Argentine and Spanish newspapers on 16 
April 2012. Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s announcement that her government would 
expropriate Repsol’s YPF shares took me and many other observers by surprise. It is 
indeed very difficult to foresee these news events. Vertommen et al. (2012) suggested an 
interesting alternative to the traditional ethnographic techniques of participant 
observation. They triangulated text-analytical observations obtained from a cross-
textual analysis of a corpus of newspaper articles on the same topic with ethnographic 
data gathered from interviews with journalists attached to written media. One possible 
avenue for further research would be to perform a similar analysis on the 2012 Repsol-
YPF case. The findings would provide better insights into the attitudes, value systems, 
concerns and motivations of individual Argentine and Spanish newspaper journalists, 
both in general and in the context of this particular renationalization after 
privatization. 
 
Another interesting pathway would be to further explore the ways in which 
discourse metaphors and metaphor scenarios can be used to guide and colour our 
understanding of contemporary events. Future analyses could consider the use of 
metaphor scenarios in media discourse about the FDI of other nations with a strong 
international reputation (China, France, Germany, the US) and/or in other discourse 
genres (such as, for instance, political discourse about FDI). 
 
It would also be worthwhile to take further steps in the analysis of discursive 
struggles over the legitimacy of (re)nationalizations. Several Latin American 
governments have made controversial decisions to intervene in their national 
economies that are worth taking a closer look at. However, it must not be forgotten that 
several European governments have made similar moves in the past few years. The 
global financial crisis often left these governments not much choice but to intervene in 
different areas, but particularly in the banking sector. Thorough discourse analyses of 
these cases would provide more insights into the ways in which different social actors 
positioned themselves vis-à-vis these decisions and vis-à-vis the different ideas about 
the appropriate balance between state and market in the economy. 
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Clarín. (1998, 19 November). YPF rechaza oficialmente la venta de acciones en bloque. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1998, 20 November). Hay nuevos interesados en las acciones de YPF. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1998, 24 November). Un fondo de EE UU compró el 5,1% de YPF. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1998, 26 November). YPF: Roque consigue plata y Monti mantiene el control. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1998, 27 November). YPF: invitan a 15 empresas. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1998, 28 November). YPF: Economía acelera la venta de acciones. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1998, 4 December). Interés italiano por YPF. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1998, 5 December). YPF: sólo quedan cuatro candidatos. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1998, 9 December). Postulantes para YPF. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1998, 10 December). Seis interesados en el 14,99% de YPF. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1998, 13 December). Un año bursátil para el olvido. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1998, 16 December). Roque pretende 1 900 millones por el 14,9% de YPF. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1998, 21 December). El petróleo quedó en poquísimas manos. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 5 January). YPF: el precio base superará los $29. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 6 January). YPF: el precio base es de 38 pesos por acción. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 7 January). Las acciones de YPF ya tendrían comprador. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 17 January). YPF: ¿Quiénes serán los nuevos dueños? Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 18 January). Repsol, firme candidata a las acciones de YPF. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 20 January). Prueba de fuego: hoy venden YPF. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 21 January[a]). Repsol compró las acciones de YPF y ofertaría por todo el resto. 
Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 21 January[b]). Respiro para Economía tras la venta de las acciones. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 22 January). Confirmó Repsol que pretende toda YPF. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 27 January). La plata de YPF, para cubrir baches. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 3 February). Repsol apura la fusión con YPF. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 5 February). Se complica el acceso de Repsol al control de YPF. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 9 February). Podría profundizarse la pelea de YPF y Repsol. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 2 March). Más tironeos entre YPF y los españoles. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 3 March). Tregua entre YPF y Repsol. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 19 March). Perez Companc se fue de YPF. Clarín.  
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Clarín. (1999, 28 April). Hubo pase de facturas en la asamblea anual de YPF. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 30 April). Quieren comprar todo YPF por 13 439 millones de dólares. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 2 May[a]). Una bandera española en YPF. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 2 May[b]). Repsol venderá activos y cancelará inversiones. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 2 May[c]). Euforia y preocupación generó la oferta por YPF. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 2 May[d]). La Bolsa festejó con una suba del 9,7%. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 3 May[a]). Gran expectativa en la Bolsa. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 3 May[b]). Luz verde para la venta de YPF a los españoles. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 4 May[a]). La Bolsa sigue de fiesta por la oferta de Repsol a YPF. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 4 May[b]). Los españoles dominarán el negocio energético. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 4 May[c]). Una operación bajo la lupa. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 5 May[a]). Un banquero de 37 años dará el veredicto sobre YPF. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 5 May[b]). El titular de YPF acepta la oferta de Repsol. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 6 May[a]). Las condiciones que pone Repsol. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 6 May[b]). Economía estudia el efecto de la venta de YPF. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 6 May[c]). El efecto español sigue dando aire a la Bolsa. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 7 May). Repsol vendería una refinería y 800 estaciones de servicio. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 8 May). Repsol ya tiene ofertas como para controlar YPF. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 9 May[a]). La venta del final. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 9 May[b]). Ascenso, apogeo y caída de YPF. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 9 May[c]). Adónde irá el dinero de YPF. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 9 May[d]). Buscan frenar la venta de YPF. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 9 May[e]). El 7% de la economía, en manos españolas. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 10 May). Día clave en la venta de YPF: esperan el aval del directorio. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 11 May). YPF: La cúpula aprobó la venta. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 12 May). Cuestionamientos a la venta de YPF. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 15 May). YPF: guía para vender acciones. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 19 May). Ya suenan tres candidatos para suceder a Monti en YPF. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 21 May). Repsol cambiará estaciones de Eg3 con Petrobrás. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 24 May). Comienza la oferta por YPF. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 30 May[a]). Cómo se despliega la reconquista española. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 30 May[b]). El adelantado del petróleo español. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 30 May[c]). España: de Franco al euro. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 31 May). Cuáles son los pasos para vender las acciones de YPF. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 5 June). Repsol se apresta a cerrar su oferta de compra por YPF.  
Clarín. (1999, 6 June). Repsol anticipa que habrá reducción de personal en YPF. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 7 June). Repsol partiría en tres a YPF. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 13 June[a]). La deuda y las inversiones. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 13 June[b]). Repsol y el ahorro de costos. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 13 June[c]). El BBV vs La Caixa. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 13 June[d]). La guerra del management. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 13 June[e]). YPF no es ni será un monopolio. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 13 June[f]). Los secretos de la conquista de YPF. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 18 June). Repsol debe vender estaciones. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 21 June). Para pagar YPF, Repsol sale a buscar US$ 5 000 millones. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 22 June). Repsol promete ganancias récords, de la mano de YPF. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 23 June). Hoy cierran la venta de YPF. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 24 June[a]). El ajuste llega a la petrolera. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 24 June[b]). Repsol tiene el control de YPF. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 24 June[c]). El Senado dio media sanción al proyecto de ley antimonopolio. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 25 June[a]). Negociaciones en España. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 25 June[b]). Finalmente Repsol se quedó con el 98,2% de las acciones de YPF. Clarín.  
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Clarín. (1999, 29 June). Repsol terminó de pagar a todos los accionistas de YPF. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 30 June). La plata de YPF se va de la Bolsa. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 1 July). A Techint le habría encantado comprar YPF. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 2 July). Designan nueva cúpula en la YPF española. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 4 July). YPF: los nuevos dueños preguntan por la recesión. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 8 July). Repsol suma el nombre YPF para crecer en el mundo. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 14 July). Repsol pide precisiones políticas. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 13 August). El ente regulador denunció a YPF por sobreprecios en el gas. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 2 September[a]). Repsol pidió cotizar en la Bolsa. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 2 September[b]). Nacionales y extranjeras. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 2 September[c]). El 40% de las ventas está concentrado en 500 empresas. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 29 September). Repsol-YPF se achica en el gas. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 13 October). Repsol comprará acciones de Astra. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 15 October[a]). El próximo gobierno pondría dos directores en la cúpula de YPF. 
Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 15 October[b]). Cien días. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 5 November). YPF y Petrobrás se acercan. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 23 November). Repsol en la Bolsa porteña. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 24 November[a]). Desembarcó en la Bolsa la primera empresa extranjera. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 24 November[b]). Aumentos. Clarín.  
Clarín. (1999, 1 December). Repsol, en la Bolsa. Clarín.  
La Nación. (1998, 27 October). El Gobierno venderá otro 15% de YPF. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1998, 28 October). Sigue en carrera la venta en bloque de las acciones de YPF. La 
Nación. 
La Nación. (1998, 30 October). Objetan la venta en bloque de las acciones de YPF. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1998, 5 November). Medidas para evitar prácticas monopólicas. La Nación.  
La Nación. (1998, 15 November[a]). El extraño caso de YPF. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1998, 15 November[b]). Tiempo de definiciones. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1998, 20 November). Legisladores se oponen a la venta de las acciones de YPF. La 
Nación. 
La Nación. (1998, 22 November). YPF, el negocio que no cierra. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1998, 24 November[a]). Pagaron 550 millones por el 5,1% de YPF. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1998, 24 November[b]). La venta de las acciones de YPF. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1998, 25 November). Condicionan la venta de las acciones de YPF. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1998, 26 November). Venta en bloque de las acciones. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1998, 27 November). YPF: el Gobierno invitó a 15 petroleras. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1998, 29 November). El fin de la maniobra. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1998, 4 December). YPF volvió a rechazar el cambio de su estatuto. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1998, 10 December). Sólo seis petroleras tras YPF. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 6 January). YPF se venderá a US $ 38 por acción. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 7 January). YPF dará la llave del sector a una multinacional. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 19 January). BP y Repsol, en la recta final por YPF. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 21 January[a]). Repsol pagó lo que el Gobierno esperaba. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 21 January[b]). Repsol logró una pieza estratégica en la región. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 22 January). Repsol busca un acuerdo para quedarse con YPF. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 27 January). Repsol busca una integración con YPF. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 1 February). Repsol en YPF. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 3 February). Repsol va por todo YPF. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 4 February). Rumores sobre Repsol. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 17 February). Repsol, YPF y el dilema del prisionero. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 3 March). El directorio de YPF se une contra el avance de Repsol. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 19 March). Perez Companc vendió el 80% de sus acciones en YPF. La Nación. 
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La Nación. (1999, 25 March). Repsol confía en su alianza con YPF. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 27 April). YPF espera a Repsol. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 28 April). Compás de espera para YPF y Repsol. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 30 April). Repsol hizo una oferta hostil por el 85% de YPF. La Nación.  
La Nación. (1999, 2 May[a]). Repsol planea para YPF una fusión con Astra. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 2 May[b]). El mercado dará el sí. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 2 May[c]). Bolsa politizada. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 3 May[a]). Auguran otra alza bursátil. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 3 May[b]). Lamentos en el Parlamento. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 4 May[a]). Una puja política frena la respuesta a Repsol. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 4 May[b]). La venta sería un aval al Gobierno. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 4 May[c]). La española Repsol se juega a todo o nada. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 4 May[d]). Un empresario que apuesta a llevar la firma hacia la cima. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 4 May[e]). Los fondos se utilizarán para cancelar deuda. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 4 May[f]). El efecto riqueza, una ayuda para las AFJP. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 4 May[g]). Siguió la euforia que desató Repsol. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 5 May[a]). Monti admitió que es una buena oferta. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 5 May[b]). No cambió el humor de los mercados. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 5 May[c]). La Bolsa moderó su tendencia alcista. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 6 May[a]). El Merval se mueve al ritmo de YPF. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 6 May[b]). Repsol sigue siendo el único candidato. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 6 May[c]). La compra de YPF por Repsol. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 7 May). Repsol trajo al centro de la escena la ley antimonopolio. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 8 May). Repsol se asegura YPF. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 9 May[a]). A la Bolsa todavía le dura el efecto Repsol. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 9 May[b]). La Argentina extranjera. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 10 May). Preocupa el gas, tras la venta de YPF. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 11 May). YPF aceptó la oferta de Repsol. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 12 May[a]). Preocupa el dominio de Repsol en gas licuado. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 12 May[b]). La verdadera historia de la venta de YPF. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 14 May). Repsol dice que no busca el monopolio. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 19 May[a]). La venta de YPF encendió el debate por los monopolios. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 19 May[b]). Cartas de lectores – Repsol/YPF. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 24 May). Repsol recibe desde hoy las ofertas de los accionistas de YPF. La 
Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 25 May). En la compra de YPF también participan pequeños inversores. La 
Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 30 May). El futuro de YPF, la Nación y los consumidores. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 31 May). El Senado busca regular el mercado petrolero. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 12 June). YPF y Repsol compiten en Brasil. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 13 June). Con la venta de YPF, el país va a contramano. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 17 June). En Brasil, YPF se alzó con las principales áreas. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 18 June). Repsol tendrá que vender activos. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 19 June). Repsol aceptó desprenderse de activos. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 20 June[a]). Etapa clave en la ley antimonopolio. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 20 June[b]). Principales puntos. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 22 June). Repsol prevé ganancias millonarias. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 23 June[a]). La española Repsol ya controla YPF. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 23 June[b]). El Merval, a contramano de la región. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 23 June[c]). El Senado limitaría a la petrolera Repsol. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 24 June[a]). Repsol admitió que ya controla YPF. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 24 June[b]). Modificaron la ley antimonopolio. La Nación. 
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La Nación. (1999, 25 June). La compañía más grande del país ya es de los españoles. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 27 June[a]). Repsol, del centralismo a la competencia. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 27 June[b]). Transparencia para los mercados. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 28 June). En YPF se esperan despidos. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 29 June). La venta de YPF quita liquidez a la Bolsa. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 2 July). Cortina y Monti, al frente de YPF. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 8 July). Repsol-YPF es ahora el nombre de la petrolera. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 13 July). Repsol apura la fusión con YPF. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 14 July[a]). Repsol-YPF invertirá en América latina 7000 millones de dólares. La 
Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 14 July[b]). Confianza en el país. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 18 July). Juntos por América latina. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 9 September). Repsol-YPF: primer conflicto gremial. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 10 September). Incidentes durante una huelga petrolera. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 20 September). Repsol acomoda sus fichas. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 25 September). YPF ya jugó sus fichas en el mercado regional. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 29 September). YPF venderá menos gas. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 12 October). YPF adecuó el precio del gas licuado. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 15 October). Con el nuevo gobierno, Repsol se reestructurará. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 26 October). Escenario alentador para hidrocarburos. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 20 November). Repsol-YPF, en la Bolsa local. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 24 November). Repsol dice que no bajará el precio de los combustibles. La 
Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 1 December). La llegada de Repsol-YPF no pudo animar la Bolsa. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 7 December). Apoyo de Repsol al nuevo gobierno. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 28 December). Para ser grandes hay que decirlo. La Nación. 
La Nación. (1999, 30 December). Repsol-YPF quiere crecer en el gas. La Nación. 
 
Spanish subcorpus (Cinco Días & El País) 
Cinco Días. (1998, 29 September). Santander Investment consideraría positiva una eventual 
fusión entre YPF y Repsol. Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1998, 26 October). Repsol supedita su entrada en YPF a una alianza con la petrolera 
argentina. Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1998, 25 November). La última joya de Menem. Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1998, 26 November). YPF mantiene la obligación de OPA para quien compre más del 
14,9%. Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1998, 7 December). Repsol diseña su oferta por el 14,9% de YPF aunque no se revisen 
sus estatutos. Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1998, 11 December[a]). La oposición quiere parar en los tribunales la venta de YPF. 
Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1998, 11 December[b]). Repsol, Amoco, Enron y el ENI formalizan su interés por YPF. 
Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1999, 12 January). Repsol y BP-Amoco, favoritos en la puja por YPF. Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1999, 13 January). BP-Amoco podría retirarse de la puja por la argentina YPF. Cinco 
Días. 
Cinco Días. (1999, 20 January). El 46% de cuota del mercado petrolífero. Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1999, 22 January[a]). Repsol inicia negociaciones para salvar la hostilidad de la 
dirección de YPF. Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1999, 22 January[b]). Bailar al son de los precios del petróleo. Cinco Días. 
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Cinco Días. (1999, 26 January). Repsol e YPF crean una comisión para negociar la integración y 
Cortina ingresará en el consejo. Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1999, 1 February). Beta Capital y Norbolsa aconsejan acumular los títulos de Repsol. 
Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1999, 2 February). Repsol +YPF, quinta en reservas de gas. Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1999, 3 February). Repsol anuncia que se reserva el derecho a vender el 14,9% de 
YPF. Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1999, 10 February). Repsol refinancia la compra del 14,99% de YPF. Emite 1.100 
millones de euros al 3,81% y protagoniza la mayor operación de renta fija de una firma 
española. Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1999, 15 February). YPF reduce beneficios un 42,5% en el último trimestre de 1998. 
Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1999, 23 February). Repsol aumenta la emisión de bonos hasta 1.400 millones de 
euros. Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1999, 25 February). Los analistas creen que Repsol puede revalorizarse entre un 
7,0% y un 14,5%. Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1999, 2 March). El consejo de administración de YPF se reunirá hoy en Buenos Aires. 
Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1999, 3 March). El consejo de Endesa y las medidas legales. Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1999, 9 March). Monti aceptaría una fusión YPF-Repsol si creara valor para el 
accionista. Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1999, 11 March). Los bancos de negocios consideran positiva la operación. Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1999, 19 March). Repsol e YPF, condenados a entenderse. Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1999, 25 March). YPF y el salto al 'club de los diez'. Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1999, 3 May[a]). Repsol da el paso. Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1999, 3 May[b]). La deuda quedará en 15.000 millones de dólares, con unos activos 
de 31.000 millones. Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1999, 3 May[c]). La Bolsa argentina recibe la oferta con euforia. Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1999, 3 May[d]). La oposición se lamenta. Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1999, 4 May[a]). Cortina no asistirá al consejo de YPF hasta que decida su posición 
sobre la OPA de Repsol. Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1999, 4 May[b]). Aguas abajo, pero con resultados hacia arriba. Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1999, 4 May[c]). Repsol logra la mayor subida de su historia (+9,5%) por la OPA a 
YPF. Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1999, 5 May). Críticas a la posición en el mercado. Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1999, 6 May). Monti reconoce que la oferta de Repsol por YPF no se puede mejorar y 
afirma que no entorpecerá la operación. Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1999, 10 May). Brasil y Chile, con hambre de gas. Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1999, 11 May). El consejo de YPF vuelve a examinar la OPA de Repsol. Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1999, 12 May). Eliminación de horas extras y 700 contrataciones indefinidas. Cinco 
Días. 
Cinco Días. (1999, 17 May). Alfonso Cortina y Javier Carrillo, premios Aster de Esic. Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1999, 19 May). El recorte de la deuda financiera, objetivo de las ofertas. Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1999, 20 May[a]). Repsol bate el récord del euromercado con una emisión de 3.250 
millones de euros. Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1999, 20 May[b]). Una ampliación que equivale casi a una OPV. Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1999, 21 May). El Congreso de Argentina aprueba una ley antimonopolio que quiere 
aplicar a Repsol. Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1999, 26 May). Los accionistas de YPF esperan al cobro del dividendo para acudir a la 
OPA de Repsol. Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1999, 28 May). JP Morgan ve a Repsol en línea con el mercado. Cinco Días. 
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Cinco Días. (1999, 4 June). El Senado argentino estudia la ley que puede afectar a Repsol. Cinco 
Días. 
Cinco Días. (1999, 7 June[a]). Tratamiento preferente a los accionistas. Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1999, 7 June[b]). La prioridad en el prorrateo será proporcional a las acciones en 
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Días. 
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Cinco Días. (1999, 22 June). Repsol prevé beneficios superiores a los 300.000 millones en el 2000, 
tras la integración de YPF 
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la petrolera argentina. Cinco Días. 
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Cinco Días. (1999, 28 June). Red Eléctrica: la OPV 6,7 veces suscrita. Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1999, 5 July). Warburg Dillon recomienda fuerte compra de Repsol, con un precio 
objetivo de 24 e. Cinco Días. 
Cinco Días. (1999, 7 July). La capitalización de Repsol y su peso en el Ibex se elevan un 32% con la 
operación. Cinco Días. 
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compra de YPF. Cinco Días. 
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Días. 
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Días. 
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Argentina y Brasil. Cinco Días. 
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La marea me dejó arenas de plata, 
que pondré en el reloj del tiempo que no pasa. 
La marea me dejó islas inundadas, 
donde atrapar con mi red una historia de piratas. 
 
La marea me dejó aromas de un barco, 
algas tejidas en forma de desengaño. 
La marea me dejó unas conchas sin nombre, 
con que el niño hace un collar de un alfabeto  
que no entiende el hombre. 
 
La marea me dejó cangrejos helados, 
agujas de hielo y un libro en blanco. 
La marea me dejó los versos borrados, 
la tinta, un borrón, un papel mojado. 
 
(Vetusta Morla – La marea) 
